GLOBAL EDITION

Psychological Testing

History, Principles, and Applications

SEVENTH EDITION

Robert J. Gregory



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Seventh Edition

Psychological Testing

History, Principles, and Applications

Global Edition

Robert J. Gregory
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PREFACE

Psychological testing began as a timid enterprise in the scholarly laboratories of nineteenth-century European psychologists. From this inauspicious birth, the practice of testing proliferated throughout the industrialized world at an ever accelerating pace. As the reader will discover within the pages of this book, psychological testing now impacts virtually every corner of modern life, from education to vocation to remediation.

PURPOSE OF THE BOOK

The seventh edition of this book is based on the same assumptions as earlier versions. Its ambitious purpose is to provide the reader with knowledge about the characteristics, objectives, and wide-ranging effects of the consequential enterprise, psychological testing. In pursuit of this goal, I have incorporated certain well-worn traditions but proceeded into some new directions as well. For example, in the category of customary traditions, the book embraces the usual topics of norms, standardization, reliability, validity, and test construction. Furthermore, in the standard manner, I have assembled and critiqued a diverse compendium of tests and measures in such traditional areas as intellectual, achievement, industrial-organizational, vocational, and personality testing.

Special Features

In addition to the traditional topics previously listed, I have emphasized certain issues, themes, and concepts that are, in my opinion, essential for an in-depth understanding of psychological testing. For example, the second chapter of the book examines Origins of Psychological Testing. The placement of this chapter underscores my view that Origins of Psychological Testing is of substantial relevance to present-day practices. Put simply, a mature comprehension of modern testing can be obtained only by delving into its heritage. Of course, students of psychology typically shun historical matters because these topics are often presented in a dull, dry, and pedantic manner, devoid of relevance to the present. However, I hope the skeptical reader will approach my history chapter with an open mind—I have worked hard to make it interesting and relevant.

Psychological testing represents a contract between two persons. One person—the examiner—usually occupies a position of power over the other person—the examinee. For this reason, the examiner needs to approach testing with utmost sensitivity to the needs and rights of the examinee. To emphasize this crucial point, I have devoted the first topic to the subtleties of the testing process, including such issues as establishing rapport and watching for untoward environmental influences upon test results. The second topic in the book also emphasizes the contractual nature of assessment by reviewing professional issues and ethical standards in testing.

Another topic emphasized in this book is neuropsychological assessment, a burgeoning subfield of clinical psychology that is now a well-established specialty in its own right. Neuropsychological assessment is definitely a growth area and now constitutes one of the major contemporary applications of psychological testing. I have devoted an entire chapter to this important subject. So that the reader can better appreciate the scope and purpose of neuropsychological assessment, I begin the chapter with a succinct review of neurological principles before discussing specific instruments. Tangentially, this review introduces important concepts in neuropsychological assessment such as the relationship between localized brain dysfunction and specific behavioral symptoms. Nonetheless, readers who need to skip the section on neurological underpinnings of behavior may do so with minimal loss—the section on neuropsychological tests and procedures is comprehensible in its own right.

This edition continues to feature a chapter on Evaluation of Normality and Individual Strengths. This includes a lengthy topic on positive psychological assessment, such as the testing of creativity, emotional intelligence, optimism, gratitude, and humor. I hope this concentration on life-affirming concepts

will provide some balance to the field of assessment which, for too long, has emphasized pathology.

New to this edition is an extended topic on assessment for career development in a global economy. This topic surveys major theories that guide career-based assessment and also provides an introduction to valuable assessment tools. I felt that increased coverage of career issues was desirable, in light of the increasing fluidity of the modern global economy. Further, even though the Great Recession of 2007–2009 is technically over, uncertainty in the world of work remains for many, especially for those newly entering the job market. An understanding of the potential role of career assessment in helping individuals traverse the new terrain of work and vocation is now more vital than ever before.

This is more than a book about tests and their reliabilities and validities. I also explore numerous value-laden issues bearing on the wisdom of testing. Psychological tests are controversial precisely because the consequences of testing can be harmful, certainly to individuals and perhaps to the entire social fabric as well. I have not ducked the controversies surrounding the use of psychological tests. Separate topics explore genetic and environmental contributions to intelligence, origins of race differences in IQ, test bias and extravalidity concerns, cheating on group achievement tests, courtroom testimony, and ethical issues in psychological testing.

Note on Case Exhibits

This edition continues the use of case histories and brief vignettes that feature testing concepts and illustrate the occasionally abusive application of psychological tests. These examples are "boxed" and referred to as Case Exhibits. Most are based on my personal experience rather than scholarly undertakings. All of these case histories are real. The episodes in question really happened—I know because I have direct knowledge of the veracity of each anecdote. These points bear emphasis because the reader will likely find some of the vignettes to be utterly fantastical and almost beyond belief. Of course, to guarantee the privacy of persons and institutions, I have altered certain unessential details while maintaining the basic thrust of the original events.

CHANGES FROM THE SIXTH EDITION

In this revision, my goals were threefold. First, I wanted to add the latest findings about established tests. For this purpose, I have made use of about 300 new scholarly references, and "retired" an almost equal number of outdated citations. Second, I wanted to incorporate worthwhile topics overlooked in previous editions. A prominent example in this category is assessment for career development, which receives extended coverage in the book. And, third, I sought to include coverage of innovations and advances in testing. One example of this is inclusion of the Rorschach Performance Assessment System, a new and promising approach to this established test. I was also aware that several tests have been revised since the last edition went to press, including the CAS-II, WMS-IV, WIAT-III, to name just a few. For these instruments, I have described the newest editions and included relevant research.

More specifically, the improvement and enhancements in the current edition include the following:

1. In Chapter 1 on Implementation and Attributes of Psychological Testing, new empirical research on the role of examiner errors in producing distorted test scores is included. New evidence of widespread cheating in high stakes testing (school system achievement testing, national certification exams) also is presented.
2. Recent developments in evidence-based practice and outcomes assessment have been added to Chapter 2, Origins of Psychological Testing. New material on the history of personality testing is also included.
3. In Chapter 5, coverage of the PASS theory (Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, Successive) has been expanded in Topic 5A: Theories of Intelligence and Factor Analysis. In Topic 5B: Individual Tests of Intelligence and Achievement, a major test featuring PASS theory, the Cognitive Assessment System-II (Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2012) is highlighted.
4. A number of new and fascinating findings have been added to Topic 6B: Test bias and Other

Controversies. The question of whether statistical tests of bias are themselves biased is first raised.

5. New research on the impact of Head Start, the fate of children with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders, and the nature of cognitive decline in advance age, has been added to Topic 6B.
6. Also in Topic 6B, a new Case Exhibit demonstrating the impact of cultural background on the test results has been added.
7. In the Chapter 7, Assessing Special Populations, new material includes coverage of the Devereaux Early Childhood Assessment—Clinical Form (DECA-C), and a review of scales for the screening of Autism Spectrum Disorders. The complex issue of screening for school readiness also is included.
8. In Chapter 8, Foundations of Personality Testing, the Rorschach Performance Assessment System (R-PAS), a new scoring system for the inkblot test, is reviewed. The well-known State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is incorporated as well. New material on the value of ecological momentary assessment also is included.
9. A new topic on stability and change in personality has been added to Chapter 9, Evaluation of Normality and Individual Strengths. A new instrument featured in longitudinal research, the Big Five Inventory (BFI), is featured in this topic.
10. The coverage of spiritual and religious assessment also has been significantly increased in Chapter 9, including a review of the ASPIRES scale (Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments scale, Piedmont, 2010), a recent and promising measure of spiritual and religious variables. Likewise, the review of creativity assessment has been expanded in this chapter.
11. In Chapter 10, Neuropsychological Testing, the last research on mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) is presented, and the controversies surrounding baseline testing of neurocognitive functioning in soldiers and athletes are reviewed. The recently revised Wechsler Memory Scale-IV (WMS-IV) is presented as well.
12. Chapter 11, Industrial, Occupational, and Career Assessment, has undergone the most substantial revisions in the book, especially in the new Topic 11B: Assessment for Career Development in the Global Economy. In this section, I review theories of career development, and present assessment approaches often useful in the new global economy.

Of course, minor but essential changes have been made throughout the entire book to capture the latest developments in testing. For example, I have searched the literature to include the most recent studies bearing on the validity of well-established instruments.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

Topical Organization

To accommodate the widest possible audience, I have incorporated an outline that partitions the gargantuan field of psychological testing—its history, principles, and applications—into 22 small, manageable, modular topics. I worked hard to organize the 22 topics into natural pairings. Thus, the reader will notice that the book is also organized as an ordered series of 11 chapters of 2 topics each. The chapter format helps identify pairs of topics that are more or less contiguous and also reduces the need for redundant preambles to each topic.

The most fundamental and indivisible unit of the book is the topic. Each topic stands on its own. In each topic, the reader encounters a manageable number of concepts and reviews a modest number of tests. To the student, the advantage of topical organization is that the individual topics are small enough to read at a single sitting. To the instructor, the advantage of topical organization is that subjects deemed of lesser importance can be easily excised from the reading list. Naturally, I would prefer that every student read every topic, but I am a realist too. Often, a foreshortened textbook is necessary for practical reasons such as the length of the school term. In those instances, the instructor will find it easy to fashion a subset of topics to meet the curricular needs of almost any course in psychological testing.

The 11 chapters break down into five broad areas, as follows:

Nature, History, and Consequences of Testing

Chapter 1: Implementation and Attributes of Psychological Testing

Topic 1A: The Nature and Uses of Psychological Testing

Topic 1B: Ethical and Social Implications of Testing

Chapter 2: Origins of Psychological Testing

Topic 2A: The Origins of Psychological Testing

Topic 2B: Testing from the Early 1900s to Present

Foundations of Testing

Chapter 3: Norms and Reliability

Topic 3A: Norms and Test Standardization

Topic 3B: Concepts of Reliability

Chapter 4: Validity and Test Construction

Topic 4A: Basic Concepts of Validity

Topic 4B: Test Construction

Ability Testing and Controversies

Chapter 5: Intelligence and Achievement: Theories and Tests

Topic 5A: Theories of Intelligence and Factor Analysis

Topic 5B: Individual Tests of Intelligence and Achievement

Chapter 6: Ability Testing: Group Tests and Controversies

Topic 6A: Group Tests of Ability and Related Concepts

Topic 6B: Test Bias and Other Controversies

Chapter 7: Assessing Special Populations

Topic 7A: Infant and Preschool Assessment

Topic 7B: Testing Persons with Disabilities

Assessment of Personality and Related Constructs

Chapter 8: Foundations of Personality Testing

Topic 8A: Theories of Personality and Projective Techniques

Topic 8B: Self-Report and Behavioral Assessment of Psychopathology

Chapter 9: Evaluation of Normality and Individual Strengths

Topic 9A: Assessment within the Normal Spectrum

Topic 9B: Positive Psychological Assessment

Specialized Applications

Chapter 10: Neuropsychological Testing

Topic 10A: Neurobiological Concepts and Behavioral Assessment

Topic 10B: Neuropsychological Tests, Batteries, and Screening Tools

Chapter 11: Industrial, Occupational, and Career Assessment

Topic 11A: Industrial and Organizational Assessment

Topic 11B: Assessment for Career Development in a Global Economy

The book also features an extensive glossary and a table for converting percentile ranks to standard and standardized-score equivalents. In addition, an important feature is Appendix A, Major Landmarks in the History of Psychological Testing. To meet personal needs, readers and course instructors will pick and choose from these topics as they please.

Supplements

Pearson Education is pleased to offer the following supplements to qualified adopters.

Instructor's Manual and Test Bank The instructor's manual is a wonderful tool for classroom preparation and management. Corresponding to the topics from the text, each of the manual's 22 topics contains classroom discussion questions, extramural assignments, classroom demonstrations, and essay questions. In addition, the test bank portion provides instructors with more than 1,000 readymade multiple choice questions.

PowerPoint Presentation The PowerPoint Presentation is an exciting interactive tool for use in the classroom. Each chapter pairs key concepts with images from the textbook to reinforce student learning.

This text is available in a digital format as well. To learn more about our programs, pricing options, and customization, visit www.pearsonglobaleditions.com/Gregory.

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CHAPTER 1

Implementation and Attributes of Psychological Testing

TOPIC 1A The Nature and Uses of Psychological Testing

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If you ask average citizens "What do you know about psychological tests?" they might mention something about intelligence tests, inkblots, and true-false inventories such as the widely familiar MMPI. Most likely, their understanding of tests will focus on quantifying intelligence and detecting personality problems, as this is the common view of how tests are used in our society. Certainly, there is more than a grain of truth to this common view: Measures of personality and intelligence are still the essential mainstays of psychological testing. However, modern test developers have produced many other kinds of tests for diverse and imaginative purposes that even the early pioneers of testing could not have anticipated. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the varied applications of psychological testing and also to review the ethical and social consequences of this enterprise.

The chapter begins with a panoramic survey of psychological tests and their often surprising applications. In Topic 1A, The Nature and Uses of Psychological Testing, we summarize the different types and varied applications of modern tests. We also introduce the reader to a host of factors that can influence the soundness of testing such as adherence to

standardized procedures, establishment of rapport, and the motivation of the examinee to deceive. In Topic 1B, Ethical and Social Implications of Testing, we further develop the theme that testing is a consequential endeavor. In this topic, we survey professional guidelines that impact testing and review the influence of cultural background on test results.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF TESTING

From birth to old age, we encounter tests at almost every turning point in life. The baby's first test conducted immediately after birth is the Apgar test, a quick, multivariate assessment of heart rate, respiration, muscle tone, reflex irritability, and color. The total Apgar score (0 to 10) helps determine the need for any immediate medical attention. Later, a toddler who previously received a low Apgar score might be a candidate for developmental disability assessment. The preschool child may take school-readiness tests. Once a school career begins, each student endures hundreds, perhaps thousands, of academic tests before graduation—not to mention possible tests for learning disability, giftedness, vocational interest, and college admission. After graduation, adults may face tests for job entry, driver's license, security clearance, personality function, marital compatibility, developmental disability, brain dysfunction—the list is nearly endless. Some persons even encounter one final indignity in the frailness of their later years: a test to determine their competency to manage financial affairs.

Tests are used in almost every nation on earth for counseling, selection, and placement. Testing occurs in settings as diverse as schools, civil service, industry, medical clinics, and counseling centers. Most persons have taken dozens of tests and thought nothing of it. Yet, by the time the typical individual reaches retirement age, it is likely that psychological test results will have helped to shape his or her destiny. The deflection of the life course by psychological test results might be subtle, such as when a prospective mathematician qualifies for an accelerated calculus course based on tenth-grade achievement scores. More commonly, psychological test results alter individual destiny in profound ways. Whether a person is admitted to one college and not another, offered one job but refused a second, diagnosed as depressed or not—all such determinations rest, at least in part, on the meaning of test results as interpreted by persons in authority. Put simply, psychological test results change lives. For this reason it is prudent—indeed, almost mandatory—that students of psychology learn about the contemporary uses and occasional abuses of testing. In Case Exhibit 1.1, the life-altering aftermath of psychological testing is illustrated by means of several true case history examples.

CASE EXHIBIT 1.1

True-Life Vignettes of Testing

The influence of psychological testing is best illustrated by example. Consider these brief vignettes:

- A shy, withdrawn 7-year-old girl is administered an IQ test by a school psychologist. Her score is phenomenally higher than the teacher expected. The student is admitted to a gifted and talented program where she blossoms into a self-confident and gregarious scholar.
- Three children in a family living near a lead smelter are exposed to the toxic effects of lead dust and suffer neurological damage. Based in part on psychological test results that demonstrate impaired intelligence and shortened attention span in the children, the family receives an $8 million settlement from the company that owns the smelter.
- A candidate for a position as police officer is administered a personality inventory as part of the selection process. The test indicates that the candidate tends to act before thinking and resists supervision from authority figures. Even though he has excellent training and impresses the interviewers, the candidate does not receive a job offer.
- A student, unsure of what career to pursue, takes a vocational interest inventory. The test indicates that she would like the work of a pharmacist. She signs up for a prepharmacy curriculum but finds the classes to be both difficult and boring. After three years, she abandons pharmacy for a major in dance,

frustrated that she still faces three more years of college to earn a degree.

These cases demonstrate that test results impact individual lives and the collective social fabric in powerful and far-reaching ways. In the first story about the hidden talent of a 7-year-old girl, cognitive test results changed her life trajectory for the better. In the second case involving the tragic saga of children exposed to lead poisoning, the test data helped redress a social injustice. In the third situation—the impulsive candidate for police officer—personality test results likely served the public interest by tipping the balance against a questionable applicant. But test results do not always provide a positive conclusion. In the last case mentioned above, a young student wasted time and money following the seemingly flawed guidance of a well-known vocational inventory.

The idea of a test is thus a pervasive element of our culture, a feature we take for granted. However, the layperson's notion of a test does not necessarily coincide with the more restrictive view held by psychometricians. A **psychometrician** is a specialist in psychology or education who develops and evaluates psychological tests. Because of widespread misunderstandings about the nature of tests, it is fitting that we begin this topic with a fundamental question, one that defines the scope of the entire book: What is a test?

DEFINITION OF A TEST

A **test** is a standardized procedure for sampling behavior and describing it with categories or scores. In addition, most tests have norms or standards by which the results can be used to predict other, more important behaviors. We elaborate these characteristics in the sections that follow, but first it is instructive to portray the scope of the definition. Included in this view are traditional tests such as personality questionnaires and intelligence tests, but the definition also subsumes diverse procedures that the reader might not recognize as tests. For example, all of the following could be tests according to the definition used in this book: a checklist for rating the social skills of a youth with mental retardation; a nontimed measure of mastery in adding pairs of three-digit numbers; microcomputer appraisals of reaction time; and even situational tests such as observing an individual working on a group task with two "helpers" who are obstructive and uncooperative.

In sum, tests are enormously varied in their formats and applications. Nonetheless, most tests possess these defining features:

- Standardized procedure
- Behavior sample
- Scores or categories
- Norms or standards
- Prediction of nontest behavior

In the sections that follow, we examine each of these characteristics in more detail. The portrait that we draw pertains especially to norm-referenced tests—tests that use a well-defined population of persons for their interpretive framework. However, the defining characteristics of a test differ slightly for the special case of criterion-referenced tests—tests that measure what a person can do rather than comparing results to the performance levels of others. For this reason, we provide a separate discussion of criterion-referenced tests.

Standardized procedure is an essential feature of any psychological test. A test is considered to be *standardized* if the procedures for administering it are uniform from one examiner and setting to another. Of course, standardization depends to some extent on the competence of the examiner. Even the best test can be rendered useless by a careless, poorly trained, or ill-informed tester, as the reader will discover later in this topic. However, most examiners are competent. Standardization, therefore, rests largely on the directions for administration found in the instructional manual that typically accompanies a test.

The formulation of directions is an essential step in the standardization of a test. In order to guarantee uniform administration procedures, the test developer must provide comparable stimulus materials to all testers, specify with considerable precision the oral instructions for each item or subtest, and advise the examiner how to handle a wide range of queries from the examinee.

To illustrate these points, consider the number of different ways a test developer might approach the assessment of *digit span*—the maximum number of orally presented digits a subject can recall from memory. An unstandardized test of digit span might merely suggest that the examiner orally present increasingly long series of numbers until the subject fails. The number of digits in the longest series recalled would then be the subject's digit span. Most readers can discern that such a loosely defined test will lack uniformity from one examiner to another. If the tester is free to improvise any series of digits, what is to prevent him or her from presenting, with the familiar inflection of a television announcer, "1-800-325-3535"? Such a series would be far easier to recall than a more random set, such as, "7-2-8-1-9-4-6-3-7-4-2." The speed of presentation would also crucially affect the uniformity of a digit span test. For purposes of standardization, it is essential that every examiner present each series at a constant rate, for example, one digit per second. Finally, the examiner needs to know how to react to unexpected responses such as a subject asking, "Could you repeat that again?" For obvious reasons, the usual advice is "No."

A psychological test is also a limited sample of behavior. Neither the subject nor the examiner has sufficient time for truly comprehensive testing, even when the test is targeted to a well-defined and finite behavior domain. Thus, practical constraints dictate that a test is only a sample of behavior. Yet, the sample of behavior is of interest only insofar as it permits the examiner to make inferences about the total domain of relevant behaviors. For example, the purpose of a vocabulary test is to determine the examinee's entire word stock by requesting definitions of a very small but carefully selected sample of words. Whether the subject can define the particular 35 words from a vocabulary subtest (e.g., on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV, or the WAIS-IV) is of little direct consequence. But the indirect meaning of such results is of great import because it signals the examinee's general knowledge of vocabulary.

An interesting point—and one little understood by the lay public—is that the test items need not resemble the behaviors that the test is attempting to predict. The essential characteristic of a good test is that it permits the examiner to predict other behaviors—not that it mirrors the to-be-predicted behaviors. If answering "true" to the question "I drink a lot of water" happens to help predict depression, then this seemingly unrelated question is a useful index of depression. Thus, the reader will note that successful prediction is an empirical question answered by appropriate research. While most tests do sample directly from the domain of behaviors they hope to predict, this is not a psychometric requirement.

A psychological test must also permit the derivation of scores or categories. Thorndike (1918) expressed the essential axiom of testing in his famous assertion, "Whatever exists at all exists in some amount." McCall (1939) went a step further, declaring, "Anything that exists in amount can be measured." Testing strives to be a form of measurement akin to procedures in the physical sciences whereby numbers represent abstract dimensions such as weight or temperature. Every test furnishes one or more scores or provides evidence that a person belongs to one category and not another. In short, psychological testing sums up performance in numbers or classifications.

The implicit assumption of the psychometric viewpoint is that tests measure individual differences in traits or characteristics that exist in some vague sense of the word. In most cases, all people are assumed to possess the trait or characteristic being measured, albeit in different amounts. The purpose of the testing is to estimate the amount of the trait or quality possessed by an individual.

In this context, two cautions are worth mentioning. First, every test score will always reflect some degree of measurement error. The imprecision of testing is simply unavoidable: Tests must rely on an external sample of behavior to estimate an unobservable and, therefore, inferred characteristic. Psychometricians often express this fundamental point with an equation:

$$X = T + e$$

where X is the observed score, T is the true score, and e is a positive or negative error component.

The best that a test developer can do is make *e* very small. It can never be completely eliminated, nor can its exact impact be known in the individual case. We discuss the concept of measurement error in Topic 3B, Concepts of Reliability.

The second caution is that test consumers must be wary of reifying the characteristic being measured. Test results do not represent a *thing* with physical reality. Typically, they portray an abstraction that has been shown to be useful in predicting nontest behaviors. For example, in discussing a person's IQ, psychologists are referring to an abstraction that has no direct, material existence but that is, nonetheless, useful in predicting school achievement and other outcomes.

A psychological test must also possess norms or standards. An examinee's test score is usually interpreted by comparing it with the scores obtained by others on the same test. For this purpose, test developers typically provide **norms**—a summary of test results for a large and representative group of subjects (Petersen, Kolen, & Hoover, 1989). The norm group is referred to as the standardization sample.

The selection and testing of the **standardization sample** is crucial to the usefulness of a test. This group must be representative of the population for whom the test is intended or else it is not possible to determine an examinee's relative standing. In the extreme case when norms are not provided, the examiner can make no use of the test results at all. An exception to this point occurs in the case of criterion-referenced tests, discussed later.

Norms not only establish an average performance but also serve to indicate the frequency with which different high and low scores are obtained. Thus, norms allow the tester to determine the degree to which a score deviates from expectations. Such information can be very important in predicting the nontest behavior of the examinee. Norms are of such overriding importance in test interpretation that we consider them at length in a separate section later in this text.

Finally, tests are not ends in themselves. In general, the ultimate purpose of a test is to predict additional behaviors, other than those directly sampled by the test. Thus, the tester may have more interest in the nontest behaviors predicted by the test than in the test responses per se. Perhaps a concrete example will clarify this point. Suppose an examiner administers an inkblot test to a patient in a psychiatric hospital. Assume that the patient responds to one inkblot by describing it as "eyes peering out." Based on established norms, the examiner might then predict that the subject will be highly suspicious and a poor risk for individual psychotherapy. The purpose of the testing is to arrive at this and similar predictions—not to determine whether the subject perceives eyes staring out from the blots.

The ability of a test to predict nontest behavior is determined by an extensive body of validational research, most of which is conducted after the test is released. But there are no guarantees in the world of psychometric research. It is not unusual for a test developer to publish a promising test, only to read years later that other researchers find it deficient. There is a lesson here for test consumers: The fact that a test exists and purports to measure a certain characteristic is no guarantee of truth in advertising. A test may have a fancy title, precise instructions, elaborate norms, attractive packaging, and preliminary findings—but if in the dispassionate study of independent researchers the test fails to predict appropriate nontest behaviors, then it is useless.

FURTHER DISTINCTIONS IN TESTING

The chief features of a test previously outlined apply especially to norm-referenced tests, which constitute the vast majority of tests in use. In a **norm-referenced test**, the performance of each examinee is interpreted in reference to a relevant standardization sample (Petersen, Kolen, & Hoover, 1989). However, these features are less relevant in the special case of criterion-referenced tests, since these instruments suspend the need for comparing the individual examinee with a reference group. In a **criterion-referenced test**, the objective is to determine where the examinee stands with respect to very tightly defined educational objectives (Berk, 1984). For example, one part of an arithmetic test for 10-year-olds might measure the accuracy level in adding pairs of two-digit numbers. In an untimed test of 20 such problems, accuracy should be nearly perfect. For this kind of test, it really does not matter

how the individual examinee compares to others of the same age. What matters is whether the examinee meets an appropriate, specified criterion—for example, 95 percent accuracy. Because there is no comparison to the normative performance of others, this kind of measurement tool is aptly designated a criterion-referenced test. The important distinction here is that, unlike norm-referenced tests, criterion-referenced tests can be meaningfully interpreted without reference to norms. We discuss criterion-referenced tests in more detail in Topic 3A, Norms and Test Standardization.

Another important distinction is between testing and assessment, which are often considered equivalent. However, they do not mean exactly the same thing. *Assessment* is a more comprehensive term, referring to the entire process of compiling information about a person and using it to make inferences about characteristics and to predict behavior. **Assessment** can be defined as appraising or estimating the magnitude of one or more attributes in a person. The assessment of human characteristics involves observations, interviews, checklists, inventories, projectives, and other psychological tests. In sum, tests represent only one source of information used in the assessment process. In assessment, the examiner must compare and combine data from different sources. This is an inherently subjective process that requires the examiner to sort out conflicting information and make predictions based on a complex gestalt of data.

The term *assessment* was invented during World War II (WWII) to describe a program to select men for secret service assignment in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS Assessment Staff, 1948). The OSS staff of psychologists and psychiatrists amassed a colossal amount of information on candidates during four grueling days of written tests, interviews, and personality tests. In addition, the assessment process included a variety of real-life situational tests based on the realization that there was a difference between know-how and can-do:

> We made the candidates actually attempt the tasks with their muscles or spoken words, rather than merely indicate on paper how the tasks could be done. We were prompted to introduce realistic tests of ability by such findings as this: that men who earn a high score in Mechanical Comprehension, a paper-and-pencil test, may be below average when it comes to solving mechanical problems with their hands. (OSS Assessment Staff, 1948, pp. 41–42)

The situational tests included group tasks of transporting equipment across a raging brook and scaling a 10-foot-high wall, as well as individual scrutiny of the ability to survive a realistic interrogation and to command two uncooperative subordinates in a construction task.

On the basis of the behavioral observations and test results, the OSS staff rated the candidates on dozens of specific traits in such broad categories as leadership, social relations, emotional stability, effective intelligence, and physical ability. These ratings served as the basis for selecting OSS personnel.

TYPES OF TESTS

Tests can be broadly grouped into two camps: group tests versus individual tests. **Group tests** are largely pencil-and-paper measures suitable to the testing of large groups of persons at the same time. **Individual tests** are instruments that by their design and purpose must be administered one on one. An important advantage of individual tests is that the examiner can gauge the level of motivation of the subject and assess the relevance of other factors (e.g., impulsiveness or anxiety) on the test results.

For convenience, we will sort tests into the eight categories depicted in Table 1.1. Each of the categories contains norm-referenced, criterion-referenced, individual, and group tests. The reader will note that any typology of tests is a purely arbitrary determination. For example, we could argue for yet another dichotomy: tests that seek to measure maximum performance (e.g., an intelligence test) versus tests that seek to gauge a typical response (e.g., a personality inventory).

In a narrow sense, there are hundreds—perhaps thousands—of different kinds of tests, each measuring

TABLE 1.1 The Main Types of Psychological Tests

Intelligence Tests: Measure an individual's ability in relatively global areas such as verbal comprehension, perceptual organization, or reasoning and thereby help determine potential for scholastic work or certain occupations.
Aptitude Tests: Measure the capability for a relatively specific task or type of skill; aptitude tests are, in effect, a narrow form of ability testing.
Achievement Tests: Measure a person's degree of learning, success, or accomplishment in a subject or task.
Creativity Tests: Assess novel, original thinking and the capacity to find unusual or unexpected solutions, especially for vaguely defined problems.
Personality Tests: Measure the traits, qualities, or behaviors that determine a person's individuality; such tests include checklists, inventories, and projective techniques.
Interest Inventories: Measure an individual's preference for certain activities or topics and thereby help determine occupational choice.
Behavioral Procedures: Objectively describe and count the frequency of a behavior, identifying the antecedents and consequences of the behavior.
Neuropsychological Tests: Measure cognitive, sensory, perceptual, and motor performance to determine the extent, locus, and behavioral consequences of brain damage.

a slightly different aspect of the individual. For example, even two tests of intelligence might be arguably different types of measures. One test might reveal the assumption that intelligence is a biological construct best measured through brain waves, whereas another might be rooted in the traditional view that intelligence is exhibited in the capacity to learn acculturated skills such as vocabulary. Lumping both measures under the category of *intelligence tests* is certainly an oversimplification, but nonetheless a useful starting point.

Intelligence tests were originally designed to sample a broad assortment of skills in order to estimate the individual's general intellectual level. The Binet-Simon scales were successful, in part, because they incorporated heterogeneous tasks, including word definitions, memory for designs, comprehension questions, and spatial visualization tasks. The group intelligence tests that blossomed with such profusion during and after WWII also tested diverse abilities—witness the Army Alpha with its eight different sections measuring practical judgment, information, arithmetic, and reasoning, among other skills.

Modern intelligence tests also emulate this historically established pattern by sampling a wide variety of proficiencies deemed important in our culture. In general, the term *intelligence test* refers to a test that yields an overall summary score based on results from a heterogeneous sample of items. Of course, such a test might also provide a profile of subtest scores as well, but it is the overall score that generally attracts the most attention.

Aptitude tests measure one or more clearly defined and relatively homogeneous segments of ability. Such tests come in two varieties: single aptitude tests and multiple aptitude test batteries. A single aptitude test appraises, obviously, only one ability, whereas a multiple aptitude test battery provides a profile of scores for a number of aptitudes.

Aptitude tests are often used to predict success in an occupation, training course, or educational endeavor. For example, the Seashore Measures of Musical Talents (Seashore, 1938), a series of tests covering pitch, loudness, rhythm, time, timbre, and tonal memory, can be used to identify children with potential talent in music. Specialized aptitude tests also exist for the assessment of clerical skills, mechanical abilities, manual dexterity, and artistic ability.

The most common use of aptitude tests is to determine college admissions. Most every college student is familiar with the SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test, previously called the Scholastic Aptitude Test) of the College Entrance Examination Board. This test contains a Verbal section stressing

word knowledge and reading comprehension; a Mathematics section stressing algebra, geometry, and insightful reasoning; and a Writing section. In effect, colleges that require certain minimum scores on the SAT for admission are using the test to predict academic success.

Achievement tests measure a person's degree of learning, success, or accomplishment in a subject matter. The implicit assumption of most achievement tests is that the schools have taught the subject matter directly. The purpose of the test is then to determine how much of the material the subject has absorbed or mastered. Achievement tests commonly have several subtests, such as reading, mathematics, language, science, and social studies.

The distinction between aptitude and achievement tests is more a matter of use than content (Gregory, 1994a). In fact, any test can be an aptitude test to the extent that it helps predict future performance. Likewise, any test can be an achievement test insofar as it reflects how much the subject has learned. In practice, then, the distinction between these two kinds of instruments is determined by their respective uses. On occasion, one instrument may serve both purposes, acting as an aptitude test to forecast future performance and an achievement test to monitor past learning.

Creativity tests assess a subject's ability to produce new ideas, insights, or artistic creations that are accepted as being of social, aesthetic, or scientific value. Thus, measures of **creativity** emphasize novelty and originality in the solution of fuzzy problems or the production of artistic works. A creative response to one problem is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Tests of creativity have a checkered history. In the 1960s, they were touted as a useful alternative to intelligence tests and used widely in U.S. school systems. Educators were especially impressed that creativity tests required divergent thinking—putting forth a variety of answers to a complex or fuzzy problem—as opposed to convergent thinking—finding the single correct solution to a well-defined problem. For example, a creativity test might ask the examinee to imagine all the things that would happen if clouds had strings trailing from them down to the ground. Students who could come up with a large number of consequences were assumed to be more creative than their less-imaginative colleagues. However, some psychometricians are skeptical, concluding that creativity is just another label for applied intelligence.



FIGURE 1.1 Solutions to the Nine-Dot Problem as Examples of Creativity

Note: Without lifting the pencil, draw through all the dots with as few straight lines as possible. The usual solution is shown in *a.* Creative solutions are depicted in *b* and *c.*

Personality tests measure the traits, qualities, or behaviors that determine a person's individuality; this information helps predict future behavior. These tests come in several different varieties, including checklists, inventories, and projective techniques such as sentence completions and inkblots (Table 1.2).

Interest inventories measure an individual's preference for certain activities or topics and thereby help determine occupational choice. These tests are based on the explicit assumption that interest patterns determine and, therefore, also predict job satisfaction. For example, if the examinee has the same interests as successful and satisfied accountants, it is thought likely that he or she would enjoy the work of an accountant. The assumption that interest patterns predict job satisfaction is

TABLE 1.2 Examples of Personality Test Items

(a) An Adjective Checklist

Check those words which describe you:

( ) relaxed	( ) assertive
( ) thoughtful	( ) curious
( ) cheerful	( ) even-tempered
( ) impatient	( ) skeptical
( ) morose	( ) impulsive
( ) optimistic	( ) anxious

(b) A True-False Inventory

Circle true or false as each statement applies to you:

T F I like sports magazines.
T F Most people would lie to get a job.
T F I like big parties where there is lots of noisy fun.
T F Strange thoughts possess me for hours at a time.
T F I often regret the missed opportunities in my life.
T F Sometimes I feel anxious for no reason at all.
T F I like everyone I have met.
T F Falling asleep is seldom a problem for me.

(c) A Sentence Completion Projective Test

Complete each sentence with the first thought that comes to you:

I feel bored when
What I need most is
I like people who
My mother was

largely borne out by empirical studies, as we will review in a later chapter.

Many kinds of **behavioral procedures** are available for assessing the antecedents and consequences of behavior, including checklists, rating scales, interviews, and structured observations. These methods share a common assumption that behavior is best understood in terms of clearly defined characteristics such as frequency, duration, antecedents, and consequences. Behavioral procedures tend to be highly pragmatic in that they are usually interwoven with treatment approaches.

Neuropsychological tests are used in the assessment of persons with known or suspected brain dysfunction. *Neuropsychology* is the study of brain–behavior relationships. Over the years, neuropsychologists have discovered that certain tests and procedures are highly sensitive to the effects of brain damage. Neuropsychologists use these specialized tests and procedures to make inferences about the locus, extent, and consequences of brain damage. A full neuropsychological assessment typically requires three to eight hours of one-on-one testing with an extensive battery of measures. Examiners must undergo comprehensive advanced training in order to make sense out of the resulting mass of test data.

USES OF TESTING

By far the most common use of psychological tests is to make decisions about persons. For example, educational institutions frequently use tests to determine placement levels for students, and universities ascertain who should be admitted, in part, on the basis of test scores. State, federal, and local civil service systems also rely heavily on tests for purposes of personnel selection.

Even the individual practitioner exploits tests, in the main, for decision making. Examples include the consulting psychologist who uses a personality test to determine that a police department hire one candidate and not another, and the neuropsychologist who employs tests to conclude that a client has suffered brain damage.

But simple decision making is not the only function of psychological testing. It is convenient to distinguish five uses of tests:

- Classification
- Diagnosis and treatment planning
- Self-knowledge
- Program evaluation
- Research

These applications frequently overlap and, on occasion, are difficult to distinguish one from another. For example, a test that helps determine a psychiatric diagnosis might also provide a form of self-knowledge. Let us examine these applications in more detail.

The term **classification** encompasses a variety of procedures that share a common purpose: assigning a person to one category rather than another. Of course, the assignment to categories is not an

end in itself but the basis for differential treatment of some kind. Thus, classification can have important effects such as granting or restricting access to a specific college or determining whether a person is hired for a particular job. There are many variant forms of classification, each emphasizing a particular purpose in assigning persons to categories. We will distinguish placement, screening, certification, and selection.

Placement is the sorting of persons into different programs appropriate to their needs or skills. For example, universities often use a mathematics placement exam to determine whether students should enroll in calculus, algebra, or remedial courses.

Screening refers to quick and simple tests or procedures to identify persons who might have special characteristics or needs. Ordinarily, psychometricians acknowledge that screening tests will result in many misclassifications. Examiners are, therefore, advised to do follow-up testing with additional instruments before making important decisions on the basis of screening tests. For example, to identify children with highly exceptional talent in spatial thinking, a psychologist might administer a 10-minute paper-and-pencil test to every child in a school system. Students who scored in the top 10 percent might then be singled out for more comprehensive testing.

Certification and selection both have a pass/fail quality. Passing a certification exam confers privileges. Examples include the right to practice psychology or to drive a car. Thus, certification typically implies that a person has at least a minimum proficiency in some discipline or activity. Selection is similar to certification in that it confers privileges such as the opportunity to attend a university or to gain employment.

Another use of psychological tests is for diagnosis and treatment planning. **Diagnosis** consists of two intertwined tasks: determining the nature and source of a person's abnormal behavior, and classifying the behavior pattern within an accepted diagnostic system. Diagnosis is usually a precursor to remediation or treatment of personal distress or impaired performance.

Psychological tests often play an important role in diagnosis and treatment planning. For example, intelligence tests are absolutely essential in the diagnosis of mental retardation. Personality tests are helpful in diagnosing the nature and extent of emotional disturbance. In fact, some tests such as the MMPI were devised for the explicit purpose of increasing the efficiency of psychiatric diagnosis.

Diagnosis should be more than mere classification, more than the assignment of a label. A proper diagnosis conveys information—about strengths, weaknesses, etiology, and best choices for remediation/treatment. Knowing that a child has received a diagnosis of **learning disability** is largely useless. But knowing in addition that the same child is well below average in reading comprehension, is highly distractible, and needs help with basic phonics can provide an indispensable basis for treatment planning.

Psychological tests also can supply a potent source of self-knowledge. In some cases, the feedback a person receives from psychological tests can change a career path or otherwise alter a person's life course. Of course, not every instance of psychological testing provides self-knowledge. Perhaps in the majority of cases the client already knows what the test results divulge. A high-functioning college student is seldom surprised to find that his IQ is in the superior range. An architect is not perplexed to hear that she has excellent spatial reasoning skills. A student with meager reading capacity is usually not startled to receive a diagnosis of "learning disability."

Another use for psychological tests is the systematic evaluation of educational and social programs. We have more to say about the evaluation of educational programs when we discuss achievement tests in a later chapter. We focus here on the use of tests in the evaluation of social programs. Social programs are designed to provide services that improve social conditions and community life. For example, Project Head Start is a federally funded program that supports nationwide pre-school teaching projects for underprivileged children (McKey and others, 1985). Launched in 1965 as a precedent-setting attempt to provide child development programs to low-income families, Head Start has provided educational enrichment and health services to millions of at-risk preschool children.

But exactly what impact does the multi-billion-dollar Head Start program have on early childhood

development? Congress wanted to know if the program improved scholastic performance and reduced school failure among the enrollees. But the centers vary by sponsoring agencies, staff characteristics, coverage, content, and objectives, so the effects of Head Start are not easy to ascertain. Psychological tests provide an objective basis for answering these questions that is far superior to anecdotal or impressionistic reporting. In general, Head Start children show immediate gains in IQ, school readiness, and academic achievement, but these gains dissipate in the ensuing years (Figure 1.2).

So far we have discussed the practical application of psychological tests to everyday problems such as job selection, diagnosis, or program evaluation. In each of these instances, testing serves an immediate, pragmatic purpose: helping the tester make decisions about persons or programs. But tests also play a major role in both the applied and theoretical branches of behavioral research. As an example of testing in applied research, consider the problem faced by neuropsychologists who wish to investigate the hypothesis that low-level lead absorption causes behavioral deficits in children. The only feasible way to explore this supposition is by testing normal and lead-burdened children with a battery of psychological tests. Needleman and associates (1979) used an array of traditional and innovative tests to conclude that low-level lead absorption causes decrements in IQ, impairments in reaction time, and escalations of undesirable classroom behaviors. Their conclusions inspired a tumultuous and bitter exchange of opinions that we will not review here (Needleman et al., 1990). However, the passions inspired by this study epitomize an instructive point: Academicians and public policymakers respect psychological tests. Why else would they engage in lengthy, acrimonious debates about the validity of testing-based research findings?



FIGURE 1.2 Longitudinal Test Results from the Head Start Project *Source:* From McKey, R. H., and others. (1985). *The impact of Head Start on children, families and communities.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. In the public domain.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SOUNDNESS OF TESTING

Psychological testing is a dynamic process influenced by many factors. Although examiners strive to ensure that test results accurately reflect the traits or capacities being assessed, many extraneous factors can sway the outcome of psychological testing. In this section, we review the potentially crucial impact of several sources of influence: the manner of administration, the characteristics of the tester, the context of the testing, the motivation and experience of the examinee, and the method of scoring.

The sensitivity of the testing process to extraneous influences is obvious in cases where the examiner is cold, hurried, or incompetent. However, invalid test results do not originate only from obvious sources such as blatantly nonstandard administration, hostile tester, noisy testing room, or fearful examinee. In addition, there are numerous, subtle ways in which method, examiner, context, or motivation can alter test results. We provide a comprehensive survey of these extraneous influences in the remainder of this topic.

STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES IN TEST ADMINISTRATION

The interpretation of a psychological test is most reliable when the measurements are obtained under the standardized conditions outlined in the publisher's test manual. Nonstandard testing procedures can alter the meaning of the test results, rendering them invalid and, therefore, misleading. Standardized procedures are so important that they are listed as an essential criterion for valid testing in the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (1999),

a reference manual published jointly by the American Psychological Association and other groups:

> In typical applications, test administrators should follow carefully the standardized procedures for administration and scoring specified by the test publisher. Specifications regarding instructions to test takers, time limits, the form of item presentation or response, and test materials or equipment should be strictly observed. Exceptions should be made only on the basis of carefully considered professional judgment, primarily in clinical applications. (AERA, APA, NCME, 1999)

Suppose the instructions to the vocabulary section of a children's intelligence test specify that the examiner should ask, "What does *sofa* mean, what is a sofa?" If a subject were to reply, "I've never heard that word," an inexperienced tester might be tempted to respond, "You know, a couch—what is a couch?" This may strike the reader as a harmless form of fair play, a simple rephrasing of the original question. Yet, by straying from standardized procedures, the examiner has really given a different test. The point in asking for a definition of *sofa* (and not *couch*) is precisely that *sofa* is harder to define and, therefore, a better index of high-level vocabulary skills.

Even though standardized testing procedures are normally essential, there are instances in which flexibility in procedures is desirable or even necessary. As suggested in the APA *Standards*, such deviations should be reasoned and deliberate. An analogy to the spirit of the law versus the letter of the law is relevant here. An overly zealous examiner might capture the letter of the law, so to speak, by adhering literally and strictly to testing procedures outlined in the publisher's manual. But is this really what most test publishers intend? Is it even how the test was actually administered to the normative sample? Most likely publishers would prefer that examiners capture the spirit of the law even if, on occasion, it is necessary to adjust testing procedures slightly.

The need to adjust standardized procedures for testing is especially apparent when examining persons with certain kinds of disabilities. A subject with a speech impediment might be allowed to write down the answers to orally presented questions or to use gesture and pantomime in response to some items. For example, a test question might ask, "What shape is a ball?" The question is designed to probe the subject's knowledge of common shapes, not to examine whether the examinee can verbalize "round." The written response *round* and the gestured response (a circular motion of the index finger) are equally correct, too.

Minor adjustments in procedures that heed the spirit in which a test was developed occur on a regular basis and are no cause for alarm. These minor adjustments do not invalidate the established norms—on the contrary, the appropriate adaptation of procedures is necessary so that the norms remain valid. After all, the testers who collected data from the standardization sample did not act like heartless robots when posing questions to subjects. Examiners who wish to obtain valid results must likewise exercise a reasoned flexibility in testing procedures.

However, considerable clinical experience is needed to determine whether an adjustment in procedure is minor or so substantial that existing norms no longer apply. This is why psychological examiners normally receive extensive supervised experience before they are allowed to administer and interpret individual tests of ability or personality.

In certain cases an examiner will knowingly depart from standard procedures to a substantial degree; this practice precludes the use of available test norms. In these instances, the test is used to help formulate clinical judgments rather than to determine a quantitative index. For example, when examining aphasic patients, it may be desirable to ignore time limits entirely and accept roundabout answers. The examiner might not even calculate a score. In these rare cases, the test becomes, in effect, an adjunct to the clinical interview. Of course, when the examiner does not adhere to standardized procedures, this should be stated explicitly in the written report.

DESIRABLE PROCEDURES OF TEST ADMINISTRATION

A small treatise could be written on desirable procedures of test administration, but we will have to settle for a brief listing of the most essential points.

For more details, the interested reader can consult Sattler (2001) on the individual testing of children and Clemans (1971) on group testing. We discuss individual testing first, then briefly list some important points about desirable procedures in group testing.

An essential component of individual testing is that examiners must be intimately familiar with the materials and directions before administration begins. Largely this involves extensive rehearsal and anticipation of unusual circumstances and the appropriate response. A well-prepared examiner has memorized key elements of verbal instructions and is ready to handle the unexpected.

The uninitiated student of assessment often assumes that examination procedures are so simple and straightforward that a quick once-through reading of the manual will suffice as preparation for testing. Although some individual tests are exceedingly rudimentary and uncomplicated, many of them have complexities of administration that, unheeded, can cause the examinee to fail items unnecessarily. For example, Choi and Proctor (1994) found that 25 of 27 graduate students made serious errors in the administration of the Stanford-Binet: Fourth Edition, even though the sessions were videotaped and the students knew their testing skills were being evaluated. Ramos, Alfonso, and Schermerhorn (2009) reviewed 108 protocols from the Woodcock Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities administered by 36 first-year graduate students in a school psychology doctoral program. The researchers found an average of almost 5 errors per test, including the use of incorrect ceilings, failure to record errors, and failure to encircle the correct row for the total number correct. Loe, Kadlubek, and Williams (2007) reviewed 51 WISC-IV protocols administered by graduate students and found an average of almost 26 errors per protocol. The two most common errors were the failure to query incomplete or ambiguous verbal responses, and granting too many points for substandard answers. In many cases, these errors materially affected the Full Scale IQ, shifting it upward or downward from the likely true score. What these studies confirm is that appropriate attention to the details of administration and scoring is essential for valid results.

The necessity for intimate familiarity with testing procedures is well illustrated by the Block Design subtest of the WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008). The materials for the subtest include nine blocks (cubes) colored red on two sides, white on two sides, and red/white on two sides. The examinee's task is to use the blocks to construct patterns depicted on cards. For the initial designs, four blocks are needed, while for more difficult designs, all nine blocks are provided (Figure 1.3).



FIGURE 1.3 Materials Similar to WAIS-IV Block Design Subtest

Bright examinees have no difficulty comprehending this task and the exact instructions do not influence their performance appreciably. However, persons whose intelligence is average or below average need the elaborate demonstrations and corrections that are specified in the WAIS-IV manual (Wechsler, 2008). In particular, the examiner demonstrates the first two designs and responds to the examinee's success or failure on these according to a complex flow of reaction and counterreaction, as outlined in *three pages* of instructions. Woe to the tester who has not rehearsed this subtest and anticipated the proper response to examinees who falter on the first two designs.

Sensitivity to Disabilities

Another important ingredient of valid test administration is sensitivity to disabilities in the examinee. Impairments in hearing, vision, speech, or motor control may seriously distort test results. If the examiner does not recognize the physical disability responsible for the poor test performance,

a subject may be branded as intellectually or emotionally impaired when, in fact, the essential problem is a sensory or motor disability.

Vernon and Brown (1964) reported the tragic case of a young girl who was relegated to a hospital for the mentally retarded as a consequence of the tester's insensitivity to physical disability. The examiner failed to notice that the child was deaf and concluded that her Stanford-Binet IQ of 29 was valid. She remained in the hospital for five years, but was released after she scored an IQ of 113 on a performance-based intelligence test! After dismissal from the hospital, she entered a school for the deaf and made good progress.

Persons with disabilities may require specialized tests for valid assessment. The reader will encounter a lengthy discussion of available tests for exceptional examinees in Chapter 7, Assessing Special Populations. In this section, we concentrate on the vexing issues raised when standardized tests for normal populations are used with mildly or moderately disabled subjects. We include separate discussions of the testing process for examinees with a hearing, vision, speech, or motor control problem. However, the reader needs to know that many exceptional examinees have multiple disabilities.

Valid testing of a subject with a hearing impairment requires first of all that the examiner detect the existence of the disability! This is often more difficult than it seems. Many persons with mild hearing loss learn to compensate for this disability by pretending to understand what others say and waiting for further conversational cues to help clarify faintly perceived words or phrases. As a result, other persons—including psychologists—may not perceive that an individual with mild hearing loss has any disability at all.

Failure to notice a hearing loss is particularly a problem with young examinees, who are usually poor informants about their disabilities. Young children are also prone to fluctuating hearing losses due to the periodic accumulation of fluid in the middle ear during intervals of mild illness (Vernon & Alles, 1986). A child with a fluctuating hearing loss may have normal hearing in the morning, but perceive conversational speech as a whisper just a few hours later.

Indications of possible hearing difficulty include lack of normal response to sound, inattentiveness, difficulty in following oral instructions, intent observation of the speaker's lips, and poor articulation (Sattler, 1988). In all cases in which hearing impairment is suspected, referral for an audiological examination is crucial. If a serious hearing problem is confirmed, then the examiner should consider using one of the specialized tests discussed in Chapter 7, Assessing Special Populations. In persons with a mild hearing loss, it is essential for the examiner to face the subject squarely, speak loudly, and repeat instructions slowly. It is also important to find a quiet room for testing. Ideally, a testing room will have curtains and textured wall surfaces to minimize the distracting effects of background noises.

In contrast to those with hearing loss, subjects with visual disabilities generally attend well to verbally presented test materials. The examinee with visual impairment introduces a different kind of challenge to the examiner: detecting that a visual impairment exists, and then ensuring that the subject can see the test materials well.

Detecting visual impairment is a straightforward matter with adult subjects—in most cases, a mature examinee will freely volunteer information about visual impairment, especially if asked. However, children are poor informants about their visual capacities, so testers need to know the signs and symptoms of possible visual impairment in a young examinee. Common sense is a good starting point: Children who squint, blink excessively, or lose their place when reading may have a vision problem. Holding books or testing materials up close is another suspicious sign. Blurred or double vision may signify visual problems, as may headaches or nausea after reading. In general, it is so common for children to require corrective lenses that examiners should be on the lookout for a vision problem in any young subject who does not wear glasses and has not had a recent vision exam.

Depending on the degree of visual impairment, examiners need to make corresponding adjustments in testing. If the child's vision is of no practical use, special instruments with appropriate norms must be used. For example, the Perkins-Binet is available for testing children who are blind. These

tests are discussed in Topic 7B, Testing Persons with Disabilities. For obvious reasons, only the verbal portions of tests should be administered to sighted children with an uncorrected visual problem.

Speech impairments present another problem for diagnosticians. The verbal responses of subjects with speech impairment are difficult to decipher. Owing to the failed comprehension of the examiner, subjects may receive less credit than is due. Sattler (1988) relates the lamentable case of Daniel Hoffman, a youngster with speech impairment who spent his entire youth in classes for those with mental retardation because his Stanford-Binet IQ was 74. In actuality, his intelligence was within the normal range, as revealed by other performance-based tests. In another tragic miscarriage of assessment, a patient in England was mistakenly confined to a ward for those with severe retardation because cerebral palsy rendered his speech incomprehensible. The patient was wheelchair-bound and had almost no motor control, so his performance on nonverbal tests was also grossly impaired. The staff assumed he was severely retarded, so the patient remained on the back ward for decades. However, he befriended a fellow resident who could comprehend the patient's gutteral rendition of the alphabet. The friend was severely retarded but could nonetheless recognize keys on a typewriter. With laborious letter-by-letter effort, the patient with incapacitating cerebral palsy wrote and published an autobiography, using his friend with mental disability as a conduit to the real world.

Even if their disability is mild, persons with cerebral palsy or other motor impairments may be penalized by timed performance tests. When testing a person with a mild motor disability, examiners may wish to omit timed performance subtests or to discount these results if they are consistently lower than scores from untimed subtests. If a subject has an obvious motor disability—such as a difficulty in manipulating the pieces of a puzzle—then standard instruments administered in the normal manner are largely inappropriate. A number of alternative instruments have been developed expressly for examinees with cerebral palsy and other motor impairments, and standard tests have been cleverly adapted and renormed (Topic 7B, Testing Persons with Disabilities).

Desirable Procedures of Group Testing

Psychologists and educators commonly assume that almost any adult can accurately administer group tests, so long as he or she has the requisite manual. Administering a group test would appear to be a simple and straightforward procedure of passing out forms and pencils, reading instructions, keeping time, and collecting the materials.

In reality, conducting a group test requires as much finesse as administering an individual test, a point recognized years ago by Traxler (1951). There are numerous ways in which careless administration and scoring can impair group test results, causing bias for the entire group or affecting only certain individuals. We outline only the more important inadequacies and errors in the following paragraphs, referring the reader to Traxler (1951) and Clemans (1971) for a more complete discussion.

Undoubtedly the greatest single source of error in group test administration is incorrect timing of tests that require a time limit. Examiners must allot sufficient time for the entire testing process: setup, reading instructions out loud, and the actual test taking by examinees. Allotting sufficient time requires foresightful scheduling. For example, in many school settings, children must proceed to the next class at a designated time, regardless of ongoing activities. Inexperienced examiners might be tempted to cut short the designated time limit for a test so that the school schedule can be maintained. Of course, reduced time on a test renders the norms completely invalid and likely lowers the score for most subjects in the group.

Allowing too much time for a test can be an equally egregious error. For example, consider the impact of receiving extra time on the Miller Analogies Test (MAT), a high-level reasoning test once required by many universities for graduate school application. Since the MAT is a speeded test that requires quick analogical thinking, extra time would allow most examinees to solve several extra problems. This kind of testing error would likely

lower the validity of the MAT results as a predictor of graduate school performance.

A second source of error in group test administration is lack of clarity in the directions to the examinees. Examiners must read the instructions slowly in a clear, loud voice that commands the attention of the subjects. Instructions must not be paraphrased. Where allowed by the manual, examiners must stop and clarify points with individual examinees who are confused.

Noise is another factor that must be controlled in group testing. It has been known for some time that noise causes a decrease in performance, especially for tasks of high complexity (e.g., Boggs & Simon, 1968). Surprisingly, there is little research on the effects of noise on psychological tests. However, it seems almost certain that loud noise, especially if intermittent and unpredictable, will cause test scores to decline substantially. Elementary schoolchildren should not be expected to perform well while a construction worker jackhammers a cement wall in the next room. In fairness to the examinees, there are times when the test administrator should reschedule the test.

Another source of error in the administration of a group test is failure to explain when and if examinees should guess. Perhaps more frequently than any other question, examiners are asked, "Is there a penalty if I guess wrong?" In most instances, test developers anticipate this issue and provide explicit guidance to subjects as to the advantages and/or pitfalls of guessing. Examiners should not give supplementary advice on guessing—this would constitute a serious deviation from standardized procedure.

Most test developers incorporate a **correction for guessing** based on established principles of probability. Consider a multiple-choice test that has four alternatives per item. On those items that the subject makes a wild, uneducated guess, the odds on being correct are 1 out of 4, while the odds on being wrong are 3 out of 4. Thus, for every three wrong guesses, there will be one correct guess that reflects luck rather than knowledge. Suppose a young girl answers correctly on 35 questions from a 50-item test but answers erroneously on 9 questions. In all, she has answered 44 questions, leaving 6 blank. The fact that she selected the wrong alternative on 9 questions suggests that she also gained 3 correct answers due to luck rather than knowledge. Remember, on wild guesses we expect there to be, on average, 3 wrong answers for every correct answer, so for 9 wrong guesses we would expect 3 correct guesses on other questions. The subject's corrected score—the one actually reported and compared to existing norms—would then be 32; that is, 35 minus 3. In other words, she probably knew 32 answers but by guessing on 12 others she boosted her score another 3 points.

The scoring correction outlined in the preceding paragraph pertains only to wild, uneducated guesses. The effect of such a correction is to eliminate the advantage otherwise bestowed on unabashed risk takers. However, not all guesses are wild and uneducated. In some instances, an examinee can eliminate one or two of the alternatives, thereby increasing the odds of a correct guess among the remaining choices. In this situation, it may be wise for the examinee to guess.

Whether an educated guess is really to the advantage of the examinee depends partly on the diabolical skill of the item writer. Traxler (1951) notes:

> In effect, the item writer attempts to make each wrong response so plausible that every examinee who does not possess the desired skill or ability will select a wrong response. In other words, the item writer's aim is to make all or nearly all considered guesses wrong guesses.

A skilled item writer can fashion questions so that the correct alternative is completely counterintuitive and the wrong alternatives are persuasively appealing. For these items, an educated guess is almost always wrong.

Nonetheless, many test developers now advise subjects to make educated guesses but warn against wild guesses. For example, a recent edition of the test preparation manual *Taking the SAT* advises:

> Because of the way the test is scored, haphazard or random guessing for questions you know nothing about is unlikely to change

your score. When you know that one or more choices can be eliminated, guessing from among the remaining choices should be to your advantage.

Whether or not a group test uses a scoring correction, the important point to emphasize in this context is that the administrator should follow standardized procedure and never offer supplementary advice about guessing. In group testing, deviations from the instructions manual are simply unacceptable.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMINER

The Importance of Rapport

Test publishers urge examiners to establish **rapport**—a comfortable, warm atmosphere that serves to motivate examinees and elicit cooperation. Initiating a cordial testing milieu is a crucial aspect of valid testing. A tester who fails to establish rapport may cause a subject to react with anxiety, passive-aggressive noncooperation, or open hostility. Failure to establish rapport distorts test findings: Ability is underestimated and personality is misjudged.

Rapport is especially important in individual testing and particularly so when evaluating children. Wechsler (1974) has noted that establishing rapport places great demands on the clinical skills of the tester:

> To put the child at ease in his surroundings, the examiner might engage him in some informal conversation before getting down to the more serious business of giving the test. Talking to him about his hobbies or interests is often a good way of breaking the ice, although it may be better to encourage a shy child to talk about something concrete in the environment—a picture on the wall, an animal in his classroom, or a book or toy (not a test material) in the examining room. In general, this introductory period need not take more than 5 to 10 minutes, although the testing should not start until the child seems relaxed enough to give his maximum effort.

Testers may differ in their abilities to establish rapport. Cold testers will likely obtain less cooperation from their subjects, resulting in reduced performance on ability tests or distorted, defensive results on personality tests. Overly solicitous testers may err in the opposite direction, giving subtle (and occasionally blatant) cues to correct answers. Both extremes should be avoided.

Examiner Sex, Experience, and Race

A wide body of research has sought to determine whether certain characteristics of the examiner cause examinee scores to be raised or lowered on ability tests. For example, does it matter whether the examiner is male or female? Experienced or novice? Same or different race from the examinee? We will contain the urge to review these studies—with a few exceptions—for one simple reason: The results are contradictory and, therefore, inconclusive. Most studies find that sex, experience, and race of the examiner make little, if any, difference. Furthermore, the few studies that report a large effect in one direction (e.g., female examiners elicit higher IQ scores) are contradicted by other studies showing the opposite trend. The interested reader can consult Sattler (1988) for a discussion and extensive listing of references.

Yet, it would be unwise to conclude that sex, experience, or race of the examiner never affect test scores. In isolated instances, a particular examiner characteristic might very well have a large effect on examinee test scores. For example, Terrell, Terrell, and Taylor (1981) ingeniously demonstrated that the race of the examiner interacts potently with the trust level of African American examinees in IQ testing. These researchers identified African American college students with high and low levels of mistrust of whites; half of each group was then administered the WAIS by a white examiner, the other half by an African American examiner. The high-mistrust group with an African American examiner scored significantly higher than the high-mistrust group with a white examiner (average IQs of 96 versus 86, respectively). In addition, the low-mistrust group with a white examiner scored slightly higher than the low-mistrust group with an African American examiner (average IQs of

97 versus 92, respectively). In sum, the authors concluded that mistrustful African Americans do poorly when tested by white examiners. Data bearing on this type of racial effect are meager, and there is certainly room for additional research.

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION OF THE EXAMINEE

Examinees differ not only in the characteristics that examiners desire to assess but also in other extraneous ways that might confound the test results. For example, a bright subject might perform poorly on a speeded ability test because of test anxiety; a sane murderer might seek to appear mentally ill on a personality inventory to avoid prosecution; a student of average ability might undergo coaching to perform better on an aptitude test. Some subjects utterly lack motivation and don't care if they do well on psychological tests. In all of these instances, the test results may be inaccurate because of the filtering and distorting effects of certain examinee characteristics such as anxiety, malingering, coaching, or cultural background.

Test Anxiety

Test anxiety refers to those phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral responses that accompany concern about possible failure on a test. There is no doubt that subjects experience different levels of test anxiety ranging from a carefree outlook to incapacitating dread at the prospect of being tested.

Several true-false questionnaires have been developed to assess individual differences in test anxiety (e.g., Lowe, Lee, Witteborg, & others, 2008; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, & others, 1980; Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). Following, we list characteristic items and their direction of keying (*T* for True, *F* for False):

(T) When taking an important examination, I sweat a great deal.
(T) I freeze up when I take intelligence tests or school exams.
(F) I really don't understand why some people get so upset about tests.
(T) I dread courses in which the instructor likes to give "pop" quizzes.

An extensive body of research has confirmed the commonsense notion that test anxiety is negatively correlated with school achievement, aptitude test scores, and measures of intelligence (e.g., Chapell, Blanding, & Silverstein, 2005; Naveh-Benjamin, McKeachie, & Lin, 1987; Ortner & Caspers, 2011). However, the interpretation of these correlational findings is not straightforward. One possibility is that students develop test anxiety because of a history of performing poorly on tests. That is, the decrements in performance may precede and cause the test anxiety. In support of this viewpoint, Paulman and Kennelly (1984) found that—independent of their anxiety—many test-anxious students also display ineffective test taking in academic settings. Such students would do poorly on tests whether or not they were anxious. Moreover, Naveh-Benjamin et al. (1987) determined that a large proportion of test-anxious college students have poor study habits that predispose them to poor test performance. The test anxiety of these subjects is partly a by-product of lifelong frustration over mediocre test results.

Other lines of research indicate that test anxiety has a directly detrimental effect on test performance. That is, test anxiety is likely both cause and effect in the equation linking it with poor test performance. Consider the seminal study on this topic by Sarason (1961), who tested high- and low-anxious subjects under neutral or anxiety-inducing instructions. The subjects were college students required to memorize two-syllable words low in meaningfulness—a difficult task. Half of the subjects performed under neutral instructions—they were simply told to memorize the lists. The remaining subjects were told to memorize the lists and told that the task was an intelligence test. They were urged to perform as well as possible. The two groups did not differ significantly in performance when the instructions were neutral and nonthreatening. However, when the instructions aroused anxiety, performance levels for the high-anxious subjects dropped markedly, leaving them at a huge disadvantage compared to low-anxious subjects. This indicates that test-anxious subjects show significant decrements in performance when they perceive the situation as a test. In contrast, low-anxious subjects are relatively unaffected by such a simple redefinition of the context.

Tests with narrow time limits pose a special problem to persons with high levels of test anxiety. Time pressure seems to exacerbate the degree of personal threat, causing significant reductions in the performance of test-anxious persons. Siegman (1956) demonstrated this point many years ago by comparing performance levels of high- and low-anxious medical/psychiatric patients on timed and untimed subtests from the WAIS. The WAIS consists of eleven subtests, including six subtests for which the examiner uses a stopwatch to enforce strict time limits, and five subtests for which the subject has unlimited time to respond. Interestingly, the high- and low-anxious subjects were of equal overall ability on the WAIS. However, each group excelled on different kinds of subtests in predictable directions. In particular, the low-anxious subjects surpassed the high-anxious subjects on timed subtests, whereas the reverse pattern was observed on untimed subtests (Figure 1.4).



FIGURE 1.4 Influence of Timing and Anxiety Level on WAIS Subtest Results *Source:* Based on data from Siegman, A. W. (1956). The effect of manifest anxiety on a concept formation task, a nondirected learning task, and on timed and untimed intelligence tests. *Journal of Consulting Psychology, 20,* 176–178.

Motivation to Deceive

Test results also may be inaccurate if the examinee has reasons to perform in an inadequate or unrepresentative manner. Overt faking of test results is rare, but it does happen. A small fraction of persons seeking benefits from rehabilitation or social agencies will consciously fake bad on personality and ability tests. The topic of malingering (faking bad for personal gain) is discussed in a later chapter.

TOPIC 1B Ethical and Social Implications of Testing

The Rationale for Professional Testing Standards
Case Exhibit 1.2 Ethical and Professional Quandaries in Testing
Responsibilities of Test Publishers
Responsibilities of Test Users
Case Exhibit 1.3 Overzealous Interpretation of the MMPI
Testing of Cultural and Linguistic Minorities
Unintended Effects of High-Stakes Testing
Reprise: Responsible Test Use

The general theme of this book is that psychological testing is a beneficial influence in modern society. When used ethically and responsibly, testing provides a basis for arriving at sensible inferences about individuals and groups. After all, the intention of the enterprise is to promote proper guidance, effective treatment, accurate evaluation, and fair decision making—whether in one-on-one clinic testing or institutional group testing. Who could possibly complain about these goals?

Thankfully, tests generally are applied in an ethical and responsible manner by psychologists, educators, administrators, and others. But there are exceptions. Almost everyone has heard the horrific anecdotes: the minority grade schooler casually labeled as having mental retardation on the basis of a single IQ score; the college student implausibly diagnosed as schizophrenic from a projective test; the job applicant wrongfully screened from employment based on an irrelevant measure; the aspiring teacher given unfair advantage when a competency test is mysteriously leaked beforehand; or the minority child penalized in testing because English is not her first language. Exceptions such as these illustrate the need for ethical and professional standards in testing.

A major purpose of this topic is to introduce the reader to the ethical and professional standards that inform the practice of psychological testing. We also pursue the related theme of special considerations in the testing of cultural and linguistic minorities. The two topics share substantial overlap: When an examinee is not from the majority Anglo-American culture (predominantly Caucasian, English-speaking, individualistic, future-oriented), ethical and professional concerns in testing rise to the forefront.

Finally, we examine a troubling and underreported implication of widespread testing, namely, to the extent that society uses test results to make important decisions, the motivation for stakeholders to cheat is intensified. As a result, cheating has emerged as a dark, unintended consequence of high-stakes testing, especially in the school systems of our nation.

THE RATIONALE FOR PROFESSIONAL TESTING STANDARDS

Testing is generally applied in a responsible manner, but as previously noted, there are exceptions. On rare occasions, testing is irresponsible by design rather than by accident. Consider, with shuddering amazement, the advertisement for Mind Prober featured in a pop psychology magazine:

> Read Any Good Minds Lately? With the Mind Prober you can. In just minutes you can have a scientifically accurate personality profile of anyone. This new expert systems software lets you discover the things most people are afraid to tell you. The strengths, weaknesses, sexual interests and more. (Eyde & Primhoff, 1992)

In this case the irresponsibility is so blatant that discussion of ethical and professional guidelines is almost superfluous.

However, testing practices do not always present in sharply contrasting shades, responsible or

irresponsible. The real challenge of competent assessment is to determine the boundaries of ethical and professional practice. As usual, it is the borderline cases that provide pause for thought. The reader is encouraged to read the quandaries of testing described in Case Exhibit 1.2 and form an opinion about each. These examples are based on firsthand reports to the author. At the close of this chapter, we will return to these problematic vignettes.

CASE EXHIBIT 1.2

Ethical and Professional Quandaries in Testing

1. A consulting psychologist agrees to perform preemployment screening for psychopathology in police officer candidates. At the beginning of each consultation, the psychologist asks the candidate to read and sign a detailed consent form that openly and honestly describes the evaluation process. However, the consent form explains that specific feedback about the test results will not be provided to job candidates. Question: Is it ethical for the psychologist to deny such feedback to the candidates?
2. A competent counselor who has received extensive training in the interpretation of the MMPI continues to use this instrument even though it has been superceded by the MMPI-2. His rationale is simply that there is a huge body of research on the MMPI and, he feels secure about the meaning of elevated MMPI test profiles, whereas he knows very little about the MMPI-2. He intends to switch over to the MMPI-2 at some undetermined future date, but finds no compelling reason to do so immediately. Question: Is the counselor's refusal to use the MMPI-2 a breach of professional standards?
3. A consulting psychologist is asked to evaluate a 9-year-old boy of Puerto Rican descent for possible learning disability. The child's primary language is Spanish and his secondary language is English. The psychologist intends to use the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-IV (WISC-IV) and other tests. Because he knows almost no Spanish, the psychologist asks the child's after-school babysitter to act as translator when this is required to communicate test directions, specific questions, or the child's responses. Question: Is it an appropriate practice to use a translator when administering an individual test such as the WISC-IV?
4. In the midst of taking a test battery for learning disability, a distraught 20-year-old female college student confides a terrifying secret to the psychologist. The client has just discovered that her 25-year-old brother, who died three months ago, was most likely a pedophile. She shows the psychologist photographs of naked children posing in the brother's bedroom. To complicate matters, the brother lived with his mother—who is still unaware of his well-concealed sexual deviancy. Question: Is the psychologist obligated to report this case to law enforcement?

The dilemmas of psychological testing do not always have simple, obvious answers. Even thoughtful and experienced psychologists may disagree as to what is ethical or professional in a given instance. Nonetheless, the scope of ethical and professional practice is not a matter of individual taste or personal judgment. Responsible test use is defined by written guidelines published by professional associations such as the American Psychological Association, the American Counseling Association, the National Association of School Psychologists, and other groups. Whether they know it or not, all practitioners owe allegiance to these guidelines, which we review in the following sections.

In general, the evolution of professional and ethical standards has been almost uniformly restrictive, providing an ever-narrowing demarcation of where, when, and how psychological tests may be used. Partly in response to the modern climate of litigation, organizations concerned with psychological testing have published guidelines that collectively define the ethical and professional standards relevant to the practice of assessment.

These standards also pertain to corporations and individuals who publish tests. We begin with a survey of guidelines for test publishers before examining the responsibilities of test users. The chapter closes with a review of special concerns in the testing of cultural and linguistic minorities.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF TEST PUBLISHERS

The responsibilities of publishers pertain to the publication, marketing, and distribution of their tests. In particular, it is expected that publishers will release tests of high quality, market their product in a responsible manner, and restrict distribution of tests only to persons with proper qualifications. We consider each of these points in turn.

Publication and Marketing Issues

Regarding the publication of new or revised instruments, the most important guideline is to guard against premature release of a test. Testing is a noble enterprise but it is also big business driven by the profit motive, which provides an inherent pressure toward early release of new or revised materials. Perhaps this is why the American Psychological Association and other organizations have published standards that relate to test publication (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999). These standards pertain especially to the technical manuals and user guides that typically accompany a test. These sources must be sufficiently complete so that a qualified user or reviewer can evaluate the appropriateness and technical adequacy of the test. This means that manuals and guides will report detailed statistics on reliability analyses, validity studies, normative samples, and other technical aspects.

Marketing tests in a responsible manner refers not only to advertising (which should be accurate and dignified) but also to the way in which information is portrayed in manuals and guides. In particular, test authors should strive for a balanced presentation of their instruments and refrain from a one-sided presentation of information. For example, if some preliminary studies reflect poorly on a test, these should be given fair weight in the manual alongside positive findings. Likewise, if a potential misuse or inappropriate use of a test can be anticipated, the test author needs to discuss this matter as well.

Competence of Test Purchasers

Test publishers recognize the broad responsibility that only qualified users should be able to purchase their products. By way of brief review, the reasons for restricted access include the potential for harm if tests fall into the wrong hands (e.g., an undergraduate psychology major administers the MMPI-2 to his friends and then makes frightful pronouncements about the results) and the obvious fact that many tests are no longer valid if potential examinees have previewed them (e.g., a teacher memorizes the correct answers to a certification exam).

These examples illustrate that access to psychological tests needs to be limited. But limited to whom? The answer, it turns out, depends on the complexity of the specific test under consideration. Guidelines proposed many years ago by the American Psychological Association (APA, 1953) are still relevant today, even though they are not enforced by all publishers. The APA proposed that tests fall into three levels of complexity (Levels A, B, and C) that require different degrees of expertise from the examiner. Level A comprised simple paper-and-pencil tests that require minimal training. These can be used by responsible nonpsychologists such as educational administrators. Examples include group educational tests and vocational proficiency scales. Level B tests require training in statistics and knowledge of test construction. Some graduate training is needed. This group includes aptitude tests and personality inventories relevant to normal populations. Level C includes the most complex instruments. Minimum training required is a master's degree in psychology or a related field. Instruments include projective personality tests, individual tests of intelligence, and neuropsychological test batteries.

In general, test publishers try to screen out inappropriate requests by requiring that purchasers have the necessary credentials. For example, the Psychological Corporation, one of the major suppliers of test materials in the United States, requires prospective customers to fill out a registration form detailing their training and experience with tests. Buyers who do not hold an advanced degree in

psychology must list details of courses in the administration and interpretation of tests and in statistics. References are required, too.

Most test publishers also specify that individuals or groups who provide testing and counseling by mail are not allowed to purchase materials. On a related note, ethical standards now discourage practitioners from giving "take-home" tests to clients. Until recent years, this has been an occasional practice with lengthy personality tests such as the MMPI. The ethics committee endorsed the following point:

> Nonmonitored administration of the MMPI generally does not represent sound testing practice and may result in invalid assessment for a variety of reasons (e.g., influence from other people or completion of the test while intoxicated).

In general, users are advised to refrain from giving take-home tests and publishers are counseled to deny access to practitioners or groups who promote this practice.

Even though publishers attempt to filter out unqualified purchasers, there may still be instances in which sensitive tests are sold to unscrupulous individuals. Oles and Davis (1977) discovered that graduate students in psychology could purchase the WISC-R, MMPI, TAT, Stanford-Binet, and 16PF if they typed their orders on college stationery, placed the letters *Ph.D.* after their names, enclosed payment, and used a post office box return address. Although illicit test orders are few in number, they do occur.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF TEST USERS

The psychological assessment of personality, interests, brain functioning, aptitude, or intelligence is a sensitive professional action that should be completed with utmost concern for the well-being of the examinee, his or her family, employers, and the wider network of social institutions that might be affected by the results of that particular clinical assessment (Matarazzo, 1990). Over the years, the profession of psychology has proposed, clarified, and sharpened a series of thorough and thoughtful standards to provide guidance for the individual practitioner. Professional organizations publish formal ethical principles that bear upon test use, including the American Psychological Association (APA, 2002), the American Association for Counseling and Development (AACD, 1988), the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA, 1991), and the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP, 2010).

In addition to ethical principles, several testing organizations have published practice guidelines to help define the scope of responsible test use. Sources of test use guidelines include teaching groups (AFT, NCME, NEA, 1990), the American Psychological Association (APA, 1992b), the Educational Testing Service (ETS, 1989), the Joint Committee on Testing Practices (JCTP, 1988), the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP, 1987), and professional alliances (AERA, APA, NCME, 1999). Finally, we should mention that the principles of responsible test use have been distilled in an illuminating casebook published jointly by several testing groups (Eyde, Robertson, & Krug, 2009).

The dozens of guidelines relevant to testing are quite specific, for example:

> Standard 5.9: When test score information is released to students, parents, legal representatives, teachers, clients, or the media, those responsible for testing programs should provide appropriate interpretations. The interpretations should describe in simple language what the test covers, what scores mean, the precision of the scores, common misinterpretations of test scores, and how scores will be used.

Because of their specificity, a detailed analysis of relevant ethical and professional standards is beyond the scope of this text. What follows is a summary of the general provisions that pertain to the responsible practice of psychological testing and clinical psychological assessment.

These principles apply to psychologists, students of psychology, and others who work under the supervision of a psychologist. We restrict our discussion to those principles that are directly pertinent to the practice of psychological testing. Proper adherence to these principles would eliminate most—but not all—legal challenges to testing.

Best Interests of the Client

Several ethical principles recognize that all psychological services, including assessment, are provided within the context of a professional relationship. Psychologists are, therefore, enjoined to accept the responsibility implicit in this relationship. In general, the practitioner is guided by one overriding question: What is in the best interests of the client? The functional implication of this guideline is that assessment should serve a constructive purpose for the individual examinee. If it does not, the practitioner is probably violating one or more specific ethical principles. For example, Standard 11.15 in the *Standards* manual (AERA, APA, NCME, 1999) warns testers to avoid actions that have unintended negative consequences. Allowing a client to attach unsupported surplus meanings to test results would not be in the best interests of the client and would, therefore, constitute an unethical testing practice. In fact, with certain worry-prone and self-doubting clients, a psychologist may choose not to use an appropriate test, since these clients are almost certain to engage in self-destructive misinterpretation of virtually any test findings.

Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn

Practitioners have a primary obligation to safeguard the confidentiality of information, including test results, that they obtain from clients in the course of consultations (Principle 5; APA, 1992a). Such information can be ethically released to others only after the client or a legal representative gives unambiguous consent, usually in written form. The only exceptions to confidentiality involve those unusual circumstances in which the withholding of information would present a clear danger to the client or other persons. For example, most states have passed laws that mandate that health care practitioners must report all cases of suspected abuse in children and vulnerable elderly persons. In most states, a psychologist who learns in the course of testing that the client has physically or sexually abused a child is obligated to report that information to law enforcement.

Psychologists also have a **duty to warn** that stems from the 1976 decision in the *Tarasoff* case (Wrightsman, Nietzel, Fortune, & Greene, 2002). Tanya Tarasoff was a young college student in California who was murdered by Prosenjit Poddar, a student from India. What makes the case relevant to the practice of psychology is that Poddar had made death threats regarding Tarasoff to his campus-based therapist. Although the therapist warned the police that Poddar had made death threats, he did not warn Tarasoff. Two months later, Poddar stabbed Tarasoff to death at her home. The parents of Tanya Tarasoff sued, and the California Supreme Court later agreed that therapists have a duty to use "reasonable care" to protect potential victims from their clients. Although the Tarasoff ruling has been modified by legislation in many states, the thrust of the case still stands: Clinicians must communicate any serious threat to the potential victim, law enforcement agencies, or both.

Finally, the clinician should consider the client's welfare in deciding whether to release information, especially when the client is a minor who is unable to give voluntary, informed consent. When appropriate, practitioners are advised to inform their clients of the legal limits of confidentiality.

Expertise of the Test User

A number of principles acknowledge that the test user must accept ultimate responsibility for the proper application of tests. From a practical standpoint, this means that the test user must be well trained in assessment and measurement theory. The user must possess the expertise needed to evaluate psychological tests for proper standardization, reliability, validity, interpretive accuracy, and other psychometric characteristics. This guideline has special significance in areas such as job screening, special education, testing of persons with disabilities, or other situations in which potential impact is strong.

Psychologists who are poorly trained in their chosen instruments can make serious errors of test interpretation that harm examinees. Furthermore, inept test usage may expose the examiner to professional sanctions and civil lawsuits. A common error observed among inexperienced test users is the overzealous, pathologized interpretation of personality test results (Case Exhibit 1.3).

CASE EXHIBIT 1.3

Overzealous Interpretation of the MMPI

An inexperienced consulting psychologist routinely used the MMPI for preemployment screening of law enforcement candidates. One candidate subsequently filed a lawsuit, alleging that she had been harmed by the psychologist's report. The plaintiff, a young woman with extensive training and background in law enforcement, was denied a position as police officer because of a supposedly "defensive" MMPI profile. Her profile was entirely within normal limits, although she did obtain a *T* score of 72 on the K scale. The K scale is usually considered a good index of defensive test-taking attitudes, especially for mental health evaluations with clinic or hospital referrals. By way of quick review, MMPI *T* scores of approximately 50 are average, whereas elevations of 70 or higher are considered noteworthy. The consulting psychologist noticed the candidate's elevated score on the K scale, surmised hastily that the candidate was unduly defensive, and cautioned the police chief not to hire her.

What the psychologist did not know is that elevated K-scale scores are extremely common among law enforcement job applicants. For example, Hiatt and Hargrave (1988) found that about 25 percent of a sample of peace officers produced MMPI profiles with K scales at or above a *T* score of 70. In fact, successful police officers tend to have higher K-scale scores than "problem" peace officers! In this case the test user did not possess sufficient expertise to use the MMPI for job screening. His ignorance on this point constituted a breach of professional ethics. Incidentally, the case was settled out of court for a substantial sum of money, showing that trespasses of responsible test use can have serious legal consequences.

The expertise of the psychologist is particularly relevant when test scoring and interpretation services are used. The Ethical Principles of the American Psychological Association leave no room for doubt:

> Psychologists retain appropriate responsibility for the appropriate application, interpretation, and use of assessment instruments, whether they score and interpret such tests themselves or use automated or other services. (APA, 1992a)

The reader is referred to Topic 12B, Computerized Assessment and the Future of Testing, for further discussion of this point.

Informed Consent

Before testing commences, the test user needs to obtain informed consent from test takers or their legal representatives. Exceptions to informed consent can be made in certain instances, for example, legally mandated statewide testing programs, school-based group testing, and when consent is clearly implied (e.g., college admissions testing). The principle of **informed consent** is so important that the *Standards* manual devotes a separate standard to it:

> Informed consent implies that the test takers or representatives are made aware, in language that they can understand, of the reasons for testing, the type of tests to be used, the intended use and the range of material consequences of the intended use. If written, video, or audio records are made of the testing session, or other records are kept, test takers are entitled to know what testing information will be released and to whom. (AERA et al., 1999)

Even young children or test takers with limited intelligence deserve an explanation of the reasons for assessment. For example, the examiner might explain, "I'm going to ask you some questions and have you work on some puzzles so I can see what you can do and find out what things you need more help with."

From a legal standpoint, the three elements of informed consent include disclosure, competency, and voluntariness (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1998). The heart of disclosure is that the client receive sufficient information (e.g., about risks, benefits, release of reports) to make a thoughtful decision about continued participation in the

INFORMED CONSENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

This is an agreement between [Client's Name] and Dr. [Practitioner's Name], a licensed psychologist in the state of Illinois. You are encouraged to ask questions at any time about my training and background, and about the process of testing.

1. ***General Information:*** The purpose of this assessment is to provide you (and possibly others) with information about your psychological functioning that could prove helpful. The assessment will involve a brief interview and psychological testing. The entire process will take about three to four hours.
2. ***Specific Procedures:*** In addition to interview, the following tests will be administered: [List of tests and brief descriptions], e.g., MMPI-2, a 567-item true-false inventory of psychological functioning. WAIS-IV, a general test of adult intelligence in varied areas.
3. ***Test Report:*** The relevant information from the interview and the test results will be summarized in a written report. The results and the report will be reviewed with you in approximately one week. I will keep a copy of this report in a locked file for at least seven years.
4. ***Confidentiality:*** The report will not be released to any other source unless you sign a formal request. A few (remote) exceptions to the confidentiality guideline include situations of potential harm to self or others, abuse of children or elderly, or a court order to release the test results.
5. ***Cost:*** An hourly rate of $____ is used in determining the total fee. I will bill your insurance company, but you are responsible for the cost. The estimated total cost for your assessment is $____.
6. ***Side Effects:*** While most people find these tests and procedures to be interesting, some people experience anxiety when tested. Yet, it is unlikely that you will experience any long-term adverse effects from this assessment. You are encouraged to talk about the experience as we proceed.
7. ***Refusal of Assessment:*** Most people find the process of psychological assessment to be beneficial. However, you are not required to undergo this assessment. You can withdraw consent and discontinue at any time. On request, I will discuss referral options with you.

_____ _____

Client's Signature Date

FIGURE 1.5 Abbreviated Example of Informed Consent for Psychological Assessment

Note: This form is illustrative only. Practitioners should consult legal counsel in regard to the details of an informed consent form.

testing. Competency refers to the mental capacity of the examinee to provide consent. In general, there is a presumption of competency unless the examinee is a child, very elderly, or has mental disabilities (e.g., has mental retardation). In these cases, a guardian will need to provide legal consent. Finally, the standard of voluntariness implies that the choice to undergo an assessment battery is given freely and not based on subtle coercion (e.g., inmates are promised release time if they participate in research testing). In most cases, the examiner uses a written informed consent form such as that found in Figure 1.5.

Obsolete Tests and the Standard of Care

Standard of care is a loose concept that often arises in the professional or legal review of specific health practices, including psychological testing. The prevailing **standard of care** is one that is "usual, customary or reasonable" (Rinas & Clyne-Jackson, 1988). To cite an extreme example, in medicine the standard of care for a fever might include the administration of aspirin—but would not include the antiquated practice of bleeding the patient.

Practitioners of psychological testing must be wary of obsolete tests, because their use might violate the prevailing standard of care. A case in point is the MMPI versus the MMPI-2. Even though the MMPI-2 is a relatively conservative revision of the highly esteemed MMPI, the improvements in norming and scale construction are substantial. The MMPI-2 is now the standard of care in MMPI-based assessment of psychopathology. Practitioners who continue to rely on the original MMPI could be

liable for malpractice suits, especially if the test interpretation resulted in misleading interpretive statements or an incorrect diagnosis.

Another concern relevant to the standard of care is reliance on test results that are outdated for the current purpose. After all, individual characteristics and traits show valid change over time. A student who meets the criteria for learning disability (LD) in the fourth grade might show large gains in academic achievement, such that the LD diagnosis is no longer accurate in the fifth grade. Personality test results are especially prone to quixotic change. A short-term personal crisis might cause an MMPI-2 profile to look like a range of mountains. A week later, the test profile could be completely normal. It is difficult to provide comprehensive guidelines as to the "shelf life" of psychological test results. For example, GRE test scores that are years old still might be validly predictive of performance in graduate school, whereas Beck Depression Inventory test results from yesterday could mislead a therapist as to the current level of depression. Practitioners must evaluate the need for retesting on an individual basis.

Responsible Report Writing

Except for group testing, the practice of psychological testing invariably culminates in a written report that constitutes a semipermanent record of test findings and examiner recommendations. Effective report writing is an important skill because of the potential lasting impact of the written document. It is beyond the scope of this text to illuminate the qualities of effective report writing, although we can refer the reader to a few sources (Gregory, 1999; Tallent, 1993).

Responsible reports typically use simple and direct writing that steers clear of jargon and technical terms. The proper goal of a report is to provide helpful perspectives on the client, not to impress the referral source that the examiner is a learned person! When Tallent (1993) surveyed more than one thousand health practitioners who made referrals for testing, one respondent declared his disdain toward psychologists who "reflect their needs to shine as a psychoanalytic beacon in revealing the dark, deep secrets they have observed." On a related note, effective reports stay within the bounds of expertise of the examiner. For example:

> It is never appropriate for a psychologist to recommend that a client undergo a specific medical procedure (such as a CT scan for an apparent brain tumor) or receive a particular drug (such as Prozac for depression). Even when the need for a special procedure seems obvious (e.g., the symptoms strongly attest to the rapid onset of a brain disease), the best way to meet the needs of the client is to recommend immediate consultation with the appropriate medical profession (e.g., neurology or psychiatry). (Gregory, 1999)

Additional advice on effective report writing can be found in Ownby (1991) and Sattler (2001).

Communication of Test Results

Individuals who take psychological tests anticipate that the results will be shared with them. Yet practitioners often do not include one-to-one feedback as part of the assessment. A major reason for reluctance is a lack of training in how to provide feedback, especially when the test results appear to be negative. For example, how does a clinician tell a college student that her IQ is 93 when most students in that milieu score 115 or higher?

Providing effective and constructive feedback to clients about their test results is a challenging skill to learn. Pope (1992) emphasizes the responsibility of the clinician to determine that the client has understood adequately and accurately the information that the clinician was attempting to convey. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the clinician to check for adverse reactions:

> Is the client exceptionally depressed by the findings? Is the client inferring from findings suggesting a learning disorder that the client—as the client has always suspected—is "stupid"? Using scrupulous care to conduct this assessment of the client's understanding of and reactions to the feedback is no less important than using adequate care in administering standardized psychological tests;

> test administration and feedback are equally important, fundamental aspects of the assessment process. (p. 271)

Proper and effective feedback involves give-and-take dialogue in which the clinician ascertains how the client has perceived the information and seeks to correct potentially harmful interpretations.

Destructive feedback often arises when the clinician fails to challenge a client's incorrect perceptions about the meaning of test results. Consider IQ tests in particular—a case in which many persons deify test scores and consider them an index of personal worth. Prior to providing test results, a clinician is advised to investigate the client's understanding of what IQ scores mean. After all, IQ is a limited slice of intellectual functioning: It does not evaluate drive or character of any kind, it is accurate only to about ± 5 points, it may change over time, and it does not assess many important attributes such as creativity, social intelligence, musical ability, or athletic skill. But a client may have an unrealistic perspective about IQ and, hence, might jump to erroneous conclusions when hearing that her score is "only" 93. The careful practitioner will elicit the client's views and challenge them when needed before proceeding. Further thoughts on feedback can be found in Pope (1992).

Going beyond the general pronouncement to avoid harm when providing test feedback, Finn and Tonsager (1997) present the intriguing view that information about test results should be directly and immediately therapeutic to individuals experiencing psychological problems. In other words, they propose that psychological assessment is a form of short-term intervention, not just a basis for gathering information that is *later* used for therapeutic purposes. In one study (Finn & Tonsager, 1992), they examined the effects of a brief psychological assessment on clients at a university counseling center. Thirty-two students took part in an initial interview, completed the MMPI-2, and then received a one-hour feedback session conducted according to a method developed by Finn (1996). A comparison group of 29 students was interviewed and received an equal amount of supportive, nondirective psychotherapy instead of the test feedback. The clients in the MMPI-2 assessment group showed a greater decline in symptomatic distress and a greater increase in self-esteem, immediately following their feedback session and also two weeks later, than the clients in the comparison group. The feedback group also felt more hopeful about their problems after the brief assessment. These findings illustrate the importance of providing thoughtful and constructive test feedback instead of rushing through a perfunctory review of the results.

Consideration of Individual Differences

Knowledge of and respect for individual differences is highlighted by all professional organizations that deal with psychological testing. The American Psychological Association lists this as one of six guiding principles:

> Principle D: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity . . . Psychologists are aware of cultural, individual, and role differences, including those due to age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socio-economic status. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone unfair discriminatory practices. (APA, 1992a)

The relevance of this principle to psychological testing is that practitioners are expected to know when a test or interpretation may not be applicable because of factors such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status. We can illustrate this point with a case study reported in Eyde et al. (1993). A psychologist evaluated a 75-year-old man at the request of his wife, who had noticed memory problems. The psychologist administered a mental status examination and a prominent intelligence test. Performance on the mental status examination was normal, but standard scores on the intelligence test revealed a large discrepancy between verbal subtests and subtests measuring spatial ability and processing speed. The psychologist interpreted this pattern as

indicating a deterioration of intellectual functioning in the husband. Unfortunately, this interpretation was based on faulty use of non-age-corrected standard scores. Also, the psychologist did not assess for depression, which is known to cause visuospatial performance to drop sharply (Wolff & Gregory, 1992). In fact, a series of further evaluations revealed that the husband was a perfectly healthy 75-year-old man. The psychologist failed to consider the relevance of the gentleman's age and emotional status when interpreting the intelligence test. This was a costly oversight that caused the client and his wife substantial unnecessary worry.

TESTING OF CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES

Background and Historical Notes

Persons of ethnic minority descent (non-European origin) currently constitute about a third of the U.S. population, and it is estimated that they will comprise more than 50 percent within several decades. Yet the enterprise of testing is based almost entirely on the efforts of white psychologists who bring an Anglo-American viewpoint to their work. The suitability of existing tests for the evaluation of diverse populations cannot be taken for granted. The assessment of ethnic minority individuals raises important questions, especially when test results translate to placement decisions or other sensitive outcomes, as is commonly the case within educational institutions.

Unfortunately, the early pioneers in the testing movement largely ignored the impact of cultural background on test results. For example, in the 1920s Henry Goddard concluded that the intelligence of the average immigrant was alarmingly low, "perhaps of moron grade." Yet he downplayed the likelihood that language and cultural differences could explain the low test scores of immigrants. Goddard's role in the history of testing is discussed in the next chapter.

Perhaps as a rebound against these early methods, beginning in the 1930s psychologists displayed an increased sensitivity to cultural variables in the practice of testing. A shining example in this regard was Stanley Porteus, who undertook a wide-ranging investigation of the temperament and intelligence of Australian aboriginal peoples. Porteus (1931) used many traditional instruments (block designs, mazes, digit span), but to his credit he also devised an ecologically valid measure of intelligence for this group, namely, footprint recognition. Whereas the aboriginal examinees performed poorly on the Eurocentric tests, their ability to recognize photographed footprints was on a par with other racial groups studied. Even so, Porteus displayed an acute awareness that his procedures *still* might have handicapped the aboriginals:

> The photograph of a footprint is not the same as the footprint itself, and quite probably a number of cues that are made use of by the aboriginal tracker are absent from a photograph. The varying depths of parts of the foot impression are not visible in the photograph, and the individual peculiarities other than general shape and size of the footprint may not be brought out clearly. Hence we must expect that the aboriginal subjects would be under some disadvantage in matching these photographs of footprints, as against recognition of the footprints themselves. (pp. 399–400)

In a similar vein, DuBois (1939) found that Pueblo Indian children displayed superior ability on his specially devised horse drawing test of mental ability, whereas they performed less well on the mainstream Goodenough (1926) Draw-A-Man test. From these early studies onward, psychologists have maintained a keen interest in the impact of language and culture on the meaning of test results.

The Impact of Cultural Background on Test Results

Practitioners need to appreciate that the cultural background of examinees will impact the entire process of assessment. For this reason, Sattler (1988) advises assessment psychologists to approach their task from a pluralistic standpoint:

> Cultural groups may vary with respect to cultural values (stemming in part from cultural shock, discontinuity, or conflict); language and nuances in language style; views

> of life and death; roles of family members; problem-solving strategies; attitudes toward education, mental health, and mental illness; and stage of acculturation (the group may follow traditional values, accept the dominant group's values, or be at some point between the two). You should adopt a frame of reference that will enable you to understand how particular behaviors make sense within each culture. (p. 505)

For example, it is often noted that Native Americans display a distinctive conception of time, emphasizing *present-time* as opposed to the *future-time* orientation that is so powerfully formative in white, middle-class America (Panigua, 1994). A possible implication of this cultural difference is that time limits might not mean the same thing for a Native American child as for a child from the mainstream culture. Perhaps the minority child will disregard the subtest instructions and work at a careful, measured pace rather than seeking quick solutions. Of course, this child would then obtain a misleadingly low score on that measure.

While acknowledging the impact of cultural differences on testing, it is also important to avoid stereotypical overgeneralization. Culture is not monolithic. Every person is unique. Some Native Americans will exhibit a distinctive orientation to time but perhaps most will not. The challenge for the practitioner is to observe the clinical details of performance and to identify the culture-based nuances of behavior that help determine the test results.

An ingenious study by Moore (1986) powerfully illustrates the relevance of cultural background for understanding the test performance of ethnic minority examinees. She compared not only the intelligence test scores but also *the qualitative manner* of responding to test demands in two groups of adopted African American children. One group of 23 children had been transracially adopted into middle-class white families. The other group of 23 children had been intraracially adopted into middle-class African American families. All children were adopted prior to age 2 and the backgrounds of the adoptive families were similar in terms of education and social class. Thus, group difference in test scores and test behaviors could be attributed mainly to differences in cultural background arising from the fact that one group was adopted into African American families, the other adopted into white families. Testing and observations were completed by two female African American examiners who were "blind" to the purposes of the study. Tested at 7 to 10 years of age, the transracially adopted children scored an average IQ of 117 on the WISC compared to an average IQ of 104 for the traditionally adopted children. These IQ results were not remarkable, insofar as Scarr and Weinberg reported similar findings years before.

The surprising and informative outcome of the study was that the two groups of children showed very different *qualitative* behaviors during testing. As a group, the children with lower IQ scores (those adopted by African American families) were less likely to spontaneously elaborate on their work responses and more likely simply to refuse to respond when presented with a test demand. Moore (1986) offers the following interpretations:

> Children's tendency to spontaneously elaborate on their work responses may be a very important index of their level of involvement in task performance, strategies for problem solving, level of motivation to generate a correct response, and level of adjustment to the standardized test situation. . . . Although the terminal not-work response is treated as an incorrect response, it does not actually provide any empirical documentation of what the child does or does not know or of what the child can and cannot do. The only information available is that the child did not respond to the demand. (p. 322)

The essential lesson of this study is that culturally based differences in response style may function to conceal the underlying competence of some examinees. Cautious interpretation of test results is always advisable, but this is especially important for examinees from culturally or linguistically diverse backgrounds.

The influence of cultural factors is not limited to the test performance of children but extends to adults as well. Terrell, Terrell, and Taylor (1981) investigated the effects of racial trust/mistrust on the intelligence

test scores of African American college students. They identified African American students with high and low levels of mistrust of whites. Using a 2 × 2 design, half of each group was then administered an individual intelligence test by a white examiner, the other half by an African American examiner. As predicted, the analysis of variance revealed no differences for the main effects of race of examiner (white versus African American) or level of mistrust (high versus low) (Figure 1.6). But a substantial interaction was revealed; namely, the high-mistrust group with an African American examiner scored much better than the high-mistrust group with a white examiner (average IQs of 96 versus 86, respectively). Put simply, cultural mistrust among African Americans was associated with significantly lower IQ scores, but *only* when the examiner was white.

Further illustrating cultural influences, Steele (1997) has proposed a theory that societal stereotypes about groups influence the immediate intellectual performance and also the long-term identity development of individual group members. He has applied this theory both to women—when stereotypes affect their achievement in math and sciences—and to African Americans—when stereotypes apparently depress their performance on standardized tests. Here we discuss his research on stereotype threat with African American college students (Steele & Aronson, 1995).



FIGURE 1.6 Mean IQ Scores of African American Students as a Function of Race of Examiner and Cultural Mistrust *Source:* Based on data in Terrell, F., Terrell, S., & Taylor, J. (1981). Effects of race of examiner and cultural mistrust on the WAIS performance of Black students. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49,* 750–751.

The idea of stereotype threat is essentially a sophisticated version of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The researchers define **stereotype threat** as the threat of confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one's group. For example, based on published data and media coverage about race and IQ scores, African Americans are stereotyped as possessing less intellectual ability than others. As a consequence, whenever they encounter tests of intelligence or academic achievement, individuals from this group may perceive a risk that they will confirm the stereotype. In the short run, stereotype threat is hypothesized to depress test performance through heightened anxiety and other mechanisms. In the long run, it may have the further impact of pressuring African American students to "protectively disidentify" with achievement in school and related intellectual domains.

Steele and Aronson (1995) conducted a series of four studies to evaluate the hypothesis of stereotype threat. All the investigations supported the hypothesis. We focus here on the first study, in which African American and white college students were given a 30-minute test composed of challenging items from the verbal Graduate Record Examination. Students from both racial groups were randomly assigned to one of three test conditions: stereotype-threat, in which the test was described as diagnostic of individual verbal ability; control, in which the test was described as a research tool only; and control-challenge, in which the test was described as a research tool only but participants were exhorted to "take this challenge seriously." Scores on the verbal test were adjusted (covariate analysis) on the basis of prior achievement scores so as to eliminate the effects of preexisting differences between groups.

Race differences were small and nonsignificant in the control and control-challenge conditions, whereas African Americans scored much lower than whites in the stereotype-threat condition (Figure 1.7). In other studies, Steele and Aronson (1995) investigated the mechanism of mediation by which stereotype threat caused African Americans to score lower on standardized tests. The details are beyond the scope of this text, but the overall conclusion is not:

> Our best assessment is that stereotype threat caused an inefficiency of processing much



FIGURE 1.7 Average Verbal Items Correct for Whites and African Americans under Three Conditions *Source:* Based on data in Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,* 797–811.

> like that caused by other evaluative pressures. Stereotype-threatened participants spent more time doing fewer items more inaccurately—probably as a result of alternating their attention between trying to answer the items and trying to assess the self-significance of their frustration. (Steele & Aronson, 1995, p. 809)

In sum, the authors propose a social-psychological perspective on the meaning of lower test scores in African Americans and perhaps other stereotype-threatened groups as well. Their viewpoint emphasizes that test results do not reside within individuals. Test scores occur within a complex social-psychological field that is potentially influenced by national history, predicaments of race, and many other subtle factors.

UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF HIGH-STAKES TESTING

The prevailing view in the general public is that cheating rarely or never occurs in nationally administered testing programs. We tend to think that the risks are too high and the opportunities too limited for cheaters to prevail. Therefore, we rest assured that test fraud must be a rare event. Unfortunately, this view is probably naive. After all, a growing number of people must pass a test to gain college entry, get a job, or obtain a promotion. Furthermore, school officials increasingly are evaluated on the basis of average test scores in their district. Precisely because the stakes are so high, unscrupulous individuals will try to beat the system.

Widespread cheating in public school systems is sporadically reported in many large cities across the United States. In most cases, the cheating is motivated by the desire of teachers and principals to further their own careers by creating the illusion of educational excellence. For example, in 1999, dozens of teachers and two principals in the New York City public school system were charged with helping students cheat on the standardized reading and math tests used to rank schools and determine whether students move on to the next grade (*New York Times,* December 12, 1999). The cheating scheme was described as "one of the largest in the recent history of American public schools." In 2000, an entire eighth-grade class in a Chicago elementary school was required to retake the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) because a school administrator allegedly filled in incomplete tests and changed incorrect answers to correct ones (*Chicago Tribune,* June 2, 2000). Officials were tipped off to the fraud because the test scores were simply too good to be true—the *average* score for the class was two years above their standing. In 2005, the *Dallas Morning News* reported strong evidence of "organized, educator-led cheating" in dozens of schools on the statewide achievement test and found suspicious scores in *hundreds* more (www.dallasnews.com, March 21, 2005). Disturbingly, one assessment expert noted, "You're catching the dumb cheaters. The smart cheaters you're not going to be able to detect." We only read about the cases of cheating that are detected. The number of undetected cases is simply unknown, although probably larger than the public would like to believe.

Cheating in public school systems is not a thing of the past. It continues unabated, year after year. In 2011, a decade long cheating scandal was revealed in the Atlanta, Georgia, public school

system (*Atlanta Journal-Constitution,* July 6, 2011). Teachers and principals routinely changed students' answer sheets to produce higher scores. The school system scores soared dramatically, bringing national acclaim to the district and the superintendent. But it was all based on fraud perpetrated by 178 educators, including 38 principals. Cheating was confirmed in 44 of 56 schools examined. In 2011, six charter schools in Los Angeles were threatened with closure when it was discovered that the founding director had ordered principals to open the state standardized tests and train students on actual test questions (*Los Angeles Times,* June 22, 2011). Suspiciously, scores for the schools had vaulted upward in recent years. The director and the six principals were terminated.

An especially flagrant instance of cheating on national tests was uncovered in Louisiana in 1997. This case involved wholesale circulation of the Educational Testing Service (ETS) exam administered to teachers who want to be school principals. As reported in the *New York Times* (September 28, 1997), copies of the 145-item test, along with correct answers, had circulated among teachers throughout southern Louisiana, most likely for several years. In a state ranked at or near the bottom on nearly every educational index, it appears that many potentially unqualified persons cheated their way into running the schools. ETS handled this case quietly by asking more than 200 teachers to retake the test so as to "confirm" their initial scores. Unfortunately, the Louisiana case was not an isolated instance. In another case, ETS allegedly failed to monitor its handling of the federal government's test for immigrants who want to become citizens, with the likely result that test supervisors accepted bribes. English-proficiency tests for foreign students also were vulnerable to cheating. In 1994, ETS canceled the scores of 30,000 students from China after discovering a ring that was selling the examinations abroad. Cizek (1999) catalogues literally dozens of ingenious ways that students have developed for cheating on tests: writing information on the floor, in tissues, on the back of a bottled water label; using an ultraviolet pen to write information on "blank" paper; and using a video transmitter (e.g., hidden in an eyeglass case) to send pictures of the test to an outside accomplice who then coaches the student by means of an audio receiver (e.g., hidden in the ear).

Stories about miniature transmitters are not fanciful. Consider the following story reported from a monolithic culture where test results literally make or break a child's future. In China, 10 million 18-year-olds take a two day exam each year that determines whether they will be allowed to attend public universities. Success or failure drastically impacts their lives and those of their families who might depend on their future income. In 2009, eight parents were jailed for up to three years after it was determined that they were transmitting stolen test answers to their children through miniature earpieces. The subterfuge was discovered when police detected unusual radio signals near the school (www.guardian.co.uk, April 3, 2009).

In 2012, cheating was brought to light on the board certification test for radiology (CNN, *Prescription for Cheating,* January 13, 2012). For years, doctors around the country have helped one another cheat by each memorizing one or two test questions verbatim, writing down the questions after taking the test, and circulating the ever-expanding list of questions (dubbed "recalls") to cooperating programs. The practice is so widespread and considered so egregious that the American Board of Radiology released a sternly worded video condemning the use of recalls as unethical. CNN found at least 15 years' worth of test questions (with answers) on a website for residents in radiology.

Recently, efforts to circumvent exam security have become even more brazen, with some test preparation companies encouraging students to *steal* copies of college entrance exams such as the Scholastic Assessment Tests (SAT) (*Los Angeles Times,* October 12, 2005). Fortunately, the publisher of the SAT was granted a restraining order in federal court, prohibiting individuals or companies from soliciting stolen copies of the test. Even so, this episode illustrates once again that high-stakes testing has had a corrupting influence on the testing process.

Dishonest and inappropriate practices by school officials are implicated in the recent inflation of scores on nationally normed group tests of achievement. By definition, for a norm-referenced test, 50 percent of the examinees should score above

the 50th percentile, 50 percent below. If the same test is used in a large sample of typical and representative school systems, average scores for the school systems should be split evenly—about half above the nationally normed 50th percentile, half below.

According to a survey reported in the news media (Foster, 1990), virtually all states of the union claim that average achievement scores for their school systems exceed the 50th percentile. The resulting overly optimistic picture of student achievement is labeled the **Lake Wobegon Effect**, in reference to humorist Garrison Keillor's mythical Minnesota town where "all the children are above average."

How does inflation of achievement test scores arise? According to Cannell (1988), the major cause is educational administrators who are desperate to demonstrate the excellence of their school systems. Precisely because our society attaches so much importance to achievement test results, some educators apparently help students cheat on standardized tests. The alleged cheating includes the following:

- Teachers and principals coach students on test answers.
- Examiners give more than the allotted time to take tests.
- Administrators alter answer sheets.
- Teachers teach directly to the specific test items.
- Teachers make copies of the tests to give to their students.

In sum, the importance that our society attaches to achievement test scores has caused a number of unappealing side effects that undermine the very foundations of nationally normed group-testing programs.

Moore (1994) reports on a special case in educational testing, namely, the districtwide consequences of court-ordered achievement testing. He surveyed 79 teachers from third- through fifth-grade level in a midwestern town in which the court required the use of a standardized test to determine the effectiveness of a desegregation effort. The test in question, the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS), is a well-respected group achievement test that requires strict adherence to instructions and time limits for obtaining valid results. Yet the teachers found little value in the testing program, complaining that its benefits did not offset the time and costs involved. As a consequence of their devaluing the effort, nonstandard testing was practically the rule rather than the exception. The teachers engaged in several nonstandard practices, most of which tended to inflate the test scores. Inappropriate testing practices included praising students who answered a question correctly during the test (67 percent), using last year's test questions for practice (44 percent), recoding a student's answer sheet because he or she just "miscoded" the answer (26 percent), giving students as much time as they needed (24 percent), giving students items that were directly off the test (24 percent), and giving hints or clues during the test (23 percent). In general, Moore (1994) notes that teachers modified their instructional efforts and curriculum in anticipation of having their students take the test. More than 90 percent of the teachers added test-related lessons to the curriculum, and more than 70 percent eliminated topics so that they could spend more time on test-related skills.

What this study demonstrates is that mandated educational testing can have the unanticipated consequence of polluting the validity of a worthy test—especially when crucial stakeholders have no voice in the process.

Further, in teaching to the tests, educators may emphasize bits and pieces of factual knowledge rather than imparting a general ability to think clearly and solve problems. In conclusion, it appears that an excessive emphasis on nationally normed achievement tests for selection and evaluation promotes inappropriate behavior, including outright fraud and cheating on the part of students and school officials. Just how widespread is the problem? Although we live with the optimistic assumption that fraud in nationally normed testing programs is rare, the disturbing truth is that we really don't know how often this occurs.

REPRISE: RESPONSIBLE TEST USE

We return now to the real-life quandaries of testing mentioned at the beginning of the topic. The reader will recall that the first quandary had to do

with whether a consulting psychologist responsibly could refuse to provide feedback to police officer candidates referred for preemployment screening. Surprisingly, the answer to this query is "Yes." Under normal circumstances, a practitioner must explain assessment results to the client. But there are exceptions, as explained by Principle 9.10 of the APA Ethical Code:

> Psychologists take reasonable steps to ensure that explanations of results are given to the individual or designated representative unless the nature of the relationship precludes provision of an explanation of results (such as in some organizational consulting, preemployment or security screenings, and forensic evaluations), and this fact has been clearly explained to the person being assessed in advance.

The second quandary concerned a counselor who continued to use the MMPI even though the MMPI-2 has been available for several years. Is the counselor's refusal to use the MMPI-2 a breach of professional standards? The answer to this query is probably "Yes." The MMPI-2 is well validated and constitutes a significant improvement upon the MMPI. As mentioned previously, the MMPI-2 is now the standard of care in MMPI-based assessment of psychopathology. The counselor who continued to rely on the original MMPI could be liable for malpractice suits, especially if his test interpretations resulted in misleading interpretive statements or a false diagnosis.

The third predicament involved the use of a neighborhood friend as translator in the administration of the WISC-IV to a 9-year-old boy whose first language was Spanish. This is usually a mistake as it sacrifices strict control of the testing material. The examiner was not bilingual and, therefore, he would have no way of knowing whether the translator was remaining faithful to the original text or was possibly supplying additional cues. In an ideal world, the proper procedure would be to enlist a Spanish-speaking examiner who would use a test formally translated and also standardized with Hispanic examinees. For example, the Escala de Inteligencia Wechsler Para Ninos-Revisada de Puerto Rico (EIWN-R PR) would be a good choice.

The final quandary concerned the client who informed a psychologist that her recently deceased brother was most likely a pedophile. Is the psychologist obligated to report this case to law enforcement? The answer to this query is probably "Yes," but it may depend on the jurisdiction of the psychologist and the wording of the relevant statutes. In fact, the psychologist did report the case to authorities with unexpected consequences. Police obtained a search warrant, went to the home of the client's mother (where the brother had lived), and ransacked the brother's bedroom. The mother was traumatized by the unexpected visit from the police and blamed the fiasco on her daughter. A bitter estrangement followed, and the client then sued the psychologist for violation of confidentiality!

CHAPTER 2

Origins of Psychological Testing

TOPIC 2A The Origins of Psychological Testing

Rudimentary Forms of Testing in China in 2200 B.C.
Physiognomy, Phrenology, and the Psychograph
The Brass Instruments Era of Testing
Rating Scales and Their Origins
Changing Conceptions of Mental Retardation in the 1800s
Influence of Binet's Early Research on His Test
Binet and Testing for Higher Mental Processes
The Revised Scales and the Advent of IQ

Origins of psychological testing is a fascinating story and has abundant relevance to present-day practices. After all, contemporary tests did not spring from a vacuum; they evolved slowly from a host of precursors introduced over the last 100 years. Accordingly, Chapter 2 features a review of the historical roots of present-day psychological tests. In Topic 2A, The Origins of Psychological Testing, we focus largely on the efforts of European psychologists to measure intelligence during the late nineteenth century and pre–World War I era. These early intelligence tests and their successors often exerted powerful effects on the examinees who took them, so the first topic also documents the historical impact of psychological test results. Topic 2B, Testing from the Early 1900s to the Present, catalogues the profusion of tests developed by American psychologists in the first half of the twentieth century.

Psychological testing in its modern form originated little more than 100 years ago in laboratory studies of sensory discrimination, motor skills, and reaction time. The British genius Francis Galton (1822–1911) invented the first battery of tests, a peculiar assortment of sensory and motor measures, which we review in the following. The American psychologist James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944) studied with Galton and then, in 1890, proclaimed the modern testing agenda in his classic paper entitled "Mental Tests and Measurements." He was tentative and modest when describing the purposes and applications of his instruments:

> Psychology cannot attain the certainty and exactness of the physical sciences, unless it rests on a foundation of experiment and measurement. A step in this direction could be made by

> applying a series of mental tests and measurements to a large number of individuals. The results would be of considerable scientific value in discovering the constancy of mental processes, their interdependence, and their variation under different circumstances. Individuals, besides, would find their tests interesting, and, perhaps, useful in regard to training, mode of life or indication of disease. The scientific and practical value of such tests would be much increased should a uniform system be adopted, so that determinations made at different times and places could be compared and combined. (Cattell, 1890)

Cattell's conjecture that "perhaps" tests would be useful in "training, mode of life or indication of disease" must certainly rank as one of the prophetic understatements of all time. Anyone reared in the Western world knows that psychological testing has emerged from its timid beginnings to become a big business and a cultural institution that permeates modern society.

As we shall see, the importance of testing is evident from historical review. Students of psychology generally regard historical issues as dull, dry, and pedantic, and sometimes these prejudices are well deserved. After all, many textbooks fail to explain the relevance of historical matters and provide only vague sketches of early developments in mental testing. As a result, students of psychology often conclude incorrectly that historical issues are boring and irrelevant.

In reality, origins of psychological testing is a captivating story that has substantial relevance to present-day practices. In later chapters, we examine the principles of psychological testing, investigate applications in specific fields (e.g., personality, intelligence, neuropsychology), and reflect on the social and legal consequences of testing. However, the reader will find these topics more comprehensible when viewed in historical context. So, for now, we begin at the beginning by reviewing rudimentary forms of testing that existed over 4,000 years ago in imperial China.

RUDIMENTARY FORMS OF TESTING IN CHINA IN 2200 B.C.

Although the widespread use of psychological testing is largely a phenomenon of the twentieth century, historians note that rudimentary forms of testing date back to at least 2200 B.C. when the Chinese emperor had his officials examined every third year to determine their fitness for office (Bowman, 1989; Chaffee, 1985; Franke, 1963; Teng, 1942–43). Such testing was modified and refined over the centuries until written exams were introduced in the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 200). Five topics were tested: civil law, military affairs, agriculture, revenue, and geography.

The Chinese examination system took its final form around 1370 when proficiency in the Confucian classics was emphasized. In the preliminary examination, candidates were required to spend a day and a night in a small isolated booth, composing essays on assigned topics and writing a poem. The 1 to 7 percent who passed moved up to the district examinations, which required three separate sessions of three days and three nights.

The district examinations were obviously grueling and rigorous, but this was not the final level. The 1 to 10 percent who passed were allowed the privilege of going to Peking for the final round of examinations. Perhaps 3 percent of this final group passed and became mandarins, eligible for public office.

Although the Chinese developed the external trappings of a comprehensive civil service examination program, the similarities between their traditions and current testing practices are, in the main, superficial. Not only were their testing practices unnecessarily grueling, but the Chinese also failed to validate their selection procedures. Nonetheless, it does appear that the examination program incorporated relevant selection criteria. For example, in the written exams beauty of penmanship was weighted very heavily. Given the highly stylistic features of Chinese written forms, good penmanship was no doubt essential for clear, exact communication. Thus, penmanship was probably a relevant predictor of suitability for civil service employment. In response to widespread discontent, the examination system was abolished by royal decree in 1906 (Franke, 1963).

PHYSIOGNOMY, PHRENOLOGY, AND THE PSYCHOGRAPH

Physiognomy is based on the notion that we can judge the inner character of people from their outward appearance, especially the face. Albeit misguided and now largely discredited, physiognomy

represents an early form of psychological testing. Hence, we provide a primer on the topic, including its more recent cousin, phrenology.

Interest in physiognomy can be dated to the fourth century, when the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) published a short treatise based on the premise that the soul and the body "sympathize" with each other. Essentially, Aristotle argued that changes in a person's soul (inner character) could impact the appearance of the body, and vice versa. The relationship between the two allowed the astute observer to infer personality characteristics from individual appearance. Aristotle catalogued a vast array of traits that could be discerned from features of hair, forehead, eyebrows, eyes, nose, lips, and so on. Here are some examples:

> Hair that hangs down without curling, if it be of a fair complexion, thin, and soft withal, signifies a man to be naturally fainthearted, and of a weak body but of a quiet and harmless disposition. Hair that is big, and thick, and short withal, denotes a man to be of a strong constitution, secure, and deceitful, and for the most part unquiet, and vain, lusting after beauty, and more foolish than wise, though fortune may favor him. (Aristotle, *Of Physiognomy,* www.exclassics.com/arist/arist63.htm)

Many other classical Latin authors wrote about physiognomy, including Juvenal, Suetonius, and Pliny the Elder. But it was not until centuries later that physiognomy began to flourish when a Swiss theologian penned a popular best-seller on the topic.

Johann Lavater (1741–1801) published his *Essays on Physiognomy* in Germany in the late eighteenth century. English and French translations followed shortly and sales exploded in Western Europe and the United States. Eventually, more than 150 editions of the text were published (Graham, 1961). Lavater's book contained hundreds of meticulous drawings depicting his principles of physiognomy by which character could be judged from details of facial appearance. Lukasik (2004) describes the allure of this approach:

> Since Lavaterian physiognomy read moral character from unalterable and involuntary facial features, it created a visual system for discerning a person's permanent moral character despite his or her social masks. Readers of the 1817 *Pocket Lavater,* for instance, learned how to look at the features of various white male faces in order to discriminate "the physiognomy of . . . a man of business" from that of "a rogue." (p. 1)

Physiognomy remained popular for centuries and laid the foundation for the more specialized form of quackery known as **phrenology**—reading "bumps" on the head.

The founding of **phrenology** is usually attributed to the German physician Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828). His "science" actually was based on a veneer of plausibility. In his major work, *The Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in General, and of the Brain in Particular* (1810), Gall argued that the brain is the organ of sentiments and faculties and that these capacities are localized. Furthermore, he reasoned, to the extent that a specific faculty was well developed, the corresponding component of the brain would be enlarged. In turn, because the skull conforms to the shape of the brain, a cranial "bump" would signify an enlargement of the underlying faculty. These plausible (but incorrect) assumptions allowed Gall and his followers to decide if an individual was amorous, secretive, hopeful, combative, benevolent, self-confident, happy, imitative—in all, dozens of traits were discerned from cranial bumps.

Johann Spurzheim (1776–1832), a disciple of Gall, popularized phrenology and disseminated it to the United States and Great Britain, where it became enormously popular. In fact, a few entrepreneurs developed automated devices to measure the bumps with precision. In 1931, after decades of tinkering, Henry C. Lavery, a self-proclaimed genius and ardent believer in phrenology, spent a small fortune developing his machine known as the psychograph (McCoy, 2000). It consisted of hundreds of moving parts assembled in a large helmet-like device fitted over the examinee's head. Each of 32 mental faculties was rated 1 through 5 ("deficient" to "very superior") based on the way that probes made contact with the head. A belt-driven motor stamped out statements for each of the 32 faculties, providing

one of the first automated personality descriptions. Initially, the psychograph was a spectacular success, and its promoters earned small fortunes. But by the mid-1930s public skepticism held sway, and the company that manufactured the instrument went out of business (McCoy, 2000).

THE BRASS INSTRUMENTS ERA OF TESTING

Experimental psychology flourished in the late 1800s in continental Europe and Great Britain. For the first time in history, psychologists departed from the wholly subjective and introspective methods that had been so fruitlessly pursued in the preceding centuries. Human abilities were instead tested in laboratories. Researchers used objective procedures that were capable of replication. Gone were the days when rival laboratories would have raging arguments about "imageless thought," one group saying it existed, another group saying that such a mental event was impossible.

Even though the new emphasis on objective methods and measurable quantities was a vast improvement over the largely sterile mentalism that preceded it, the new experimental psychology was itself a dead end, at least as far as psychological testing was concerned. The problem was that the early experimental psychologists mistook simple sensory processes for intelligence. They used assorted brass instruments to measure sensory thresholds and reaction times, thinking that such abilities were at the heart of intelligence. Hence, this period is sometimes referred to as the Brass Instruments era of psychological testing.

In spite of the false start made by early experimentalists, at least they provided psychology with an appropriate methodology. Such pioneers as Wundt, Galton, Cattell, and Wissler showed that it was possible to expose the mind to scientific scrutiny and measurement. This was a fateful change in the axiomatic assumptions of psychology, a change that has stayed with us to the current day.

Most sources credit Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) with founding the first psychological laboratory in 1879 in Leipzig, Germany. It is less well recognized that he was measuring mental processes years before, at least as early as 1862, when he experimented with his thought meter (Diamond, 1980). This device was a calibrated pendulum with needles sticking off from each side. The pendulum would swing back and forth, striking bells with the needles. The observer's task was to take note of the position of the pendulum when the bells sounded. Of course, Wundt could adjust the needles beforehand and thereby know the precise position of the pendulum when each bell was struck. Wundt thought that the difference between the observed pendulum position and the actual position would provide a means of determining the swiftness of thought of the observer.

Wundt's analysis was relevant to a long-standing problem in astronomy. The problem was that two or more astronomers simultaneously using the same telescope (with multiple eyepieces) would report different crossing times as the stars moved across a grid line on the telescope. Even in Wundt's time, it was a well-known event in the history of science that Kinnebrook, an assistant at the Royal Observatory in England, had been dismissed in 1796 because his stellar crossing times were nearly a full second too slow (Boring, 1950). Wundt's analysis offered another explanation that did not assume incompetence on the part of anyone. Put simply, Wundt believed that the speed of thought might differ from one person to the next:

> For each person there must be a certain speed of thinking, which he can never exceed with his given mental constitution. But just as one steam engine can go faster than another, so this speed of thought will probably not be the same in all persons. (Wundt, 1862, as translated in Rieber, 1980)

This analysis of telescope reporting times seems simplistic by present-day standards and overlooks the possible contribution of such factors as attention, motivation, and self-correcting feedback from prior trials. On the positive side, this was at least an empirical analysis that sought to explain individual differences instead of trying to explain them away. And that is the relevance to current practices in psychological testing. However crudely, Wundt measured mental processes and begrudgingly acknowledged individual differences. This emphasis on individual differences was rare for Wundt. He

is more renowned for proposing common laws of thought for the average adult mind.

Galton and the First Battery of Mental Tests

Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911) pioneered the new experimental psychology in nineteenth-century Great Britain. Galton was obsessed with measurement, and his intellectual career seems to have been dominated by a belief that virtually anything was measurable. His attempts to measure intellect by means of reaction time and sensory discrimination tasks are well known. Yet, to appreciate his wide-ranging interests, the reader should be apprised that Galton also devised techniques for measuring beauty, personality, the boringness of lectures, and the efficacy of prayer, to name but a few of the endeavors that his biographer has catalogued in elaborate detail (Pearson 1914, 1924, 1930a,b).

Galton was a genius who was more interested in the problems of human evolution than in psychology per se (Boring, 1950). His two most influential works were *Hereditary Genius* (1869), an empirical analysis purporting to prove that genetic factors were overwhelmingly important for the attainment of eminence, and *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development* (1883), a disparate series of essays that emphasized individual differences in mental faculties.

Boring (1950) regards *Inquiries* as the beginning of the mental test movement and the advent of the scientific psychology of individual differences. The book is a curious mixture of empirical research and speculative essays on topics as diverse as "just perceptible differences" in lifted weight and diminished fertility among inbred animals. There is, nonetheless, a common theme uniting these diverse essays; Galton demonstrates time and again that individual differences not only exist but also are objectively measurable.

Galton borrowed the time-consuming psychophysical procedures practiced by Wundt and others on the European continent and adapted them to a series of simple and quick sensorimotor measures. Thus, he continued the tradition of brass instruments mental testing but with an important difference: his procedures were much more amenable to the timely collection of data from hundreds if not thousands of subjects. Because of his efforts in devising practicable measures of individual differences, historians of psychological testing usually regard Galton as the father of mental testing (Goodenough, 1949; Boring, 1950).

To further his study of individual differences, Galton set up a psychometric laboratory in London at the International Health Exhibition in 1884. It was later transferred to the London Museum, where it was maintained for six years. Various anthropometric and psychometric measures were arranged on a long table at one side of a narrow room. Subjects were admitted at one end for threepence and given successive tests as they moved down the table. At least 17,000 individuals were tested during the 1880s and 1890s. About 7,500 of the individual data records have survived to the present day (Johnson et al., 1985).

The tests and measures involved both the physical and behavioral domains. Physical characteristics assessed were height, weight, head length, head breadth, arm span, length of middle finger, and length of lower arm, among others. The behavioral tests included strength of hand squeeze determined by dynamometer, vital capacity of the lungs measured by spirometer, visual acuity, highest audible tone, speed of blow, and reaction time (RT) to both visual and auditory stimuli.

Ultimately, Galton's simplistic attempts to gauge intellect with measures of reaction time and sensory discrimination proved fruitless. Nonetheless, he did provide a tremendous impetus to the testing movement by demonstrating that objective tests could be devised and that meaningful scores could be obtained through standardized procedures.

Cattell Imports Brass Instruments to the United States

James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944) studied the new experimental psychology with both Wundt and Galton before settling at Columbia University where, for 26 years, he was the undisputed dean of American psychology. With Wundt, he did a series of painstakingly elaborate RT studies (1880–1882), measuring with great precision the fractions of a second presumably required for different mental reactions. He also noted, almost in passing, that he and another colleague had small but consistent differences in RT. Cattell proposed to Wundt that such individual differences ought to be studied systematically.

Although Wundt acknowledged individual differences, he was philosophically more inclined to study general features of the mind, and he offered no support for Cattell's proposal (Fancher, 1985).

But Cattell received enthusiastic support for his study of individual differences from Galton, who had just opened his psychometric laboratory in London. After corresponding with Galton for a few years, Cattell arranged for a two-year fellowship at Cambridge so that he could continue the study of individual differences. Cattell opened his own research laboratory and developed a series of tests that were mainly extensions and additions to Galton's battery.

Cattell (1890) invented the term *mental test* in his famous paper entitled "Mental Tests and Measurements." This paper described his research program, detailing 10 mental tests he proposed for use with the general public. These tests were clearly a reworking and embellishment of the Galtonian tradition:

> Strength of hand squeeze as measured by dynamometer
>
> Rate of hand movement through a distance of 50 centimeters
>
> Two-point threshold for touch—minimum distance at which two points are still perceived as separate
>
> Degree of pressure needed to cause pain—rubber tip pressed against the forehead
>
> Weight differentiation—discern the relative weights of identical-looking boxes varying by one gram from 100 to 110 grams
>
> Reaction time for sound—using a device similar to Galton's
>
> Time for naming colors
>
> Bisection of a 50-centimeter line
>
> Judgment of 10 seconds of time
>
> Number of letters repeated on one hearing

Strength of hand squeeze seems a curious addition to a battery of mental tests, a point that Cattell (1890) addressed directly in his paper. He was of the opinion that it was impossible to separate bodily energy from mental energy. Thus, in Cattell's view, an ostensibly physiological measure such as dynamometer pressure was an index of one's mental power as well. Clearly, the physiological and sensory bias of the entire test battery reflects its strongly Galtonian heritage (Fancher, 1985).

In 1891, Cattell accepted a position at Columbia University, at that time the largest university in the United States. His subsequent influence on American psychology was far in excess of his individual scientific output and was expressed in large part through his numerous and influential students (Boring, 1950). Among his many famous doctoral students and the years of their degrees were E. L. Thorndike (1898) who made monumental contributions to learning theory and educational psychology; R. S. Woodworth (1899) who was to author the very popular and influential *Experimental Psychology* (1938); and E. K. Strong (1911) whose Vocational Interest Blank—since revised—is still in wide use. But among Cattell's students, it was probably Clark Wissler (1901) who had the greatest influence on the early history of psychological testing.

Wissler obtained both mental test scores and academic grades from more than 300 students at Columbia University and Barnard College. His goal was to demonstrate that the test results could predict academic performance. With our early twenty-first-century perspective on research and testing, it seems amazing that the early experimentalists waited so long to do such basic validational research. Wissler's (1901) results showed virtually no tendency for the mental test scores to correlate with academic achievement. For example, class standing correlated .16 with memory for number lists, −.08 with dynamometer strength, .02 with color naming, and −.02 with reaction time. The highest correlation (.16) was statistically significant because of the large sample size. However, so humble a correlation carries with it very little predictive utility.[1]

[1]We discuss the correlation coefficient in more detail in Topic 3B, Concepts of Reliability. By way of quick preview, correlations can range from –1.0 to +1.0. Values near zero indicate a weak, negligible linear relationship between the two variables. For example, correlations between −.20 and +.20 are generally of minimal value for purposes of individual prediction. Note also that negative correlations indicate an inverse relationship.

Also damaging to the brass instruments testing movement was the very modest correlations between the mental tests themselves. For example, color naming and hand movement speed correlated only .19, while RT and color naming correlated −.15. Several physical measures such as head size (a holdover measure from the Galton era) were, not surprisingly, also uncorrelated with the various sensory and RT measures.

With the publication of Wissler's (1901) discouraging results, experimental psychologists largely abandoned the use of RT and sensory discrimination as measures of intelligence. This turning away from the brass instruments approach was a desirable development in origins of psychological testing. The way was thereby paved for immediate acceptance of Alfred Binet's more sensible and useful measures of higher mental processes.

A common reaction among psychologists in the early 1900s was to begrudgingly conclude that Galton had been wrong in attempting to infer complex abilities from simple ones. Goodenough (1949) has likened Galton's approach to "inferring the nature of genius from the nature of stupidity or the qualities of water from those of the hydrogen and oxygen of which it is composed." The academic psychologists apparently agreed with her, and American attempts to develop intelligence tests virtually ceased at the turn of the twentieth century. For his own part, Wissler was apparently so discouraged by his results that he immediately switched to anthropology, where he became a strong environmentalist in explaining differences between ethnic groups.

The void created by the abandonment of the Galtonian tradition did not last for long. In Europe, Alfred Binet was on the verge of a major breakthrough in intelligence testing. Binet introduced his scale of intelligence in 1905, and shortly thereafter H. H. Goddard imported it to the United States, where it was applied in a manner that Gould (1981) has described as "the dismantling of Binet's intentions in America." Whether early twentieth-century American psychologists subverted Binet's intentions is an important question that we review in the next topic. First we turn to a more general topic, the rise of rating scales in the history of psychology.

RATING SCALES AND THEIR ORIGINS

Rating scales are widely used in psychology as a means of quantifying subjective psychological variables of many kinds. An example of a simple rating scale might be the 11-point scale used by doctors when they ask patients in the emergency room "On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is no pain at all, and 10 is the worst pain you have ever felt, how bad is your pain right now?" Albeit crude, this is a form of psychological measurement. Psychometricians have developed a rich literature on the qualities and applications of rating scales of this type (Guilford, 1954; Nunnally, 1967; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).

Historians of psychology used to think that numerical rating scales originated in the "brass instruments" era of Francis Galton (McReynolds & Ludwig, 1987). However, it now appears that a crude form of rating scale can be traced to Galen, the second century Greco-Roman physician. Galen believed in the prevailing humor theory of health and disease, in which the harmony or disharmony among four bodily fluids or "humors" determined one's health. The four humors were yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and blood. The humorology of the time also featured the dichotomies of hot–cold and wet–dry as elements of health or illness. With respect to the hot-cold dimension, Galen recognized the need for something more sophisticated than a simple dichotomy:

> This standard, or neutral value, he suggested should be the temperature, as reflected in direct sense–perception, of a mixture of equal quantities of boiling water and ice (Taylor, 1942). Further, Galen proposed a convention of four degrees of heat and four degrees of cold, on either side of that standard, that could be induced in patients by various drugs. (McReynolds & Ludwig, 1987, p. 281)

Although he did not say so explicitly, Galen was in effect proposing a nine-point rating scale consisting of four points above and four points below a neutral point. Whether the successive increases of heat or cold were equal in the hot–cold scale—what we would now refer to as the underlying scale of measurement—was an issue left to others, including the ninth-century Islamic philosopher, Al-kindi

(Taylor, 1942). Al-kindi was an Arab polymath considered by many the father of Islamic philosophy. He questioned whether the successive degrees of heat and cold could be equal but did not propose a means for answering the inquiry. Al-kindi made important contributions in many fields, including astronomy, chemistry, and medicine (www.muslimphilosophy.com/kindi).

According to McReynolds and Ludwig (1984), the first person to devise and apply rating scales for psychological variables was Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). Thomasius was a German jurist and philosopher whose career spanned numerous fields of inquiry. He developed a theory of personality that posited four major dimensions—sensuousness, acquisitiveness, social ambition, and rational love. He employed judges to assess individuals on all four inclinations on a 12-point scale (5, 10, 15, 20, all the way up to 60). In 1692, he published numerical data—including reliability data—on five individuals as rated by himself and other judges. This was a landmark accomplishment: "This work appears to constitute the first systematic collection and analysis of quantitative empirical data in the entire history of psychology" (McReynolds & Ludwig, 1984, p. 282).

Ratings scale slowly caught on in the years after their first serious use by Thomasius. Among those applying these new devices were phrenologists, including the renowned practitioner Orson Fowler. Phrenology is described in an earlier section of this chapter. Fowler depicted the application of seven-point rating scales in his *Practical Phrenology* (1851). The bulges in different areas of the skull were rated as 1, VERY SMALL; 2, SMALL; 3, MODERATE; 4, AVERAGE; 5, FULL; 6, LARGE; 7, VERY LARGE. From these ratings, the relative strengths of specific moral and intellectual qualities were presumed to be quantified.[2]

The use of ratings scale may have provided Fowler's practice of phrenology a facade of respectability. Even so, this did not prevent his arrest in 1886 for practicing medicine without a license (*New York Times,* January 17, 1886). According to the *Times* article:

> The phrenologist denies that he practices medicine and asserts that he has violated no law, that he is simply a phrenologist, and does not give remedies to persons who apply to him to have their craniums examined. There was quite a crowd of patrons in the Professor's anteroom at the hotel when the detective served the warrant. Prof. Fowler was held to await action by the Grand Jury, and released on his own recognizance.

Phrenology, which surrounded itself with the trappings of science, including models of the head and brain, authoritative pronouncements, and, yes, even ratings scales, phrenology which flourished into the early 1900s, eventually faded into disrepute.

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE 1800s

Many great inventions have been developed in response to the practical needs created by changes in societal values. Such is the case with intelligence tests. To be specific, the first such tests were developed by Binet in the early 1900s to help identify children in the Paris school system who were unlikely to profit from ordinary instruction. Prior to this time, there was little interest in the educational needs of children with mental retardation. A new humanism toward those with mental retardation thus created the practical problem—identifying those with special needs—that Binet's tests were to solve.

The Western world of the late 1800s was just emerging from centuries of indifference and hostility toward the psychiatrically and mentally impaired. Medical practitioners were just beginning to acknowledge a distinction between individuals with emotional disabilities and mental retardation. For centuries, all such social outcasts were given similar treatment. In the Middle Ages, they were occasionally "diagnosed" as witches and put to death by burning. Later on, they were alternately ignored, persecuted, or tortured. In his comprehensive history of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, Bromberg (1959)

[2]The common idiom "You should have your head examined" probably alludes to the (now discredited) practice of phrenology (Ammer, 2003).

has an especially graphic chapter on the various forms of maltreatment toward those with mental and emotional disabilities, from which only one example will be provided here. In 1698, a prominent physician wrote a gruesome book, *Flagellum Salutis,* in which beatings were advocated as treatment "in melancholia; in frenzy; in paralysis; in epilepsy; in facial expression of feebleminded" (Bromberg, 1959).

By the early 1800s, saner minds began to prevail. Medical practitioners realized that some of those with psychiatric impairment had reversible illnesses that did not necessarily imply diminished intellect, whereas other exceptional persons, those with mental retardation, showed a greater developmental continuity and invariably had impaired intellect. In addition, a newfound humanism began to influence social practices toward individuals with psychological and mental disabilities. With this humanism there arose a greater interest in the diagnosis and remediation of mental retardation. At the forefront of these developments were two French physicians, J. E. D. Esquirol and O. E. Seguin, each of whom revolutionized thinking about those with mental retardation, thereby helping to create the necessity for Binet's tests.

Esquirol and Diagnosis in Mental Retardation

Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, many physicians had begun to perceive the difference between mental retardation (then called *idiocy*) and mental illness (often referred to as *dementia*). J. E. D. Esquirol (1772–1840) was the first to formalize the difference in writing. His diagnostic breakthrough was noting that mental retardation was a lifelong developmental phenomenon, whereas mental illness usually had a more abrupt onset in adulthood. He thought that mental retardation was incurable, whereas mental illness might show improvement (Esquirol, 1845/1838).

Esquirol placed great emphasis on language skills in the diagnosis of mental retardation. This may offer a partial explanation as to why Binet's later tests and the modern-day descendents from them are so heavily loaded on linguistic abilities. After all, the original use of the Binet scales was, in the main, to identify children with mental retardation who would not likely profit from ordinary schooling.

Esquirol also proposed the first classification system in mental retardation and it should be no surprise that language skills were the main diagnostic criteria. He recognized three levels of mental retardation: (1) those using short phrases, (2) those using only monosyllables, and (3) those with cries only, no speech. Apparently, Esquirol did not recognize what we would now call *mild mental retardation,* instead providing criteria for the equivalents of the modern-day classifications of moderate, severe, and profound mental retardation.

Seguin and Education of Individuals with Mental Retardation

Perhaps more than any other pioneer in the field of mental retardation, O. Edouard Seguin (1812–1880) helped establish a new humanism toward those with mental retardation in the late 1800s. He had been a student of Esquirol and had also studied with J. M. G. Itard (1774–1838), who is well known for his five-year attempt to train the Wild Boy of Aveyron, a feral child who had lived in the woods for his first 11 or 12 years (Itard, 1932/1801).

Seguin borrowed from techniques used by Itard and devoted his life to developing educational programs for persons with mental retardation. As early as 1838, he had established an experimental class for such individuals. His treatment efforts earned him international acclaim and he eventually came to the United States to continue his work. In 1866, he published *Idiocy, and Its Treatment by the Physiological Method,* the first major textbook on the treatment of mental retardation. This book advocated a surprisingly modern approach to education of individuals with mental retardation and even touched on what would now be called *behavior modification.*

Such was the social and historical background that allowed intelligence tests to flourish. We turn now to the invention of the modern-day intelligence test by Alfred Binet. We begin with a discussion of the early influences that shaped his famous test.

INFLUENCE OF BINET'S EARLY RESEARCH ON HIS TEST

As most every student of psychology knows, Alfred Binet (1857–1911) invented the first modern intelligence test in 1905. What is less well known,

but equally important for those who seek an understanding of his contributions to modern psychology, is that Binet was a prolific researcher and author long before he turned his attentions to intelligence testing. The character of his early research had a material bearing on the subsequent form of his well-known intelligence test. For those who seek a full understanding of his pathbreaking influence, brief mention of Binet's early career is mandatory. For more details the reader can consult Fancher (1985), Goodenough (1949), Gould (1981), and Wolf (1973).

Binet began his career in medicine but was forced to drop out because of a complete emotional breakdown. He switched to psychology, where he studied the two-point threshold and dabbled in the associationist psychology of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Later, he selected an apprenticeship with the neurologist J. M. Charcot (1825–1893) at the famous Salpetriere Hospital. Thus, for a brief time Binet's professional path paralleled that of Sigmund Freud, who also studied hysteria under Charcot. At the Salpetriere Hospital, Binet coauthored (with C. Fere) four studies supposedly demonstrating that reversing the polarity of a magnet could induce complete mood changes (e.g., from happy to sad) or transfer of hysterical paralysis (e.g., from left to right side) in a single hypnotized subject. In response to public criticism from other psychologists, Binet later published a recantation of his findings. This was a painful episode for Binet, and it sent his career into a temporary detour. Nonetheless, he learned two things through his embarrassment. First, he never again used sloppy experimental procedures that allowed for unintentional suggestion to influence his results. Second, he became skeptical of the zeitgeist (spirit of the times) in experimental psychology. Both of these lessons were applied when he later developed his intelligence scales.

In 1891, Binet went to work at the Sorbonne as an unpaid assistant and began a series of studies and publications that were to define his new "individual psychology" and ultimately to culminate in his intelligence tests. Binet was an ardent experimentalist, often using his two daughters to try out existing and new tests of intelligence. Binet's experiments with his children greatly influenced his views on proper testing procedures:

> The experimenter is obliged, to a point, to adjust his method to the subject he is addressing. There are certain rules to follow when one experiments on a child, just as there are certain rules for adults, for hysterics, and for the insane. These rules are not written down anywhere; each one learns them for himself and is repaid in great measure. By making an error and later accounting for the cause, one learns not to make the mistake a second time. In regard to children, it is necessary to be suspicious of two principal causes of error: suggestion and failure of attention. This is not the time to speak on the first point. As for the second, failure of attention, it is so important that it is always necessary to suspect it when one obtains a negative result. One must then suspend the experiments and take them up at a more favorable moment, restarting them 10 times, 20 times, with great patience. Children, in fact, are often little disposed to pay attention to experiments which are not entertaining, and it is useless to hope that one can make them more attentive by threatening them with punishment. By particular tricks, however, one can sometimes give the experiment a certain appeal. (Binet, 1895, quoted in Pollack, 1971)

It is interesting to contrast modern-day testing practices—which go so far as to specify the exact wording the examiner should use—with Binet's advice to exercise nearly endless patience and use entertaining tricks when testing children.

BINET AND TESTING FOR HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES

In 1896, Binet and his Sorbonne assistant, Victor Henri, published a pivotal review of German and American work on individual differences. In this historically important paper, they argued that intelligence could be better measured by means of the higher psychological processes rather than the elementary sensory processes such as reaction time. After several false starts, Binet and Simon eventually settled on the straightforward format of their 1905 scales, discussed subsequently.

The character of the 1905 scale owed much to a prior test developed by Dr. Blin (1902) and his pupil, M. Damaye. They had attempted to improve the diagnosis of mental retardation by using a battery of assessments in 20 areas such as spoken language; knowledge of parts of the body; obedience to simple commands; naming common objects; and ability to read, write, and do simple arithmetic. Binet criticized the scale for being too subjective, for having items reflecting formal education, and for using a "yes or no" format on many questions (DuBois, 1970). But he was much impressed with the idea of using a battery of tests, a feature that he adopted in his 1905 scales.

In 1904, the Minister of Public Instruction in Paris appointed a commission to decide on the educational measures that should be undertaken with those children who could not profit from regular instruction. The commission concluded that medical and educational examinations should be used to identify those children who could not learn by the ordinary methods. Furthermore, it was determined that these children should be removed from their regular classes and given special instruction suitable to their more limited intellectual prowess. This was the beginning of the special education classroom.

It was evident that a means of selecting children for such special placement was needed, and Binet and his colleague Simon were called on to develop a practical tool for just this purpose. Thus arose the first formal scale for assessing the intelligence of children.

The 30 tests on the 1905 scale ranged from utterly simple sensory tests to quite complex verbal abstractions. Thus, the scale was appropriate for assessing the entire gamut of intelligence—from severe mental retardation to high levels of giftedness. The entire scale is outlined in Table 2.1.

Except for the very simplest tests, which were designed for the classification of very low-grade *idiots* (an unfortunate diagnostic term that has since been dropped), the tests were heavily weighted toward verbal skills, reflecting Binet's departure from the Galtonian tradition.

An interesting point that is often overlooked by contemporary students of psychology is that Binet and Simon did not offer a precise method for arriving at a total score on their 1905 scale. It is well to remember that their purpose was classification, not measurement, and that their motivation was entirely humanitarian, namely, to identify those children who needed special educational placement. By contemporary standards, it is difficult to accept the fuzziness inherent in such an approach, but that may reflect a modern penchant for quantification more than a weakness in the 1905 scale. In fact, their scale was popular among educators in Paris. And, even with the absence of precise quantification, the approach was successful in selecting candidates for special classes.

THE REVISED SCALES AND THE ADVENT OF IQ

In 1908, Binet and Simon published a revision of the 1905 scale. In the earlier scale, more than half the items had been designed for the very retarded, yet the major diagnostic decisions involved older children and those with borderline intellect. To remedy this imbalance, most of the very simple items were dropped and new items were added at the higher end of the scale. The 1908 scale had 58 problems or tests, almost double the number from 1905. Several new tests were added, many of which are still used today: reconstructing scrambled sentences, copying a diamond, and executing a sequence of three commands. Some of the items were absurdities that the children had to detect and explain. One such item was amusing to French children: "The body of an unfortunate girl was found, cut into 18 pieces. It is thought that she killed herself." However, this item was very upsetting to some American subjects, demonstrating the importance of cultural factors in intelligence (Fancher, 1985).

The major innovation of the 1908 scale was the introduction of the concept of mental level. The tests had been standardized on about 300 normal children between the ages of 3 and 13 years. This allowed Binet and Simon to order the tests according to the age level at which they were typically passed. Whichever items were passed by 80 to 90 percent of the 3-year-olds were placed in the 3-year level, and similarly on up to age 13. Binet and Simon also devised a rough scoring system whereby a basal age was

TABLE 2.1 The 1905 Binet-Simon Scale

1. Follows a moving object with the eyes.
2. Grasps a small object which is touched.
3. Grasps a small object which is seen.
4. Distinguishes between a square of chocolate and a square of wood.
5. Finds and eats a square of chocolate wrapped in paper.
6. Executes simple commands and imitates simple gestures.
7. Points to familiar named objects, e.g., "Where is your head?"
8. Points to objects shown in pictures, e.g., "Put your finger on the window."
9. Names objects in pictures, e.g., "What is this?" [examiner points to a picture of a dog].
10. Compares two lines of markedly unequal length.
11. Repeats three spoken digits.
12. Compares two weights.
13. Shows susceptibility to suggestion.
14. Defines common words by function.
15. Repeats a sentence of 15 words.
16. Tells how two common objects are different, e.g., "paper and cardboard."
17. Names from memory objects displayed on a board for 30 seconds. [Later dropped]
18. Reproduces from memory two designs shown for 10 seconds.
19. Repeats a longer series of digits than in item 11 to test immediate memory.
20. Tells how two common objects are alike, e.g., "butterfly and flea."
21. Compares two lines of slightly unequal length.
22. Compares five blocks to put them in order of weight.
23. Indicates which of the previous five weights the examiner has removed.
24. Produces rhymes, e.g., "What rhymes with 'school'?"
25. A word completion test based on those proposed by Ebbinghaus.
26. Puts three nouns, e.g., "Paris, river, fortune" in a sentence.
27. Responds to 25 abstract (comprehension) questions.
28. Reverses the hands of a clock.
29. After paper folding and cutting, draws the form of the resulting holes.
30. Defines abstract words by designating the difference between, e.g., "boredom and weariness."

Source: Based on Kite, E. (1916), *The development of intelligence in children,* Vineland, NJ: Vineland Training School.

first determined from the age level at which not more than one test was failed. For each five tests that were passed at levels above the basal, a full year of mental level was granted. Insofar as partial years of mental level were not credited and the various age levels had anywhere from three to eight tests, the method left much to be desired.

In 1911, a third revision of the Binet-Simon scales appeared. Each age level now had exactly five tests. The scale was also extended into the adult range. And with some reluctance, Binet introduced new scoring methods that allowed for one-fifth of a year for each subtest passed beyond the basal level. In his writings, Binet emphasized strongly that the

child's exact mental level should not be taken too seriously as an absolute measure of intelligence.

Nonetheless, the idea of deriving a mental level was a monumental development that was to influence the character of intelligence testing throughout the twentieth century. Within months, what Binet called mental level was being translated as mental age. And testers everywhere, including Binet himself, were comparing a child's mental age with the child's chronological age. Thus, a 9-year-old who was functioning at the mental level (or mental age) of a 6-year-old was retarded by three years. Very shortly, Stern (1912) pointed out that being retarded by three years had different meanings at different ages. A 5-year-old functioning at the 2-year-old level was more impaired than a 13-year-old functioning at the 10-year-old level. Stern suggested that an intelligence quotient computed from the mental age divided by the chronological age would give a better measure of the relative functioning of a subject compared to his or her same-aged peers.

In 1916, Terman and his associates at Stanford revised the Binet-Simon scales, producing the Stanford-Binet, a successful test that is discussed in a later chapter. Terman suggested multiplying the intelligence quotient by 100 to remove fractions; he was also the first person to use the abbreviation *IQ*. Thus was born one of the most popular and controversial concepts in the history of psychology. Binet died in 1911 before the IQ swept American testing, so we will never know what he would have thought of this new development based on his scales. However, Simon, his collaborator, later called the concept of IQ a "betrayal" of their scale's original objectives (Fancher, 1985, p. 104), and we can assume from Binet's humanistic concern that he might have held a similar opinion.

TOPIC 2B Testing from the Early 1900s to the Present

Early Uses and Abuses of Tests in the United States
Group Tests and the Classification of WWI Army Recruits
Early Educational Testing
The Development of Aptitude Tests
Personality and Vocational Testing after WWI
The Origins of Projective Testing
The Development of Interest Inventories
The Emergence of Structured Personality Tests
The Expansion and Proliferation of Testing
Evidence-Based Practice and Outcomes Assessment

The Binet-Simon scales helped solve a practical social quandary, namely, how to identify children who needed special schooling. With this successful application of a mental test, psychologists realized that their inventions could have pragmatic significance for many different segments of society. Almost immediately, psychologists in the United States adopted a utilitarian focus. Intelligence testing was embraced by many as a reliable and objective response to perceived social problems such as the identification of immigrants with mental retardation and the quick, accurate classification of Army recruits (Boake, 2002).

Whether these early tests really solved social dilemmas—or merely exacerbated them—is a fiercely debated issue reviewed in the following sections. One thing is certain: The profusion of tests developed early in the twentieth century helped shape the character of contemporary tests. A review of these historical trends will aid in the comprehension of the nature of modern tests and a better appreciation of the social issues raised by them.

EARLY USES AND ABUSES OF TESTS IN THE UNITED STATES

First Translation of the Binet-Simon Scale

In 1906, Henry H. Goddard was hired by the Vineland Training School in New Jersey to do research on the classification and education of "feebleminded" children. He soon realized that a diagnostic instrument would be required and was, therefore, pleased to read of the 1908 Binet-Simon scale. He quickly set about translating the scale, making minor changes so that it would be applicable to American children (Goddard, 1910a).

Goddard (1910b) tested 378 residents of the Vineland facility and categorized them by diagnosis and mental age. He classified 73 residents as *idiots* because their mental age was 2 years or lower; 205 residents were termed *imbeciles* with mental age of 3 to 7 years; and 100 residents were deemed *feebleminded* with mental age of 8 to 12 years. It is instructive to note that originally neutral and descriptive terms for portraying levels of mental retardation—idiot, imbecile, and feebleminded—have made their way into the everyday lexicon of pejorative labels. In fact, Goddard made his own contribution by coining the diagnostic term *moron* (from the Greek *moronia,* meaning "foolish").

Goddard (1911) also tested 1,547 normal children with his translation of the Binet-Simon scales. He considered children whose mental age was four or more years behind their chronological age to be feebleminded—these constituted 3 percent of his sample. Considering that all of these children were found outside of institutions for the retarded, 3 percent is rather an alarming rate of mental deficiency. Goddard (1911) was of the opinion that these children should be segregated so that they would be prevented from "contaminating society." These early

studies piqued Goddard's curiosity about "feebleminded" citizenry and the societal burdens they imposed. He also gained a reputation as one of the leading experts on the use of intelligence tests to identify persons with impaired intellect. His talents were soon in heavy demand.

The Binet-Simon and Immigration

In 1910, Goddard was invited to Ellis Island by the commissioner of immigration to help make the examination of immigrants more accurate. A dark and foreboding folklore had grown up around mental deficiency and immigration in the early 1900s:

> It was believed that the feebleminded were degenerate beings responsible for many if not most social problems; that they reproduced at an alarming rate and menaced the nation's overall biological fitness; and that their numbers were being incremented by undesirable "new" immigrants from southern and eastern European countries who had largely supplanted the "old" immigrants from northern and western Europe. (Gelb, 1986)

Initially, Goddard was unconcerned about the supposed threat of feeblemindedness posed by the immigrants. He wrote that adequate statistics did not exist and that the prevalent opinions about undue percentages of mentally defective immigrants were "grossly overestimated" (Goddard, 1912). However, with repeated visits to Ellis Island, Goddard became convinced that the rates of feeblemindedness were much higher than estimated by the physicians who staffed the immigration service. Within a year, he reversed his opinions entirely and called for congressional funding so that Ellis Island could be staffed with experts trained in the use of intelligence tests. In the following decade, Goddard became an apostle for the use of intelligence tests to identify feebleminded immigrants. Although he wrote that the rates of mentally deficient immigrants were "alarming," he did not join the popular call for immigration restriction (Gelb, 1986).

The story of Goddard and his concern for the "menace of feeblemindedness," as Gould (1981) has satirically put it, is often ignored or downplayed in books on psychological testing. The majority of textbooks on testing do not mention or refer to Goddard at all. The few books that do mention him usually state that Goddard "used the tests in institutions for the retarded," which is surely an understatement. In his influential *History of Psychological Testing,* DuBois (1970) has a portrait of Goddard but devotes less than one line of text to him.

The fact is that Goddard was one of the most influential American psychologists of the early 1900s. Any thoughtful person must, therefore, wonder why so many contemporary authors have ignored or slighted the person who first translated and applied Binet's tests in the United States. We will attempt an answer here, based in part on Goddard's original writing, but also relying on Gould's (1981) critique of Goddard's voluminous writings on mental deficiency and intelligence testing. We refer to Gelb's (1986) more sympathetic portrayal of Goddard as well.

Perhaps Goddard has been ignored in the textbooks because he was a strict hereditarian who conceived of intelligence in simpleminded Mendelian terms. No doubt his call for colonization of "morons" so as to restrict their breeding has won him contemporary disfavor as well. And his insistence that much undesirable behavior—crime, alcoholism, prostitution—was due to inherited mental deficiency also does not sit well with the modern environmentalist position.

However, the most likely reason that modern authors have ignored Goddard is that he exemplified a large number of early prominent psychologists who engaged in the blatant misuse of intelligence testing. In his efforts to demonstrate that high rates of immigrants with mental retardation were entering the United States each day, Goddard sent his assistants to Ellis Island to administer his English translation of the Binet-Simon tests to newly arrived immigrants. The tests were administered through a translator, not long after the immigrants walked ashore. We can guess that many of the immigrants were frightened, confused, and disoriented. Thus, a test devised in French, then translated to English was, in turn, retranslated back to Yiddish, Hungarian, Italian, or Russian; administered to bewildered farmers and laborers who had just endured an Atlantic crossing; and interpreted according to the original French norms.

What did Goddard find and what did he make of his results? In small samples of immigrants (22 to 50), his assistants found 83 percent of the Jews, 80 percent of the Hungarians, 79 percent of the Italians, and 87 percent of the Russians to be feebleminded, that is, below age 12 on the Binet-Simon scales (Goddard, 1917). His interpretation of these findings is, by turns, skeptically cautious and then provocatively alarmist. In one place he claims that his study "makes no determination of the actual percentage, even of these groups, who are feebleminded." Yet, later in the report he states that his figures would only need to be revised by "a relatively small amount" in order to find the actual percentages of feeblemindedness among immigrant groups. Furthermore, he concludes that the intelligence of the average immigrant is low, "perhaps of moron grade," but then goes on to cite environmental deprivation as the primary culprit. Simultaneously, Goddard appears to favor deportation for low IQ immigrants but also provides the humanitarian perspective that we might be able to use "moron laborers" if only "we are wise enough to train them properly."

There is much, much more to the Goddard era of early intelligence testing, and the interested reader is urged to consult Gould (1981) and Gelb (1986). The most important point that we wish to stress here is that—like many other early psychologists—Goddard's scholarly views were influenced by the social ideologies of his time. Finally, Goddard was a complex scholar who refined and contradicted his professional opinions on numerous occasions. One ironic example: After the damage was done and his writings had helped restrict immigration, Goddard (1928) recanted, concluding that feeblemindedness was not incurable and that the feebleminded did not need to be segregated in institutions.

The Goddard chapter in the history of testing serves as a reminder that even well-meaning persons operating within generally accepted social norms can misuse psychological tests. We need be ever mindful that disinterested "science" can be harnessed to the goals of a pernicious social ideology.

Testing for Giftedness: Leta Stetter Hollingworth

One of the earliest uses of IQ tests like the Stanford-Binet was testing for giftedness. A pioneer in this application was Leta Stetter Hollingworth (1886–1939) who spent her short career (she died of cancer at the age of 53) focusing on the psychology of genius. In one study, Hollingworth (1928) demonstrated that children of high genius (Stanford-Binet IQs hovering around 165) showed significantly greater school achievement than those of mere ordinary genius (IQs clustering around 146). In another study, she dispelled the belief, common at the time, that gifted children should not be moved ahead in school because they would lag behind older children in penmanship and other motor skills (Hollingworth & Monahan, 1926). In yet another study, she found that highly gifted adolescents were judged by total strangers to be significantly better looking than matched controls of the same age (Hollingworth, 1935).

Hollingworth was a prolific researcher who advanced the science of IQ testing. Being an idealist, she was ahead of her time. She proposed a revolving fund from which gifted children could draw for their development, with the moral (but not legal) obligation to pay the money back in 20 years. She surmised that such a fund would grow exponentially over the decades and benefit the nation in unforeseeable ways (H. Hollingworth, 1943). Unfortunately, this remarkable plan never came to fruition.

Hollingworth also was a feminist who attributed gender differences in eminence and achievement to social and cultural impacts:

> It is undesirable to seek for the cause of sex differences in eminence in ultimate and obscure affective and intellectual differences until we have exhausted as a cause the known, obvious, and inescapable fact that women bear and rear the children, and that this has had as an inevitable sequel the occupation of housekeeping, a field where eminence is not possible. As a corollary it may be added that . . . It is desirable, for both the enrichment of society and the peace of individuals, that women may find a way to vary from their mode as men do, and yet procreate. Such a course is at present hindered by individual prejudice, poverty, and the enactment of legal measures. But public expectation will slowly change, as the conditions that generated that expectation have

> already changed, and in another century the solution to this problem will have been found. (Hollingworth, 1914, p. 529)

It is now a century, more or less, since Hollingworth's proclamation. Gender differences in eminence and achievement still exist, but they have been greatly reduced.

The Stanford-Binet: The Early Mainstay of IQ

Although it was Goddard who first translated the Binet scales in the United States, it was Stanford professor Lewis M. Terman (1857–1956) who popularized IQ testing with his revision of the Binet scales in 1916. The new Stanford-Binet, as it was called, was a substantial revision, not just an extension, of the earlier Binet scales. Among the many changes that led to the unquestioned prestige of the Stanford-Binet was the use of the now familiar IQ for expressing test results. The number of items was increased to 90, and the new scale was suitable for those with mental retardation, children, and both normal and "superior" adults. In addition, the Stanford-Binet had clear and well-organized instructions for administration and scoring. Great care had been taken in securing a representative sample of subjects for use in the standardization of the test. As Goodenough (1949) notes: "The publication of the Stanford Revision marked the end of the initial period of experimentation and uncertainty. Once and for all, intelligence testing had been put on a firm basis."

The Stanford-Binet was the standard of intelligence testing for decades. New tests were always validated in terms of their correlations with this measure. It continued its preeminence through revisions in 1937 and 1960, by which time the Wechsler scales (Wechsler, 1949, 1955) had begun to compete with it. The latest revision of the Stanford-Binet was completed in 2003. This test and the Wechsler scales are discussed in detail in a later chapter. It is worth mentioning here that the Wechsler scales became a quite popular alternative to the Stanford-Binet mainly because they provided more than just an IQ score. In addition to Full Scale IQ, the Wechsler scales provided 10 to 12 subtest scores and a Verbal and Performance IQ. By contrast, the earlier versions of the Stanford-Binet supplied only a single overall summary score, the global IQ.

GROUP TESTS AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF WWI ARMY RECRUITS

Given the American penchant for efficiency, it was only natural that researchers would seek group mental tests to supplement the relatively time-consuming individual intelligence tests imported from France. Among the first to develop group tests was Pyle (1913), who published schoolchildren norms for a battery consisting of such well-worn measures as memory span, digit-symbol substitution, and oral word association (quickly writing down words in response to a stimulus word). Pintner (1917) revised and expanded Pyle's battery, adding to it a timed cancellation test in which the child crossed out the letter *a* wherever it appeared in a body of text.

But group tests were slow to catch on, partly because the early versions still had to be scored laboriously by hand. The idea of a completely objective test with a simple scoring key was inconsistent with tests such as logical memory for which the judgment of the examiner was required in scoring. Most amazing of all—at least to anyone who has spent any time as a student in American schools—the multiple-choice question was not yet in general use.

The slow pace of developments in group testing picked up dramatically as the United States entered World War I in 1917. It was then that Robert M. Yerkes, a well-known psychology professor at Harvard, convinced the U.S. government and the Army that all of its 1.75 million recruits should be given intelligence tests for purposes of classification and assignment (Yerkes, 1919). Immediately upon being commissioned into the Army as a colonel, Yerkes assembled a Committee on the Examination of Recruits, which met at the Vineland school in New Jersey to develop the new group tests for the assessment of Army recruits. Yerkes chaired the committee; other famous members included Goddard and Terman.

Two group tests emerged from this collaboration: the Army Alpha and the Army Beta. It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of the

Alpha and Beta on subsequent intelligence tests. The format and content of these tests inspired developments in group and individual testing for decades to come. We discuss these tests in some detail so that the reader can appreciate their influence on modern intelligence tests.

The Army Alpha and Beta Examinations

The Alpha was based on the then unpublished work of Otis (1918) and consisted of eight verbally loaded tests for average and high-functioning recruits. The eight tests were (1) following oral directions, (2) arithmetical reasoning, (3) practical judgment, (4) synonym–antonym pairs, (5) disarranged sentences, (6) number series completion, (7) analogies, and (8) information. Figure 2.1 lists some typical items from the Army Alpha examination.

The Army Beta was a nonverbal group test designed for use with illiterates and recruits whose first language was not English. It consisted of various visual-perceptual and motor tests such as tracing a path through mazes and visualizing the correct number of blocks depicted in a three-dimensional drawing. Figure 2.2 depicts the blackboard demonstrations for all eight parts of the Beta examination.

In order to accommodate illiterate subjects and recent immigrants who did not comprehend English, Yerkes instructed the examiners to use largely pictorial and gestural methods for explaining the tests to the prospective Army recruits. The examiner and an assistant stood atop a platform at the front of the class and engaged in pantomime to explain each of the eight tests.

The Army testing was intended to help segregate and eliminate the mentally incompetent, to classify men according to their mental ability, and to assist in the placement of competent men in responsible positions (Yerkes, 1921). However, it is not really clear whether the Army made much use of the masses of data supplied by Yerkes and his eager assistants. A careful reading of his memoirs reveals that Yerkes did little more than produce favorable testimonials from high-ranking officers. In the main, his memoirs say that the Army could have saved millions of dollars and increased its efficiency if the testing data had been used.

To some extent, the mountains of test data had little practical impact on the efficiency of the Army because of the resistance of the military mind to scientific innovation. However, it is also true that the Army brass had good reason to doubt the validity of the test results. For example, an internal memorandum described the use of pantomime in the instructions to the nonverbal Beta examination:

> For the sake of making results from the various camps comparable, the examiners were ordered to follow a certain detailed and specific series of ballet antics, which had not only the merit of being perfectly incomprehensible and unrelated to mental testing, but also lent a highly confusing and distracting mystical atmosphere to the whole performance, effectually preventing all approach to the attitude in which a subject should be while having his soul tested. (cited in Samelson, 1977)

In addition, the testing conditions left much to be desired, with wave upon wave of recruits ushered in one door, tested, and virtually shoved out the other side. Tens of thousands of recruits received a literal zero for many subtests, not because they were retarded but because they couldn't fathom the instructions to these enigmatic new instruments. Many recruits fell asleep while the testers gave esoteric and mysterious pantomime instructions.

On the positive side, the Army testing provided psychologists with a tremendous amount of experience in the psychometrics of test construction. Thousands of correlation coefficients were computed, including the prominent use of multiple correlations in the analysis of test data. Test construction graduated from an art to a science in a few short years.

EARLY EDUCATIONAL TESTING

For good or for ill, Yerkes's grand scheme for testing Army recruits helped to usher in the era of group tests. After World War I, inquiries rushed in from industry, public schools, and colleges about the potential

FOLLOWING ORAL DIRECTIONS

Mark a cross in the first and also the third circle:

○ ○ ○ ○ ○

ARITHMETICAL REASONING

Solve each problem:

How many men are 5 men and 10 men? Answer ( )

If 3 1/2 tons of coal cost $21, what will 5 1/2 tons cost? Answer ( )

PRACTICAL JUDGMENT

Why are high mountains covered with snow? Because

- ☐ they are near the clouds
- ☐ the sun shines seldom on them
- ☐ the air is cold there

SYNONYM–ANTONYM PAIRS

Are these words the same or opposite?

largess—donation same? or opposite?

accumulate—dissipate same? or opposite?

DISARRANGED SENTENCES

Can these words be rearranged to form a sentence?

envy bad malice traits are and true? or false?

NUMBER SERIES COMPLETION

Complete the series: 3 6 8 16 18 36 . . . . . .

ANALOGIES

Which choice completes the analogy?

tears—sorrow :: laughter— joy smile girls grin

granary—wheat :: library— desk books paper librarian

INFORMATION

Choose the best alternative:

The pancreas is in the abdomen head shoulder neck

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought in 1863 1813 1778 1812

FIGURE 2.1 Sample Items from the Army Alpha Examination *Source:* Reprinted from Yerkes, R. M. (Ed.). (1921). *Psychological examining in the United States Army. Memoirs the National Academy of Sciences, Volume 15.* With permission from the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.

Note: Examinees received verbal instructions for each subtest.

applications of these straightforward tests that almost anyone could administer and score (Yerkes, 1921). The psychologists who had worked with Yerkes soon left the service and carried with them to industry and education their newfound notion of paper-and-pencil tests of intelligence.



FIGURE 2.2 The Blackboard Demonstrations for All Eight Parts of the Beta Examination *Source:* Reprinted from Yerkes, R. M. (Ed.). (1921). *Psychological examining in the United States Army. Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, Volume 15.* With permission from the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.

The Army Alpha and Beta were also released for general use. These tests quickly became the prototypes for a large family of group tests and influenced the character of intelligence tests, college entrance examinations, scholastic achievement tests, and aptitude tests. To cite just one specific consequence of the Army testing, the National Research Council, a government organization of scientists, devised the National Intelligence Test, which was eventually given to 7 million children in the United States during the 1920s. Thus, such well-known tests as the Wechsler scales, the Scholastic Aptitude Tests, and the Graduate Record Exam actually have roots that reach back to Yerkes, Otis, and the mass testing of Army recruits during World War I.

The College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) was established at the turn of the twentieth century to help avoid duplication in the testing of applicants to U.S. colleges. The early exams had been of the short answer essay format, but this was to change quickly when C. C. Brigham, a disciple of Yerkes, became CEEB secretary after World War I. In 1925, the College Board decided to construct a scholastic aptitude test for use in college admissions (Goslin, 1963). The new tests reflected the now familiar objective format of unscrambling sentences, completing analogies, and filling in the next number in a sequence. Machine scoring was introduced in the 1930s, making objective group tests even more efficient than before. These tests then evolved into the present College Board tests, in particular, the Scholastic Aptitude Tests, now known as the Scholastic Assessment Tests.

The functions of the CEEB were later subsumed under the nonprofit Educational Testing Service (ETS). The ETS directed the development, standardization, and validation of such well-known tests as the Graduate Record Examination, the Law School Admissions Test, and the Peace Corps Entrance Tests.

Meanwhile, Terman and his associates at Stanford were busy developing standardized achievement tests. The Stanford Achievement Test (SAchT) was first published in 1923; a modern version of it is still in wide use today. From the very beginning, the SAchT incorporated such modern psychometric principles as norming the subtests so that within-subject variability could be assessed and selecting a very large and representative standardization sample.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF APTITUDE TESTS

Aptitude tests measure more specific and delimited abilities than intelligence tests. Traditionally, intelligence tests assess a more global construct such as general intelligence, although there are exceptions to this trend that will be discussed later. By contrast, a single aptitude test will measure just one ability domain, and a multiple aptitude test battery will provide scores in several distinctive ability areas.

The development of aptitude tests lagged behind that of intelligence tests for two reasons, one statistical, the other social. The statistical problem was that a new technique, factor analysis, was often needed to discern which aptitudes were primary and, therefore, distinct from each other. Research on this question had been started quite early by Spearman (1904) but was not refined until the 1930s (Spearman, 1927; Kelley, 1928; Thurstone, 1938). This new family of techniques, factor analysis, allowed Thurstone to conclude that there were specific factors of primary mental ability such as verbal comprehension, word fluency, number facility, spatial ability, associative memory, perceptual speed, and general reasoning (Thurstone, 1938; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941). More will be said about this in the later chapters on intelligence and ability testing. The important point here is that Thurstone and his followers thought that global measures of intelligence did not, so to speak, "cut nature at its joints." As a result, it was felt that such measures as the Stanford-Binet were not as useful as multiple aptitude test batteries in determining a person's intellectual strengths and weaknesses.

The second reason for the slow growth of aptitude batteries was the absence of a practical application for such refined instruments. It was not until World War II that a pressing need arose to select candidates who were highly qualified for very difficult and specialized tasks. The job requirements of pilots, flight engineers, and navigators were very specific and demanding. A general estimate of intellectual ability,

such as provided by the group intelligence tests used in World War I, was not sufficient to choose good candidates for flight school. The armed forces solved this problem by developing a specialized aptitude battery of 20 tests that was administered to men who passed preliminary screening tests. These measures proved invaluable in selecting pilots, navigators, and bombadiers, as reflected in the much lower washout rates of men selected by test battery instead of the old methods (Goslin, 1963). Such tests are still used widely in the armed services.

PERSONALITY AND VOCATIONAL TESTING AFTER WWI

Although such rudimentary assessment methods as the free association technique had been used before the turn of the twentieth century by Galton, Kraepelin, and others, it was not until World War I that personality tests emerged in a form resembling their contemporary appearance. As has happened so often in the history of testing, it was once again a practical need that served as the impetus for this new development. Modern personality testing began when Woodworth attempted to develop an instrument for detecting Army recruits who were susceptible to psychoneurosis. Virtually all the modern personality inventories, schedules, and questionnaires owe a debt to Woodworth's Personal Data Sheet (1919).

The Personal Data Sheet consisted of 116 questions that the subject was to answer by underlining *Yes* or *No*. The questions were exclusively of the "face obvious" variety and, for the most part, involved fairly serious symptomatology. Representative items included:

- Do ideas run through your head so that you cannot sleep?
- Were you considered a bad boy?
- Are you bothered by a feeling that things are not real?
- Do you have a strong desire to commit suicide?

Readers familiar with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) must surely recognize the debt that this more recent inventory has to Woodworth's instrument.

The next major development was an inventory of neurosis, the Thurstone Personality Schedule (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1930). After first culling hundreds of items answerable in the yes-no? manner from Woodworth's inventory and other sources, Thurstone rationally keyed items in terms of how the neurotic would typically answer them. Reflecting Thurstone's penchant for statistical finesse, this inventory was one of the first to use the method of internal consistency whereby each prospective item was correlated with the total score on the tentatively identified scale to determine whether it belonged on the scale.

From the Thurstone test sprang the Bernreuter Personality Inventory (Bernreuter, 1931). It was a little more refined than its Thurstone predecessor, measuring four personality dimensions: neurotic tendency, self-sufficiency, introversion-extroversion, and dominance-submission. A major innovation in test construction was that a single test item could contribute to more than one scale.

Any chronology of self-report inventories must surely include the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940). This test and its revision, the MMPI-2, are discussed in detail later. It will suffice for now to point out that the scales of the MMPI were constructed by the method that Woodworth pioneered, contrasting the responses of normal and psychiatrically disturbed subjects. In addition, the MMPI introduced the use of validity scales to determine fake bad, fake good, and random response patterns.

THE ORIGINS OF PROJECTIVE TESTING

The projective approach originated with the word association method pioneered by Francis Galton in the late 1800s. Galton gave himself four seconds to come up with as many associations as possible to a stimulus word and then categorized his associations as parrotlike, image-mediated, or histrionic representations. This latter category convinced him that mental operations "sunk wholly below the level of consciousness" were at play. Some historians have even speculated that Freud's application of free association as a therapeutic tool in psychoanalysis sprang from Galton's paper published in *Brain* in 1879 (Forrest, 1974).

Galton's work was continued in Germany by Wundt and Kraepelin and finally brought to fruition by Jung (1910). Jung's test consisted of 100 stimulus words. For each word, the subject was to reply as quickly as possible with the first word coming to mind. Kent and Rosanoff (1910) gave the association method a distinctively American flavor by tabulating the reactions of 1,000 normal subjects to a list of 100 stimulus words. These tables were designed to provide a basis for comparing the reactions of normal and "insane" subjects.

While the Americans were pursuing the empirical approach to objective personality testing, a young Swiss psychiatrist, Hermann Rorschach (1884–1922), was developing a completely different vehicle for studying personality. Rorschach was strongly influenced by Jungian and psychoanalytic thinking, so it was natural that his new approach focused on the tendency of patients to reveal their innermost conflicts unconsciously when responding to ambiguous stimuli. The Rorschach and other projective tests discussed subsequently were predicated on the projective hypothesis: When responding to ambiguous or unstructured stimuli, we inadvertently disclose our innermost needs, fantasies, and conflicts.

Rorschach was convinced that people revealed important personality dimensions in their responses to inkblots. He spent years developing just the right set of 10 inkblots and systematically analyzed the responses of personal friends and different patient groups (Rorschach, 1921). Unfortunately, he died only a year after his monograph was published, and it was up to others to complete his work. Developments in the Rorschach are reviewed later in the text.

Whereas Rorschach's test was originally developed to reveal the innermost workings of the abnormal subject, the TAT, or Thematic Apperception Test (Morgan & Murray, 1935), was developed as an instrument to study normal personality. Of course, both have since been expanded for testing with the entire continuum of human behavior.

The TAT consists of a series of pictures that largely depict one or more persons engaged in an ambiguous interaction. The subject is shown one picture at a time and told to make up a story about it. He or she is instructed to be as dramatic as possible, to discuss thoughts and feelings, and to describe the past, present, and future of what is depicted in the picture.

Murray (1938) believed that underlying personality needs, such as the need for achievement, would be revealed by the contents of the stories. Although numerous scoring systems were developed, clinicians in the main have relied on an impressionistic analysis to make sense of TAT protocols. Modern applications of the TAT are discussed in a later chapter.

The sentence completion technique was also begun during this era with the work of Payne (1928). There have been numerous extensions and variations on the technique, which consists of giving subjects a stem such as "I am bored when ———," and asking them to complete the sentence. Some modern applications are discussed later, but it can be mentioned now that the problem of scoring and interpretation, which vexed early sentence completion test developers, is still with us today.

An entirely new approach to projective testing was taken by Goodenough (1926), who tried to determine not just intellectual level but also the interests and personality traits of children by analyzing their drawings. Buck's (1948) test, the House-Tree-Person, was a little more standardized and structured and required the subject to draw a house, a tree, and a person. Machover's (1949) *Personality Projection in the Drawing of the Human Figure* was the logical extension of the earlier work. Figure drawing as a projective approach to understanding personality is still used today, and a later chapter discusses modern developments in this practice.

Meanwhile, projective testing in Europe was dominated by the Szondi Test, a wacky instrument based on wholly faulty premises. Lipot Szondi was a Hungarian-born Swiss psychiatrist who believed that major psychiatric disorders were caused by recessive genes. His test consisted of 48 photographs of psychiatric patients divided into six sets of the following eight types: homosexual, epileptic, sadistic, hysteric, catatonic, paranoiac, manic, and depressive (Deri, 1949). From each set of eight pictures, the subject was instructed to select the two pictures he or she liked best and the two disliked most. A person who consistently preferred one kind of picture

in the six sets was presumed to have some recessive genes that made him or her have sympathy for the pictured person. Thus, projective preferences were presumed to reveal recessive genes predisposing the individual to specific psychiatric disturbances.

Deri (1949) imported the test to the United States and changed the rationale. She did not argue for a recessive genetic explanation of picture choice but explained such preferences on the basis of unconscious identification with the characteristics of the photographed patients. This was a more palatable theoretical basis for the test than the dubious genetic theories of Szondi. Nonetheless, empirical research cast doubt on the validity of the Szondi Test, and it shortly faded into oblivion.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST INVENTORIES

While the clinicians were developing measures for analyzing personality and unconscious conflicts, other psychologists were devising measures for guidance and counseling of the masses of more normal persons. Chief among such measures was the interest inventory, which has roots going back to Thorndike's (1912) study of developmental trends in the interests of 100 college students. In 1919–1920, Yoakum developed a pool of 1,000 items relating to interests from childhood through early maturity (DuBois, 1970). Many of these items were incorporated in the Carnegie Interest Inventory. Cowdery (1926–1927) improved and refined previous work on the Carnegie instrument by increasing the number of items, comparing responses of three criterion groups (doctors, engineers, and lawyers) with control groups of nonprofessionals, and developing a weighting formula for items. He was also the first psychometrician to realize the importance of cross validation. He tested his new scales on additional groups of doctors, engineers, and lawyers to ensure that the discriminations found in the original studies were reliable group differences rather than capitalizations on error variance.

Edward K. Strong (1884–1963) revised Cowdery's test and devoted 36 years to the development of empirical keys for the modified instrument known as the Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB). Persons taking the test could be scored on separate keys for several dozen occupations, providing a series of scores of immeasurable value in vocational guidance. The SVIB became one of the most widely used tests of all time (Strong, 1927). Its modern version, the Strong Interest Inventory, is still widely used by guidance counselors.

For decades the only serious competitor to the SVIB was the Kuder Preference Record (Kuder, 1934). The Kuder differed from the Strong by forcing choices within triads of items. The Kuder was an ipsative test; that is, it compared the relative strength of interests within the individual, rather than comparing his or her responses to various professional groups. More recent revisions of the Kuder Preference Record include the Kuder General Interest Survey and the Kuder Occupational Interest Survey (Kuder, 1966; Kuder & Diamond, 1979).

THE EMERGENCE OF STRUCTURED PERSONALITY TESTS

Beginning in the 1940s, personality tests began to flourish as useful tools for clinical evaluation and also for assessment of the normal spectrum of functioning. The most respected and highly researched device of this genre is the MMPI, initially conceived to facilitate psychiatric diagnosis (Hathaway & McKinley, 1940, 1942, 1943). Subsequently, applications of this empirically based true-false inventory have expanded to include assessment of personal and social adjustment, preemployment screening of individuals in high-risk law enforcement positions, testing of patients in medical and substance abuse settings, evaluation of persons in forensic or courtroom proceedings, and appraisal of college students for career counseling (Butcher, 2005). Many other useful tests followed alongside this pathbreaking measure, now in its second edition (MMPI-2). Some widely used alternative tests include the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), a test derived from factor analysis, useful in the evaluation of normal and abnormal personality; the California Psychological Inventory (CPI, Gough, 1987) a spinoff from the MMPI that measures folk concepts like responsibility, dominance, tolerance, and flexibility; and,

the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers & McCaulley, 1985), a self-report inventory based on Carl Jung's theory of personality types. The MBTI is widely used in corporate settings.

More recently, some personality tests demonstrate allegiance to a theory known as the "big 5" model, which is commonly viewed as the consensus model of personality (Goldberg, 1990). According to this approach, five factors of personality are sufficient to capture the important domains of individual functioning. These factors are neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. We discuss the five-factor model in Chapter 8, Foundations of Personality Testing. Well respected tests loyal to this approach include the NEO-Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the Five-Factor Personality Inventory (FFPI, Hendriks, Hofstee, & De Raad, 1999), and the NEO-Personality Inventory-3 (Costa, McCrae, & Martin, 2005).

Tens of millions of individuals undergo personality testing each year. According to its publisher, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is given to more than 1.5 million individuals annually, including employees of most Fortune 500 companies. Worldwide, an estimated 15 million persons take the MMPI in its different versions each year (MMPI-A, for adolescents, MMPI-2, for adults) (Paul, 2004). The test has been translated with wild profusion into dozens of languages (Butcher, 2000). Another widely translated test is the 16 Personality Factor (16PF), which has been adapted into 35 languages. In each setting, the test is interpreted according to local norms (Cattell & Mead, 2008). Although exact figures are not available, beyond a doubt the 16PF is taken by millions of individuals annually.

THE EXPANSION AND PROLIFERATION OF TESTING

In the twenty-first century, the reach of testing continues to increase, both in one-to-one clinical uses and in group testing for societal applications. Regarding one-to-one assessment, clinical psychology has spawned several new specialties, each requiring innovative approaches to testing. For example, once merely an area of focus within psychological practice, clinical neuropsychology is now a well-defined domain of expertise with specialized tests used mainly by those with proper credentials. In a massive tome that runs to 1,240 pages, Strauss, Sherman, and Spreen (2006) provide norms and commentary for nearly 100 neuropsychological tests and scales. Health psychology is another emerging specialty that has generated many new tests, as evidenced by the twin volumes *Measuring Health* and *Measuring Disease* (Bowling, 1997, 2001). These books detail hundreds of measures of health status and illness, including tests of well-being, quality of life measures, and disease impact scales. Additional specialties, each with a panoply of new tests, include child clinical psychology, forensic psychology, and industrial-organizational psychology. The number of available tests for individual clinical assessment surely must number in the many thousands.

Group testing for broad social purposes such as educational assessment, entry to college and graduate school, and certification in the professions also continues to expand. Testing is probably more widely used and more important now than at any time in history. Consider just one arena for group testing, the millions of standardized tests administered every year in public school systems. According to FairTest, a national advocacy group for fair and open testing, more than 100 million standardized tests—including achievement, IQ, screening, and readiness tests—were given in America's public schools in 2007 (www.fairtest.org/testing-explosion-0). Regarding group testing for college and graduate school admissions, based on relevant websites, more than 3 million students take the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) each year, and more than 600,000 thousand students complete the Graduate Record Exam each year. Many tens of thousands of applicants also take specialized tests for professional training like the MCAT (Medical College Admissions Test), the LSAT (Law School Admissions Test), and the GMAT (Graduate Management Admissions Test).

EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE AND OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT

Evidence-based practice is an important trend in health care, education, and other fields. This recent movement will greatly boost the need for assessment with tests and outcome measures. According to the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2001), evidence-based practice is "the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values (p. 147)." The advance of evidence-based practice is part of a worldwide trend to require proof that treatments and interventions yield *measurable* positive outcomes. Of course, whenever measurement is needed, psychological tests often are the best alternative. In education, for example, recent federal legislation such as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act (2001), which promotes standards-based educational change, absolutely requires regular academic achievement testing with validated instruments. In 2012, a revised version of NCLB was reauthorized. This law likely will remain a driving force behind increased educational assessment for years to come.

In psychology, the evidence-based movement has led to evidence-based psychological practice (EBPP), which mandates the practice of empirically supported interventions (APA Task Force, 2006). EBPP also involves the use of outcomes assessment with psychotherapy patients. Increasingly, insurance companies require periodic assessments with short, simple outcome measures as a condition for ongoing reimbursement. EBPP is here to stay. It will promote increased testing with brief measures such as the Outcome Rating Scale (ORS, Miller & Duncan, 2000), an index of a patient's current functioning. The ORS is a visual analogue scale consisting of four 10-centimeter lines, each representing a bipolar dimension of well-being (individual, interpersonal, social, and general). The patient merely places a hash mark on each line. The distance from the starting point in centimeters is the score for each dimension. These scores are summed to obtain the total score, which can range from 0 to 40. The scale takes less than a minute to complete, and provides a surprisingly reliable and valid index of current functioning (Miller, Duncan, Brown, Sparks, & Claud, 2003).

We conclude this chapter on origins of psychological testing by referring the reader to the brief tabular summary of landmark events found in Appendix A at the end of the book.

CHAPTER 3

Norms and Reliability

TOPIC 3A Norms and Test Standardization

Raw Scores
Essential Statistical Concepts
Raw Score Transformations
Selecting a Norm Group
Criterion-Referenced Tests

This chapter concerns two basic concepts needed to facilitate the examiner's interpretation of test scores: Norms and Reliability. In most cases, scores on psychological tests are interpreted by reference to norms that are based on the distribution of scores obtained by a representative sample of examinees. In Topic 3A, Norms and Test Standardization, we review the process of standardizing a test against an appropriate norm group so that test users can make sense out of individual test scores. Since the utility of a test score is also determined by the consistency or repeatability of test results, we introduce the essentials of reliability theory and measurement in Topic 3B, Concepts of Reliability. The next chapter flows logically from the material presented here and investigates the complex issues of validity—does a test measure what it is supposed to measure? First, we begin with the more straightforward issues of establishing a comparative frame of reference (norms) and determining the consistency or repeatability of test results (reliability).

The initial outcome of testing is typically a raw score such as the total number of personality statements endorsed in a particular direction or the total number of problems solved correctly, perhaps with bonus points added in for quick solutions. In most cases, the initial score is useless by itself. For test results to be meaningful, examiners must be able to convert the initial score to some form of derived score based on comparison to a standardization or norm group. The vast majority of tests are interpreted by comparing individual results to a norm group performance; criterion-referenced tests are an exception, discussed subsequently.

A **norm group** consists of a sample of examinees who are representative of the population for whom the test is intended. Consider a word knowledge test designed for use with prospective first-year college students. In this case, the performance of a large, heterogeneous, nationwide sampling of such persons might be collected for purposes of standardization. The essential objective of test standardization is to determine the distribution of raw scores in the norm group so that the test developer can publish derived scores known as norms. Norms come in many varieties, for example, percentile ranks, age equivalents, grade equivalents, or standard scores, as

discussed in the following. In general, norms indicate an examinee's standing on the test relative to the performance of other persons of the same age, grade, sex, and so on.

To be effective, norms must be obtained with great care and constructed according to well-known precepts discussed in the following. Furthermore, norms may become outmoded in just a few years, so periodic renorming of tests should be the rule, not the exception. We approach the topic of norms indirectly, first providing the reader with a discussion of raw scores and then reviewing statistical concepts essential to an understanding of norms.

RAW SCORES

The most basic level of information provided by a psychological test is the **raw score**. For example, in personality testing, the raw score is often the number of questions answered in the keyed direction for a specific scale. In ability testing, the raw score commonly consists of the number of problems answered correctly, often with bonus points added for quick performance. Thus, the initial outcome of testing is almost always a numerical tally such as 17 out of 44 items answered in the keyed direction on a depression scale, or 29 of 55 raw score points earned on the block design subscale of an intelligence test.

However, it should be obvious to the reader that raw scores, in isolation, are absolutely meaningless. For example, what use is it to know that a subject correctly solved 12 of 20 abstract reasoning questions? What does it mean that an examinee responded in the keyed direction to 19 out of 33 true-false questions from a psychological-mindedness scale?

It is difficult to even think about such questions without resorting to comparisons of one variety or another. We want to know how others have done on these tests, whether the observed scores are high or low in comparison to a representative group of subjects. In the case of ability tests, we are curious whether the questions were easy or hard, especially in relation to the age of the subject.

In fact, it seems almost a truism that a raw score becomes meaningful mainly in relation to norms, an independently established frame of reference derived from a standardization sample. We have much to say about the derivation and use of norms later in this unit. For now it will suffice to know that norms are empirically established by administering a test to a large and representative sample of persons. An examinee's score is then compared to the distribution of scores obtained by the standardization sample. In this manner, we determine from the norms whether an obtained score is low, average, or high.

The vast majority of psychological tests are interpreted by consulting norms; as noted, these instruments are called *norm-referenced tests.* However, the reader is reminded that other kinds of instruments do exist. In particular, criterion-referenced tests help determine whether a person can accomplish an objectively defined criterion such as adding pairs of two-digit numbers with 97 percent accuracy. In the case of criterion-referenced tests, norms are not essential. We elaborate on criterion-referenced tests at the end of this topic.

There are many different kinds of norms, but they share one characteristic: Each incorporates a statistical summary of a large body of scores. Thus, in order to understand norms, the reader needs to master elementary descriptive statistics. We take a modest digression here to review essential statistical concepts.

ESSENTIAL STATISTICAL CONCEPTS

Suppose for the moment that we have access to a high-level vocabulary test appropriate for testing the verbal skills of college professors and other professional persons (Gregory & Gernert, 1990). The test is a multiple-choice quiz of 30 difficult words such as *welkin, halcyon,* and *mellifluous.* A curious professor takes the test and chooses the correct alternative for 17 of the 30 words. She asks how her score compares to others of similar academic standing. How might we respond to her question?

One manner of answering the query would be to give her a list of the raw scores from the preliminary standardization sample of 100 representative professors at her university (Table 3.1). However, even with this relatively small norm sample (thousands of subjects is more typical), the list of test scores is an overpowering display.

TABLE 3.1 Raw Scores of 100 Professors on a 30-Item Vocabulary Test

6,	10,	16,	16,	17,	14,	19,	14,	16,	15
17,	17,	19,	20,	20,	22,	17,	24,	14,	25
13,	20,	11,	20,	21,	11,	20,	16,	18,	12
13,	7,	20,	27,	21,	7,	15,	18,	18,	25
20,	27,	28,	13,	21,	17,	12,	18,	12,	15
9,	24,	25,	9,	17,	17,	9,	19,	24,	15
20,	21,	22,	12,	21,	12,	19,	19,	23,	16
8,	12,	12,	17,	13,	19,	13,	11,	16,	16
7,	19,	14,	17,	19,	14,	18,	15,	15,	15
14,	14,	17,	18,	18,	22,	11,	15,	13,	9

Source: Based on data from Gregory, R. J., & Gernert, C. H. (1990). *Age trends for fluid and crystallized intelligence in an able subpopulation.* Unpublished manuscript.

When confronted with a collection of quantitative data, the natural human tendency is to summarize, condense, and organize it into meaningful patterns. For example, in assessing the meaning of the curious professor's vocabulary score, the reader might calculate the average score for the entire sample, or tally the relative position of the professor's score (17 correct) among the 100 data points found in Table 3.1. We review these and other approaches to organizing and summarizing quantitative data in the following sections.

Frequency Distributions

A very simple and useful way of summarizing data is to tabulate a frequency distribution (Table 3.2). A **frequency distribution** is prepared by specifying a small number of usually equal-sized class intervals and then tallying how many scores fall within each interval. The sums of the frequencies for all intervals will equal *N,* the total number of scores in the sample. There is no hard and fast rule for determining the size of the intervals. Obviously, the size of the intervals depends on the number of intervals desired. It is common for frequency distributions to include between 5 and 15 class intervals. In the case of Table 3.2, there are 9 class intervals of 3 scores each. The table indicates that one professor scored 4, 5, or 6, eight professors scored 7, 8, or 9, and so on.

TABLE 3.2 Frequency Distribution of Scores of 100 Professors on a Vocabulary Test

Class Interval	*Frequency*
4–6	1
7–9	8
10–12	12
13–15	21
16–18	24
19–21	21
22–24	7
25–27	5
28–30	1
	$N = 100$

A **histogram** provides a graphic representation of the same information contained in the frequency distribution (Figure 3.1a). The horizontal axis portrays the scores grouped into class intervals, whereas the vertical axis depicts the number of scores falling within each class interval. In a histogram, the height of a column indicates the number of scores occurring within that interval. A **frequency polygon** is similar to a histogram, except that the frequency of the class intervals is represented by single points rather than columns. The single points are then joined by straight lines (Figure 3.1b).

The graphs shown in Figure 3.1 constitute visual summaries of the 100 raw score data points from the sample of professors. In addition to visual summaries of data, it is also possible to produce numerical summaries by computing statistical indices of central tendency and dispersion.

Measures of Central Tendency

Can we designate a single, representative score for the 100 vocabulary scores in our sample? The mean (M), or arithmetic average, is one such measure of central tendency. We compute the **mean** by adding all the scores up and dividing by *N,* the number of scores. Another useful index of central tendency is the **median**, the middlemost score when all the scores have been ranked. If the number of scores is even, the median is the average of the middlemost



FIGURE 3.1 **(a) A Histogram Representing Vocabulary Test Scores for 100 Professors. (b) A Frequency Polygon of Vocabulary Test Scores for 100 Professors**

two scores. In either case, the median is the point that bisects the distribution so that half of the cases fall above it, half below. Finally, the **mode** is simply the most frequently occurring score. If two scores tie for highest frequency of occurrence, the distribution is said to be bimodal.

The mean of the scores listed in Table 3.1 is 16.8; the median and mode are both 17. In this instance, the three measures of central tendency are in very good agreement. However, this is not always so. The mean is sensitive to extreme values and can be misleading if a distribution has a few scores that are unusually high or low. Consider an extreme case in which nine persons earn $10,000 and a tenth person earns $910,000. The mean income for this group is $100,000, yet this income level is not typical of anyone in the group. The median income of $10,000 is much more representative. Of course, this is an extreme example, but it illustrates a general point: If a distribution of scores is skewed (that is, asymmetrical), the median is a better index of central tendency than the mean.

Measures of Variability

Two or more distributions of test scores may have the same mean, yet differ greatly in the extent of dispersion of the scores about the mean (Figure 3.2). To describe the degree of dispersion, we need a statistical index that expresses the variability of scores in the distribution.

The most commonly used statistical index of variability in a group of scores is the **standard deviation**, designated as *s* or abbreviated as SD. From a conceptual standpoint, the reader needs to know that the standard deviation reflects the degree of dispersion in a group of scores. If the scores are tightly packed around a central value, the standard deviation is small. In fact, in the extreme case in which all the scores are identical, the standard deviation is exactly zero. As a group of scores becomes more spread out, the standard deviation becomes larger. For example, in Figure 3.2, distribution *a* would have the largest standard deviation, distribution *c* the smallest.



FIGURE 3.2 **Three Distributions with Identical Means but Different Variability**

The standard deviation, or *s,* is simply the square root of the variance, designated as s^2. The formula for the **variance** is

$$s^2 = \frac{\Sigma(X - \overline{X})^2}{(N - 1)}$$

where Σ designates "the sum of," X stands for each individual score, $\overline{X}$ is the mean of the scores, and N is the total number of scores. As the name suggests, the variance is a measure of variability. However, psychologists usually prefer to report the standard deviation, which is computed by taking the square root of the variance. Of course, the variance and the standard deviation convey interchangeable information—one can be computed from the other by squaring (the standard deviation to obtain the variance) or taking the square root (of the variance to obtain the standard deviation). The standard deviation is nonetheless the preferred measure of variance in psychological testing because of its direct relevance to the normal distribution, as discussed in the next section.

The Normal Distribution

The frequency polygon depicted in Figure 3.1b is highly irregular in shape, a typical finding with real-world data based on small sample sizes. What would happen to the shape of the frequency polygon if we increased the size of the normative sample and also increased the number of class intervals by reducing their size? Possibly, as we added new subjects to our sample, the distribution of scores would more and more closely resemble a symmetrical, mathematically defined, bell-shaped curve called the **normal distribution** (Figure 3.3).



FIGURE 3.3 The Normal Curve and the Percentage of Cases within Certain Intervals

Psychologists prefer a normal distribution of test scores, even though many other distributions are theoretically possible. For example, a rectangular distribution of test scores—an equal number of outcomes in each class interval—is within the realm of possibility. Indeed, many laypersons might even prefer a rectangular distribution of test scores on the egalitarian premise that individual differences are thereby less pronounced. For example, a higher proportion of persons would score in the superior range if psychological tests conformed to a rectangular rather than normal distribution of scores.

Why, then, do psychologists prefer a normal distribution of test scores, even to the point of selecting test items that help produce this kind of distribution in the standardization sample? There are several reasons, including statistical considerations and empirical findings. We digress briefly here to explain the psychometric fascination with normal distributions.

One reason that psychologists prefer normal distributions is that the normal curve has useful mathematical features that form the basis for several kinds of statistical investigation. For example, suppose we wished to determine whether the average IQs for two groups of subjects were significantly different. An inferential statistic such as the *t*-test for a difference between means would be appropriate. However, many inferential statistics are based on the assumption that the underlying population of scores is normally distributed, or nearly so. Thus, in order to facilitate the use of inferential statistics, psychologists prefer that test scores in the general population follow a normal or near-normal distribution.

Another basis for preferring the normal distribution is its mathematical precision. Since the normal distribution is precisely defined in mathematical terms, it is possible to compute the area under different regions of the curve with great accuracy. Thus, a useful property of normal distributions is that the percentage of cases falling within a certain range or beyond a certain value is precisely known. For example, in a normal distribution, a mere 2.14 percent of the scores will exceed the mean by two standard deviations or more (Figure 3.3). In like manner, we can determine that the vast bulk of scores—more than 68 percent—fall within one standard deviation of the mean in either direction.

A third basis for preferring a normal distribution of test scores is that the normal curve often arises spontaneously in nature. In fact, early investigators were so impressed with the ubiquity of the normal distribution that they virtually deified the normal curve as a law of nature. For example, Galton (1888) wrote:

> It is the supreme law of Unreason. Whenever a large sample of chaotic elements are taken in hand and marshalled in the order of their magnitude, an unsuspected and most beautiful form of regularity proves to have been latent all along.

Certainly there is no "law of nature" regarding the form that frequency distributions must take. Nonetheless, it is true that many important human characteristics—both physical and mental—produce a close approximation to the normal curve when measurements for large and heterogeneous samples are graphed. For example, a near-normal distribution curve is a well-known finding for physical characteristics such as birthweight, height, and brain weight (Jensen, 1980). An approximately normal distribution is also found with numerous mental tests, even for tests constructed entirely without reference to the normal curve.

Skewness

Skewness refers to the symmetry or asymmetry of a frequency distribution. If test scores are piled up at the low end of the scale, the distribution is said to be positively skewed. In the opposite case, when test scores are piled up at the high end of the scale, the distribution is said to be negatively skewed (Figure 3.4).

In psychological testing, skewed distributions usually signify that the test developer has included too few easy items or too few hard items. For example, when scores in the standardization sample are massed at the low end (positive skew), the test probably contains too few easy items to make effective discriminations at this end of the scale. In this case, examinees who obtain zero or near-zero scores might actually differ with respect to the dimension measured. However, the test is unable to elicit these differences, since most of the items are too hard for these examinees. Of course, the opposite pattern holds as well. If scores are massed at the high end (negative skew), the test probably contains too few hard items to make effective discriminations at this end of the scale.



FIGURE 3.4 **Skewed Distribution Curves: (a) Negative Skew; (b) Positive Skew**

When initial research indicates that an instrument produces skewed results in the standardization sample, test developers typically revamp the test at the item level. The most straightforward solution is to add items or modify existing items so that the test has more easy items (to reduce positive skew) or more hard items (to reduce negative skew). If it is too late to revise the instrument, the test developer can use a statistical transformation to help produce a more normal distribution of scores (see the following). However, the preferred strategy is to revise the test so that skewness is minimal or nonexistent.

RAW SCORE TRANSFORMATIONS

Making sense out of test results is largely a matter of transforming the raw scores into more interpretable and useful forms of information. In the preceding

discussion of normal distributions, we hinted at transformations by showing how knowledge of the mean and standard deviation of such distributions can help us determine the relative standing of an individual score. In this section we continue this theme in a more direct manner by introducing the formal requirements for several kinds of raw score transformations.

Percentiles and Percentile Ranks

A **percentile** expresses the percentage of persons in the standardization sample who scored below a specific raw score. For example, on the vocabulary test depicted in Table 3.2, 94 percent of the sample fell below a raw score of 25. Thus, a raw score of 25 would correspond to a percentile of 94, denoted as P_{94}. Note that higher percentiles indicate higher scores. In the extreme case, an examinee who obtained a raw score that exceeded every score in the standardization sample would receive a percentile of 100, or P_{100}.

The reader is warned not to confuse percentiles with percent correct. Remember that a percentile indicates only how an examinee compares to the standardization sample and does not convey the percentage of questions answered correctly. Conceivably, on a difficult test, a raw score of 50 percent correct might translate to a percentile of 90, 95, or even 100. Conversely, on an easy test, a raw score of 95 percent correct might translate to a percentile of 5, 10, or 20.

Percentiles can also be viewed as ranks in a group of 100 representative subjects, with 1 being the lowest rank and 100 the highest. Note that percentile ranks are the complete reverse of usual ranking procedures. A percentile rank (PR) of 1 is at the bottom of the sample, while a PR of 99 is near the top.

A percentile of 50 (P_{50}) corresponds to the median or middlemost raw score. A percentile of 25 (P_{25}) is often denoted as $Q1$ or the first quartile because one-quarter of the scores fall below this point. In like manner, a percentile of 75 (P_{75}) is referred to as $Q3$ or the third quartile because three-quarters of the scores fall below this point.

Percentiles are easy to compute and intuitively appealing to laypersons and professionals alike. It is not surprising, then, that percentiles are the most common type of raw score transformation encountered in psychological testing. Almost any kind of test result can be reported as a percentile, even when other transformations are the primary goal of testing. For example, intelligence tests are used to obtain IQ scores—a kind of transformation discussed subsequently—but also yield percentile scores, too. Thus, an IQ of 130 corresponds to a percentile of 98, meaning that the score is not only well above average but, more precisely, also exceeds 98 percent of the standardization sample.

Percentile scores do have one major drawback: They distort the underlying measurement scale, especially at the extremes. A specific example will serve to clarify this point. Consider a hypothetical instance in which four persons obtain the following percentiles on a test: 50, 59, 90, and 99. (Remember that we are speaking here of percentiles, not percent correct.) The first two persons differ by 9 percentile points (50 versus 59) and so do the last two persons (90 versus 99). The untrained observer might assume, falsely, that the first two persons differed in underlying raw score points by the same amount as the last two persons. An inspection of Figure 3.5 reveals the fallacy of this assumption. The difference in underlying raw score points between percentiles of 90 and 99 is far greater than between percentiles of 50 and 59.

Standard Scores

Although percentiles are the most popular type of transformed score, standard scores exemplify the



FIGURE 3.5 **Percentile Ranks in a Normal Distribution**

most desirable psychometric properties. A standard score uses the standard deviation of the total distribution of raw scores as the fundamental unit of measurement. The **standard score** expresses the distance from the mean in standard deviation units. For example, a raw score that is exactly one standard deviation above the mean converts to a standard score of +1.00. A raw score that is exactly one-half a standard deviation below the mean converts to a standard score of −.50. Thus, a standard score not only expresses the magnitude of deviation from the mean, but the direction of departure (positive or negative) as well.

Computation of an examinee's standard score (also called a *z* score) is simple: Subtract the mean of the normative group from the examinee's raw score and then divide this difference by the standard deviation of the normative group. Table 3.3 illustrates the computation of *z* scores for three subjects of widely varying ability on a hypothetical test.

Standard scores possess the desirable psychometric property of retaining the relative magnitudes of distances between successive values found in the original raw scores. This is because the distribution of standard scores has exactly the same shape as the distribution of raw scores. As a consequence, the use of standard scores does not distort the underlying measurement scale. This fidelity of the transformed measurement scale is a major advantage of standard scores over percentiles and percentile ranks. As previously noted, percentile scores are very distorting, especially at the extremes.

TABLE 3.3 Computation of Standard Scores on a Hypothetical Test

For the normative sample: $M = 50, SD = 8$

$$\text{Standard score} = z = \frac{X - M}{SD}$$

Person A: raw score of 35 (below average)

$$z = \frac{35 - 50}{8} = -1.88$$

Person B: raw score of 50 (exactly average)

$$z = \frac{50 - 50}{8} = 0.00$$

Person C: raw score of 70 (above average)

$$z = \frac{70 - 50}{8} = +2.50$$

A specific example will serve to illustrate the nondistorting feature of standard scores. Consider four raw scores of 55, 60, 70, and 80 on a test with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10. The first two scores differ by 5 raw score points, while the last two scores differ by 10 raw score points—twice the difference of the first pair. When the raw scores are converted to standard scores, the results are +0.50, +1.00, +2.00, and +3.00, respectively. The reader will notice that the first two scores differ by 0.50 standard scores, while the last two scores differ by 1.00 standard scores—twice the difference of the first pair. Thus, standard scores always retain the relative magnitude of differences found in the original raw scores.

Standard score distributions possess important mathematical properties that do not exist in the raw score distributions. When each of the raw scores in a distribution is transformed to a standard score, the resulting collection of standard scores always has a mean of zero and a variance of 1.00. Because the standard deviation is the square root of the variance, the standard deviation of standard scores ($\sqrt{1.00}$) is necessarily 1.00 as well.

One reason for transforming raw scores into standard scores is to depict results on different tests according to a common scale. If two distributions of test scores possess the same form, we can make direct comparisons on raw scores by transforming them to standard scores. Suppose, for example, that a first-year college student earned 125 raw score points on a spatial thinking test for which the normative sample averaged 100 points (with SD of 15 points). Suppose, in addition, he earned 110 raw score points on a vocabulary test for which the normative sample averaged 90 points (with SD of 20 points). In which skill area does he show greater aptitude, spatial thinking or vocabulary?

If the normative samples for both tests produced test score distributions of the same form, we can compare spatial thinking and vocabulary

scores by converting each to standard scores. The spatial thinking standard score for our student is (125 − 100)/15 or +1.67, whereas his vocabulary standard score is (110 − 90)/20 or +1.00. Relative to the normative samples, the student has greater aptitude for spatial thinking than vocabulary.

But a word of caution is appropriate when comparing standard scores from different distributions. If the distributions do not have the same form, standard score comparisons can be very misleading. We illustrate this point with Figure 3.6, which depicts two distributions: one markedly skewed with average score of 30 (SD of 10) and another normally distributed with average score of 60 (SD of 8). A raw score of 40 on the first test and a raw score of 68 on the second test both translate to identical standard scores of +1.00. Yet, a standard score of 1.00 on the first test exceeds 92 percent of the normative sample, while the equivalent standard score on the second test exceeds only 84 percent of the normative sample. When two distributions of test scores do not possess the same form, equivalent standard scores do not signify comparable positions within the respective normative samples.

T Scores and Other Standardized Scores

Many psychologists and educators appreciate the psychometric properties of standard scores but regard the decimal fractions and positive/negative signs (e.g., $z = -2.32$) as unnecessary distractions. In response to these concerns, test specialists have devised a number of variations on standard scores that are collectively referred to as *standardized scores.*

From a conceptual standpoint, standardized scores are identical to standard scores. Both kinds of scores contain exactly the same information. The shape of the distribution of scores is not affected, and a plot of the relationship between standard and standardized scores is always a straight line. However, standardized scores are always expressed as positive whole numbers (no decimal fractions or negative signs), so many test users prefer to depict test results in this form.

Standardized scores eliminate fractions and negative signs by producing values other than zero for the mean and 1.00 for the standard deviation of the transformed scores. The mean of the transformed scores can be set at any convenient value, such as 100 or 500, and the standard deviation at,



FIGURE 3.6 **Relationships between Raw Scores, z Scores, and Relative Standing for Two Distributions of Markedly Different Form**

say, 15 or 100. The important point about standardized scores is that we can transform any distribution to a preferred scale with predetermined mean and standard deviation.

One popular kind of standardized score is the ***T* score**, which has a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. *T* score scales are especially common with personality tests. For example, on the MMPI, each clinical scale (e.g., Depression, Paranoia) is converted to a common metric for which 50 is the average score and 10 is the standard deviation for the normative sample.

To transform raw scores to *T* scores, we use the following formula:

$$T = \frac{10(X - M)}{\text{SD}} + 50$$

The term $(X - M)/\text{SD}$ is, of course, equivalent to *z*, so we can rewrite the formula for *T* as a simple transformation of *z*:

$$T = 10z + 50$$

For any distribution of raw scores, the corresponding *T* scores will have an average of 50. In addition, for most distributions the vast majority of *T* scores will fall between values of 20 and 80, that is, within three standard deviations of the mean. Of course, *T* scores outside this range are entirely possible and perhaps even likely in special populations. In clinical settings it is not unusual to observe very high *T* scores—even as high as 90—on personality inventories such as the MMPI.

Standardized scores can be tailored to produce any mean and standard deviation. However, to eliminate negative standardized scores, the preselected mean should be at least five times as large as the standard deviation. In practice, test developers rely upon a few preferred values for means and standard deviations of standardized scores, as outlined in Table 3.4.

Normalizing Standard Scores

As previously noted, psychologists and educators prefer to deal with normal distributions because the statistical properties of the normal curve are well known and standard scores from these distributions can be directly compared. Perhaps the reader has wondered what recourse is available to test developers who find that their tests produce an asymmetrical distribution of scores in the normative sample. Fortunately, distributions of scores that are skewed or otherwise nonnormal can be transformed or normalized to fit a normal curve. Although test specialists have devised several methods for transmuting a nonnormal distribution into a normal one, we will discuss only the most popular approach—the conversion of percentiles to normalized standard scores. Oddly enough, it is easier to explain this approach if we first describe the reverse process: conversion of standard scores to percentiles.

We have noted that a normal distribution of raw scores has, by definition, a distinct, mathematically defined shape (Figure 3.3). In addition, we have pointed out that transforming a group of raw scores to standard scores leaves the original form of a distribution unchanged. Thus, if a collection of raw

TABLE 3.4 Means and Standard Deviations of Common Standardized Scores

Type of Measure	*Specific Examples*	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*
Full Scale	IQ WAIS-IV	100	15
IQ Test Subscales	Vocabulary, Block Design	10	3
Personality Test Scales	MMPI-2 Depression, Paranoia	50	10
Aptitude Tests	Graduate Record Exam, Scholastic Assessment Tests	500	100

scores is normally distributed, the resulting standard scores will obey the normal curve, too.

We also know that the mathematical properties of the normal distribution are precisely calculable. Without going into the details of computation, it should be obvious that we can determine the percentage of cases falling below any particular standard score. For example, in Figure 3.3, a standard score of −2.00 (designated as -2σ) exceeds 2.14 percent of the cases. Thus, a standard score of −2.00 corresponds to a percentile of 2.14. In like manner, any conceivable standard score can be expressed in terms of its corresponding percentile. Appendix D lists percentiles for standard scores and several other transformed scores.

Producing a **normalized standard score** is accomplished by working in the other direction. Namely, we use the percentile for each raw score to determine its corresponding standard score. If we do this for each and every case in a nonnormal distribution, the resulting distribution of standard scores will be normally distributed. Notice that in such a normalized standard score distribution, the standard scores are not calculated directly from the usual computational formula but are determined indirectly by first computing the percentile and then ascertaining the equivalent standard score.

The conversion of percentiles to normalized standard scores might seem an ideal solution to the problem of unruly test data. However, there is a potentially serious drawback: Normalized standard scores are a nonlinear transformation of the raw scores. Thus, mathematical relationships established with the raw scores may not hold true for the normalized standard scores. In a markedly skewed distribution, it is even possible that a raw score that is significantly below the mean might conceivably have a normalized standard score that is above the mean.

In practice, normalized standard scores are used sparingly. Such transformations are appropriate only when the normative sample is large and representative and the raw score distribution is only mildly nonnormal. Incidentally, the most likely cause of these nonnormal score distributions is inappropriate difficulty level in the test items, such as too many difficult or easy items.

There is a catch-22 here, in that mildly nonnormal distributions are not changed much when they are normalized, so little is gained in the process. Ironically, normalized standard scores produce the greatest change with markedly nonormal distributions. However, when the raw score distribution is markedly nonnormal, test developers are better advised to go back to the drawing board and adjust the difficulty level of test items so as to produce a normal distribution, rather than succumb to the partial statistical fix of normalized standard scores.

Stanines, Stens, and C Scale

Finally, we give brief mention to three raw score transformations that are mainly of historical interest. The stanine (standard nine) scale was developed by the United States Air Force during World War II. In a **stanine scale**, all raw scores are converted to a single-digit system of scores ranging from 1 to 9. The mean of stanine scores is always 5, and the standard deviation is approximately 2. The transformation from raw scores to stanines is simple: The scores are ranked from lowest to highest, and the bottom 4 percent of scores convert to a stanine of 1, the next 7 percent convert to a stanine of 2, and so on (see Table 3.5). The main advantage of stanines is that they are restricted to single-digit numbers. This was a considerable asset in the premodern computer era in which data was keypunched on Hollerith cards that had to be physically carried and stored on shelves. Because a stanine could be keypunched in a single column, far fewer cards were required than if the original raw scores were entered.

TABLE 3.5 Distribution Percentages for Use in Stanine Conversion

Percentage	4	7	12	17	20	17	12	7	4
Stanine	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9



FIGURE 3.7 **Equivalencies between Common Raw Score Transformation in a Normal Distribution**

Statisticians have proposed several variations on the stanine theme. Canfield (1951) proposed the 10-unit **sten scale**, with 5 units above and 5 units below the mean. Guilford and Fruchter (1978) proposed the **C scale** consisting of 11 units. Although stanines are still in widespread use, variants such as the sten and C scale never roused much interest among test developers.

A Summary of Statistically Based Norms

We have alluded several times to the ease with which standard scores, *T* scores, stanines, and percentiles can be transformed into each other, especially if the underlying distribution of raw scores is normally distributed. In fact, the exact form in which scores are reported is largely a matter of convention and personal preference. For example, a WAIS-III IQ of 115 could also be reported as a standard score of +1.00, or a *T* score of 60, or a percentile rank of 84. All of these results convey exactly the same information.[1] Figure 3.7 summarizes the relationships that exist between the most commonly used statistically based norms.

This ends the brief introduction to the many techniques by which test data from a normative sample can be statistically summarized and transformed. We should never lose sight of the overriding purpose of these statistical transmutations, namely, to help the test user make sense out of one

[1]A WAIS-III IQ of 115 also can be expressed as a stanine of 7. However, it is worth noting that some information is lost when scores are reported as stanines. Note that IQs in the range of 111 to 119 *all* convert to a stanine of 7. Thus, if we are told only that an individual has achieved at the 7th stanine on an intelligence test, we do not know the exact IQ equivalent.

individual's score in relation to an appropriate comparison group.

But what is an appropriate comparison group? What characteristics should we require in our norm group subjects? How should we go about choosing these subjects? How many subjects do we need? These are important questions that influence the relevance of test results just as much as proper item selection and standardized testing procedure. In the remainder of this topic, we examine the procedures involved in selecting a norm group.

SELECTING A NORM GROUP

When choosing a norm group, test developers strive to obtain a representative cross-section of the population for whom the test is designed (Petersen, Kolen, & Hoover, 1989). In theory, obtaining a representative norm group is straightforward and simple. Consider a scholastic achievement test designed for sixth graders in the United States. The relevant population is all sixth graders coast to coast and in Alaska and Hawaii. A representative cross-section of these potential subjects could be obtained by computerized random sampling of 10,000 or so of the millions of eligible children. Each child would have an equal chance of being chosen to take the test; that is, the selection strategy would be simple **random sampling**. The results for such a sample would comprise an ideal source of normative data. With a large random sample, it is almost certain that the diversities of ethnic background, social class, geographic location, urban versus rural setting, and so on would be proportionately represented in the sample.

In the real world, obtaining norm samples is never as simple and definitive as the hypothetical case previously outlined. Researchers do not have a complete list of every sixth grader in the nation, and even if they did, test developers could not compel every randomly selected child to participate in the standardization of a test. Questions of cost arise, too. Psychometricians must be paid to administer the tests to the norm group. Test developers may opt for a few hundred representative subjects instead of a larger number.

To help ensure that smaller norm groups are truly representative of the population for which the test was designed, test developers employ **stratified random sampling**. This approach consists of stratifying, or classifying, the target population on important background variables (e.g., age, sex, race, social class, educational level) and then selecting an appropriate percentage of persons at random from each stratum. For example, if 12 percent of the relevant population is African American, then the test developer chooses subjects randomly but with the constraint that 12 percent of the norm group is also African American.

In practice, very few test developers fully emulate either random sampling or stratified random sampling in the process of selecting the norm group. What is more typical is a good faith effort to pick a diverse and representative sample from strong and weak schools, minority and white neighborhoods, large and small cities, and northern, eastern, central, and southern communities. If this sample then embodies about the same percentage of minorities, city dwellers, and upper- and lower-class families as the national census, then the test developer feels secure that the norm group is representative.

There is an important lesson in the uncertainties, compromises, and pragmatics of norm group selection; namely, psychological test norms are not absolute, universal, or timeless. They are relative to one historical era and the particular normative population from which they were derived. We will illustrate the ephemeral nature of normative statistics in a later section when we show how a major IQ test normed at a national average of 100 in 1974 yielded a national average of 107 in 1988. Even norms that are selected with great care and based on large samples can become obsolete in a decade—sometimes less.

Age and Grade Norms

As we grow older, we change in measurable ways, for better or worse. This is obviously true in childhood, when intellectual skills improve visibly from one month to the next. In adulthood, personal change is slower but still discernible. We expect, for example, that adults will show a more mature level of vocabulary with each passing decade (Gregory & Gernert, 1990).

An **age norm** depicts the level of test performance for each separate age group in the normative

sample. The purpose of age norms is to facilitate same-aged comparisons. With age norms, the performance of an examinee is interpreted in relation to standardization subjects of the same age. The age span for a normative age group can vary from a month to a decade or more, depending on the degree to which test performance is age-dependent. For characteristics that change quickly with age—such as intellectual abilities in childhood—test developers might report separate test norms for narrowly defined age brackets, such as four-month intervals. This allows the examiner, for example, to compare test results of a child who is 5 years and 2 months old (age 5-2) to the normative sample of children ranging from age 5–0 to age 5–4. By contrast, adult characteristics change more slowly and it might be sufficient to report normative data by 5- or 10-year age intervals.

Grade norms are conceptually similar to age norms. A **grade norm** depicts the level of test performance for each separate grade in the normative sample. Grade norms are rarely used with ability tests. However, these norms are especially useful in school settings when reporting the achievement levels of schoolchildren. Since academic achievement in many content areas is heavily dependent on grade-based curricular exposure, comparing a student against a normative sample from the same grade is more appropriate than using an age-based comparison.

Local and Subgroup Norms

With many applications, local or subgroup norms are needed to suit the specific purpose of a test. **Local norms** are derived from representative local examinees, as opposed to a national sample. Likewise, **subgroup norms** consist of the scores obtained from an identified subgroup (African Americans, Hispanics, females), as opposed to a diversified national sample. As an example of local norms in action, the admissions officer of a junior college that attracts mainly local residents might prefer to consult statewide norms rather than national norms on a scholastic achievement test.

As a general rule, whenever an identifiable subgroup performs appreciably better or worse on a test than the more broadly defined standardization sample, it may be helpful to construct supplementary subgroup norms. The subgroups can be formed with respect to sex, ethnic background, geographical region, urban versus rural environment, socio economic level, and many other factors.

Whether local or subgroup norms are beneficial depends on the purpose of testing. For example, ethnic norms for standardized intelligence tests may be superior to nationally based norms in predicting competence within the child's nonschool environment. However, ethnic norms may not predict how well a child will succeed in mainstream public school instructional programs (Mercer & Lewis, 1978). Thus, local and subgroup norms must be used cautiously.

Expectancy Tables

One practical form that norms may take is an expectancy table. An **expectancy table** portrays the established relationship between test scores and expected outcome on a relevant task (Harmon, 1989). Expectancy tables are especially useful with predictor tests used to forecast well-defined criteria. For example, an expectancy table could depict the relationship between scores on a scholastic aptitude test (predictor) and subsequent college grade point average (criterion).

Expectancy tables are always based on the previous predictor and criterion results for large samples of examinees. The practical value of tabulating normative information in this manner is that new examinees receive a probabilistic preview of how well they are likely to do on the criterion. For example, high school examinees who take a scholastic aptitude test can be told the statistical odds of achieving a particular college grade point average.

Based on 7,835 previous examinees who subsequently attended a major university, the expectancy table in Table 3.6 provides the probability of achieving certain first-year college grades as a function of score on the American College Testing (ACT) examination. The ACT test is typically given to high school seniors who have expressed an interest in attending college. The first column of the table shows ACT test scores, divided into 10 class intervals. The second column gives the number of students whose scores fell into each interval. The remaining entries in each row show the percentage

TABLE 3.6 Expectancy Table Showing Relation between ACT Composite Scores and First-Year College Grades for 7,835 Students at a Major State University

ACT Test Score	*Number of Cases*	*Grade Point Average (4.00 Scale)*					
		0.00–1.49	*1.50–1.99*	*2.00–2.49*	*2.50–2.99*	*3.00–3.49*	*3.50–4.00*
34–36	3	0	0	33	0	0	67
31–33	117	2	2	4	9	19	64
28–30	646	10	6	10	17	23	35
25–27	1,458	12	10	16	19	24	19
22–24	1,676	17	10	22	20	20	11
19–21	1,638	23	14	25	18	16	4
16–18	1,173	31	17	24	15	11	3
13–15	690	38	18	25	12	6	1
10–12	332	54	16	20	6	3	1
below 10	102	60	20	13	8	0	0

Note: Some rows total to more than 100 percent because of rounding errors.
Source: Courtesy of Archie George, Management Information Services, University of Idaho.

of students within each test-score interval who subsequently received college grade points within a designated range. For example, of the 117 students who scored 31 to 33 points on the ACT, only 2 percent received a first-year college grade point average below 1.50, while 64 percent earned superlative grades of 3.50 up to a perfect A or 4.00. At the other extreme, of the 102 students who scored below 10 points on the ACT, fully 80 percent (60 percent plus 20 percent) received first-year college grades below a C average of 2.00.

Of course, expectancy tables do not foreordain how new examinees will do on the criterion. In an individual case, it is conceivable that a low–ACT scoring student might beat the odds and earn a 4.00 college grade point average. More commonly, though, new examinees discover that expectancy tables provide a broadly accurate preview of criterion performance.

But there are some exceptional instances in which expectancy tables can become inaccurate. An expectancy table is always based on the previous performance of a large and representative sample of examinees whose test performances and criterion outcomes reflected existing social conditions and institutional policies. If conditions or policies change, an expectancy table can become obsolete and misleading.

CRITERION-REFERENCED TESTS

We close this unit with a brief mention of an alternative to norm-referenced tests, namely, criterion-referenced tests. These two kinds of tests differ in their intended purposes, the manner in which content is chosen, and the process of interpreting results (Hambleton & Zenitsky, 2003; Bond, 1996; Frechtling, 1989; Popham, 1978).

The purpose of a norm-referenced test is to classify examinees, from low to high, across a continuum of ability or achievement. Thus, a norm-referenced test uses a representative sample of individuals—the norm group or standardization sample—as its interpretive framework. Examiners might want to classify individuals in this way for purposes of selection to a specialized curriculum or placement in remedial or gifted programs. In a classroom setting, a teacher might use a norm-referenced test to assign students to different reading levels or math instructional groups (Bond, 1996).

Whereas norm-referenced tests are used to rank students along a continuum in comparison to one another, criterion-referenced tests are used to compare examinees' accomplishments to a predefined performance standard. For example, consider a hypothetical school system in which fourth graders are expected to master the addition of pairs of two-digit numbers (e.g., 23 + 19 = 42). Perhaps the performance standard is set at 80 percent accuracy when doing 10 such addition problems in a 15-minute time period. Results for a specific fourth grader are then descriptively stated as a particular percentage (e.g., 70 percent). While it is possible to compare this result to the predetermined *standard,* no comparison is made to other *students.* In fact, it is entirely possible (and even desirable) for all students to exceed the standard.

Criterion-referenced tests represent a fundamental shift in perspective. The focus is on what the test taker can do rather than on comparisons to the performance levels of others. Thus, criterion-referenced tests identify an examinee's relative mastery (or nonmastery) of specific, predetermined competencies. These kinds of tests are increasingly popular in educational systems, where they are used to evaluate how well students have mastered the academic skills expected at each grade level. This information, in turn, provides a basis for intervention with students who are lagging behind. In addition, system-wide results of criterion-referenced tests can be used to evaluate the curriculum and to determine how well individual schools are teaching the curriculum.

A major difference between norm-referenced tests and criterion-referenced tests is the manner in which test content is chosen. In a norm-referenced test, items are chosen so that they provide maximal discrimination among respondents along the dimension being measured. Within this framework, well-defined psychometric principles are used to identify ideal items according to difficulty level, correlation with the total score, and other properties. In contrast, with a criterion-referenced test, the content is selected on the basis of its relevance in the curriculum. This involves the judgment and consensus of educators and other stakeholders in the educational enterprise. In Table 3.7, we have summarized and compared some distinctive characteristics of criterion-referenced and norm-referenced tests.

Criterion-referenced tests are best suited to the testing of basic academic skills (e.g., reading level, computation skill) in educational settings. However, these kinds of instruments are largely inappropriate for testing higher-level abilities because it is difficult to formulate specific objectives for such content domains. Consider a particular case: How could we develop a criterion-referenced test for expert computer programming? It would be difficult to propose specific behaviors that all expert computer programmers would possess and, therefore, nearly impossible to construct a criterion-referenced test for this high-level skill. Berk (1984) discusses the technical problems in the construction and evaluation of criterion-referenced tests.

TABLE 3.7 Distinctive Characteristics of Criterion-Referenced and Norm-Referenced Tests

Dimension	*Criterion-Referenced Tests*	*Norm-Referenced Tests*
Purpose	Compare examinees' performance to a standard	Compare examinees' performance to one another
Item Content	Narrow domain of skills with real-world relevance	Broad domain of skills with indirect relevance
Item Selection	Most items of similar difficulty level	Items vary widely in difficulty level
Interpretation of Scores	Scores usually expressed as a percentage, with passing level predetermined	Scores usually expressed as a standard score, percentile, or grade equivalent

A common application of criterion-referenced tests (CRTs) is in educational settings where they are used to determine whether students have met the minimum or basic standards in curriculum areas such as algebra, reading, or science. As noted, students are compared to a standard, not to one another. CRTs allow for the possibility that everyone might pass. At first glance, they might appear to be more equitable than norm-referenced tests which feature comparisons among students. However, as noted by FairTest, the National Center for Open and Fair Testing (www.fairtest.org), whether CRTs are really fair depends upon how the cut-off scores are determined:

> On a standardized CRT (one taken by students in many schools), the passing or "cut-off" score is usually set by a committee of experts, while in a classroom the teacher sets the passing score. In both cases, deciding the passing score is subjective, not objective. Sometimes cut scores have been set in a way that maximizes the number of low-income or minority students who fail the test. A small change in the cut score would not change the meaning of the test but would greatly increase minority pass rates. (www.fairtest.org)

Criterion-referenced tests can be used for specific classroom objectives (e.g., meeting a minimal level of proficiency in spelling for sixth graders) or for more far-reaching, high-stakes purposes such as determining graduation from high school. An example of the latter is the AIMS Test (Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards), used statewide in Arizona as a high school exit exam (Arizona Senate Research Staff, 2008). The test is designed to measure academic achievement in reading, writing, and math. The *minimum* passing level is mastery at a 10th grade level in all subjects for graduating seniors. Exemptions are granted for some students in special education.

Ultimately, individual Arizona public schools are beholden to these criterion-referenced standards as well. The AIMS Test is given in grades 3 through 8 and also serves as the benchmark for graduation in the senior year. The state legislation authorizing AIMS also stipulates that a school is making adequate yearly progress if at least 90 percent of its students pass the AIMS test at their grade level, or if the percentage passing is higher than the previous year (Arizona Senate Research Staff, 2008). Based on these data, schools receive a label of either (1) excelling; (2) highly performing; (3) performing; (4) underperforming; or (5) failing. Underperforming and failing schools face outside review. Certainly the AIMS Test is an example of high-stakes testing, as discussed in the first chapter.

Another concern is the degree to which the test matches the curriculum. Many state tests are developed by a committee of experts who have only general ideas about what students might be taught. The tests that emerge from the committee might not match the curricula for specific school systems. Thus, they might include areas that some students have not studied.

TOPIC 3B Concepts of Reliability

Classical Test Theory and the Sources of Measurement Error
Sources of Measurement Error
Measurement Error and Reliability
The Reliability Coefficient
The Correlation Coefficient
The Correlation Coefficient as a Reliability Coefficient
Reliability as Temporal Stability
Reliability as Internal Consistency
Item Response Theory
The New Rules of Measurement
Special Circumstances in the Estimation of Reliability
The Interpretation of Reliability Coefficients
Reliability and the Standard Error of Measurement

Reliability refers to the attribute of consistency in measurement. However, reliability is seldom an all-or-none matter; more commonly it is a question of degree. Very few measures of physical or psychological characteristics are completely consistent, even from one moment to the next. For example, a person who steps on a scale twice in quick succession might register a weight of $145\frac{1}{2}$ pounds the first time and $145\frac{3}{4}$ pounds the second. The same individual might take two presumably equivalent forms of an IQ test and score 114 on one and 119 on the other. Two successive measures of speed of response—pressing a key quickly whenever the letter *X* appears on a microcomputer screen—might produce a reaction time of 223 milliseconds on the first trial and 341 milliseconds on the next. We see in these examples a pattern of consistency—the pairs of measurements are not completely random—but different amounts of inconsistency are evident, too. In the short run, measures of weight are highly consistent, intellectual test scores are moderately stable, but simple reaction time is somewhat erratic.

The concept of **reliability** is best viewed as a continuum ranging from minimal consistency of measurement (e.g., simple reaction time) to near-perfect repeatability of results (e.g., weight). Most psychological tests fall somewhere in between these two extremes. With regard to tests, an acceptable degree of reliability is more than an academic matter. After all, it would be foolish and unethical to base important decisions on test results that are not repeatable.

Psychometricians have devised several statistical methods for estimating the degree of reliability of measurements, and we will explore the computation of such reliability coefficients in some detail. But first we examine a more fundamental issue to help clarify the meaning of reliability: What are the sources of consistency and inconsistency in psychological test results?

CLASSICAL TEST THEORY AND THE SOURCES OF MEASUREMENT ERROR

The theory of measurement introduced here has been called the classical test theory because it was developed from simple assumptions made by test theorists since the inception of testing. This approach is also

called the *theory of true and error scores,* for reasons explained below. Charles Spearman (1904) laid down the foundation for the theory that was subsequently extended and revised by contemporary psychologists (Feldt & Brennan, 1989; Lord & Novick, 1968; Kline, 1986). We should mention that a rival model does exist and is slowly supplanting classical test theory as a basis for test development. Item response theory, or latent trait theory (Embretson & Hershberger, 1999), is an appealing alternative to classical test theory. We close this chapter with a brief review of item response theory. However, classical test theory was the basis for test development throughout most of the twentieth century. Accordingly, we begin our coverage with this model.

The basic starting point of the **classical theory of measurement** is the idea that test scores result from the influence of two factors:

1. Factors that contribute to consistency. These consist entirely of the stable attributes of the individual, which the examiner is trying to measure.
2. Factors that contribute to inconsistency. These include characteristics of the individual, test, or situation that have nothing to do with the attribute being measured, but that nonetheless affect test scores.

It should be clear to the reader that the first factor is desirable because it represents the true amount of the attribute in question, while the second factor represents the unavoidable nuisance of error factors that contribute to inaccuracies of measurement. We can express this conceptual breakdown as a simple equation:

$$X = T + e$$

where X is the obtained score, T is the **true score**, and e represents errors of measurement.

Errors in measurement, thus, represent discrepancies between the obtained scores and the corresponding true scores:

$$e = X - T$$

Notice in the preceding equations that errors of measurement e can be either positive or negative. If e is positive, the obtained score X will be higher than the true score T. Conversely, if e is negative, the obtained score will be lower than the true score. Although it is impossible to eliminate all **measurement error**, test developers do strive to minimize this psychometric nuisance through careful attention to the sources of measurement error outlined in the following section.

Finally, it is important to stress that the true score is never known. As the reader will discover, we can obtain a probability that the true score resides within a certain interval and we can also derive a best estimate of the true score. However, we can never know the value of a true score with certainty.

SOURCES OF MEASUREMENT ERROR

As indicated by the formula $X = T + e$, measurement error e is everything other than the true score that makes up the obtained test score. Errors of measurement can arise from innumerable sources (Feldt & Brennan, 1989). Stanley (1971) provides an unusually thorough list. We will outline only the most important and likely contributions here: item selection, test administration, test scoring, and systematic errors of measurement.

Item Selection

One source of measurement error is the instrument itself. A test developer must settle on a finite number of items from a potentially infinite pool of test questions. Which questions should be included? How should they be worded? Item selection is crucial to the accuracy of measurement.

Although psychometricians strive to obtain representative test items, the particular set of questions chosen for a test might not be equally fair to all persons. A hypothetical and deliberately extreme example will serve to illustrate this point: Even a well-prepared student might flunk a classroom test that emphasized the obscure footnotes in the textbook. By contrast, an ill-prepared but curious student who studied only the footnotes might do very well on such an exam. The scores for both persons would reflect massive amounts of measurement error. Remember in this context that the true score is what the student really knows. For the conscientious

student, the obtained score would be far lower than the true score because of a hefty dose of negative measurement error. For the serendipitous second student, the obtained score would be far higher than the true score, owing to the positive measurement error.

Of course, in a well-designed test the measurement error from item sampling will be minimal. However, a test is always a sample and never the totality of a person's knowledge or behavior. As a result, item selection is always a source of measurement error in psychological testing. The best a psychometrician can do is minimize this unwanted nuisance by attending carefully to issues of test construction. We discuss technical aspects of item selection in Topic 4B, Test Construction.

Test Administration

Although examiners usually provide an optimal and standardized testing environment, numerous sources of measurement error may nonetheless arise from the circumstances of administration. Examples of general environmental conditions that may exert an untoward influence on the accuracy of measurement include uncomfortable room temperature, dim lighting, and excessive noise. In some cases it is not possible to anticipate the qualities of the testing situation that will contribute to measurement error. Consider this example: An otherwise lackluster undergraduate correctly answers a not very challenging information item, namely, "Who wrote *Canterbury Tales*?" When queried later whether he had read any Chaucer, the student replies, "No, but you've got that book right behind you on your bookshelf."

Momentary fluctuations in anxiety, motivation, attention, and fatigue level of the test taker may also introduce sources of measurement error. For example, an examinee who did not sleep well the night before might lack concentration and, therefore, misread questions. A student distracted by temporary emotional distress might inadvertently respond in the wrong columns of the answer sheet. The classic nightmare in this regard is the test taker who skips a question—let us say, question number 19—but forgets to leave the corresponding part of the answer sheet blank. As a result, all the subsequent answers are off by one, with the response to question 20 entered on the answer sheet as item 19, and so on.

The examiner, too, may contribute to measurement error in the process of test administration. In an orally administered test, an unconscious nod of the head by the tester might convey that the examinee is on the right track, thereby guiding the test taker to the correct response. Conversely, a terse and abrupt examiner may intimidate a test taker who would otherwise volunteer a correct answer.

Test Scoring

Whenever a psychological test uses a format other than machine-scored multiple-choice items, some degree of judgment is required to assign points to answers. Fortunately, most tests have well-defined criteria for answers to each question. These guidelines help minimize the impact of subjective judgment in scoring (Gregory, 1987). However, subjectivity of scoring as a source of measurement error can be a serious problem in the evaluation of projective tests or essay questions. With regard to projective tests, Nunnally (1978) points out that the projective tester might undergo an evolutionary change in scoring criteria over time, coming to regard a particular type of response as more and more pathological with each encounter.

Systematic Measurement Error

The sources of inaccuracy previously discussed are collectively referred to as **unsystematic measurement error**, meaning that their effects are unpredictable and inconsistent. However, there is another type of measurement error that constitutes a veritable ghost in the psychometric machine. A **systematic measurement error** arises when, unknown to the test developer, a test consistently measures something other than the trait for which it was intended. Systematic measurement error actually is a problem for test validity, as discussed in the next chapter. Yet, we mention it here because it does contribute to inaccuracies of measurement.

Suppose, for example, that a scale to measure social introversion also inadvertently taps anxiety in a consistent fashion. In this case, the equation depicting the relationship between observed scores,

true scores, and sources of measurement error would be

$$X = T + e_s + e_u$$

where X is the obtained score, T is the true score, e_s is the systematic error due to the anxiety subcomponent, and e_u is the collective effect of the unsystematic measurement errors previously outlined.

Because by definition their presence is initially undetected, systematic measurement errors may constitute a significant problem in the development of psychological tests. However, if psychometricians use proper test development procedures discussed in Topic 4B, Test Construction, the impact of systematic measurement errors can be greatly minimized. Nonetheless, systematic measurement errors serve as a reminder that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to truly assess a trait in pure isolation from other traits.

MEASUREMENT ERROR AND RELIABILITY

Perhaps at this point the reader is wondering what measurement error has to do with reliability. The most obvious connection is that measurement error reduces the reliability or repeatability of psychological test results. In fact, we will show here that reliability bears a precise statistical relationship to measurement error. Reliability and measurement error are really just different ways of expressing the same concern: How consistent is a psychological test? The interdependence of these two concepts will become clear if we provide a further sketch of the classical theory of measurement.

A crucial assumption of classical theory is that unsystematic measurement errors act as random influences. This does not mean that the sources of measurement error are completely mysterious and unfathomable in every individual case. We might suspect for one person that her score on digit span reflected a slight negative measurement error caused by the auditory interference of someone coughing in the hallway during the presentation of the fifth item. Likewise, we could conjecture that another person received the benefit of positive measurement error by glimpsing in the mirror behind the examiner to see the correct answer to the ninth item on an information test. Thus, measurement error is not necessarily a mysterious event in every individual case.

However, when we examine the test scores of groups of persons, the causes of measurement error are incredibly complex and varied. In this context, unsystematic measurement errors behave like random variables. The classical theory accepts this essential randomness of measurement error as an axiomatic assumption.

Because they are random events, unsystematic measurement errors are equally likely to be positive or negative and will, therefore, average out to zero across a large group of subjects. Thus, a second assumption is that the mean error of measurement is zero. Classical theory also assumes that measurement errors are not correlated with true scores. This makes intuitive sense: If the error scores were related to another score, it would suggest that they were systematic rather than random, which would violate the essential assumption of classical theory. Finally, it is also assumed that measurement errors are not correlated with errors on other tests.

We can summarize the main features of classical theory as follows (Gulliksen, 1950, chap. 2):

1. Measurement errors are random.
2. Mean error of measurement $= 0$.
3. True scores and errors are uncorrelated: $r_{Te} = 0$.
4. Errors on different tests are uncorrelated: $r_{12} = 0$.

Starting from these assumptions, it is possible to develop a number of important implications for reliability and measurement. (The points that follow are based on the optimistic assumption that systematic measurement errors are minimal or nonexistent for the instrument in question.) For example, we know that any test administered to a large group of persons will show a variability of obtained scores that can be expressed statistically as a variance, that is, σ^2. The value of classical theory is that it permits us to partition the variance of obtained scores into two separate sources. Specifically, it can be shown that the variance of obtained scores is simply the

variance of true scores plus the variance of errors of measurement:

$$\sigma_X^2 = \sigma_T^2 + \sigma_e^2$$

We will refer the interested reader to Gulliksen (1950, chap. 3) for the computational details.

The preceding formula demonstrates that test scores vary as the result of two factors: variability in true scores, and variability due to measurement error. The obvious implication of this relationship is that errors of measurement contribute to inconsistency of obtained test scores; results will not remain stable if the test is administered again.

THE RELIABILITY COEFFICIENT

We are finally in a position to delineate the precise relationship between reliability and measurement error. By now the reader should have discerned that reliability expresses the relative influence of true and error scores on obtained test scores. In more precise mathematical terms, the **reliability coefficient** (r_{XX}) is the ratio of true score variance to the total variance of test scores. That is:

$$r_{XX} = \frac{\sigma_T^2}{\sigma_X^2}$$

or equivalently:

$$r_{XX} = \frac{\sigma_T^2}{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_e^2}$$

Note that the range of potential values for r_{XX} can be derived from analysis of the preceding formula. Consider what happens when the variance due to measurement error (σ_e^2) is very small, close to zero. In that event, the reliability coefficient (r_{XX}) approaches a value of (σ_T^2/σ_T^2) or 1.0. At the opposite extreme, where the variance due to measurement error is very large, the value of the reliability coefficient becomes smaller, approaching a theoretical limit of 0.0. In sum, a completely unreliable test (large measurement error) will yield a reliability coefficient close to 0.0, while a completely reliable test (no measurement error) will produce a reliability coefficient of 1.0. Thus, the possible range of the reliability coefficient is between 0.0 and 1.0. In practice, all tests produce reliability coefficients somewhere in between, but the closer the value of r_{XX} to 1.0, the better.

In a literal sense, r_{XX} indicates the proportion of variance in obtained test scores that is accounted for by the variability in true scores. However, the formula for the reliability coefficient r_{XX} indicates an additional interpretation of it as well. The reader will recall that obtained scores are symbolized by *X*s. In like manner, the subscripts in the symbol for the reliability coefficient signify that r_{XX} is an index of the potential or actual consistency of obtained scores. Thus, tests that capture minimal amounts of measurement error produce consistent and reliable scores; their reliability coefficients are near 1.0. Conversely, tests that reflect large amounts of measurement error produce inconsistent and unreliable scores; their reliability coefficients are closer to 0.0.

Up to this point, the discussion of reliability has been conceptual rather than practical. We have pointed out that reliability refers to consistency of measurement; that reliability is diminished to the extent that errors of measurement dominate the obtained score; and that one statistical index of reliability, the reliability coefficient, can vary between 0.0 and 1.0. But how is a statistical measure of reliability computed? We approach this topic indirectly, first reviewing an essential statistical tool, the correlation coefficient. The reader will discover that the correlation coefficient, a numerical index of the degree of linear relationship between two sets of scores, is an excellent tool for appraising the consistency or repeatability of test scores. We provide a short refresher on the meaning of correlation before proceeding to a summary of methods for estimating reliability.

THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

In its most common application, a **correlation coefficient** (r) expresses the degree of linear relationship between two sets of scores obtained from the same persons. Correlation coefficients can take on values ranging from −1.00 to +1.00. A correlation coefficient of +1.00 signifies a perfect linear

relationship between the two sets of scores. In particular, when two measures have a correlation of +1.00, the rank ordering of subjects is identical for both sets of scores. Furthermore, when arrayed on a scatterplot (Figure 3.8a), the individual data points (each representing a pair of scores from a single subject) conform to a perfectly straight line with an upward slope. A correlation coefficient of −1.00 signifies an equally strong relationship but with inverse correspondence: the highest score on one variable corresponding to the lowest score on the other, and vice versa. In this case, the individual data points conform to a perfectly straight line with a downward slope (Figure 3.8b). Correlations of +1.00 or −1.00 are extremely rare in psychological research and usually signify a trivial finding. For example, if on two occasions in quick succession we counted the number of letters in the last name of 100 students, these two sets of "scores" would show a correlation of +1.00.

Negative correlations usually result from the manner in which one of the two variables was scored. For example, scores on the Category Test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993) are reported as errors, whereas results on the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1983, 1986) are reported as number of items correct. Persons who obtain a high score on the Category Test (many errors) will most likely obtain a low score on the Progressive Matrices test (few correct). Thus, we would expect a substantial negative correlation for scores on these two tests.

Consider the scatterplot in Figure 3.8c, which might depict the hypothetical heights and weights of a group of persons. As the reader can see, height and weight are strongly but not perfectly related to one another. Tall persons tend to weigh more, short persons less, but there are some exceptions. If we were to compute the correlation coefficient between height and weight—a simple statistical task outlined in the following—we would obtain a value of about +.80, indicating a strong, positive relationship between these measures.

When two variables have no relationship, the scatterplot takes on an undefined bloblike shape and the correlation coefficient is close to 0.00 (Figure 3.8d). For example, in a sample of adults, the correlation between reaction time and weight would most likely be very close to zero.

Finally, it is important to understand that the correlation coefficient is independent of the mean. For example, a correlation of +1.00 can be found between two administrations of the same test even when there are significant mean differences between pretest and posttest. In sum, perfect correlation does not imply identical pre- and posttest scores for each examinee. However, perfect correlation does imply perfectly ordered ranking from pretest to posttest, as discussed previously.



FIGURE 3.8 Scatterplots Depicting Different Degrees of Correlation

THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT AS A RELIABILITY COEFFICIENT

One use of the correlation coefficient is to gauge the consistency of psychological test scores. If test results are highly consistent, then the scores of persons taking the test on two occasions will be strongly correlated, perhaps even approaching the theoretical upper limit of +1.00. In this context, the correlation coefficient is also a reliability coefficient. Even though the computation of the Pearson *r* makes no reference to the theory of true and error scores, the correlation coefficient does, nonetheless, reflect the

proportion of variance in obtained test scores accounted for by the variability in true scores. Thus, in some contexts a correlation coefficient is a reliability coefficient.

This discussion introduces one method for estimating the reliability of a test: Administer the instrument twice to the same group of persons and compute the correlation between the two sets of scores. The test–retest approach is very common in the evaluation of reliability, but several other strategies exist as well. As we review the following methods for estimating reliability, the reader may be temporarily bewildered by the apparent diversity of approaches. In fact, the different methods fall into two broad groups, namely, temporal stability approaches, which directly measure the consistency of test scores, and internal consistency approaches, which rely upon a single test administration to gauge reliability. Keep in mind that one common theme binds all the eclectic methods together: Reliability is always an attempt to gauge the likely accuracy or repeatability of test scores.

RELIABILITY AS TEMPORAL STABILITY

Test–Retest Reliability

The most straightforward method for determining the reliability of test scores is to administer the identical test twice to the same group of heterogeneous and representative subjects. If the test is perfectly reliable, each person's second score will be completely predictable from his or her first score. On many kinds of tests, particularly ability and achievement tests, we might expect subjects generally to score somewhat higher the second time because of practice, maturation, schooling, or other intervening effects that take place between pretest and posttest. However, so long as the second score is strongly correlated with the first score, the existence of practice, maturation, or treatment effects does not cast doubt on the **test–retest reliability** of a psychological test.

An example of a reliability coefficient computed as a test-retest correlation coefficient is depicted in Figure 3.9. In this case, 60 subjects were administered the Finger Tapping Test (FTT) on two occasions separated by a week (Morrison, Gregory, & Paul, 1979). The FTT, one component of the Halstead-Reitan neuropsychological test battery (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993), is a relatively pure measure of motor speed. Using a standardized mechanical counting apparatus, the subject is instructed to tap with the index finger as fast as possible for 10 seconds. This procedure is continued until five trials in a row reveal consistent results. The procedure is repeated for the nondominant hand. The score for each hand is the average of the five consecutive trials.



FIGURE 3.9 Scatterplots Revealing a Reliability Coefficient of .80 *Source:* Based on data from Morrison, M. W., Gregory, R. J., & Paul, J. J. (1979). Reliability of the Finger Tapping Test and a note on sex differences. *Perceptual and Motor Skills, 48,* 139–142.

The correlation between scores from repeated administrations of this test works out to be about .80. This is at the low end of acceptability for reliability coefficients, which usually fall in the .80*s* or .90*s*. We discuss standards of reliability in more detail subsequently.

Alternate-Forms Reliability

In some cases test developers produce two forms of the same test. These alternate forms are independently constructed to meet the same specifications, often on an item-by-item basis. Thus, alternate forms of a test incorporate similar content and cover the same range and level of difficulty in items. Alternate forms of a test possess similar statistical and normative properties.

For example, when administered in counterbalanced fashion to the same group of subjects, the means and standard deviations of alternate forms are typically quite comparable.

Estimates of **alternate-forms reliability** are derived by administering both forms to the same group and correlating the two sets of scores. This approach has much in common with test–retest methods—both strategies involve two test administrations to the same subjects with an intervening time interval. For both approaches, we would expect that intervening changes in motivation and individual differences in amount of improvement would produce fluctuations in test scores and thereby reduce reliability estimates somewhat. Thus, test–retest and alternate-forms reliability estimates share considerable conceptual similarity.

However, there is one fundamental difference between these two approaches. The alternate-forms methodology introduces item-sampling differences as an additional source of error variance. That is, some test takers may do better or worse on one form of a test because of the particular items sampled. Even though the two forms may be equally difficult on average, some subjects may find one form quite a bit harder (or easier) than the other because supposedly parallel items are not equally familiar to every person. Notice that item-sampling differences are not a source of error variance in the test-retest approach because identical items are used in both administrations.

Alternate forms of a test are also quite expensive—nearly doubling the cost of publishing a test and putting it on the market. Because of the increased cost and also the psychometric difficulties of producing truly parallel forms, fewer and fewer tests are being released in this format.

RELIABILITY AS INTERNAL CONSISTENCY

We turn now to some intriguing ways of estimating the reliability of an individual test without developing alternate forms and without administering the test twice to the same examinees (Feldt & Brennan, 1989). The first approach correlates the results from one-half of the test with the other half and is appropriately termed split-half reliability. The second approach examines the internal consistency of individual test items. In this method, the psychometrician seeks to determine whether the test items tend to show a consistent interrelatedness. Finally, insofar as some tests are less than perfectly reliable because of differences among scorers, we also take up the related topic of interscorer reliability.

Split-Half Reliability

We obtain an estimate of **split-half reliability** by correlating the pairs of scores obtained from equivalent halves of a test administered only once to a representative sample of examinees. The logic of split-half reliability is straightforward: If scores on two half tests from a *single* test administration show a strong correlation, then scores on two whole tests from two *separate* test administrations (the traditional approach to evaluating reliability) also should reveal a strong correlation.

Psychometricians typically view the split-half method as supplementary to the gold standard approach, which is the test–retest method. For example, in the standardization of the WAIS-IV, the reliability of most scales was established by the test–retest approach *and* the split-half approach. These two estimates of reliability are generally similar, although split-half approaches often yield higher estimates of reliability.

One justification for the split-half approach is that logistical problems or excessive cost may render it impractical to obtain a second set of test scores from the same examinees. In this case, a split-half estimate of reliability is the only thing available, and it is certainly better than no estimate at all. Another justification for the split-half approach is that the test–retest method is potentially misleading in certain cases. For example, some ability tests are prone to large but inconsistent practice effects—such as when examinees learn concepts from feedback given as part of the standardized testing procedure. When practice effects are large and variable, the rank order of scores from a second administration will at best sustain only a modest association to the rank order of scores from the first administration. For these kinds of instruments, test–retest reliability coefficients could be misleadingly low. Finally, test–retest approaches also will yield misleadingly low estimates

of reliability if the trait being measured is known to fluctuate rapidly (e.g., certain measures of mood).

The major challenge with split-half reliability is dividing the test into two nearly equivalent halves. For most tests—especially those with the items ranked according to difficulty level—the first half is easier than the second half. We would not expect examinees to obtain equivalent scores on these two portions, so this approach to splitting a test rarely is used. The most common method for obtaining split halves is to compare scores on the odd items versus the even items of the test. This procedure works particularly well when the items are arranged in approximate order of difficulty.

In addition to calculating a Pearson *r* between scores on the two equivalent halves of the test, the computation of a coefficient of split-half reliability entails an additional step: adjusting the half-test reliability using the Spearman-Brown formula.

The Spearman-Brown Formula

Notice that the split-half method gives us an estimate of reliability for an instrument half as long as the full test. Although there are some exceptions, a shorter test generally is less reliable than a longer test. This is especially true if, in comparison to the shorter test, the longer test embodies equivalent content and similar item difficulty. Thus, the Pearson *r* between two halves of a test will usually underestimate the reliability of the full instrument. We need a method for deriving the reliability of the whole test based on the half-test correlation coefficient.

The **Spearman-Brown formula** provides the appropriate adjustment:

$$r_{SB} = \frac{2r_{hh}}{1 + r_{hh}}$$

In this formula, r_{SB} is the estimated reliability of the full test computed by the Spearman-Brown method, while r_{hh} is the half-test reliability. Table 3.8 shows conceivable half-test correlations alongside the corresponding Spearman-Brown reliability coefficients for the whole test. For example, using the Spearman-Brown formula, we could determine that a half-test reliability of .70 is equivalent to an estimated full-test reliability of .82.

TABLE 3.8 Comparison of Split-Half Reliabilities and Corresponding Spearman-Brown Reliabilities

Split-Half Reliability	*Spearman-Brown Reliability*
.5	.67
.6	.75
.7	.82
.8	.89
.9	.95

Critique of the Split-Half Approach

Although the split-half approach is widely used, nonetheless it has been criticized for its lack of precision:

> Instead of giving a single coefficient for the test, the procedure gives different coefficients depending on which items are grouped when the test is split into two parts. If one split may give a higher coefficient than another, one can have little faith in whatever result is obtained from a single split. (Cronbach, 1951)

Why rely on a single split? Why not take a more typical value such as the mean of the split-half coefficients resulting from all possible splittings of a test? Cronbach (1951) advocated just such an approach when proposing a general formula for estimating the reliability of a psychological test.

Coefficient Alpha

As proposed by Cronbach (1951) and subsequently elaborated by others (Novick & Lewis, 1967; Kaiser & Michael, 1975), **coefficient alpha** may be thought of as the mean of all possible split-half coefficients, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula. The formula for coefficient alpha is

$$r_{\alpha} = \left(\frac{N}{N-1}\right)\left(1 - \frac{\Sigma\sigma_j^2}{\sigma^2}\right)$$

where r_α is the coefficient alpha, N is the number of items, σ_j^2 is the variance of one item, $\Sigma\sigma_j^2$ is the sum of variances of all items, and σ^2 is the variance of the total test scores. As with all reliability estimates, coefficient alpha can vary between 0.00 and 1.00.

Coefficient alpha is an index of the internal consistency of the items, that is, their tendency to correlate positively with one another. Insofar as a test or scale with high internal consistency will also tend to show stability of scores in a test–retest approach, coefficient alpha is therefore a useful estimate of reliability.

Traditionally, coefficient alpha has been thought of as an index of unidimensionality, that is, the degree to which a test or scale measures a single factor. Recent analyses by Schmitt (1996) serve to dispel this misconception. Certainly coefficient alpha is an index of the interrelatedness of the individual items, but this is not synonymous with the unidimensionality of what the test or scale measures. In fact, it is possible for a scale to measure two or more distinct factors and yet still possess a very strong coefficient alpha. Schmitt (1996) gives the example of a six-item test in which the first three items correlate .8 one with another, the last three items also correlate .8 one with another, whereas correlations across the two three-item sets are only .3 (Table 3.9). Even though this is irrefutably a strong two-factor test, the value for coefficient alpha works out to be 86! For this kind of test, coefficient alpha probably will overestimate test–retest reliability. This is why psychometricians look to test–retest approaches as essential to the evaluation of reliability. Certainly the split-half approach in general and coefficient alpha in particular are valuable approaches to reliability, but they cannot replace the common sense of the test–retest approach: When the same test is administered twice to a representative sample of examinees, do they obtain the same relative placement of scores?

TABLE 3.9 A Six-Item Test with Two Factors and Strong Coefficient Alpha

Variable	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*
1	—					
2	.8	—				
3	.8	.8	—			
4	.3	.3	.3	—		
5	.3	.3	.3	.8	—	
6	.3	.3	.3	.8	.8	—

Note: Coefficient alpha = .86.
Source: Reprinted with permission from Schmitt, N. (1996). Uses and abuses of coefficient alpha. *Psychological Assessment, 8,* 350–353.

The Kuder-Richardson Estimate of Reliability

Cronbach (1951) has shown that coefficient alpha is the general application of a more specific formula developed earlier by Kuder and Richardson (1937). Their formula is generally referred to as **Kuder-Richardson formula 20** or, simply, KR-20, in reference to the fact that it was the twentieth in a lengthy series of derivations. The KR-20 formula is relevant to the special case in which each test item is scored 0 or 1 (e.g., wrong or right). The formula is

$$\text{KR-20} = \left(\frac{N}{N-1}\right)\left(1 - \frac{\Sigma pq}{\sigma^2}\right)$$

where

N = the number of items on the test,
σ^2 = the variance of scores on the total test,
p = the proportion of examinees getting each item correct,
q = the proportion of examinees getting each item wrong.

Coefficient alpha extends the Kuder-Richardson method to types of tests with items that are not scored as 0 or 1. For example, coefficient alpha could be used with an attitude scale in which examinees indicate on each item whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree **interscorer reliability**.

Interscorer Reliability

Some tests leave a great deal of judgment to the examiner in the assignment of scores. Certainly, projective tests fall into this category, as do tests of

moral development and creativity. Insofar as the scorer can be a major factor in the reliability of these instruments, a report of interscorer reliability is imperative. Computing is a very straightforward procedure. A sample of tests is independently scored by two or more examiners and scores for pairs of examiners are then correlated. Test manuals typically report the training and experience required of examiners and then list representative interscorer correlation coefficients.

Interscorer reliability supplements other reliability estimates but does not replace them. It would still be appropriate to assess the test–retest or other type of reliability in a subjectively scored test. We provide a quick summary of methods for estimating reliability in Table 3.10.

Which Type of Reliability Is Appropriate?

As noted, even when a test has only a single form, there are still numerous methods available for assessing reliability: test–retest, split-half, coefficient alpha, and interscorer methods. For tests that possess two forms, we can add a fifth method: alternate-forms reliability. Which method is best? When should we use one method but not another? To answer these questions, we need to know the nature and purpose of the individual test in question.

For tests designed to be administered to individuals more than once, it would be reasonable to expect that the test demonstrate reliability across time—in this case, test–retest reliability is appropriate. For tests that purport to possess factorial purity, coefficient alpha would be essential. In contrast, factorially complex tests such as measures of general intelligence would not fare well by measures of internal consistency. Thus, coefficient alpha is not an appropriate index of reliability for all tests but applies only to measures that are designed to assess a single factor. Split-half methods work well for instruments that have items carefully ordered according to difficulty level. Of course, interscorer reliability is appropriate for any test that involves subjectivity of scoring.

It is common for test manuals to report multiple sources of information about reliability. For example, the WAIS-IV Manual (Wechsler, 2008) reports split-half reliabilities for most subtests and also provides test–retest coefficients for all subtests and IQ scores. The manual also cites information akin to alternate-forms reliability—it reports the correlations between the WAIS-IV and its predecessor, the WAIS-III.

In order to analyze the error variance into its component parts, a number of reliability coefficients will need to be computed. Although it is difficult to arrive at precise data in the real world, on a theoretical basis we can partition the variability of scores into true and error components as depicted in Figure 3.10.

TABLE 3.10 Brief Synopsis of Methods for Estimating Reliability

Method	*No. Forms*	*No. Sessions*	*Sources of Error Variance*
Test–Retest	1	2	Changes over time
Alternate-Forms (immediate)	2	1	Item sampling
Alternate-Forms (delayed)	2	2	Item sampling
			Changes over time
Split-Half	1	1	Item sampling
			Nature of split
Coefficient Alpha	1	1	Item sampling
			Test heterogeneity
Interscorer	1	1	Scorer differences



FIGURE 3.10 **Sources of Variance in a Hypothetical Test**
Note: The results are similar to what might be found if alternative forms of an individual intelligence test were administered to the same person by different examiners.

ITEM RESPONSE THEORY

The classical test theory summarized previously dominated test development for most of the twentieth century. However, beginning slowly in the 1960s and continuing to the present time, psychometricians have favored an alternative model of test theory known as **item response theory** (IRT) or **latent trait theory** (Embretson, 1996; Lord & Novick, 1968; Rasch, 1960). IRT is more than a theory; it is also a collection of mathematical models and statistical tools with widespread uses. The applications of IRT include analyzing items and scales, developing homogeneous psychological measures, measuring individuals on psychological constructs (e.g., depression, intelligence, leadership), and administering psychological tests by computer. The foundational elements of IRT include item response functions (IRFs), information functions, and the assumption of invariance (Reise, Ainsworth, & Haviland, 2005).

Item Response Functions

An **item response function** (IRF), also known as an item characteristic curve (ICC), is a mathematical equation that describes the relation between the amount of a latent trait an individual possesses and the probability that he or she will give a designated response to a test item designed to measure that construct. In the case of ability measures, the designated response is the correct answer, whereas in other situations (e.g., the measurement of personality constructs such as leadership), the designated response would be the one indicating the presence of the trait being assessed. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the designated response as the "correct" response in the discussion that follows.

Each respondent is assumed to have a certain amount of the latent trait being measured, whether this is verbal proficiency, spatial memory, or leadership ability. In turn, the latent trait is assumed to influence directly the examinee's responses to the items on the test, which has been carefully designed to measure the trait in question. The mathematical models and statistical tools of IRT are designed to establish the IRF for each item on the test. Collectively, the IRFs can be used for many purposes, including the refinement of the instrument, the calculation of reliability, and the estimation of examinee trait levels. For example, test developers commonly use IRFs to eliminate items that don't function optimally in a psychometric sense.

Each test item has its own IRF. The IRFs for four dichotomously scored items are plotted in Figure 3.11. The trait level is depicted on the abscissa, with standard scores ranging from -3 to $+3$. An average amount of the trait in question would be indicated by a score of 0. Actually, for mathematical reasons, the scores in an IRF can range hypothetically from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$, but in actual practice, scores rarely escape the bounds of -3 to $+3$. The ordinate depicts the probability of a correct response on a scale from 0 to 1.

Upon careful reflection, the IRF provides a wealth of information about each item. For example, it can be used to determine the difficulty level of test items. In the IRT approach, difficulty level is gauged differently than in classical test theory. According to classical test theory, the difficulty level of an item is equivalent to the proportion of examinees in a standardization sample who pass the item. In contrast, according to IRT, difficulty is indexed by how much of the trait is needed to answer the item correctly. For the items shown in Figure 3.11, item A has the lowest difficulty level—it is passed by almost everyone, even examinees possessing only a small amount of the trait in question. In contrast, item D has the highest difficulty level—only those with high amounts of the trait typically answer



FIGURE 3.11 **Item Response Functions for Four Test Items**

correctly. Although not immediately obvious, items B and C are equal in difficulty level—for example, individuals with an average trait level (a score of 0) have a 50 percent chance of answering these items correctly.

Another quality evident in the IRF is the item discrimination parameter, which is a gauge of how well the item differentiates among individuals at a specific level of the trait in question. Consider items B and C in Figure 3.11. Although they are equally difficult overall—both answered correctly by 50 percent of the examinees—item C with its steeper curve possesses better discrimination, meaning that it is better able to differentiate among individuals at this level of the trait.

The appealing advantage of the IRT approach to measurement is that the probability of a respondent answering a particular question correctly can be expressed as a precise mathematical equation. Although it is beyond the scope of our presentation to go into the derivation, seeing an IRT equation might help the reader appreciate the sophistication of this approach. We denote the item difficulty as b and the amount of the trait that an examinee possesses as θ. Then the relevant equation looks like this:

$$p(\theta) = 1/(1 + e^{-(\theta - b)})$$

where $p(\theta)$ is the probability of a respondent with trait level θ correctly responding to an item of difficulty b. When the parameters are filled in and this equation is plotted, the outcome is an IRF for each test item, similar to those shown in Figure 3.11. The symbol e in the equation refers to the base for natural logarithms, which has a constant value of 2.71828. The parameter θ refers to the examinee trait level measured on a standard scale, which typically varies from −3 to +3. This particular formula was developed by the Danish mathematician Georg Rasch (1960); hence, in his honor this IRT application is also known as a **Rasch Model**. This is a simple and elegant application of IRT, also known as the one parameter model. The single parameter referred to is b, the item difficulty level. More complex models have also been developed. These include the two-parameter model that adds the item discrimination index to the equation, and the three-parameter model that factors in a guessing parameter as well (Baker, 2001). The discussion here is based on the one-parameter model.

Information Functions

In general terms, information is that which reduces uncertainty. In psychological measurement, information represents the capacity of a test item to differentiate among people (Reise, Ainsworth, & Haviland, 2005). On most scales, certain items are intended to differentiate among individuals low on the trait being measured, whereas other items are designed for discrimination at higher trait levels. Consider items A and D from Figure 3.11. Item A is useful only for testing individuals low on the relevant trait—at higher levels, everyone answers correctly, and no information is gained. It would be pointless to administer this item to individuals at the higher end of the trait spectrum because it is certain they will answer correctly. Conversely, item D is useful only for individuals with high trait levels—at lower trait levels, it is certain that everyone fails the item and, likewise, no information is gained.

Another way of stating this is to say that a test item typically provides a different level of information at each level of the trait in question. For example, item A provides a lot of information at low trait levels but none at high levels, whereas item D shows



FIGURE 3.12 Item Information Functions for Two Test Items

the reverse pattern—no information at low trait levels but more information at high levels. Using a simple mathematical conversion, an **item information function** can be derived from the IRF for each item. This function portrays graphically the relationship between the trait level of examinees and the information provided by the test item. The information functions for items A and D are displayed in Figure 3.12.

The beauty of IRT is that the item information functions from different scale items can be *added together* to derive the scale information function:

> Because information is directly related to measurement precision (more information equals more precise measurement), the scale information function estimates how well a measure functions as a whole in different trait ranges. The fact that item information functions can be added together is the foundation for scale construction with IRT. (Reise, Ainsworth, & Haviland, 2005, p. 96)

The scale information function is analogous to test reliability as elucidated in classical test theory with two important differences. First, in IRT the precision of measurement can vary, depending on where an individual falls in the trait range, whereas in classical test theory a single reliability (precision of measurement) is typically calculated for the entire test. Second, in IRT a different collection of test items might be used for each examinee to obtain a predetermined precision of measurement, whereas in classical test theory a single set of items is typically administered to all examinees.

Invariance in IRT

Invariance is a challenging concept to understand because it is contrary to the traditional lore of testing, which posits that test scores are meaningful only in a relative sense—in relation to fixed scales administered to large standardization samples. Certainly, it is true within IRT that huge databases are needed to make sense of individual test results. Yet, within IRT the manner in which we estimate the trait level (i.e., acquire a score) is fundamentally different from traditional approaches such as classical test theory.

Within the IRT framework, invariance refers to two separate but related ideas (Reise, Ainsworth, & Haviland, 2005). First, invariance means that an examinee's position on a latent-trait continuum (his or her score) can be estimated from the responses to any set of test items with known IRFs. In other words, as long as the IRFs for a particular set of test items have been previously calculated, a trait level can be estimated for an examinee who has answered those items. In fact, the particular items used might differ from one examinee to another, and the number of items administered might even differ. But as long as the IRFs of the particular items are known, the methods of IRT provide an estimate of the trait level (i.e., a test score). Preferably, of course, items with appropriate difficulty levels corresponding to the trait level of the examinee will be administered. Typically, this is accomplished by using computer programs that flexibly select test items based on the prior responses of the examinee.

The second meaning of invariance is that the IRFs do not depend on the characteristics of a particular population. In other words, the IRF for each item is presumed to exist in some abstract, independent, and enduring manner, waiting to be discovered by the psychometrician. The results for different samples might help fine-tune different parts of the IRF, but the outcome always should fall on the same curve. This means, as well, that the scale

of the trait exists independently of any set of items and independently of any particular population. Reise, Ainsworth, and Haviland (2005) describe the advantages of item-parameter invariance as follows:

> For example, in large-scale educational assessment, item-parameter invariance facilitates the linking of scales from different measures (i.e., placing scores on a single, common scale), across students in different grade levels (e.g., third through sixth grade in the same school) and within a grade level (e.g., fourth graders in different schools). Similarly, using IRT methods to compare individuals who have responded to different measures is relevant to cross-cultural and developmental researchers. . . . (p. 98)

Although IRT analyses typically require large samples—several hundred or thousands of respondents—the necessary software is straightforward and commonly available. Given its advantages, IRT approaches to test development likely will become increasingly prominent in the years ahead.

THE NEW RULES OF MEASUREMENT

When fully explicated, IRT leads to what Embretson (1996) has called "the new rules of measurement." By this she means that several conclusions from classical testing theory do not hold true within the framework of IRT. For example, within classical testing theory, the standard error of measurement is assumed to be a constant that applies to all examinee scores regardless of the ability level of a particular respondent. However, within IRT the standard error of measurement becomes substantially larger at both extremes of ability. In other words, the IRT model concludes that test scores are more reliable for individuals of average ability and increasingly less reliable for those with very high or very low ability.

Another difference pertains to the relationship between test length and reliability. In classical test theory, it is almost an axiom that longer tests are more reliable than shorter tests. For example, this follows from the Spearman-Brown formula discussed earlier in the chapter. However, when IRT models are used, shorter tests can be more reliable than longer tests. This is especially true when there is a good match between the difficulty level of the specific items administered and the proficiency level of the examinee. A good fit between these two parameters allows for a precise (reliable) estimate of ability using a relatively smaller number of test items.

In general, tests developed within an IRT model are better suited to computerized adaptive testing, in which a computer program is used not only to administer test items but also to select them in a flexible manner based on each examinee's ongoing responses to prior items. Computerized adaptive testing is discussed in more detail in Topic 12B, Computerized Assessment and the Future of Testing.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ESTIMATION OF RELIABILITY

Traditional approaches to estimating reliability may be misleading or inappropriate for some applications. Some of the more problematic situations involve unstable characteristics, speed tests, restriction of range, and criterion-referenced tests.

Unstable Characteristics

Some characteristics are presumed to be ever changing in reaction to situational or physiological variables. Emotional reactivity as measured by electrodermal or galvanic skin response is a good example. Such a measure fluctuates quickly in reaction to loud noises, underlying thought processes, and stressful environmental events. Even just talking to another person can arouse a strong electrodermal response. Because the true amount of emotional reactivity changes so quickly, test and retest must be nearly instantaneous in order to provide an accurate index of reliability for unstable characteristics such as an electrodermal measure of emotional reactivity.

Speed and Power Tests

A speed test typically contains items of uniform and generally simple levels of difficulty. If time permitted, most subjects should be able to complete most or all of the items on such a test. However, as the

name suggests, a speeded test has a restrictive time limit that guarantees few subjects complete the entire test. Since the items attempted tend to be correct, an examinee's score on a speeded test largely reflects speed of performance.

Speed tests are often contrasted with power tests. A power test allows enough time for test takers to attempt all items but is constructed so that no test taker is able to obtain a perfect score. Most tests contain a mixture of speed and power components.

The most important point to stress about the reliability of speed tests is that the traditional split-half approach (comparing odd and even items) will yield a spuriously high reliability coefficient. Consider one test taker who completes 60 of 90 items on a speed test. Most likely, the odd-even approach would show 30 odd items correct and 30 even items correct. With similar data from other subjects, the correlation between scores on odd and even items necessarily would approach +1.00. The reliability of a speed test should be based on the test–retest method or split-half reliability from two, separately timed half tests. In the latter instance, the Spearman-Brown correction is needed.

Restriction of Range

Test–retest reliability will be spuriously low if it is based on a sample of homogeneous subjects for whom there is a **restriction of range** on the characteristic being measured. For example, it would be inappropriate to estimate the reliability of an intelligence test by administering it twice to a sample of college students. This point is illustrated by the hypothetical but realistic scatterplot shown in Figure 3.13, where the reader can see a strong test–retest correlation for the entire range of diverse subjects, but a weak correlation for brighter subjects viewed in isolation.

Reliability of Criterion-Referenced Tests

The reader will recall from the first topic of this chapter that criterion-referenced tests evaluate performance in terms of mastery rather than assessing a continuum of achievement. Test items are designed to identify specific skills that need remediation; therefore, items tend to be of the "pass/fail" variety.



FIGURE 3.13 Sampling a Restricted Range of Subjects Causes Test-Retest Reliability to Be Spuriously Low

The structure of criterion-referenced tests is such that the variability of scores among examinees is typically quite minimal. In fact, if test results are used for training purposes and everyone continues training until all test skills are mastered, variability in test scores becomes nonexistent. Under these conditions, traditional approaches to the assessment of reliability are simply inappropriate.

With many criterion-referenced tests, results must be almost perfectly accurate to be useful. For example, any classification error is serious if the purpose of a test is to determine a subject's ability to drive a manual transmission, or stick shift, automobile. The key issue here is not whether test and retest scores are close to one another, but whether the classification ("can do/can't do") is the same in both instances. What we really want to know is the percentage of persons for whom the same decision is reached on both occasions—the closer to 100 percent, the better. This is but one illustration of the need for specialized techniques in the evaluation of nonnormative tests. Berk (1984) and Feldt and Brennan (1989) discuss approaches to the reliability of criterion-referenced tests.

THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS

The reader should now be well versed in the different approaches to reliability and should possess at least a conceptual idea of how reliability coefficients

are computed. In addition, we have discussed the distinctive testing conditions that dictate the use of one kind of reliability method as opposed to others. No doubt, the reader has noticed that we have yet to discuss one crucial question: What is an acceptable level of reliability?

Many authors suggest that reliability should be at least .90 if not .95 for decisions about individuals (e.g., Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). However, there is really no hard and fast answer to this question. We offer the loose guidelines suggested by Guilford and Fruchter (1978):

> There has been some consensus that to be a very accurate measure of individual differences in some characteristic, the reliability should be above .90. The truth is, however, that many standard tests with reliabilities as low as .70 prove to be very useful. And tests with reliabilities lower than that can be useful in research.

On a more practical level, acceptable standards of reliability hinge on the amount of measurement error the user can tolerate in the proposed application of a test. Fortunately, reliability and measurement error are mutually interdependent concepts. Thus, if the test user can specify an acceptable level of measurement error, then it is also possible to determine the minimum standards of reliability required for that specific application of a test. We pursue this topic further by introducing a new concept: standard error of measurement.

RELIABILITY AND THE STANDARD ERROR OF MEASUREMENT

To introduce the concept of standard error of measurement we begin with a thought experiment. Suppose we could administer thousands of equivalent IQ tests to one individual. Suppose further that each test session was a fresh and new experience for our cooperative subject; in this hypothetical experiment, practice and boredom would have no effect on later test scores. Nonetheless, because of the kinds of random errors discussed in this chapter, the scores of our hapless subject would not be identical across test sessions. Our examinee might score a little worse on one test because he stayed up late the night before; the score on another test might be better because the items were idiosyncratically easy for him. Even though such error factors are random and unpredictable, it follows from the classical theory of measurement that the obtained scores would fall into a normal distribution with a precise mean and standard deviation. Let us say that the mean of the hypothetical IQ scores for our subject worked out to be 110, with a standard deviation of 2.5.

In fact, the mean of this distribution of hypothetical scores would be the estimated true score for our examinee. Our best estimate, then, is that our subject has a true IQ of 110. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the distribution of obtained scores would be the **standard error of measurement** (SEM). Note that while the true score on a test likely differs from one person to the next, the SEM is regarded as constant, an inherent property of the test. If we repeated this hypothetical experiment with another subject, the estimated true score would probably differ, but the SEM should work out to be a similar value.[2]

As its name suggests, the SEM is an index of measurement error that pertains to the test in question. In the hypothetical case in which $SEM = 0$, there would be no measurement error at all. A subject's obtained score would then also be his or her true score. However, this outcome is simply impossible in real-world testing. Every test exhibits some degree of measurement error. The larger the SEM, the greater the typical measurement error. However, the accuracy or inaccuracy of any individual score is always a probabilistic matter and never a known quantity.

As noted, the SEM can be thought of as the standard deviation of an examinee's hypothetical obtained scores on a large number of equivalent tests, under the assumption that practice and boredom effects are ruled out. Like any standard deviation of a normal distribution, the SEM has well-known statistical uses.

[2]This would hold true for subjects of similar age. The SEM may differ from one age group to the next—see Wechsler (2008) for an illustration with the WAIS-IV.

For example, 68 percent of the obtained scores will fall within one SEM of the mean, just as 68 percent of the cases in a normal curve fall within one SD of the mean.

The reader will recall from earlier in this chapter that about 95 percent of the cases in a normal distribution fall within two SDs of the mean. For this reason, if our examinee were to take one more IQ test, we could predict with 95 percent odds that the obtained score would be within two SEMs of the estimated true IQ of 110. Knowing that the SEM is 2.5, we would therefore predict that the obtained IQ score would be 110 $\pm$ 5; that is, the true score would very likely (95 percent odds) fall between 105 and 115.

Unfortunately, in the real world we do not have access to true scores and we most certainly cannot obtain multiple IQs from large numbers of equivalent tests; nor for that matter do we have direct knowledge of the SEM. All we typically possess is a reliability coefficient (e.g., a test–retest correlation from normative studies) plus one obtained score from a single test administration. How can we possibly use this information to determine the likely accuracy of our obtained score?

Computing the Standard Error of Measurement

We have noted several times in this chapter that reliability and measurement error are intertwined concepts, with low reliability signifying high measurement error, and vice versa. It should not surprise the reader, then, that the SEM can be computed indirectly from the reliability coefficient. The formula is

$$\text{SEM} = \text{SD}\sqrt{1 - r}$$

where SD is the standard deviation of the test scores and r is the reliability coefficient, both derived from a normative sample or other large and representative group of subjects.

We can use WAIS-R Full Scale IQ to illustrate the computation of the SEM. The SD of WAIS-R scores is known to be about 15, and the reliability coefficient is .97 (Wechsler, 1981). The SEM for Full Scale IQ is, therefore,

$$\text{SEM} = 15\sqrt{1 - .97}$$

which works out to be about 2.5.

The SEM and Individual Test Scores

Let us consider carefully what the SEM tells us about individual test results, once again using WAIS-R IQs to illustrate a general point. What we would really like to know is the likely accuracy of IQ. Let us say we have an individual examinee who obtains a score of 90, and let us assume that the test was administered in competent fashion. Nonetheless, is the obtained IQ score likely to be accurate?

In order to answer this question, we need to rephrase it. In the jargon of classical test theory, questions of accuracy really involve comparisons between obtained scores and true scores. Specifically, when we inquire whether an IQ score is accurate, we are really asking: How close is the obtained score to the true score?

The answer to this question may seem perturbing at first glance. It turns out that, in the individual case, we can never know precisely how close the obtained score is to the true score! The best we can do is provide a probabilistic statement based on our knowledge that the hypothetical obtained scores for a single examinee would be normally distributed with a standard deviation equal to the SEM. Based on this premise, we know that the obtained score is accurate to within plus or minus 2 SEMs in 95 percent of the cases. In other words, Full Scale IQ is 95 percent certain to be accurate within $\pm$5 IQ points. This range of plus or minus 5 IQ points corresponds to the 95 percent **confidence interval** for WAIS-R Full Scale IQ, because we can be 95 percent confident that the true score is contained within it.

Testers would do well to report test scores in terms of a confidence interval because this practice would help place scores in proper perspective (Sattler, 1988). An examinee who obtains an IQ of 90 should be described as follows: "Mr. Doe obtained a Full Scale IQ of 90 which is accurate to $\pm$5 points with 95 percent confidence." This wording helps forewarn others that test scores always incorporate some degree of measurement error.

The SEM and Differences between Scores

Testers are often expected to surmise whether an examinee has scored significantly higher in one

ability area than another. For example, it is usually germane to report whether an examinee is stronger at verbal or performance tasks or to say that no real difference exists in these two skill areas. The issue is not entirely academic. An examinee who has a relative superiority in performance intelligence might be counseled to pursue practical, hands-on careers. In contrast, a strength in verbal intelligence might result in a recommendation to pursue academic interests. How is an examiner to determine whether one test score is significantly better than another?

Keep in mind that every test score incorporates measurement error. It is therefore possible for an examinee to obtain a verbal score higher than his or her performance score when the underlying true scores—if only we could know them—would reveal no difference or even the opposite pattern! (see Figure 3.14). The important lesson here is that when each of two obtained scores reflects measurement error, the difference between these scores is quite volatile and must not be overinterpreted.

The **standard error of the difference** between two scores is a statistical measure that can help a test user determine whether a difference between scores is significant. The standard error of the difference between two scores can be computed from the SEMs of the individual tests by the following formula:

$$SE_{diff} = \sqrt{(SEM_1)^2 + (SEM_2)^2}$$

where SE_{diff} is the standard error of the difference and SEM_1 and SEM_2 are the respective standard errors of measurement.

It is assumed that the two scores are on the same scale or have been converted to the same scale. That is, the tests must have the same overall mean and standard deviation in the normative sample. By substituting $SD\sqrt{1 - r_{11}}$ for SEM_1 and $SD\sqrt{1 - r_{22}}$ for SEM_2, we arrive at

$$SE_{diff} = SD\sqrt{2 - r_{11} - r_{22}}$$

We return to our original question to illustrate the computation and use of SE_{diff}. How is an examiner to determine whether one test score is significantly better than another? In particular, suppose an examinee obtains Verbal IQ 112 and Performance IQ 105 on the WAIS-R. Is 7 IQ points a significant difference?



FIGURE 3.14 Obtained Scores Reflect Measurement Error and May Obscure the Relationship between True Scores
Note: In this hypothetical case the obtained Verbal IQ is higher than the obtained Performance IQ, whereas the underlying true scores show the opposite pattern.

We know from the WAIS-R Manual (Wechsler, 1981) that Verbal and Performance IQ each have standard deviations of approximately 15; and their respective reliabilities are .97 and .93. The standard error of the difference between these two scores can be found from

$$SE_{diff} = 15\sqrt{2 - .97 - .93} = 4.74$$

Recall from the discussion of normal distributions that 5 percent of the cases occur in the tails, beyond ± 1.96 standard deviations. Thus, differences that are approximately twice as large as SE_{diff} (i.e., 1.96×4.74) can be considered significant in the sense that they will occur by chance only 5 percent of the time. We may conclude, then, that differences of about 9 points or more between Verbal and Performance IQ likely reflect real differences in scores rather than chance contributions from errors of measurement. Thus, more likely than not, a difference of merely 7 IQ points does not signify a bona fide, significant difference between verbal and performance intelligence.

CHAPTER 4

Validity and Test Construction

TOPIC 4A Basic Concepts of Validity

Validity: A Definition
Content Validity
Criterion-Related Validity
Construct Validity
Approaches to Construct Validity
Extravalidity Concerns and the Widening Scope of Test Validity

As most every student of psychology knows, the merit of a psychological test is determined first by its reliability but then ultimately by its validity. In the preceding chapter we pointed out that reliability can be appraised by many seemingly diverse methods ranging from the conceptually straightforward test–retest approach to the theoretically more complex methodologies of internal consistency. Yet, regardless of the method used, the assessment of reliability invariably boils down to a simple summary statistic, the reliability coefficient. In this chapter, the more difficult and complex issue of validity—what a test score means—is investigated. The concept of validity is still evolving and, therefore, stirs up a great deal more controversy than its staid and established cousin, reliability (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1999). In Topic 4A, Basic Concepts of Validity, we introduce essential concepts of validity, including the standard tripartite division into content, criterion-related, and construct validity. We also discuss extravalidity concerns, which include side effects and unintended consequences of testing. Extravalidity concerns have fostered a wider definition of test validity that extends beyond the technical notions of content, criteria, and constructs. In Topic 4B, Test Construction, we stress that validity must be built into the test from the outset rather than being limited to the final stages of test development.

Put simply, the validity of a test is the extent to which it measures what it claims to measure. Psychometricians have long acknowledged that validity is the most fundamental and important characteristic of a test. After all, validity defines the *meaning* of test scores. Reliability is important, too, but only insofar as it constrains validity. To the extent that a test is unreliable, it cannot be valid. We can express this point from an alternative perspective: Reliability is a necessary but not a sufficient precursor of validity.

Test developers have a responsibility to demonstrate that new instruments fulfill the purposes for which they are designed. However, unlike test reliability, test validity is not a simple issue that is easily resolved on the basis of a few rudimentary studies. Test validation is a developmental process that begins with test construction and continues indefinitely:

> After a test is released for operational use, the interpretive meaning of its scores may continue to be sharpened, refined, and enriched through the gradual accumulation of clinical observations and through special research projects. . . . Test validity is a living thing; it is not dead and embalmed when the test is released. (Anastasi, 1986)

Test validity hinges upon the accumulation of research findings. In the sections that follow, we examine the kinds of evidence sought in the validation of a psychological test.

VALIDITY: A DEFINITION

We begin with a definition of **validity**, paraphrased from the influential *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1999):

> A test is valid to the extent that inferences made from it are appropriate, meaningful, and useful.

Notice that a test score per se is meaningless until the examiner draws inferences from it based on the test manual or other research findings. For example, knowing that an examinee has obtained a slightly elevated score on the MMPI-2 Depression scale is not particularly helpful. This result becomes valuable only when the examiner infers behavioral characteristics from it. Based on existing research, the examiner might conclude, "The elevated Depression score suggests that the examinee has little energy and has a pessimistic outlook on life." The MMPI-2 Depression scale possesses psychometric validity to the extent that such inferences are appropriate, meaningful, and useful.

Unfortunately, it is seldom possible to summarize the validity of a test in terms of a single, tidy statistic. Determining whether inferences are appropriate, meaningful, and useful typically requires numerous studies of the relationships between test performance and other independently observed behaviors. Validity reflects an evolutionary, research-based judgment of how adequately a test measures the attribute it was designed to measure. Consequently, the validity of tests is not easily captured by neat statistical summaries but is instead characterized on a continuum ranging from *weak* to *acceptable* to *strong*.

Traditionally, the different ways of accumulating validity evidence have been grouped into three categories:

- Content validity
- Criterion-related validity
- Construct validity

We will expand on this tripartite view of validity shortly, but first a few cautions. The use of these convenient labels does not imply that there are distinct types of validity or that a specific validation procedure is best for one test use and not another:

> An ideal validation includes several types of evidence, which span all three of the traditional categories. Other things being equal, more sources of evidence are better than fewer. However, the quality of the evidence is of primary importance, and a single line of solid evidence is preferable to numerous lines of evidence of questionable quality. Professional judgment should guide the decisions regarding the forms of evidence that are most necessary and feasible in light of the intended uses of the test and any likely alternatives to testing. (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1985)

We may summarize these points by stressing that validity is a unitary concept determined by the extent to which a test measures what it purports to measure. The inferences drawn from a valid test are appropriate, meaningful, and useful. In this light, it should be apparent that virtually any empirical study that relates test scores to other findings is a

potential source of validity information (Anastasi, 1986; Messick, 1995).

CONTENT VALIDITY

Content validity is determined by the degree to which the questions, tasks, or items on a test are representative of the universe of behavior the test was designed to sample. In theory, content validity is really nothing more than a sampling issue (Bausell, 1986). The items of a test can be visualized as a sample drawn from a larger population of potential items that define what the researcher really wishes to measure. If the sample (specific items on the test) is representative of the population (all possible items), then the test possesses content validity.

Content validity is a useful concept when a great deal is known about the variable that the researcher wishes to measure. With achievement tests in particular, it is often possible to specify the relevant universe of behaviors in advance. For example, when developing an achievement test of spelling, a researcher could identify nearly all possible words that third graders should know. The content validity of a third-grade spelling achievement test would be assured, in part, if words of varying difficulty level were randomly sampled from this preexisting list.

However, test developers must take care to specify the relevant universe of responses as well. All too often, a multiple-choice format is taken for granted:

> If the constructor thinks about his aims with an open mind he will often decide that the task should call for a response constructed by the student—written open-end responses or, if inhibitions are to be minimized, oral responses. Nor are the directions to the subject and the social setting of the test to be neglected in defining the task. (Cronbach, 1971)

In reference to spelling achievement, it cannot be assumed that a multiple-choice test will measure the same spelling skills as an oral test or a frequency count of misspellings in written compositions. Thus, when evaluating content validity, response specification is also an integral part of defining the relevant universe of behaviors.

Content validity is more difficult to assure when the test measures an ill-defined trait. How could a test developer possibly hope to specify the universe of potential items for a measure of anxiety? In these cases in which the measured trait is less tangible, no test developer in his or her right mind would try to construct the literal universe of potential test items. Instead, what usually passes for content validity is the considered opinion of expert judges. In effect, the test developer asserts that "a panel of experts reviewed the domain specification carefully and judged the following test questions to possess content validity." Figure 4.1 reproduces a sample judge's item rating form for determining the content validity of test questions.

Reviewer:_____ Date:_____

Please read carefully through the domain specification for this test. Next, please indicate how well you feel each item reflects the domain specification. Judge a test item solely on the basis of match between its content and the content defined by the domain specification. Please use the four-point rating scale shown below:

1	2	3	4
not relevant	*somewhat relevant*	*quite relevant*	*very relevant*

FIGURE 4.1 Sample Judges Item-Rating Form for Determining Content Validity *Source:* Based on Martuza (1977), Hambleton (1984), Bausell (1986).

Quantification of Content Validity

Martuza (1977) and others have discussed statistical methods for determining the overall content validity of a test from the judgments of experts. These methods tend to be very specialized and have not been widely accepted. Nonetheless, their approaches can serve as a model for a commonsense viewpoint on interrater agreement as a basis for content validity.

When two expert judges evaluate individual items of a test on the four-point scale proposed in Figure 4.1, the ratings of each judge on each item can be dichotomized into weak relevance (ratings of 1 or 2) versus strong relevance (ratings of 3 or 4). For each item, then, the conjoint ratings of the two judges can be entered into the two-by-two agreement table depicted in Figure 4.2. For example, if both judges believed an item was quite relevant (strong relevance), it would be placed in cell D. If the first judge believed an item was very relevant (strong relevance) but the second judge deemed it be only slightly relevant (weak relevance), the item would be placed in cell B.

Notice that cell D is the only cell that reflects valid agreement between judges. The other cells involve disagreement (cells B and C) or agreement that an item doesn't belong on the test (cell A). We have reproduced hypothetical results for a 100-item test in Figure 4.3. A coefficient of content validity can be derived from the following formula:

$$\text{content validity} = \frac{D}{(A + B + C + D)}$$

For example, on our 100-item test both judges concurred that 87 items were strongly relevant (cell D), so the coefficient of content validity would be 87/(4 + 4 + 5 + 87) or .87. If more than two judges are used, this computational procedure could be completed with all possible pair-wise combinations of judges, and the average coefficient reported. An important note: A coefficient of content validity is just one piece of evidence in the evaluation of a test. Such a coefficient does not by itself establish the validity of a test.

The commonsense approach to content validity advocated here serves well as a flagging mechanism to help cull out existing items that are deemed inappropriate by expert raters. However, it cannot identify nonexistent items that should be added to a test to help make the pool of questions more representative of the intended domain. A test could possess a robust coefficient of content validity and still fall short in subtle ways. Quantification of content validity is no substitute for careful selection of items.

Face Validity

We digress briefly here to mention face validity, which is not really a form of validity at all. Nonetheless, the concept is encountered in testing and, therefore, needs brief explanation. A test has **face validity** if it looks valid to test users, examiners, and especially the examinees. Face validity is really a matter of social acceptability and not a technical form of validity in the same category as content,



FIGURE 4.2 Interrater Agreement Model for Content Validity


EXPERT JUDGE #1
Weak Relevance (item rated 1 or 2)
Strong Relevance (item rated 3 or 4)
EXPERT JUDGE #2
Weak Relevance (item rated 1 or 2)
Strong Relevance (item rated 3 or 4)
4 items
5 items
4 items
87 items

FIGURE 4.3 Hypothetical Example of Agreement Model of Content Validity for a 100-Item Test

criterion-related, or construct validity (Nevo, 1985). From a public relations standpoint, it is crucial that tests possess face validity—otherwise those who take the tests may be dissatisfied and doubt the value of psychological testing. However, face validity should not be confused with objective validity, which is determined by the relationship of test scores to other sources of information. In fact, a test could possess extremely strong face validity—the items might look highly relevant to what is presumably measured by the instrument—yet produce totally meaningless scores with no predictive utility whatever.

CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY

Criterion-related validity is demonstrated when a test is shown to be effective in estimating an examinee's performance on some outcome measure. In this context, the variable of primary interest is the outcome measure, called a *criterion.* The test score is useful only insofar as it provides a basis for accurate prediction of the criterion. For example, a college entrance exam that is reasonably accurate in predicting the subsequent grade point average of examinees would possess criterion-related validity.

Two different approaches to validity evidence are subsumed under the heading of criterion-related validity. In **concurrent validity**, the criterion measures are obtained at approximately the same time as the test scores. For example, the current psychiatric diagnosis of patients would be an appropriate criterion measure to provide validation evidence for a paper-and-pencil psychodiagnostic test. In **predictive validity**, the criterion measures are obtained in the future, usually months or years after the test scores are obtained, as with the college grades predicted from an entrance exam. Each of these two approaches is best suited to different testing situations, discussed in the following sections. However, before we review the nature of concurrent and predictive validity, let us examine a more fundamental question: What are the characteristics of a good criterion?

Characteristics of a Good Criterion

As noted, a *criterion* is any outcome measure against which a test is validated. In practical terms, a criterion can be most anything. Some examples will help to illustrate the diversity of potential criteria. A simulator-based driver skill test might be validated against a criterion of "number of traffic citations received in the last 12 months." A scale measuring social readjustment might be validated against a criterion of "number of days spent in a psychiatric hospital in the last three years." A test of sales potential might be validated against a criterion of "dollar amount of goods sold in the preceding year." The choice of criteria is circumscribed, in part, by the ingenuity of the test developer. However, criteria must be more than just imaginative; they must also be reliable, appropriate, and free of contamination from the test itself.

The criterion must itself be reliable if it is to be a useful index of what the test measures. If you recall the meaning of reliability—consistency of scores—the need for a reliable criterion measure is intuitively obvious. After all, unreliable means unpredictable. An unreliable criterion will be inherently unpredictable, regardless of the merits of the test.

Consider the case in which scores on a college entrance exam (the test) are used to predict subsequent grade point average (the criterion). The validity of the entrance exam could be studied by computing the correlation (r_{xy}) between entrance exam scores and grade point averages for a representative sample of students. For purposes of a validity study, it would be ideal if the students were granted open or unscreened enrollment so as to prevent a restriction of range on the criterion variable. In any case, the resulting correlation coefficient is called a *validity coefficient.*[1]

The theoretical upper limit of the validity coefficient is constrained by the reliability of both the test and the criterion:

$$r_{xy} = \sqrt{(r_{xx})(r_{yy})}$$

[1]We have purposefully refrained from referring to such a statistic as *the* validity coefficient. Remember that validity is a unitary concept determined by multiple sources of information that may include the correlation between test and criterion.

The validity coefficient is always less than or equal to the square root of the test reliability multiplied by the criterion reliability. In other words, to the extent that the reliability of either the test or the criterion (or both) is low, the validity coefficient is also diminished. Returning to our example of an entrance exam used to predict college grade point average, we must conclude that the validity coefficient for such a test will always fall far short of +1.00, owing in part to the unreliability of college grades and also in part to the unreliability of the test itself.

A criterion measure must also be appropriate for the test under investigation. The *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* sourcebook (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1985) incorporates this important point as a separate standard:

> All criterion measures should be described accurately, and the rationale for choosing them as relevant criteria should be made explicit.

For example, in the case of interest tests, it is sometimes unclear whether the criterion measure should indicate satisfaction, success, or continuance in the activities under question. The choice between these subtle variants in the criterion must be made carefully, based on an analysis of what the interest test purports to measure.

A criterion must also be free of contamination from the test itself. Lehman (1978) has illustrated this point in a criterion-related validity study of a life change measure. The Schedule of Recent Events, or the SRE (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) is a widely used instrument that provides a quantitative index of the accumulation of stressful life events (e.g., divorce, job promotion, traffic tickets). Scores on the SRE correlate modestly with such criterion measures as physical illness and psychological disturbance. However, many seemingly appropriate criterion measures incorporate items that are similar or identical to SRE items. For example, screening tests of psychiatric symptoms often check for changes in eating, sleeping, or social activities. Unfortunately, the SRE incorporates questions that check for the following:

Change in eating habits

Change in sleeping habits

Change in social activities

If the screening test contains the same items as the SRE, then the correlation between these two measures will be artificially inflated. This potential source of error in test validation is referred to as *criterion contamination,* since the criterion is "contaminated" by its artificial commonality with the test.

Criterion contamination is also possible when the criterion consists of ratings from experts. If the experts also possess knowledge of the examinees' test scores, this information may (consciously or unconsciously) influence their ratings. When validating a test against a criterion of expert ratings, the test scores must be held in strictest confidence until the ratings have been collected.

Now that the reader knows the general characteristics of a good criterion, we will review the application of this knowledge in the analysis of concurrent and predictive validity.

Concurrent Validity

In a concurrent validation study, test scores and criterion information are obtained simultaneously. Concurrent evidence of test validity is usually desirable for achievement tests, tests used for licensing or certification, and diagnostic clinical tests. An evaluation of concurrent validity indicates the extent to which test scores accurately estimate an individual's present position on the relevant criterion. For example, an arithmetic achievement test would possess concurrent validity if its scores could be used to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the current standing of students in a mathematics course. A personality inventory would possess concurrent validity if diagnostic classifications derived from it roughly matched the opinions of psychiatrists or clinical psychologists.

A test with demonstrated concurrent validity provides a shortcut for obtaining information that might otherwise require the extended investment of professional time. For example, the case assignment procedure in a mental health clinic can be expedited if a test with demonstrated concurrent validity is used for initial screening decisions. In this manner, severely disturbed patients requiring immediate clinical workup and intensive treatment can be quickly identified by paper-and-pencil test. Of course, tests are not intended to replace mental

health specialists, but they can save time in the initial phases of diagnosis.

Correlations between a new test and existing tests are often cited as evidence of concurrent validity. This has a catch-22 quality to it—old tests validating a new test—but is nonetheless appropriate if two conditions are met. First, the criterion (existing) tests must have been validated through correlations with appropriate nontest behavioral data. In other words, the network of interlocking relationships must touch ground with real-world behavior at some point. Second, the instrument being validated must measure the same construct as the criterion tests. Thus, it is entirely appropriate that developers of a new intelligence test report correlations between it and established mainstays such as the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler scales.

Predictive Validity

In a predictive validation study, test scores are used to estimate outcome measures obtained at a later date. Predictive validity is particularly relevant for entrance examinations and employment tests. Such tests share a common function—determining who is likely to succeed at a future endeavor. A relevant criterion for a college entrance exam would be first-year-student grade point average, while an employment test might be validated against supervisor ratings after six months on the job. In the ideal situation, such tests are validated during periods of open enrollment (or open hiring) so that a full range of results is possible on the outcome measures. In this manner, future use of the test as a selection device for excluding low-scoring applicants will rest on a solid foundation of validational data.

When tests are used for purposes of prediction, it is necessary to develop a regression equation. A **regression equation** describes the best-fitting straight line for estimating the criterion from the test. We will not discuss the statistical approach to fitting the straight line, except to mention that it minimizes the sum of the squared deviations from the line (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981). For current purposes, it is more important to understand the nature and function of regression equations.

Ghiselli and associates (1981) provide a simple example of regression in the service of prediction, summarized here. Suppose we are trying to predict success on a job Y (evaluated by the supervisor on a 7-point scale ranging from poor to excellent performance) from scores on a preemployment test X (with scores that range from a low of 0 to a high of 100). The regression equation

$$Y = .07X + .2$$

might describe the best-fitting straight line and therefore produce the most accurate predictions. For an individual who scored 55 on the test, the predicted performance level would be 4.05; that is, $.07(55) + .2$. A test score of 33 yields a predicted performance level of 2.51, that is, $.07(33) + .2$. Additional predictions are made likewise.

Validity Coefficient and the Standard Error of the Estimate

The relationship between test scores and criterion measures can be expressed in several different ways. Perhaps the most popular approach is to compute the correlation between test and criterion (r_{xy}). In this context, the resulting correlation is known as a **validity coefficient**. The higher the validity coefficient r_{xy}, the more accurate is the test in predicting the criterion. In the hypothetical case where r_{xy} is 1.00, the test would possess perfect validity and allow for flawless prediction. Of course, no such test exists, and validity coefficients are more commonly in the low- to midrange of correlations and rarely exceed .80. But how high should a validity coefficient be? There is no general answer to this question. However, we can approach the question indirectly by investigating the relationship between the validity coefficient and the corresponding error of estimate.

The **standard error of estimate** (SE_{est}) is the margin of error to be expected in the predicted criterion score. The error of estimate is derived from the following formula:

$$SE_{est} = SD_y\sqrt{1 - r_{xy}^2}$$

In this formula, r_{xy}^2 is the square of the validity coefficient and SDy is the standard deviation of the criterion scores. Perhaps the reader has noticed the

similarities between this index and the standard error of measurement (SEM). In fact, both indices help gauge margins of error. The SEM indicates the margin of measurement error caused by unreliability of the test, whereas SE_{est} indicates the margin of prediction error caused by the imperfect validity of the test.

The SE_{est} helps answer the fundamental question: "How accurately can criterion performance be predicted from test scores?" (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1985). Consider the common practice of attempting to predict college grade point average from high school scores on a scholastic aptitude test. For a specific aptitude test, suppose we determine that the SE_{est} for predicted grade point average is .2 (on the usual 0.0 to 4.0 grade point scale). What does this mean for the examinee whose college grade point is predicted to be 3.1? As is the case with all standard deviations, the standard error of the estimate can be used to bracket predicted outcomes in a probabilistic sense. Assuming that the frequency distribution of grades is normal, we know that the chances are about 68 in 100 that the examinee's predicted grade point will fall between 2.9 and 3.3 (plus or minus one SE_{est}). In like manner, we know that the chances are about 95 in 100 that the examinee's predicted grade point will fall between 2.7 and 3.5 (plus or minus two SE_{est}).

What is an acceptable standard of predictive accuracy? There is no simple answer to this question. As the reader will discern from the discussion that follows, standards of predictive accuracy are, in part, value judgments. To explain why this is so, we need to introduce the basic elements of decision theory (Taylor & Russell, 1939; Cronbach & Gleser, 1965).

Decision Theory Applied to Psychological Tests

Proponents of **decision theory** stress that the purpose of psychological testing is not measurement per se but measurement in the service of decision making. The personnel manager wishes to know whom to hire; the admissions officer must choose whom to admit; the parole board desires to know which felons are good risks for early release; and the psychiatrist needs to determine which patients require hospitalization.

The link between testing and decision making is nowhere more obvious than in the context of predictive validation studies. Many of these studies use test results to determine who will likely succeed or fail on the criterion task so that, in the future, examinees with poor scores on the predictor test can be screened from admission, employment, or other privilege. This is the rationale by which admissions officers or employers require applicants to obtain a certain minimum score on an appropriate entrance or employment exam—previous studies of predictive validity can be cited to show that candidates scoring below a certain cutoff face steep odds in their educational or employment pursuits.

Psychological tests frequently play a major role in these kinds of institutional decision making. In a typical institutional decision, a committee—or sometimes a single person—makes a large number of comparable decisions based on a cutoff score on one or more selection tests. In order to present the key concepts of decision theory, let us oversimplify somewhat and assume that only a single test is involved.

Even though most tests produce a range of scores along a continuum, it is usually possible to identify a cutoff or pass/fail score that divides the sample into those predicted to succeed versus those predicted to fail on the criterion of interest. Let us assume that persons predicted to succeed are also selected for hiring or admission. In this case, the proportion of persons in the "predicted-to-succeed" group is referred to as the *selection ratio.* The selection ratio can vary from 0 to 1.0, depending on the proportion of persons who are considered good bets to succeed on the criterion measure.

If the results of a selection test allow for the simple dichotomy of "predicted to succeed" versus "predicted to fail," then the subsequent outcome on the criterion measure likewise can be split into two categories, namely, "did succeed" and "did fail." From this perspective, every study of predictive validity produces a two-by-two matrix, as portrayed in Figure 4.4.

Certain combinations of predicted and actual outcomes are more likely than others. If a test has



FIGURE 4.4 Possible Outcomes When a Selection Test Is Used to Predict Performance on a Criterion Measure

good predictive validity, then most persons predicted to succeed will succeed and most persons predicted to fail will fail. These are examples of correct predictions and serve to bolster the validity of a selection instrument. Outcomes in these two cells are referred to as *hits* because the test has made a correct prediction.

But no selection test is a perfect predictor, so two other types of outcomes are also possible. Some persons predicted to succeed will, in fact, fail. These cases are referred to as **false positives**. And some persons predicted to fail would, if given the chance, succeed. These cases are referred to as **false negatives**. False positives and false negatives are collectively known as misses, because in both cases the test has made an inaccurate prediction. Finally, the hit rate is the proportion of cases in which the test accurately predicts success or failure, that is, hit rate = (hits)/(hits + misses).

False positives and false negatives are unavoidable in the real-world use of selection tests. The only way to eliminate such selection errors would be to develop a perfect test, an instrument which has a validity coefficient of +1.00, signifying a perfect correlation with the criterion measure. A perfect test is theoretically possible, but none has yet been observed on this planet. Nonetheless, it is still important to develop selection tests with very high predictive validity, so as to minimize decision errors.

Proponents of decision theory make two fundamental assumptions about the use of selection tests:

1. The value of various outcomes to the institution can be expressed in terms of a common utility scale. One such scale—but by no means the only one—is profit and loss. For example, when using an interest inventory to select salespersons, a corporation can anticipate profit from applicants correctly identified as successful but will lose money when, inevitably, some of those selected do not sell enough even to support their own salary (false positives). The cost of the selection procedure must also be factored in to the utility scale as well.
2. In institutional selection decisions, the most generally useful strategy is one that maximizes the average gain on the utility scale (or minimizes average loss) over many similar decisions. For example, which selection ratio produces the largest average gain on the utility scale? Maximization is, thus, the fundamental decision principle.

The application of decision theory is much more complicated than illustrated here, mainly because of the difficulty of finding a common utility scale for different outcomes. Consider the plight of the admissions officer at any large university. If the selection ratio is quite strict, then most of the admitted students will also succeed. But some students not admitted might have succeeded, too, and their financial support to the university (tuition, fees) is, therefore, lost. However, if the selection ratio is too lenient, then the percentage of false positives (students admitted who subsequently fail) skyrockets. How is the cost of a false positive to be calculated? The financial cost can be estimated—for example, advisers dedicate a certain number of hours at a known pay rate counseling these students. But no single utility scale can encompass the other diverse consequences such as the need for additional remedial services (which require money), the increase in faculty cynicism (an issue of morale), and the dashed hopes of misled students (whose heartbreak affects public perception of the university and may even influence future state funding!). Clearly, the neat

statistical notions of decision theory oversimplify the complex influences that determine utility in the real world.

Nonetheless, in large institutional settings where a common utility scale can be identified, principles of decision theory can be applied to selection problems with thought-provoking results. For example, Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie, and Muldrow (1979) analyzed the potential impact of using the Programmer Aptitude Test (PAT, Hughes & McNamara, 1959) in the selection of computer programmers by the federal government. They based their analysis on the following facts and assumptions:

1. PAT scores and measures of later on-the-job programming performance correlate quite substantially; the validity coefficient of the PAT is .76 (fact).
2. The government hires 600 new programmers each year (fact).
3. The cost of testing is about $10 per examinee (fact).
4. Programmers stay on the job for about nine years and receive pay raises according to a known pay scale (fact).
5. The yearly productivity in dollars of low-performing, average, and superior programmers can be accurately estimated by supervisors (assumption).

Based on these facts and assumptions, Schmidt et al. (1979) then compared the hypothetical use of the PAT against other selection procedures of lesser validity. Since the usefulness of a test is partly determined by the percentage of applicants who are selected for employment, the researchers also looked at the impact of different selection ratios on overall productivity. In each case, they estimated the yearly increase in dollar-amount productivity from using the PAT instead of an alternative and less efficacious procedure. In general, the use of the PAT was estimated to increase productivity by tens of millions of dollars. The specific estimated increase depended on the selection ratio and the validity coefficient of hypothetical alternative procedures. For example, if 80 percent of the applicants were hired (selection ratio of .80), using the PAT would increase the productivity of the federal government by at least $5.6 million (if the alternative procedure had a validity coefficient of .50) and possibly as much as $16.5 million (if the alternative procedure had no validity at all). If the selection ratio were quite small, the use of the PAT for selection boosted productivity even more—possibly as much as nearly $100 million. Schmidt et al. (1979) concluded that "the impact of valid selection procedures on work-force productivity is considerably greater than most personnel psychologists have believed."

CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

The final type of validity discussed in this unit is construct validity, and it is undoubtedly the most difficult and elusive of the bunch. A **construct** is a theoretical, intangible quality or trait in which individuals differ (Messick, 1995). Examples of constructs include leadership ability, overcontrolled hostility, depression, and intelligence. Notice in each of these examples that constructs are inferred from behavior but are more than the behavior itself. In general, constructs are theorized to have some form of independent existence and to exert broad but to some extent predictable influences on human behavior. A test designed to measure a construct must estimate the existence of an inferred, underlying characteristic (e.g., leadership ability) based on a limited sample of behavior. Construct validity refers to the appropriateness of these inferences about the underlying construct.

All psychological constructs possess two characteristics in common:

1. There is no single external referent sufficient to validate the existence of the construct; that is, the construct cannot be operationally defined (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
2. Nonetheless, a network of interlocking suppositions can be derived from existing theory about the construct (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1985).

We will illustrate these points by reference to the construct of psychopathy (Cleckley, 1976), a personality constellation characterized by antisocial behavior (lying, stealing, and occasionally

violence), a lack of guilt and shame, and impulsivity.[2] Psychopathy is surely a construct, in that there is no single behavioral characteristic or outcome sufficient to determine who is strongly psychopathic and who is not. On average we might expect psychopaths to be frequently incarcerated, but so are many common criminals. Furthermore, many successful psychopaths somehow avoid apprehension altogether (Cleckley, 1976). Psychopathy cannot be gauged only by scrapes with the law.

Nonetheless, a network of interlocking suppositions can be derived from existing theory about psychopathy. The fundamental problem in psychopathy is presumed to be a deficiency in the ability to feel emotional arousal—whether empathy, guilt, fear of punishment, or anxiety under stress (Cleckley, 1976). A number of predictions follow from this appraisal. For example, psychopaths should lie convincingly, have a greater tolerance for physical pain, show less autonomic arousal in the resting state, and get into trouble because of their lack of behavioral inhibition. Thus, to validate a measure of psychopathy, we would need to check out a number of different expectations based on our theory of psychopathy.

Construct validity pertains to psychological tests that claim to measure complex, multifaceted, and theory-bound psychological attributes such as psychopathy, intelligence, leadership ability, and the like. The crucial point to understand about construct validity is that "no criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be measured" (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Thus, the demonstration of construct validity always rests on a program of research using diverse procedures outlined in the following sections. To evaluate the construct validity of a test, we must amass a variety of evidence from numerous sources.

Many psychometric theorists regard construct validity as the unifying concept for all types of validity evidence (Cronbach, 1988; Messick, 1995). According to this viewpoint, individual studies of content, concurrent, and predictive validity are regarded merely as supportive evidence in the cumulative quest for construct validation.

APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

How does a test developer determine whether a new instrument possesses construct validity? As previously hinted, no single procedure will suffice for this difficult task. Evidence of construct validity can be found in practically any empirical study that examines test scores from appropriate groups of subjects. Most studies of construct validity fall into one of the following categories:

- Analysis to determine whether the test items or subtests are homogeneous and therefore measure a single construct
- Study of developmental changes to determine whether they are consistent with the theory of the construct
- Research to ascertain whether group differences on test scores are theory-consistent
- Analysis to determine whether intervention effects on test scores are theory-consistent
- Correlation of the test with other related and unrelated tests and measures
- Factor analysis of test scores in relation to other sources of information
- Analysis to determine whether test scores allow for the correct classification of examinees

We examine these sources of construct validity evidence in more detail in the following.

Test Homogeneity

If a test measures a single construct, then its component items (or subtests) likely will be homogeneous (also referred to as *internally consistent*). In most cases, homogeneity is built into the test during the development process discussed in more detail in the next unit. The aim of test development is to select items that form a **homogeneous scale**. The most commonly used method for achieving this goal is

[2]The construct of psychopathy is very similar to what is now designated as antisocial personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

to correlate each potential item with the total score and select items that show high correlations with the total score. A related procedure is to correlate subtests with the total score in the early phases of test development. In this manner, wayward scales that do not correlate to some minimum degree with the total test score can be revised before the instrument is released for general use.

Homogeneity is an important first step in certifying the construct validity of a new test, but standing alone it is weak evidence. Kline (1986) has pointed out the circularity of the procedure:

> If all our items in the item pool were wide of the mark and did not measure what we hoped, they would be selecting items by the criterion of their correlation with the total score, which can never work. It is to be noted that the same argument applies to the factoring of the item pool. A general factor of poor items is still possible. This objection is sound and has to be refuted empirically. Having found by item analysis a set of homogeneous items, we must still present evidence concerning their validity. Thus to construct a homogeneous test is not sufficient, validity studies must be carried out.

In addition to demonstrating the homogeneity of items, a test developer must provide multiple other sources of construct validity, discussed subsequently.

Appropriate Developmental Changes

Many constructs can be assumed to show regular age-graded changes from early childhood into mature adulthood and perhaps beyond. Consider the construct of vocabulary knowledge as an example. It has been known since the inception of intelligence tests at the turn of the century that knowledge of vocabulary increases exponentially from early childhood into late childhood. More recent research demonstrates that vocabulary continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace, into old age (Gregory & Gernert, 1990). For any new test of vocabulary, then, an important piece of construct validity evidence would be that older subjects score better than younger subjects, assuming that education and health factors are held constant.

Of course, not all constructs lend themselves to predictions about developmental changes. For example, it is not clear whether a scale measuring "assertiveness" should show a pattern of increasing, decreasing, or stable scores with advancing age. Developmental changes would be irrelevant to the construct validity of such a scale. We should also mention that appropriate developmental changes are but one piece in the construct validity puzzle. This approach does not provide information about how the construct relates to other constructs.

Theory-Consistent Group Differences

One way to bolster the validity of a new instrument is to show that, on average, persons with different backgrounds and characteristics obtain theory-consistent scores on the test. Specifically, persons thought to be high on the construct measured by the test should obtain high scores, whereas persons with presumably low amounts of the construct should obtain low scores.

Crandall (1981) developed a social interest scale that illustrates the use of theory-consistent group differences in the process of construct validation. Borrowing from Alfred Adler, Crandall (1984) defined *social interest* as an "interest in and concern for others." To measure this construct, he devised a brief and simple instrument consisting of 15 forced-choice items. For each item, one of the two alternatives includes a trait closely related to the Adlerian concept of social interest (e.g., helpful), whereas the other choice consists of an equally attractive but nonsocial trait (e.g., quick-witted). The subject is instructed to "choose the trait which you value more highly." Each of the 15 items is scored 1 if the social interest trait is picked, 0 otherwise; thus, total scores on the Social Interest Scale (SIS) can range from 0 to 15.

Table 4.1 presents average scores on the SIS for 13 well-defined groups of subjects. The reader will notice that individuals likely to be high in social interest (e.g., nuns) obtain the highest average scores on the SIS, whereas the lowest scores are earned by presumably self-centered persons (e.g., models) and those who are outright antisocial (felons). These findings are theory-consistent and support the construct validity of this interesting instrument.

TABLE 4.1 Mean Scores on the Social Interest Scale for Selected Groups

Group	*N*	*Mean Score*
Ursuline sisters	6	13.3
Adult church members	147	11.2
Charity volunteers	9	10.8
High school students nominated for high social interest	23	10.2
University students nominated for high social interest	21	9.5
University employees	327	8.9
University students	1,784	8.2
University students nominated for low social interest	35	7.4
Professional models	54	7.1
High school students nominated for low social interest	22	6.9
Adult atheists and agnostics	30	6.7
Convicted felons	30	6.4

Source: Adapted with permission from Crandall, J. (1981). *Theory and measurement of social interest: Empirical tests of Alfred Adler's concept.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Theory-Consistent Intervention Effects

Another approach to construct validation is to show that test scores change in appropriate direction and amount in reaction to planned or unplanned interventions. For example, the scores of elderly persons on a spatial orientation test battery should increase after these subjects receive cognitive training specifically designed to enhance their spatial orientation abilities. More precisely, if the test battery possesses construct validity, we can predict that spatial orientation scores should show a greater increase from pretest to posttest than found on unrelated abilities not targeted for special training (e.g., inductive reasoning, perceptual speed, numerical reasoning, or verbal reasoning). Willis and Schaie (1986) found just such a pattern of test results in a cognitive training study with elderly subjects, supporting the construct validity of their spatial orientation measure.

Convergent and Discriminant Validation

Convergent validity is demonstrated when a test correlates highly with other variables or tests with which it shares an overlap of constructs. For example, two tests designed to measure different types of intelligence should, nonetheless, share enough of the general factor in intelligence to produce a hefty correlation (say, .5 or above) when jointly administered to a heterogeneous sample of subjects. In fact, any new test of intelligence that did not correlate at least modestly with existing measures would be highly suspect, on the grounds that it did not possess convergent validity.

Discriminant validity is demonstrated when a test does not correlate with variables or tests from which it should differ. For example, social interest and intelligence are theoretically unrelated, and tests of these two constructs should correlate negligibly, if at all.

In a classic paper often quoted but seldom emulated, Campbell and Fiske (1959) proposed a systematic experimental design for simultaneously confirming the convergent and discriminant validities of a psychological test. Their design is called the *multitrait-multimethod matrix,* and it calls for the assessment of two or more traits by two or more

TABLE 4.2 Hypothetical Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix

			Self-Report			Peer Rating			Projective Test		
	Traits		A_1	B_1	C_1	A_2	B_2	C_2	A_3	B_3	C_3
Self-Report	Social interest	A_1	(88)								
	Creativity	B_1	52	(89)							
	Dominance	C_1	31	36	(79)						
Peer Rating	Social interest	A_2	**57**	21	69	(92)					
	Creativity	B_2	22	**59**	10	68	(88)				
	Dominance	C_2	11	12	**48**	58	59	(85)			
Projective Test	Social interest	A_3	**56**	22	11	**68**	42	33	(94)		
	Creativity	B_3	23	**58**	13	43	**66**	34	68	(92)	
	Dominance	C_3	11	11	**43**	34	32	**69**	60	60	(86)

Note: Letters *A, B,* and *C* refer to traits; (social interest, creativity, dominance); subscripts 1, 2, and 3 refer to methods of measurement (self-report, peer rating, projective test). The matrix consists of correlation coefficients (decimals omitted). See text.

methods. Table 4.2 provides a hypothetical example of this approach. In this example, three traits (*A, B,* and *C*) are measured by three methods (1, 2, and 3). For example, traits *A, B,* and *C* might be social interest, creativity, and dominance. Methods 1, 2, and 3 might be self-report inventory, peer ratings, and projective test. Thus, A_1 would represent a self-report inventory of social interest, B_2 a peer rating of creativity, C_3 a dominance measure derived from projective test, and so on.

Notice in this example that nine tests are studied (three traits are each measured by three methods). When each of these tests is administered twice to the same group of subjects and scores on all pairs of tests are correlated, the result is a **multitrait-multimethod matrix** (Table 4.2). This matrix is a rich source of data on reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity.

For example, the correlations along the main diagonal (in parentheses) are reliability coefficients for each test. The higher these values, the better, and preferably we like to see values in the .80s or .90s here. The correlations along the three shorter diagonals (in boldface) supply evidence of convergent validity—the same trait measured by different methods. These correlations should be strong and positive, as shown here. Notice that the table also includes correlations between different traits measured by the same method (in solid triangles) and different traits measured by different methods (in dotted triangles). These correlations should be the lowest of all in the matrix, insofar as they supply evidence of discriminant validity.

The Campbell and Fiske (1959) methodology is an important contribution to our understanding of the test validation process. However, the full implementation of this procedure typically requires too monumental a commitment from researchers. It is more common for test developers to collect convergent and discriminant validity data in bits and pieces, rather than producing an entire matrix of intercorrelations. Meier (1984) provides one of the few real-world implementations of the multitrait-multimethod matrix in an examination of the validity of the "burnout" construct.

Factor Analysis

Factor analysis is a specialized statistical technique that is particularly useful for investigating construct validity. We discuss factor analysis in substantial

detail in Topic 5A, Intelligence Tests and Factor Analysis; here, we provide a quick preview so that the reader can appreciate the role of factor analysis in the study of construct validity. The purpose of **factor analysis** is to identify the minimum number of determiners (factors) required to account for the intercorrelations among a battery of tests. The goal in factor analysis is to find a smaller set of dimensions, called *factors,* that can account for the observed array of intercorrelations among individual tests. A typical approach in factor analysis is to administer a battery of tests to several hundred subjects and then calculate a correlation matrix from the scores on all possible pairs of tests. For example, if 15 tests have been administered to a sample of psychiatric and neurological patients, the first step in factor analysis is to compute the correlations between scores on the 105 possible pairs of tests.[3] Although it may be feasible to see certain clusterings of tests that measure common traits, it is more typical that the mass of data found in a correlation matrix is simply too complex for the unaided human eye to analyze effectively. Fortunately, the computer-implemented procedures of factor analysis search this pattern of intercorrelations, identify a small number of factors, and then produce a table of factor loadings. A **factor loading** is actually a correlation between an individual test and a single factor. Thus, factor loadings can vary between −1.0 and +1.0. The final outcome of a factor analysis is a table depicting the correlation of each test with each factor.

We can illustrate the use of factor analysis in the study of construct validity by referring to a specific instrument, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV, Wechsler, 2008), discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The 10 core subtests of the WAIS-IV yield not only a Full Scale IQ, but also four Index scores designed to provide a meaningful and theoretically sound partition of intelligence into subcomponents. These Index scores are Verbal Comprehension (3 subtests), Perceptual Reasoning (3 subtests), Working Memory (2 subtests), and Processing Speed (2 subtests). When factor analysis is applied to WAIS-IV subtest scores for large samples of adults, four factors are found, just as predicted by the structure of the test (Ryan, Sattler, & Tree, 2009). Further, each core subtest usually demonstrates its highest factor loading on the appropriate factor. For example, the Vocabulary subtest shows its highest factor loading on Verbal Comprehension, and the Matrix Reasoning subtest reveals its highest factor loading on Perceptual Reasoning. Findings like this bolster the construct validity of the WAIS-IV.

Classification Accuracy

Many tests are used for screening purposes to identify examinees who meet (or don't meet) certain diagnostic criteria. For these instruments, accurate classification is an essential index of validity. As a basis for illustrating this approach to validation, we consider the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), a short screening test of cognitive functioning. The MMSE consists of a number of simple questions (e.g., What day is this?) and easy tasks (e.g., remembering three words). The test yields a score from 0 (no items correct) to 30 (all items correct). Although used for many purposes, a major application of the MMSE is to identify elderly individuals who might be experiencing dementia. *Dementia* is a general term that refers to significant cognitive decline and memory loss caused by a disease process such as Alzheimer's disease or the accumulation of small strokes. Both the MMSE and various forms of dementia are described in more detail in Chapter 10, Neuropsychological Testing.

The MMSE is one of the most widely researched screening tests in existence. Much is known about its measurement qualities, such as the accuracy of the tool in detecting individuals with dementia. In exploring its utility, researchers have paid special attention to two psychometric features that bear upon validity: sensitivity and specificity. **Sensitivity** has to do with accurate identification of patients who have a syndrome—in this case, dementia. **Specificity** has to do with accurate identification of normal patients. These ideas are clarified later.

[3]The general formula for the number of pairings among N tests is $N(N-1)/2$. Thus, if 15 tests are administered, there will be $15 \times 14/2$ or 105 possible pairings of individual tests.

Understanding these concepts is pertinent to the validity of every screening test used in mental health and medicine. Thus, we provide modest coverage here, using the MMSE as an exemplar of a more general principle. Our discussion loosely follows the presentation found in Gregory (1999).

The concepts of sensitivity and specificity are chiefly helpful in dichotomous diagnostic situations in which individuals are presumed either to manifest a syndrome or not. For example, in medicine a patient either has prostate cancer or he does not. In this case, the criterion of truth, against which a screening test is measured, would be a tissue biopsy. Similarly, in research studies on the sensitivity and specificity of the MMSE, patients are known from independent, comprehensive medical and psychological workups either to meet the criteria for dementia or not. This is the "gold standard" against which the screening instrument is validated. The rationale for the screening test is pragmatic: It is unrealistic to refer every patient with suspected dementia for comprehensive evaluations that would include, for example, many hours of professional time (psychologist, neurologist, geriatric specialist, etc.) and expensive brain scans. The purpose of the MMSE—or any screening test—is to determine the need for additional assessment.

Screening tests typically provide a cutoff score used to identify possible cases of the syndrome in question. With the MMSE, a common cutting score is 23/24 out of the 30 points possible. Thus, a score of 23 points and below indicates the likelihood of dementia, whereas 24 points and above is considered normal. In this context, the sensitivity of the MMSE is the percentage of patients known to have dementia who score 23 points or lower. For example, if 100 patients are known from independent, comprehensive evaluations to exhibit dementia, and 79 of them score 23 or below, then the sensitivity of the test is 79 percent. The specificity of the MMSE is the other side of the coin, the percentage of patients known to be normal who score 24 points or higher. For example, if 83 of 100 normal patients score 24 points or higher, then the specificity of the test is 83 percent.

In general, the validity of a screening test is bolstered to the extent that it possesses both high sensitivity and high specificity. There are no exact cutoffs, but for many purposes a test will need sensitivity and specificity that exceed 80 or 90 percent in order to justify its use. As we will see later, the standards for sensitivity and specificity are unique to each situation and depend on the costs—both financial and otherwise—of different kinds of errors in classification.

An ideal screening test, of course, would yield 100 percent sensitivity and 100 percent specificity. No such test exists in the real world. The reality of assessment is that the examiner must choose a cutoff score that provides a balance between sensitivity and specificity. What makes this problematic is that sensitivity and specificity are inversely related. Choosing a cutoff score that increases sensitivity invariably will reduce specificity, and vice versa. The inverse relationship between sensitivity and specificity is not only an empirical fact, but it is also a logical necessity—if one improves, the other must decline—no exceptions are possible. Practitioners need to select a cutoff score that produces a livable balance between sensitivity and specificity. But exactly where is that point of equilibrium? In the case of the MMSE, the answer depends not just on the age and education of the client but also on the relative advantages and drawbacks of correct or incorrect decisions. Robust levels of sensitivity and specificity provide corroborating evidence of test validity, and test developers should strive to achieve the highest possible levels of both.

EXTRAVALIDITY CONCERNS AND THE WIDENING SCOPE OF TEST VALIDITY

We begin this section with a review of **extravalidity concerns**, which include side effects and unintended consequences of testing. By acknowledging the importance of the extravalidity domain, psychologists confirm that the decision to use a test involves social, legal, and political considerations that extend far beyond the traditional questions of technical validity. In a related development, we will also review how the interest in extravalidity concerns has spurred several theorists to broaden the concept of test validity. As the reader will discover, value implications and social consequences are now encompassed within the widening scope of test validity.

Even if a test is valid, unbiased, and fair, the decision to use it may be governed by additional considerations. Cole and Moss (1998) outline the following factors:

- What is the purpose for which the test is used?
- To what extent are the purposes accomplished by the actions taken?
- What are the possible side effects or unintended consequences of using the test?
- What possible alternatives to the test might serve the same purpose?

We survey only the most prominent extravalidity concerns here and show how they have served to widen the scope of test validity.

Unintended Side Effects of Testing

The intended outcome of using a psychological test is not necessarily the only consequence. Various side effects also are possible, indeed, they are probable. The examiner must determine whether the benefits of giving the test outweigh the costs of the potential side effects. Furthermore, by anticipating unintended side effects, the examiner might be able to deflect or diminish them.

Cole and Moss (1998) cite the example of using psychological tests to determine eligibility for special education. Although the intended outcome is to help students learn, the process of identifying students eligible for special education may produce numerous negative side effects:

- The identified children may feel unusual or dumb.
- Other children may call the children names.
- Teachers may view these children as unworthy of attention.
- The process may produce classes segregated by race or social class.

A consideration of side effects should influence an examiner's decision to use a particular test for a specified purpose. The examiner might appropriately choose not to use a test for a worthy purpose if the likely costs from side effects outweigh the expected benefits.

Consider the common practice in years past of using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to help screen candidates for peace officer positions such as police officer or sheriff's deputy. Although the MMPI was originally designed as an aid in psychiatric diagnosis, subsequent research indicated that it is also useful in the identification of persons unsuited to a career in law enforcement (Hiatt & Hargrave, 1988). In particular, peace officers who produce MMPI profiles with mild elevations (e.g., *T* score 65 to 69) on Scales F (Frequency), Masculinity-Femininity, Paranoia, and Hypomania tend to be involved in serious disciplinary actions; peace officers who produce more "defensive" MMPI profiles with fewer clinical scale elevations tend not to be involved in such actions. Thus, the test possessed modest validity for the worthy purpose of screening law enforcement candidates. But no test, not even the highly respected MMPI, is perfectly valid. Some good applicants will be passed over because their MMPI results are marginal. Perhaps their Paranoia Scale is at a *T* score of 66, or the Hypomania Scale is at a *T* score of 68. On the MMPI, a *T* score of 70 is often considered the upper limit of the "normal" range.

One unintended side effect of using the MMPI for evaluation of peace officer applicants is that job candidates who are unsuccessful with one agency may be tagged with a pathological label such as psychopathic, schizophrenic, or paranoid. The label may arise in spite of the best efforts of the consulting psychologist, who may never have used any pejorative terms in the assessment report on the candidate. Typically, the label is conceived when administrators at the referring department look at the MMPI profile and see that the candidate obtained his or her highest score on a scale with a horrendous title such as Psychopathic Deviate, Schizophrenia, Hypochondriasis, or Paranoia. Unfortunately, the law enforcement community can be a very closed fraternity. Police chiefs and sheriffs commonly exchange verbal reports about their job applicants, so a pejorative label may follow the candidate from one setting to another, permanently barring the applicant from entry into the law enforcement profession. The repercussions are not only unfair to the candidate, but they also raise the specter of lawsuits against the agency and the consulting psychologist. All things considered, the consulting psychologist may find it

preferable to use a technically less valid test for the same purpose, particularly if the alternative instrument does not produce these unintended side effects.

The renewed sensitivity to extravalidity issues has caused several test theorists to widen their definition of test validity. We review these recent developments in the following section, cautioning the reader that a final consensus about the nature of test validity is yet to emerge.

The Widening Scope of Test Validity

By now the reader is familiar with the narrow, traditionalist perspective on test use, which states that a test is valid if it measures "what it purports to measure." The implicit implication of this perspective is that technical validity is the most essential basis for recommending test use. After all, valid tests provide accurate information about examinees—and what could be wrong with that?

Recently, several psychometric theoreticians have introduced a wider, functionalist definition of validity that asserts that a test is valid if it serves the purpose for which it is used (Cronbach, 1988; Messick, 1995). For example, a reading achievement test might be used to identify students for assignment to a remedial section. According to the functionalist perspective, the test would be valid—and its use, therefore, appropriate—if the students selected for remediation actually received some academic benefit from this application of the test.

The functionalist perspective explicitly recognizes that the test validator has an obligation to determine whether a practice has constructive consequences for individuals and institutions and especially to guard against adverse outcomes (Messick, 1980). Test validity, then, is an overall evaluative judgment of the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences *and actions* that flow from test scores.

Messick (1980, 1995) argues that the new, wider conception of validity rests on four bases. These are (1) traditional evidence of construct validity, for example, appropriate convergent and discriminant validity, (2) an analysis of the value implications of the test interpretation, (3) evidence for the usefulness of test interpretations in particular applications, and (4) an appraisal of the potential and actual social consequences, including side effects, from test use. A valid test is one that answers well to all four facets of test validity.

This wider conception of test validity is admittedly controversial, and some theorists prefer the traditional view that consequences and values are important but nonetheless separate from the technical issues of test validity. Everyone can agree on one point: Psychological measurement is not a neutral endeavor, it is an applied science that occurs in a social and political context.

Utility: The Last Horizon of Test Validity

Finally, we introduce the concept of test utility, which is widely neglected in the research literature on psychological testing (Hunsley & Bailey, 1999). As noted by Wood, Garb, and Nezworski (2007), **test utility** can be summed up by the question "Does use of this test result in better patient outcomes or more efficient delivery of services?" For example, we might envision an experiment in which individual psychotherapy clients were randomly assigned to two groups. One group is tested with the Beck Depression Inventory-2 (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the results provided to their therapists, while the other group is not tested but instead proceeds directly for treatment. If the tested group showed more improvement or required fewer sessions to achieve the same level of improvement, we would conclude that utility has been demonstrated for the test.

Unfortunately, there is very little research on the utility of psychological tests, and the research that does exist is indirect. For example, Finn and Tonsager (1992) have shown that a highly structured method for giving feedback on personality test findings to college students awaiting psychotherapy has initial therapeutic effects in its own right. However, this does not answer the question whether the ultimate client outcome is better as a result of the test usage. For some tests such as the Rorschach inkblot technique, discussed later in the text, the question of utility is especially pertinent because of the time required by a psychologist to administer, score, interpret, and document the results. The total time easily can run to many hours. It is lamentable that the utility of this instrument and many other tests has not been systematically investigated.

TOPIC 4B Test Construction

Defining the Test
Selecting a Scaling Method
Representative Scaling Methods
Constructing the Items
Testing the Items
Revising the Test
Publishing the Test

Creating a new test involves both science and art. A test developer must choose strategies and materials and then make day-to-day research decisions that will affect the quality of his or her emerging instrument. The purpose of this section is to discuss the process by which psychometricians create valid tests. Although we will discuss many separate topics, they are united by a common theme: Valid tests do not just materialize on the scene in full maturity—they emerge slowly from an evolutionary, developmental process that builds in validity from the very beginning. We will emphasize the basics of test development here; readers who desire a more advanced presentation should consult Kline (1986), McDonald (1999), and Bernstein and Nunnally (1994).

Test construction consists of six intertwined stages:

Defining the test	Testing the items
Selecting a scaling method	Revising the test
Constructing the items	Publishing the test

By way of preview, we can summarize these steps as follows: defining the test consists of delimiting its scope and purpose, which must be known before the developer can proceed to test construction. Selecting a scaling method is a process of setting the rules by which numbers are assigned to test results. Constructing the items is as much art as science, and it is here that the creativity of the test developer may be required. Once a preliminary version of the test is available, the developer usually administers it to a modest-sized sample of subjects in order to collect initial data about test item characteristics. Testing the items entails a variety of statistical procedures referred to collectively as item analysis. The purpose of item analysis is to determine which items should be retained, which revised, and which thrown out. Based on item analysis and other sources of information, the test is then revised. If the revisions are substantial, new items and additional pretesting with new subjects may be required. Thus, test construction involves a feedback loop whereby second, third, and fourth drafts of an instrument might be produced (Figure 4.5). Publishing the test is the final step. In addition to releasing the test materials, the developer must produce a user-friendly test manual. Let us examine each of these steps in more detail.

DEFINING THE TEST

In order to construct a new test, the developer must have a clear idea of what the test is to measure and how it is to differ from existing instruments. Insofar



FIGURE 4.5 The Test Construction Process

as psychological testing is now entering its second one hundred years, and insofar as thousands of tests have already been published, the burden of proof clearly rests on the test developer to show that a proposed instrument is different from, and better than, existing measures.

Consider the daunting task faced by a test developer who proposes yet another measure of general intelligence. With dozens of such instruments already in existence, how could a new test possibly make a useful contribution to the field? The answer is that contemporary research continually adds to our understanding of intelligence and impels us to seek new and more useful ways to measure this multifaceted construct.

Kaufman and Kaufman (1983) provide a good model of the test definition process. In proposing the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC), a new test of general intelligence in children, the authors listed six primary goals that define the purpose of the test and distinguish it from existing measures:

1. Measure intelligence from a strong theoretical and research basis
2. Separate acquired factual knowledge from the ability to solve unfamiliar problems
3. Yield scores that translate to educational intervention
4. Include novel tasks
5. Be easy to administer and objective to score
6. Be sensitive to the diverse needs of preschool, minority group, and exceptional children (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983)

The K-ABC represents an interesting departure from traditional intelligence tests. For now, the important point is that the developers of this instrument, now in its second edition (K-ABC-II), explained its purpose explicitly and proposed a fresh focus for measuring intelligence, long before they started constructing test items.

SELECTING A SCALING METHOD

The immediate purpose of psychological testing is to assign numbers to responses on a test so that the examinee can be judged to have more or less of the characteristic measured. The rules by which numbers are assigned to responses define the scaling method. Test developers select a scaling method that is optimally suited to the manner in which they have conceptualized the trait(s) measured by their test. No single scaling method is uniformly better than the others. For some traits, ordinal ranking of expert judges might be the best measurement approach; for other traits, complex scaling of self-report data might yield the most valid measurements.

There are so many distinctive scaling methods available to psychometricians that we will be satisfied to provide only a representative sample here. Readers who wish a more thorough and detailed review should consult Gulliksen (1950), Nunnally (1978), or Kline (1986). However, before reviewing selecting scaling methods, we need to introduce a related concept, levels of measurement, so that the reader can better appreciate the differences between scaling methods.

Levels of Measurement

According to Stevens (1946), all numbers derived from measurement instruments of any kind can be placed into one of four hierarchical categories: nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio. Each category defines a level of measurement; the order listed is from least to most informative.

In a **nominal scale**, the numbers serve only as category names. For example, when collecting data for a demographic study, a researcher might code males as "1" and females as "2." Notice that the numbers are arbitrary and do not designate "more" or "less" of anything. In nominal scales the numbers are just a simplified form of naming.

An **ordinal scale** constitutes a form of ordering or ranking. If college professors were asked to rank order four cars as to which they would prefer to own, the preferred order might be "1" Cadillac, "2" Chevrolet, "3" Volkswagen, "4" Hyundai. Notice here that the numbers are not interchangeable. A ranking of "1" is "more" than a ranking of "2," and so on. The "more" refers to the order of preference. However, ordinal scales fail to provide information about the relative strength of rankings. In this hypothetical example, we do not know whether college professors strongly prefer Cadillacs over Chevrolets or just marginally so.

An **interval scale** provides information about ranking, but also supplies a metric for gauging the differences between rankings. To construct an interval scale, we might ask our college professors to rate on a

scale from 1 to 100 how much they would like to own the four cars previously listed. Suppose the average ratings work out as follows: Cadillac, 90; Chevrolet, 70; Volkswagen, 60; Hyundai, 50. From this information we could infer that the preference for a Cadillac is much stronger than for a Chevrolet, which, in turn, is mildly stronger than the preference for a Volkswagen. More important, we can also make the assumption that the intervals between the points on this scale are approximately the same: The difference between professors' preference for a Chevrolet and Volkswagen (10 points) is about the same as that between a Volkswagen and a Hyundai (also 10 points). In short, interval scales are based on the assumption of equal-sized units or intervals for the underlying scale.

A **ratio scale** has all the characteristics of an interval scale but also possesses a conceptually meaningful zero point in which there is a total absence of the characteristic being measured. The essential characteristics of the four levels of measurement are summarized in Figure 4.6.

Ratio scales are rare in psychological measurement. Consider whether there is any meaningful sense in which a person can be thought to have zero intelligence. Not really. The same is true for most constructs in psychology: Meaningful zero points just do not exist. However, a few physical measures used by psychologists qualify as ratio scales. For example, height and weight qualify, and perhaps some physiological measures such as electrodermal response qualify, too. But by and large the best a psychologist can hope for is interval-level measurement.

	Characteristics			
Level	*Allows for Categorizing*	*Allows for Ranking*	*Uses Equal Intervals*	*Possesses Real Zero Point*
Nominal	×			
Ordinal	×	×		
Interval	×	×	×	
Ratio	×	×	×	×

FIGURE 4.6 **Essential Characteristics of Four Levels of Measurement**

Levels of measurement are relevant to test construction because the more powerful and useful parametric statistical procedures (e.g., Pearson *r,* analysis of variance, multiple regression) should be used only for scores derived from measures that meet the criteria of interval or ratio scales. For scales that are only nominal or ordinal, less-powerful nonparametric statistical procedures (e.g., chi-square, rank order correlation, median tests) must be employed. In practice, most major psychological testing instruments (especially intelligence tests and personality scales) are assumed to employ approximately interval-level measurement even though, strictly speaking, it is very difficult to demonstrate absolute equality of intervals for such instruments (Bausell, 1986). Now that the reader is familiar with levels of measurement, we introduce a representative sample of scaling methods, noting in advance that different scaling methods yield different levels of measurement.

REPRESENTATIVE SCALING METHODS

Expert Rankings

Suppose we wanted to measure the depth of coma in patients who had suffered a recent head injury that rendered them unconscious. A depth of coma scale could be very important in predicting the course of improvement, because it is well known that a lengthy period of unconsciousness offers a poor prognosis for ultimate recovery. In addition, rehabilitation personnel have a practical need to know whether a patient is deeply comatose or in a partially communicative state of twilight consciousness.

One approach to scaling the depth of coma would be to rely on the behavioral **rankings of experts**. For example, we could ask a panel of neurologists to list patient behaviors associated with different levels of consciousness. After the experts had submitted a large list of diagnostic behaviors, the test developers—preferably experts on head injuries—could rank the indicator behaviors along a continuum of consciousness ranging from deep coma to basic orientation. Using precisely this approach, Teasdale and Jennett (1974) produced the Glasgow Coma Scale. Instruments similar to this scale are widely used in hospitals for the assessment of traumatic brain injury (Figure 4.7).



FIGURE 4.7 Example of the Use of the Glasgow Coma Scale for Recording Depth of Coma *Source:* Reprinted with permission from Jennett, B., Teasdale, G. M., & Knill-Jones, R. P. (1975). Predicting outcome after head injury. *Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London, 9,* 231–237.

The Glasgow Coma Scale is scored by observing the patient and assigning the highest level of functioning on each of three subscales. On each subscale, it is assumed that the patient displays all levels of behavior below the rated level. Thus, from a psychometric standpoint, this scale consists of three subscales (eyes, verbal response, and motor response) each yielding an ordinal ranking of behavior.

In addition to the rankings, it is possible to compute a single overall score that is something more than an ordinal scale, although probably less than true interval-level measurement. If numbers are attached to the rankings (e.g., for eyes open a coding of "none" = 1, "to pain" = 2, and so on), then the numbers for the rated level for each subscale can be added, yielding a maximum possible score of 14. The total score on the Glasgow Coma Scale predicts later recovery with a very high degree of accuracy (Jennett, Teasdale, & Knill-Jones, 1975). We see, then, that quite plain psychological tests derived from the very simplest scaling methods can, nonetheless, provide valid and useful information.

Method of Equal-Appearing Intervals

Early in the twentieth century, L. L. Thurstone (1929) proposed a method for constructing interval-level scales from attitude statements. His method of equal-appearing intervals is still used today, marking him as one of the giants of psychometric theory. The actual methodology of constructing equal-appearing intervals is somewhat complex and statistically laden, but the underlying logic is easy to explain (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981). We illustrate the method by summarizing the steps involved in constructing a scale of attitudes toward physical exercise.

First, a large number of true–false statements reflecting a range of positive and negative attitudes toward physical exercise would be compiled. Two extreme examples might be:

> "I feel that physical exercise is generally boring and tedious."
> "Physical exercise should be a significant part of everyone's daily life."

Of course, many items of moderate attitudinal valence would be written as well. The idea at this point-of-scale development is to produce an excess of items with the expectation that unsuitable items later will be dropped.

Next, these attitude statements would be presented to a group of judges (up to a dozen individuals) who would sort each statement into 1 of 11 categories that range from "extremely favorable" to "extremely unfavorable." Then, the average favorability for each item (−1.0 to +1.0) would be calculated, along with the standard deviation. Items with larger standard deviations would be dropped, because they produce unreliable ratings. Finally, about 20 to 30 items would be chosen to cover the range of the dimension (favorable to unfavorable). The items on the final scale are assumed to meet the criteria of an interval scale. The score for persons who take the attitude scale is the average scale value of those items endorsed as true (or false, in the case of negatively worded items).

Ghiselli et al. (1981) note that the preceding scaling method merely produces the attitude scale. Reliability and validity analyses of the scale are still needed to determine its appropriateness and usefulness.

A study by Russo (1994) illustrates a modern application of the Thurstone method. She used a Thurstone scaling approach to evaluate 216 items from three prominent self-report depression inventories. The judges included 527 undergraduates and 37 clinical faculty members at a medical school. The 216 items were randomized and rated with respect to depressive severity from 1 representing no depression to 11 representing extreme depression. She discovered that all three self-report inventories lacked items and response options typical of mild depression. The distribution of the 216 items was bimodal with many items bunched near the bottom (no depression) and many items bunched near the middle (moderate depression). A characteristic finding for one set of items from a prominent depression scale was as follows:

Rated Depression	Original Scoring	Item Content
1.0	1	I never feel downhearted or sad.
3.4	2	I sometimes feel downhearted or sad.
4.1	3	I feel downhearted or sad a good part of the time.
4.4	4	I feel downhearted or sad most of the time.

The reader will notice that the original scoring on these items deviates substantially from the depression ratings provided by the panel of students and clinical faculty. It is also evident that the actual scale values are discontinuous, jumping from 1.0 to 3.4 and higher. A similar pattern was observed for many items on all three inventories, leading Russo (1994) to conclude:

> The present results suggest that if the original scoring is used for the three scales examined here, then the distinctions between well-being and absence of depression as well as between moderate and severe will be difficult to make. Such imprecision will make it difficult to assess the efficacy of treatments for depression, because a lack thereof must be a function of added measurement error due to ordinal measures. Such error could also wreak havoc in longitudinal studies, especially in those in which memory is involved.

We see in this example that Thurstone's approach to item scaling has powerful applications in test development. Based on these findings, researchers are now in a position to develop improved self-report scales that assess the full range of symptomatology in depression.

Method of Absolute Scaling

Thurstone (1925) also developed the **method of absolute scaling**, a procedure for obtaining a measure of absolute item difficulty based on results for different age groups of test takers. The methodology for determining individual item difficulty on an absolute scale is quite complex, although the underlying rationale is not too difficult to understand. Essentially, a set of common test items is administered to two or more age groups. The relative difficulty of these items between any two age groups serves as the basis for making a series of interlocking comparisons for all items and all age groups. One age group serves as the anchor group. Item difficulty is measured in common units such as standard deviation units of ability for the anchor group. The method of absolute scaling is widely used in group achievement and aptitude testing (Donlon, 1984).

Thurstone (1925) illustrated the method of absolute scaling with data from the testing of 3,000 schoolchildren on the 65 questions from the original Binet test. Using the mean of Binet test intelligence of 3 $^1/_2$-year-old children as the zero point and the standard deviation of their intelligence as the unit of measurement, he constructed a scale that ranged from −2 to +10 and then located each of the 65 questions on that scale. Thurstone (1925) found that the scale "brings out rather strikingly the fact that the questions are unduly bunched at certain ranges [of difficulty] and rather scarce at other ranges." A modern test developer would use this kind of analysis as a basis for dropping redundant test items (redundant in the sense that they measure at the same difficulty level) and adding other items that test the higher (and lower) ranges of difficulty.

Likert Scales

Likert (1932) proposed a simple and straightforward method for scaling attitudes that is widely used today. A **Likert scale** presents the examinee with five responses ordered on an agree/disagree or approve/disapprove continuum. For example, one item on a scale to assess attitudes toward church membership might read:

Church services give me inspiration and help me to live up to my best during the following week.

Do you:

Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Depending on the wording of an individual item, an extreme answer of "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" will indicate the most favorable response on the underlying attitude measured by the questionnaire. Likert (1932) assigned a score of 5 to this extreme response, 1 to the opposite extreme, and 2, 3, and 4 to intermediate replies. The total scale score is obtained by adding the scores from individual items. For this reason, a Likert scale is also referred to as a *summative scale.*

Guttman Scales

On a **Guttman scale**, respondents who endorse one statement also agree with milder statements pertinent to the same underlying continuum (Guttman, 1947). Thus, if the examiner knows an examinee's most extreme endorsement on the continuum, it is possible to reconstruct the intermediate responses as well. Guttman scales are produced by selecting items that fall into an ordered sequence of examinee endorsement. A perfect Guttman scale is seldom achieved because of errors of measurement, but is nonetheless a fitting goal for certain types of tests.

Although the Guttman approach was originally devised to determine whether a set of attitude statements is unidimensional, the technique has been used in many different kinds of tests. For example, Beck used Guttman-type scaling to produce the individual items of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). Items from the BDI resemble the following:

( ) I occasionally feel sad or blue.
( ) I often feel sad or blue.
( ) I feel sad or blue most of the time.
( ) I always feel sad and I can't stand it.

Clients are asked to "check the statement from each group that you feel is most true about you." A client who endorses an extreme alternative (e.g., "I always feel sad and I can't stand it") almost certainly agrees with the milder statements as well.

Method of Empirical Keying

The reader may have noticed that most of the scaling methods discussed in the preceding section rely upon the authoritative judgment of experts in the selection and ordering of items. It is also possible to construct measurement scales based entirely on empirical considerations devoid of theory or expert judgment. In the **method of empirical keying**, test items are selected for a scale based entirely on how well they contrast a criterion group from a normative sample. For example, a Depression scale could be derived from a pool of true-false personality inventory questions in the following manner:

1. A carefully selected and homogeneous group of persons experiencing major depression is gathered to answer the pool of true–false questions.
2. For each item, the endorsement frequency of the depression group is compared to the endorsement frequency of the normative sample.

3. Items which show a large difference in endorsement frequency between the depression and normative samples are selected for the Depression scale, keyed in the direction favored by depression subjects (true or false, as appropriate).
4. Raw score on the Depression scale is then simply the number of items answered in the keyed direction.

The method of empirical keying can produce some interesting surprises. A common finding is that some items selected for a scale may show no obvious relationship to the construct measured. For example, an item such as "I drink a lot of water" (keyed true) might end up on a Depression scale. The momentary rationale for including this item is simply that it works. Of course, the challenge posed to researchers is to determine why the item works. However, from the practical standpoint of empirical scale construction, theoretical considerations are of secondary importance. We discuss the method of empirical keying further in Topic 8B, Self-Report and Behavioral Assessment of Psychopathology.

Rational Scale Construction (Internal Consistency)

The rational approach to scale construction is a popular method for the development of self-report personality inventories. The name *rational* is somewhat of a misnomer, insofar as certain statistical methods are essential to this approach. Also, the name implies that other approaches are nonrational or irrational, which is untrue. The heart of the **method of rational scaling** is that all scale items correlate positively with each other and also with the total score for the scale. An alternative and more appropriate name for this approach is internal consistency, which emphasizes what is actually done. Gough and Bradley (1992) explain how the rational approach earned its descriptive title:

> The idea of rationality enters the scene in that the central theme or unifying dimension around which the items cluster is one that was conceptually articulated beforehand by the developer of the measure and from which the scoring of each item is determined in a logical and understandable way.

We will follow their presentation to illustrate the features of the rational approach.

Suppose a test developer desires to develop a new self-report scale for leadership potential. Based on a review of relevant literature, the researcher might conclude that leadership potential is characterized by self-confidence, resilience under pressure, high intelligence, persuasiveness, assertiveness, and the ability to sense what others are thinking and feeling (Gough & Bradley, 1992). These notions suggest that the following true–false items might be useful in the assessment of leadership potential:

- Most of the time I am pretty confident and sure of myself (T)
- When others disagree with me, I usually let things go. (F)
- I know that I am smarter than most people. (T)
- I am not very good at understanding how others react. (F)
- My friends would describe me as a dominant person. (T)

The *T* and *F* after each statement would indicate the rationally keyed direction for leadership potential.

Of course, additional items with similar intentions also would be proposed. The test developer might begin with 100 items that appear—on a rational basis—to assess leadership potential. These preliminary items would be administered to a large sample of individuals similar to the target population for whom the scale is intended. For instance, if the scale is designed to identify college students with leadership potential, then it should be administered to a cross-section of several hundred college students. For scale development, very large samples are desirable. In this hypothetical case, let us assume that we obtain results for 500 college students.

The next step in rational scale construction is to correlate scores on each of the preliminary items with the total score on the test for the 500 subjects in the tryout sample. Because scores on the items are dichotomous (1 is arbitrarily assigned to an

answer corresponding to the scoring key, 0 to the alternative), a biserial correlation coefficient r_{bis} is needed. Once the correlations are obtained, the researcher scans the list in search of weak correlations and reversals (negative correlations). These items are discarded because they do not contribute to the measurement of leadership potential. Up to half of the initial items might be discarded. If a large proportion of items is initially discarded, the researcher might recalculate the item-total correlations based upon the reduced item pool to verify the homogeneity of the remaining items. The items that survive this iterative procedure constitute the leadership potential scale. The reader should keep in mind that the rational approach to scale construction merely produces a homogeneous scale thought to measure a specified construct. Additional studies with new subject samples would be needed to determine the reliability and validity of the new scale.

CONSTRUCTING THE ITEMS

Constructing test items is a painful and laborious procedure that taxes the creativity of test developers. The item writer is confronted with a profusion of initial questions:

- Should item content be homogeneous or varied?
- What range of difficulty should the items cover?
- How many initial items should be constructed?
- Which cognitive processes and item domains should be tapped?
- What kind of test item should be used?

We will address the first three questions briefly before turning to a more detailed discussion of the last two topics, which are commonly referred to under the rubrics of table of specifications and item formats.

Initial Questions in Test Construction

The first question pertains to the homogeneity versus heterogeneity of test item content. In large measure, whether item content is homogeneous or varied is dictated by the manner in which the test developer has defined the new instrument. Consider a culture-reduced test of general intelligence. Such an instrument might incorporate varied items, so long as the questions do not presume specific schooling. The test developer might seek to incorporate novel problems equally unfamiliar to all examinees. On the other hand, with a theory-based test of spatial thinking, subscales with homogeneous item content would be required.

The range of item difficulty must be sufficient to allow for meaningful differentiation of examinees at both extremes. The most useful tests, then, are those that include a graded series of very easy items passed by almost everyone as well as a group of incrementally more difficult items passed by virtually no one. A ceiling effect is observed when significant numbers of examinees obtain perfect or near-perfect scores. The problem with a ceiling effect is that distinctions between high-scoring examinees are not possible, even though these examinees might differ substantially on the underlying trait measured by the test. A floor effect is observed when significant numbers of examinees obtain scores at or near the bottom of the scale. For example, the WAIS-R possessed a serious floor effect in that it failed to discriminate between moderate, severe, and profound levels of mental retardation—all persons with significant developmental disabilities would fail to answer virtually every question.

Test developers expect that some initial items will prove to make ineffectual contributions to the overall measurement goal of their instrument. For this reason, it is common practice to construct a first draft that contains excess items, perhaps double the number of questions desired on the final draft. For example, the 550-item MMPI originally consisted of more than 1,000 true–false personality statements (Hathaway & McKinley, 1940).

Table of Specifications

Professional developers of achievement and ability tests often use one or more item-writing schemes to help ensure that their instrument taps a desired mixture of cognitive processes and content domains. For example, a very simple item-writing scheme might designate that an achievement test on the Civil War should consist of 10 multiple-choice items and 10 fill-in-the-blank questions, half of each on

factual matters (e.g., dates, major battles) and the other half on conceptual issues (e.g., differing views on slavery).

Before development of a test begins, item writers usually receive a table of specifications. A **table of specifications** enumerates the information and cognitive tasks on which examinees are to be assessed. Perhaps the most common specification table is the content-by-process matrix, which lists the exact number of items in relevant content areas and details the precise composite of items that must exemplify different cognitive processes (Millman & Greene, 1989).

Consider a science achievement test suitable for high school students. Such a test must cover many different content areas and should require a mixture of cognitive processes ranging from simple recall to inferential reasoning. By providing a table of specifications prior to the item-writing stage, the test developer can guarantee that the resulting instrument contains a proper balance of topical coverage and taps a desired range of cognitive skills. A hypothetical but realistic table of specifications is portrayed in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.3 Example of a Content-by-Process Table of Specifications for a Hypothetical 100-Item Science Achievement Test

	Process		
Content Area	*Factual Knowledge*[a]	*Information Competence*[b]	*Inferential Reasoning*[c]
Astronomy	8	3	3
Botany	6	7	2
Chemistry	10	5	4
Geology	10	5	2
Physics	8	5	6
Zoology	8	5	3
Totals	50	30	20

[a]Factual Knowledge: Items can be answered based on simple recognition of basic facts.

[b]Information Competence: Items require usage of information provided in written text.

[c]Inferential Reasoning: Items can be answered by making deductions or drawing conclusions.

Item Formats

When it comes to the method by which psychological attributes are to be assessed, the test developer is confronted with dozens of choices. Indeed, it would be easy to write an entire chapter on this topic alone. For reviews of item formats, the interested reader should consult Bausell (1986), Jensen (1980), and Wesman (1971). In this section, we will quickly survey the advantages and pitfalls of the more common varieties of test items.

For group-administered tests of intellect or achievement, the technique of choice is the multiple-choice question. For example, an item on an American history achievement test might include this combination of stem and options:

The president of the United States during the Civil War was

a. Washington
b. Lincoln
c. Hamilton
d. Wilson

Proponents of multiple-choice methodology argue that properly constructed items can measure conceptual as well as factual knowledge. Multiple-choice tests also permit quick and objective machine scoring. Furthermore, the fairness of multiple-choice questions can be proved (or occasionally disproved!) with very simple item analysis procedures discussed subsequently. The major shortcomings of multiple-choice questions are, first, the difficulty of writing good distractor options and, second, the possibility that the presence of the response may cue a half-knowledgeable respondent to the correct answer. Guidelines for writing good multiple-choice items are listed in Table 4.4.

Matching questions are popular in classroom testing, but suffer serious psychometric shortcomings. An example of a matching question:

Using the letters on the left, match the name to the accomplishment:

A. Binet	____	translated a major intelligence test
B. Woodworth	____	no correlation between grades and mental tests
C. Cattell	____	developed true/false personality inventory

TABLE 4.4 Guidelines for Writing Multiple-Choice Items

Choose words that have precise meanings.
Avoid complex or awkward word arrangements.
Include all information needed for response selection.
Put as much of the question as possible in the stem.
Do not take stems verbatim from textbooks.
Use options of equal length and parallel phrasing.
Use "none of the above" and "all of the above" rarely.
Minimize the use of negatives such as *not*.
Avoid the use of nonfunctional words.
Avoid unessential specificity in the stem.
Avoid unnecessary clues to the correct response.
Submit items to others for editorial scrutiny.

D. McKinley	____	battery of sensorimotor tests
E. Wissler	____	developed first useful intelligence test
F. Goddard	____	screening test for emotional disturbance

The most serious problem with matching questions is that responses are not independent—missing one match usually compels the examinee to miss another. Another problem is that the options in a matching question must be very closely related or the question will be too easy.

For individually administered tests, the procedure of choice is the short-answer objective item. Indeed, the simplest and most straightforward types of questions often possess the best reliability and validity. A case in point is the Vocabulary subtest from the WAIS-IV, which consists merely of asking the examinee to define words. This subtest has very high reliability (.96) and is often considered the single best measure of overall intelligence on the test.

Personality tests often use true–false questions because they are easy for subjects to understand. Most people find it simple to answer true or false to items such as:

T	F	
____	____	I like sports magazines.

Critics of this approach have pointed out that answers to such questions may reflect social desirability rather than personality traits (Edwards, 1961). An alternative format designed to counteract this problem is the **forced-choice methodology** in which the examinee must choose between two equally desirable (or undesirable) options:

Which would you rather do:

_____ Mop a gallon of syrup from the floor.

_____ Volunteer for a half day at a nursing home.

Although the forced-choice approach has many desirable psychometric properties, personality test developers have not rushed to embrace this interesting methodology.

TESTING THE ITEMS

Psychometricians expect that numerous test items from the original tryout pool will be discarded or revised as test development proceeds. For this reason, test developers initially produce many, many excess items, perhaps double the number of items they intend to use. So, how is the final sample of test questions selected from the initial item pool? Test developers use item analysis, a family of statistical procedures, to identify the best items. In general, the purpose of item analysis is to determine which items should be retained, which revised, and which thrown out. In conducting a thorough item analysis, the test developer might make use of item-difficulty index, item-reliability index, item-validity index, item-characteristic curve, and an index of item discrimination. We turn now to a brief review of these statistical approaches to item analysis. Readers who wish an in-depth discussion and critique of these topics should consult Hambleton (1989) and Nunnally (1978).

Item-Difficulty Index

The *item difficulty* for a single test item is defined as the proportion of examinees in a large tryout sample who get that item correct. For any individual item *i*, the index of item difficulty is p_i, which varies from 0.0 to 1.0. An item with difficulty of .2 is more difficult than an item with difficulty of .7, because fewer examinees answered it correctly.

The **item-difficulty index** is a useful tool for identifying items that should be altered or discarded. Suppose an item has a difficulty index near 0.0, meaning that nearly everyone has answered it incorrectly. Unfortunately, this item is psychometrically unproductive because it does not provide information about differences between examinees. For most applications, the item should be rewritten or thrown out. The same can be said for an item with a difficulty index near 1.0, where virtually all subjects provide a correct answer.

What is the optimal level of item difficulty? Generally, item difficulties that hover around .5, ranging between .3 and .7, maximize the information the test provides about differences between examinees. However, this rule of thumb is subject to one important qualification and one very significant exception.

For true–false or multiple-choice items, the optimal level of item difficulty needs to be adjusted for the effects of guessing. For a true–false test, a difficulty level of .5 can result when examinees merely guess. Thus, the optimal item difficulty for such items would be .75 (halfway between .5 and 1.0). In general, the optimal level of item difficulty can be computed from the formula $(1.0 + g)/2$, where g is the chance success level. Thus, for a four-option multiple-choice item, the chance success level is .25, and the optimal level of item difficulty would be $(1.0 + .25)/2$, or about .63.

If a test is to be used for selection of an extreme group by means of a cutting score, it may be desirable to select items with difficulty levels outside the .3 to .7 range. For example, a test used to select graduate students for a university that admits only a select few of its many applicants should contain many very difficult items. A test used to designate children for a remedial-education program should contain many extremely easy items. In both cases, there will be useful discrimination among examinees near the cutting score—a very high score for the graduate admissions and a very low score for students eligible for remediation—but little discrimination among the remaining examinees (Allen & Yen, 1979).

Item-Reliability Index

A test developer may desire an instrument with a high level of internal consistency in which the items are reasonably homogeneous. A simple way to determine whether an individual item "hangs together" with the remaining test items is to correlate scores on that item with scores on the total test. However, individual items are typically right or wrong (often scored 1 or 0), whereas total scores constitute a continuous variable. In order to correlate these two different kinds of scores it is necessary to use a special type of statistic called the *point-biserial correlation coefficient.* The computational formula for this correlation coefficient is equivalent to the Pearson r discussed earlier, and the point-biserial coefficient conveys much the same kind of information regarding the relationship between two variables (one of which happens to be dichotomous and scored 0 or 1). In general, the higher the point-biserial correlation r_{iT} between an individual item and the total score, the more useful is the item from the standpoint of internal consistency.

The usefulness of an individual dichotomous test item is also determined by the extent to which scores on it are distributed between the two outcomes of 0 and 1. Although it sounds incongruous, it is possible to compute the standard deviation for dichotomous items; as with a continuously scored variable, the standard deviation of a dichotomous item indicates the extent of dispersion of the scores. If an individual item has a standard deviation of zero, everyone is obtaining the same score (all right or all wrong). The more closely the item approaches a 50–50 split of right and wrong scores, the greater is its standard deviation. In general, the greater the standard deviation of an item, the more useful is the item to the overall scale. Although we will not provide the derivation, it can be shown that the item-score standard deviation s_i for a dichotomously scored item can be computed from

$$s_i = \sqrt{p_i(1 - p_i)}$$

We may summarize the discussion up to this point as follows: The potential value of a dichotomously scored test item depends jointly on its internal consistency as indexed by the correlation with the total score (r_{iT}) and also its variability as indexed by the standard deviation (s_i). If we compute the product of these two indices, we obtain $s_i r_{iT}$, which

is the **item-reliability index**. Consider the characteristics of an item that possesses a relatively large item-reliability index. Such an item must exhibit strong internal consistency and produce a good dispersion of scores between its two alternatives. The value of this index in test construction is simply this: By computing the item-reliability index for every item in the preliminary test, we can eliminate the "outlier" items that have the lowest value on this index. Such items would possess poor internal consistency or weak dispersion of scores and therefore not contribute to the goals of measurement.

Item-Validity Index

For many applications, it is important that a test possess the highest possible concurrent or predictive validity. In these cases, one overriding question governs test construction: How well does each preliminary test item contribute to accurate prediction of the criterion? The **item-validity index** is a useful tool in the psychometrician's quest to identify predictively useful test items. By computing the item-validity index for every item in the preliminary test, the test developer can identify ineffectual items, eliminate or rewrite them, and produce a revised instrument with greater practical utility.

The first step in figuring an item-validity index is to compute the point-biserial correlation between the item score and the score on the criterion variable. In general, the higher the point-biserial correlation r_{iC} between scores on an individual item and the criterion score, the more useful is the item from the standpoint of predictive validity. As previously noted, the utility of an item also depends upon its standard deviation s_i. Thus, the item-validity index consists of the product of the standard deviation and the point-biserial correlation: $s_i r_{iC}$.

Item-Characteristic Curves

Also known as an item response function, an **item-characteristic curve** (ICC) is a graphical display of the relationship between the probability of a correct response and the examinee's position on the underlying trait measured by the test. However, we do not have direct access to underlying traits, so observed test scores must be used to estimate trait quantities.

A separate ICC is graphed for each item, based upon a plot of the total test scores on the horizontal axis versus the proportion of examinees passing the item on the vertical axis (Figure 4.8). An ICC is actually a mathematical idealization of the relationship between the probability of a correct response and the amount of the trait possessed by test respondents. Different ICC models use different mathematical functions based on initial assumptions. The simplest ICC model is the Rasch Model, based upon the item-response theory of the Danish mathematician Georg Rasch (1966). The Rasch Model is the simplest model because it makes just two assumptions: (1) test items are unidimensional and measure one common trait, and (2) test items vary on a continuum of difficulty level.

In general, a good item has a positive ICC slope. If the ability to solve a particular item is normally distributed, the ICC will resemble a **normal ogive** (curve *a* in Figure 4.8). The normal ogive is simply the normal distribution graphed in cumulative form.

The desired shape of the ICC depends on the purpose of the test. Psychometric purists would prefer that test item ICCs approximate the normal ogive, because this curve is convenient for making mathematical deductions about the underlying trait (Lord & Novick, 1968). However, for selection decisions based on cutoff scores, a step function is preferred. For example, when combined with other similar items, the item that produced curve *b* in Figure 4.8 would be the best for selecting examinees with high levels of the measured trait.



FIGURE 4.8 **Some Sample Item-Characteristic Curves**

ICCs are especially useful for identifying items that perform differently for subgroups of examinees (Allen & Yen, 1979). For example, a test developer may discover that an item performs differently for men and women. A sex-biased question involving football facts comes to mind here. For men, the ICC for this item might have the desired positive slope, whereas for women the ICC might be quite flat (such as curve *c* in Figure 4.8). Items with ICCs that differ among subgroups of examinees can be revised or eliminated.

The underlying theory of ICC is also known as *item response theory* and *latent trait theory*. The usefulness of this approach has been questioned by Nunnally (1978), who points out that the assumption of test unidimensionality (implied in the ICC curve, which plots percentage passing against the unidimensional horizontal axis of trait value) is violated when many psychological tests are considered. If there were no serious technical and practical problems involved, "one wonders why ICC theory was not adopted long ago for the actual construction and scoring of tests" (Nunnally, 1978).

The merits of the ICC approach are still debated. ICC theory seems particularly appropriate for certain forms of computerized adaptive testing (CAT) in which each test taker responds to an individualized and unique set of items that are then scored on an underlying uniform scale (Weiss, 1983). The CAT approach to assessment would not be possible in the absence of an ICC approach to measurement. CAT is discussed in Topic 12B, Computerized Assessment and the Future of Testing. Readers who wish a more detailed discussion of ICC and other latent trait models should consult Hambleton (1989) and Embretson and Reise (2000).

Item-Discrimination Index

It should be clear from the discussion of ICCs that an effective test item is one that discriminates between high scorers and low scorers on the entire test. An ideal test item is one that most of the high scorers pass and most of the low scorers fail (see curve *a* in Figure 4.8). Simple visual inspection of the ICC provides a coarse basis for gauging the discriminability of a test item: If the slope of the curve is positive and the curve is preferably ogive-shaped, the item is doing a good job of separating high and low scorers. But visual inspection is not a completely objective procedure; what is needed is a statistical tool that summarizes the discrimination power of individual test items.

An **item-discrimination index** is a statistical index of how efficiently an item discriminates between persons who obtain high and low scores on the entire test. There are many indices of item discrimination, including such indirect measures as r_{iT}, the point-biserial correlation between scores on an individual item and the total test score. However, we will restrict our discussion here to a direct measure, the item-discrimination index, symbolized by the lowercase, italicized letter *d*. On an item-by-item basis, this index compares the performance of subjects in the upper and lower regions of total test score. The upper and lower ranges are generally defined as the upper- and lower-scoring 10 percent to 33 percent of the sample. If the total test scores are normally distributed, the optimal comparison is the highest-scoring 27 percent versus the lowest-scoring 27 percent of the examinees. If the distribution of total test scores is flatter than the normal curve, the optimal percentage is larger, approaching 33 percent. For most applications, any percentage between 25 and 33 will yield similar estimates of *d* (Allen & Yen, 1979).

The item-discrimination index for a test item is calculated from the formula:

$$d = (U - L)/N$$

where U is the number of examinees in the upper range who answered the item correctly, L is the number of examinees in the lower range who answered the item correctly, and N is the total number of examinees in the upper or lower range.

Let us illustrate the computation and use of *d* with a hypothetical example. Suppose that a test developer has constructed the preliminary version of a multiple-choice achievement test and has administered the exam to a tryout sample of 400 high school students. After computing total scores for each subject, the test developer then identifies the high-scoring 25 percent and low-scoring 25 percent of the sample. Since there are 100 students in each group

(25 percent of 400), N in the preceding formula will be 100. Next, for each item, the developer determines the number of students in the upper range and the lower range who answered it correctly. To compute d for each item is a simple matter of plugging these values into the formula $(U - L)/N$. For example, suppose on the first item that 49 students in the upper range answered it correctly, whereas 23 students in the lower range answered it correctly. For this item, d is equal to (49 – 23)/100 or .26.

It is evident from the formula for d that this index can vary from −1.0 to +1.0. Notice, too, that a negative value for d is a warning signal that a test item needs revision or replacement. After all, such an outcome indicates that more of the low-scoring subjects answered the item correctly than did the high-scoring subjects. If d is zero, exactly equal numbers of low- and high-scoring subjects answered the item correctly; since the item is not discriminating between low- and high-scoring subjects at all, it should be revised or eliminated. A positive value for d is preferred, and the closer to +1.0 the better. Table 4.5 illustrates item-discrimination indices for six items from the hypothetical test proposed here.

A test developer can supplement the item-discrimination approach by inspecting the number of examinees in the upper- and lower-scoring groups who choose each of the incorrect alternatives. If a multiple-choice item is well written, the incorrect alternatives should be equally attractive to subjects who do not know the correct answer. Of course, we expect that high-scoring examinees will choose the correct alternative more often than low-scoring examinees—that is the purpose in computing item-discrimination indices. But, in addition, a good item should show proportional dispersion of incorrect choices for both high- and low-scoring subjects.

Assume that we investigate the choices of 100 high-scoring and 100 low-scoring subjects on a hypothetical multiple-choice test. Correct choices are indicated by an asterisk (*). Item 1 demonstrates the desired pattern of answers, with incorrect choices about equally dispersed.

	Alternatives				
Item 1	*a*	*b*	*c**	*d*	*e*
High Scorers	5	6	80	5	4
Low Scorers	15	14	40	16	15

On item 2, we notice that no examinees picked alternative *d.* This alternative should be replaced with a more appealing distractor:

Item 2	*a*	*b**	*c*	*d*	*e*
High Scorers	5	75	10	0	10
Low Scorers	21	34	20	0	25

Item 3 is probably a poor item in spite of the fact that it discriminates effectively between high- and low-scoring subjects. The obvious problem is that high-scoring examinees prefer alternative *a* to the correct alternative, *d:*

Item 3	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d**	*e*
High Scorers	43	6	5	37	9
Low Scorers	20	19	22	10	29

TABLE 4.5 Item-Discrimination Indices for Six Hypothetical Items

Item	*U*	*L*	*(U – L)/N*	*Comment*
1	49	23	.26	Very good item with high difficulty
2	79	19	.60	Excellent item but rarely achieved
3	52	52	.00	Poor item that should be revised
4	100	0	1.00	Ideal item but never achieved
5	20	80	−.60	Terrible item that should be eliminated
6	0	100	−1.00	Theoretically worst possible item

Perhaps by rewriting alternative *a,* this item could be rescued. In any case, the main point here is that test developers should pry into every corner of every test item by every means possible, including visual inspection of the pattern of answers.

Reprise: The Best Items

From all the methods of item analysis previously portrayed, which ones should the test developer use to identify the best items for a test? The answer to this question is neither simple nor straightforward. After all, the choice of "best" items depends on the objectives of the test developer. For example, a theoretically inclined research psychologist might desire a measurement instrument with the highest possible internal consistency; item-reliability indices are crucial to this goal. A practically minded college administrator might wish for an instrument with the highest possible criterion validity; item-validity indices would be useful for this purpose. A remediation-oriented mental retardation specialist might desire an intelligence test with minimal floor effect; item-difficulty indices would be helpful in this regard. In sum, there is no single preferred method for item selection ideally suited to every context of assessment and test development.

REVISING THE TEST

The purpose of item analysis, discussed previously, is to identify unproductive items in the preliminary test so that they can be revised, eliminated, or replaced. Very few tests emerge from this process unscathed. It is common in the evolutionary process of test development that many items are dropped, others refined, and new items added. The initial repercussion is that a new and slightly different test emerges. This revised test likely contains more discriminating items with higher reliability and greater predictive accuracy—but these improvements are known to be true only for the first tryout sample.

The next step in test development is to collect new data from a second tryout sample. Of course, these examinees should be similar to those for whom the test is ultimately intended. The purpose of collecting additional test data is to repeat the item analysis procedures anew. If further changes are of the minor fine-tuning variety, the test developer may decide the test is satisfactory and ready for cross-validational study, discussed in the following section. If major changes are needed, it is desirable to collect data from a third and even perhaps a fourth tryout sample. But at some point, psychometric tinkering must end; the developer must propose a finalized instrument and proceed to the next step, cross validation.

Cross Validation

When a tryout sample is used to ascertain that a test possesses criterion-related validity, the evidence is quite preliminary and tentative. It is prudent practice in test development to seek fresh and independent confirmation of test validity before proceeding to publication. The term **cross validation** refers to the practice of using the original regression equation in a new sample to determine whether the test predicts the criterion as well as it did in the original sample. Ghiselli, Campbell, and Zedeck (1981) outline the rationale for cross validation:

> Whether items are chosen on the basis of empirical keying or whether they are corrected or weighted, the obtained results should, unless additional data are collected, be viewed as specific to the sample used for the statistical analyses. This is necessary because the obtained results have likely capitalized on chance factors operating in that group and therefore are applicable only to the sample studied.

Validity Shrinkage

A common discovery in cross-validation research is that a test predicts the relevant criterion less accurately with the new sample of examinees than with the original tryout sample. The term **validity shrinkage** is applied to this phenomenon. For example, a biographically based predictor of sales potential might perform quite well for the sample of subjects used to develop the instrument but demonstrate less validity when applied to a new group of

examinees. Mitchell and Klimoski (1986) studied validity shrinkage of an instrument designed to foretell which students will succeed in real estate, as measured by the real-world criterion of obtaining a real estate license two years later. In one analysis based on the sample used to derive the test, the biographically based predictor test correlated .6 with the criterion. But when this same test was tried out on a new sample of real estate students, the correlation with the criterion was lower, about .4, demonstrating typical validity shrinkage.

Validity shrinkage is an inevitable part of test development and underscores the need for cross validation. In most cases, shrinkage is slight and the instrument withstands the challenge of cross validation. However, shrinkage of test validity can be a major problem when derivation and cross-validation samples are small, the number of potential test items is large, and items are chosen on a purely empirical basis without theoretical rationale.

A classic paper by Cureton (1950) demonstrates a worst-case scenario: using a very small sample to select empirically keyed items from a large item pool, then validating the test on the same sample. The criterion in his study was grade point average, artificially dichotomized into grades of B or better and grades below B. His "test" items consisted of 85 tags, numbered on one side. For each of 29 students, the tags were shaken in a container and dropped on the table. All tags that fell with numbers up were recorded as indicating the presence of that "item" for the student. Next, Cureton conducted an item analysis, using the dichotomized grades as the criterion. Based on this analysis, 24 items were found to be maximally predictive of students' grades. Nine items occurred more often among students with the higher grades, and these items were weighted +1. Fifteen items occurred more often among students with the lower grades, and these items were weighted −1. The score on this test (facetiously named the "B-Projective Psychokinesis Test") consisted of the sum of these 24 item weights.

In spite of the nonsensical nature of his test, Cureton (1950) found that test scores correlated .82 with grades. Of course, the strength of this correlation was due entirely to capitalization upon chance. If we were to conduct a series of cross-validation studies using new samples of students, the correlation between the B-Projective Psychokinesis Test and grades would likely hover right around zero, because this test is completely devoid of predictive validity. There is an important lesson here that applies to serious tests as well: Demonstrate validity through cross validation, do not assume it based merely on the solemn intentions of a new instrument.

Feedback from Examinees

In test revision, feedback from examinees is a potentially valuable source of information that is normally overlooked by test developers. We can illustrate this approach with research by Nevo (1992). He developed the Examinee Feedback Questionnaire (EFeQ) to study the Inter-University Psychometric Entrance Examination, a major requirement for admission to the six universities in Israel. The Inter-University entrance exam is a group test consisting of five multiple-choice subtests: General Knowledge, Figural Reasoning, Comprehension, Mathematical Reasoning, and English. The EFeQ was designed as an anonymous posttest administered immediately after the Inter-University entrance exam.

The EFeQ is a short and simple questionnaire designed to elicit candid opinions from examinees as to these features of the test–examiner–respondent matrix:

- Behavior of examiners
- Testing conditions
- Clarity of exam instructions
- Convenience in using the answer sheet
- Perceived suitability of the test
- Perceived cultural fairness of the test
- Perceived sufficiency of time
- Perceived difficulty of the test
- Emotional response to the test
- Level of guessing
- Cheating by the examinee or others

The final question on the EFeQ is an open-ended essay: "We are interested in any remarks or suggestions you might have for improving the exam."

Nevo (1992) determined that the EFeQ questionnaire possesses modest reliability, with a

test–retest reliability of about .70. Regardless of the psychometric properties of his scale, the tradition of asking examinees for feedback about tests has proved invaluable. The Inter-University entrance exam was modified in numerous ways in response to feedback: The answer sheet format was modified in ways suggested by examinees; the time limit was increased for specific tests reported to be too speeded; certain items perceived as culturally biased or unfair were deleted. In addition, security measures were revised and tightened in order to minimize cheating, which was much more prevalent than examiners had anticipated. Nevo (1992) also cites a hidden advantage to feedback questionnaires: They convey the message that someone cares enough to listen, which reduces postexamination stress. Examinee feedback questionnaires should become a routine practice in group standardized testing.

PUBLISHING THE TEST

The test construction process does not end with the collection of cross-validation data. The test developer also must oversee the production of the testing materials, publish a technical manual, and produce a user's manual. A number of relevant guidelines can be offered for each of these final steps, as outlined in the following sections. Finally, we close this chapter with a provocative comment on the conservatism of modern test publishers.

Production of Testing Materials

Testing materials must be user friendly if they are to receive wide acceptance by psychologists and educators. Thus, a first guideline for test production is that the physical packaging of test materials must allow for quick and smooth administration. Consider the challenge posed by some performance tests, in which the examiner must wrestle with pencil, clipboard, test form, stopwatch, test manual, item shield, item box, and a disassembled cardboard object, all the while maintaining conversation with the examinee. If it is possible for the test developer to simplify the duties of the examiner while leaving examinee task demands unchanged, the resulting instrument will have much greater acceptability to potential users. For example, if the administration instructions can be summarized on the test form, the examiner can put the test manual aside while setting out the task for the examinee. Another welcome addition to psychological test packaging is the stand-up ring binder that shows the test question on the side facing the examinee and provides instructions for administration on the reverse side facing the examiner.

Technical Manual and User's Manual

Technical data about a new instrument are usually summarized with appropriate references in a **technical manual**. Here, the prospective user can find information about item analyses, scale reliabilities, cross-validation studies, and the like. In some cases, this information is incorporated in the **user's manual**, which gives instructions for administration and also provides guidelines for test interpretation.

Test manuals should communicate information to many different groups ranging in background and training from measurement specialist to classroom teacher. Test manuals serve many purposes, as outlined in the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1985, 1999). The influential *Standards* manual suggests that test manuals accomplish the following goals:

- Describe the rationale and recommended uses for the test
- Provide specific cautions against anticipated misuses of a test
- Cite representative studies regarding general and specific test uses
- Identify special qualifications needed to administer and interpret the test
- Provide revisions, ammendations, and supplements as needed
- Use promotional material that is accurate and research based
- Cite quantitative relationships between test scores and criteria
- Report on the degree to which alternative modes of response (e.g., booklet versus an answer sheet) are interchangeable
- Provide appropriate interpretive aids to the test taker
- Furnish evidence of the validity of any automated test interpretations

Finally, test manuals should provide the essential data on reliability and validity rather than referring the user to other sources—an unfortunate practice encountered in some test manuals.

Testing Is Big Business

By now the reader should appreciate the intimidating task faced by anyone who sets out to develop and publish a new test. Aside from the gargantuan proportions of the endeavor, test development is extraordinarily expensive, which means that publishers are inherently conservative about introducing new tests. Jensen (1980) provides the following provocative view on this topic:

> To produce a new general intelligence test that would be a really significant improvement over existing instruments would be a multimillion-dollar project requiring a large staff of test construction experts working for several years. Today we possess the necessary psychometric technology for producing considerably better tests than are now in popular use. The principal hindrances are copyright laws, vested interests of test publishers in the established tests in which they have already made enormous investments, and the market economy for tests. Significant improvement of tests is not an attractive commercial venture initially and would probably have to depend on large-scale and long-term subsidies from government agencies and private foundations.

CHAPTER 5

Intelligence and Achievement: Theories and Tests

TOPIC 5A Theories of Intelligence and Factor Analysis

Definitions of Intelligence
Case Exhibit 5.1 Learning and Adaptation as Core Functions of Intelligence
A Primer of Factor Analysis
Galton and Sensory Keenness
Spearman and the *g* Factor
Thurstone and the Primary Mental Abilities
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) Theory
Guilford and the Structure-of-Intellect Model
Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive (Pass) Theory
Information Processing Theories of Intelligence
Gardner and the Theory of Multiple Intelligences
Sternberg and the Triarchic Theory of Successful Intelligence

This chapter opens an extended discussion of intelligence and achievement testing, a topic so important and immense that we devote the next two chapters to it as well. In order to understand contemporary cognitive testing, the reader will need to assimilate certain definitions, theories, and mainstream assessment practices. The goal of Topic 5A, Theories of Intelligence and Factor Analysis, is to investigate the various meanings given to the term intelligence and to discuss how definitions and theories have influenced the structure and content of intelligence tests. An important justification for this topic is that an understanding of theories of intelligence is crucial for establishing the construct validity of IQ measures. Furthermore, because the statistical tools of factor analysis are so vital to many theories of intelligence, we provide a primer of the topic here. In Topic 5B, Individual Tests of Intelligence and Achievement, we summarize a number of noteworthy approaches to individual assessment and focus on one important application, the evaluation of learning disabilities. We begin with a foundational question: How is intelligence defined?

Intelligence is one of the most highly researched topics in psychology. Thousands of research articles are published each year on the nature and measurement of intelligence. New journals such as *Intelligence* and *The Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment* have flourished in response to the scholarly interest in this topic. Despite this burgeoning research literature, the definition of intelligence remains elusive, wrapped in controversy and mystery. In fact, the discussion that follows will illustrate a major paradox of modern testing: Psychometricians are better at measuring intelligence than conceptualizing it!

Even though defining intelligence has proved to be a frustrating endeavor, there is much to be gained by reviewing historical and contemporary efforts to clarify its meaning. After all, intelligence tests did not materialize out of thin air. Most tests are grounded in a specific theory of intelligence and most test developers offer a definition of the construct as a starting point for their endeavors. For these reasons, we can better understand and evaluate the multifaceted character of contemporary tests if we first review prominent definitions and theories of intelligence.

DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

Before we discuss definitions of intelligence, we need to clarify the nature of definition itself. Sternberg (1986) makes a distinction between operational and "real" definitions that is important in this context. An **operational definition** defines a concept in terms of the way it is measured. Boring (1923) carried this viewpoint to its extreme when he defined intelligence as "what the tests test." Believe it or not, this was a serious proposal, designed largely to short-circuit rampant and divisive disagreements about the definition of intelligence.

Operational definitions of intelligence suffer from two dangerous shortcomings (Sternberg, 1986). First, they are circular. Intelligence tests were invented to measure intelligence, not to define it. The test designers never intended for their instruments to define intelligence. Second, operational definitions block further progress in understanding the nature of intelligence, because they foreclose discussion on the adequacy of theories of intelligence.

This second problem—the potentially stultifying effects of relying on operational definitions of intelligence—casts doubt on the common practice of affirming the concurrent validity of new tests by correlating them with old tests. If established tests serve as the principal criterion against which new tests are assessed, then the new tests will be viewed as valid only to the extent that they correlate with the old ones. Such a conservative practice drastically curtails innovation. The operational definition of intelligence does not allow for the possibility that new tests or conceptions of intelligence may be superior to the existing ones.

We must conclude, then, that operational definitions of intelligence leave much to be desired. In contrast, a **real definition** is one that seeks to tell us the true nature of the thing being defined (Robinson, 1950; Sternberg, 1986). Perhaps the most common way—but by no means the only way—of producing real definitions of intelligence is to ask experts in the field to define it.

Expert Definitions of Intelligence

Intelligence has been given many real definitions by prominent researchers in the field. In the following, we list several examples, paraphrased slightly for editorial consistency. The reader will note that many of these definitions appeared in an early but still influential symposium, "Intelligence and Its Measurement," published in the *Journal of Educational Psychology* (Thorndike, 1921). Other definitions stem from a modern update of this early symposium, *What Is Intelligence?,* edited by Sternberg and Detterman (1986). Intelligence has been defined as the following:

> Spearman (1904, 1923): a general ability that involves mainly the eduction of relations and correlates.
>
> Binet and Simon (1905): the ability to judge well, to understand well, to reason well.
>
> Terman (1916): the capacity to form concepts and to grasp their significance.
>
> Pintner (1921): the ability of the individual to adapt adequately to relatively new situations in life.
>
> Thorndike (1921): the power of good responses from the point of view of truth or fact.

Thurstone (1921): the capacity to inhibit instinctive adjustments, flexibly imagine different responses, and realize modified instinctive adjustments into overt behavior.

Wechsler (1939): The aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with the environment.

Humphreys (1971): the entire repertoire of acquired skills, knowledge, learning sets, and generalization tendencies considered intellectual in nature that are available at any one period of time.

Piaget (1972): a generic term to indicate the superior forms of organization or equilibrium of cognitive structuring used for adaptation to the physical and social environment.

Sternberg (1985a, 1986): the mental capacity to automatize information processing and to emit contextually appropriate behavior in response to novelty; intelligence also includes metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components (discussed later).

Eysenck (1986): error-free transmission of information through the cortex.

Gardner (1986): the ability or skill to solve problems or to fashion products that are valued within one or more cultural settings.

Ceci (1994): multiple innate abilities that serve as a range of possibilities; these abilities develop (or fail to develop, or develop and later atrophy) depending upon motivation and exposure to relevant educational experiences.

Sattler (2001): intelligent behavior reflects the survival skills of the species, beyond those associated with basic physiological processes.

The preceding list of definitions is representative although definitely not exhaustive. For one thing, the list is exclusively Western and omits several cross-cultural conceptions of intelligence. Eastern conceptions of intelligence, for example, emphasize benevolence, humility, freedom from conventional standards of judgment, and doing what is right as essential to intelligence. Many African conceptions of intelligence place heavy emphasis on social aspects of intelligence such as maintaining harmonious and stable intergroup relations (Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998). The reader can consult Bracken and Fagan (1990), Sternberg (1994), and Sternberg and Detterman (1986) for additional ideas. Certainly, this sampling of views is sufficient to demonstrate that there appear to be as many definitions of intelligence as there are experts willing to define it!

In spite of this diversity of viewpoints, two themes recur again and again in expert definitions of intelligence. Broadly speaking, the experts tend to agree that intelligence is (1) the capacity to learn from experience and (2) the capacity to adapt to one's environment. That learning and adaptation are both crucial to intelligence stands out with poignancy in certain cases of mental disability in which persons fail to possess one or the other capacity in sufficient degree (Case Exhibit 5.1).

CASE EXHIBIT 5.1

Learning and Adaptation as Core Functions of Intelligence

Persons with mental disability often demonstrate the importance of experiential learning and environmental adaptation as key ingredients of intelligence. Consider the case history of a 61-year-old newspaper vendor with moderate mental retardation well known to local mental health specialists. He was an interesting if not eccentric gentleman who stored canned goods in his freezer and cursed at welfare workers who stopped by to see how he was doing. In spite of his need for financial support from a state agency, he was fiercely independent and managed his own household with minimal supervision from case workers. Thus, in some respects he maintained a tenuous adaptation to his environment. To earn much-needed extra income, he sold a local 25-cent newspaper from a streetside newsstand. He recognized that a quarter was proper payment and had learned to give three quarters in change for a dollar bill. He refused all other forms of payment, an arrangement that his customers could accept. But one day the price of the newspaper was increased to 35

cents, and the newspaper vendor was forced to deal with nickels and dimes as well as quarters and dollar bills. The amount of learning required by this slight shift in environmental demands exceeded his intellectual abilities, and, sadly, he was soon out of business. His failed efforts highlight the essential ingredients of intelligence: learning from experience and adaptation to the environment.

How well do intelligence tests capture the experts' view that intelligence consists of learning from experience and adaptation to the environment? The reader should keep this question in mind as we proceed to review major intelligence tests in the topics that follow. Certainly, there is cause for concern: Very few contemporary intelligence tests appear to require the examinee to learn something new or to adapt to a new situation as part and parcel of the examination process. At best, prominent modern tests provide indirect measures of the capacities to learn and adapt. How well they capture these dimensions is an empirical question that must be demonstrated through validational research.

Layperson and Expert Conceptions of Intelligence

Another approach to understanding a construct is to study its popular meaning. This method is more scientific than it may appear. Words have a common meaning to the extent that they help provide an effective portrayal of everyday transactions. If laypersons can agree on its meaning, a construct such as intelligence is in some sense "real" and, therefore, potentially useful. Thus, asking persons on the street, "What does intelligence mean to you?" has much to recommend it.

Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, and Bernstein (1981) conducted a series of studies to investigate conceptions of intelligence held by American adults. In the first study, people in a train station, entering a supermarket, and studying in a college library were asked to list behaviors characteristic of different kinds of intelligence. In a second study—the only one discussed here—both laypersons and experts (mainly academic psychologists) rated the importance of these behaviors to their concept of an "ideally intelligent" person.

The behaviors central to expert and lay conceptions of intelligence turned out to be very similar, although not identical. In order of importance, experts saw verbal intelligence, problem-solving ability, and practical intelligence as crucial to intelligence. Laypersons regarded practical problem-solving ability, verbal ability, and social competence to be the key ingredients in intelligence. Of course, opinions were not unanimous; these conceptions represent the consensus view of each group. In their conception of intelligence, experts place more emphasis on verbal ability than problem solving, whereas laypersons reverse these priorities. Nonetheless, experts and laypersons alike consider verbal ability and problem solving to be essential aspects of intelligence. As the reader will see, most intelligence tests also accent these two competencies. Prototypical examples would be vocabulary (verbal ability) and block design (problem solving) from the Wechsler scales, discussed later. We see then that everyday conceptions of intelligence are, in part, mirrored quite faithfully by the content of modern intelligence tests.

Some disagreement between experts and laypersons is also evident. Experts consider practical intelligence (sizing up situations, determining how to achieve goals, awareness and interest in the world) an essential constituent of intelligence, whereas laypersons identify social competence (accepting others for what they are, admitting mistakes, punctuality, and interest in the world) as a third component. Yet, these two nominations do share one property in common: Contemporary tests generally make no attempt to measure either practical intelligence or social competence. Partly, this reflects the psychometric difficulties encountered in devising test items relevant to these content areas. However, the more influential reason intelligence tests do not measure practical intelligence or social competence is inertia: Test developers have blindly accepted historically incomplete conceptions of intelligence. Until recently, the development of intelligence testing has been a conservative affair, little changed since the days of Binet and the Army Alpha and Beta tests for World War I recruits. There are some signs that testing practices may soon evolve, however, with the development of innovative instruments. For example, Sternberg and colleagues have proposed innovative

tests based on his model of intelligence. Another interesting instrument based on a new model of intelligence is the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory (Cornelius & Caspi, 1987). In this test, examinees must indicate their typical response to everyday problems such as failing to bring money, checkbook, or credit card when taking a friend to lunch.

Many theorists in the field of intelligence have relied on factor analysis for the derivation or validation of their theories. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that perhaps the majority of the theories in this area have been impacted by the statistical tools of factor analysis, which provide ways to portion intelligence into its subcomponents. One of the most compelling theories of intelligence, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory reviewed later, would not exist without factor analysis. Thus, before summarizing theories, we provide a brief review of this essential statistical tool.

A PRIMER OF FACTOR ANALYSIS

Broadly speaking, there are two forms of factor analysis: confirmatory and exploratory. In confirmatory factor analysis, the purpose is to confirm that test scores and variables fit a certain pattern predicted by a theory. For example, if the theory underlying a certain intelligence test prescribed that the subtests belong to three factors (e.g., verbal, performance, and attention factors), then a confirmatory factor analysis could be undertaken to evaluate the accuracy of this prediction. Confirmatory factor analysis is essential to the validation of many ability tests.

The central purpose of exploratory **factor analysis** is to summarize the interrelationships among a large number of variables in a concise and accurate manner as an aid in conceptualization (Gorsuch, 1983). For instance, factor analysis may help a researcher discover that a battery of 20 tests represents only four underlying variables, called **factors**. The smaller set of derived factors can be used to represent the essential constructs that underlie the complete group of variables.

Perhaps a simple analogy will clarify the nature of factors and their relationship to the variables or tests from which they are derived. Consider the track-and-field decathlon, a mixture of 10 diverse events including sprints, hurdles, pole vault, shot put, and distance races, among others. In conceptualizing the capability of the individual decathlete, we do not think exclusively in terms of the participant's skill in specific events. Instead, we think in terms of more basic attributes such as speed, strength, coordination, and endurance, each of which is reflected to a different extent in the individual events. For example, the pole vault requires speed and coordination, while hurdle events demand coordination and endurance. These inferred attributes are analogous to the underlying factors of factor analysis. Just as the results from the 10 events of a decathlon may boil down to a small number of underlying factors (e.g., speed, strength, coordination, and endurance), so too may the results from a battery of 10 or 20 ability tests reflect the operation of a small number of basic cognitive attributes (e.g., verbal skill, visualization, calculation, and attention, to cite a hypothetical list). This example illustrates the goal of factor analysis: to help produce a parsimonious description of large, complex data sets.

We will illustrate the essential concepts of factor analysis by pursuing a classic example concerned with the number and kind of factors that best describe student abilities. Holzinger and Swineford (1939) gave 24 ability-related psychological tests to 145 junior high school students from Forest Park, Illinois. The factor analysis described later was based on methods outlined in Kinnear and Gray (1997).

It should be intuitively obvious to the reader that any large battery of ability tests will reflect a smaller number of basic, underlying abilities (factors). Consider the 24 tests depicted in Table 5.1. Surely some of these tests measure common underlying abilities. For example, we would expect Sentence Completion, Word Classification, and Word Meaning (variables 7, 8, and 9) to assess a factor of general language ability of some kind. In like manner, other groups of tests seem likely to measure common underlying abilities—but how many abilities or factors? And what is the nature of these underlying abilities? Factor analysis is the ideal tool for answering these questions. We follow the factor analysis of the Holzinger and Swineford (1939) data from beginning to end.

TABLE 5.1 The 24 Ability Tests Used by Holzinger and Swineford (1939)

1.	Visual Perception	**13.**	Straight and Curved Capitals
2.	Cubes	**14.**	Word Recognition
3.	Paper Form Board	**15.**	Number Recognition
4.	Flags	**16.**	Figure Recognition
5.	General Information	**17.**	Object-Number
6.	Paragraph Comprehension	**18.**	Number-Figure
7.	Sentence Completion	**19.**	Figure-Word
8.	Word Classification	**20.**	Deduction
9.	Word Meaning	**21.**	Numerical Puzzles
10.	Add Digits	**22.**	Problem Reasoning
11.	Code (Perceptual Speed)	**23.**	Series Completion
12.	Count Groups of Dots	**24.**	Arithmetic Problems

The Correlation Matrix

The beginning point for every factor analysis is the **correlation matrix**, a complete table of intercorrelations among all the variables.[1] The correlations between the 24 ability variables discussed here can be found in Table 5.2. The reader will notice that variables 7, 8, and 9 do, indeed, intercorrelate quite strongly (correlations of .62, .69, and .53), as we suspected earlier. This pattern of intercorrelations is presumptive evidence that these variables measure something in common; that is, it appears that these tests reflect a common underlying factor. However, this kind of intuitive factor analysis based on a visual inspection of the correlation matrix is hopelessly limited; there are just too many intercorrelations for the viewer to discern the underlying patterns for all the variables. Here is where factor analysis can be helpful. Although we cannot elucidate the mechanics of the procedure, factor analysis relies on modern high-speed computers to search the correlation matrix according to objective statistical rules and determine the smallest number of factors needed to account for the observed pattern of intercorrelations. The analysis also produces the factor matrix, a table showing the extent to which each test loads on (correlates with) each of the derived factors, as discussed in the following section.

The Factor Matrix and Factor Loadings

The **factor matrix** consists of a table of correlations called factor loadings. The factor loadings (which can take on values from −1.00 to +1.00) indicate the weighting of each variable on each factor. For example, the factor matrix in Table 5.3 shows that five factors (labeled I, II, III, IV, and V) were derived from the analysis. Note that the first variable, Series Completion, has a strong positive loading of .71 on factor I, indicating that this test is a reasonably good index of factor I. Note also that Series Completion has a modest negative loading of −.11 on factor II, indicating

[1]In this example, the variables are tests that produce more or less continuous scores. But the variables in a factor analysis can take other forms, so long as they can be expressed as continuous scores. For example, all of the following could be variables in a factor analysis: height, weight, income, social class, and rating-scale results.

TABLE 5.2 The Correlation Matrix for 24 Ability Variables

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*	*21*	*22*	*23*
2	32																						
3	40	32																					
4	47	23	31																				
5	32	29	25	23																			
6	34	23	27	33	62																		
7	30	16	22	34	66	72																	
8	33	17	38	39	58	53	62																
9	33	20	18	33	72	71	69	53															
10	12	06	08	10	31	20	25	29	17														
11	31	15	09	11	34	35	23	30	28	48													
12	31	15	14	16	22	10	18	27	11	59	43												
13	49	24	32	33	34	31	35	40	28	41	54	51											
14	13	10	18	07	28	29	24	25	26	17	35	13	20										
15	24	13	07	13	23	25	17	18	25	15	24	17	14	37									
16	41	27	26	32	19	29	18	30	24	12	31	12	28	41	33								
17	18	01	18	19	21	27	23	26	27	29	36	28	19	34	35	32							
18	37	26	21	25	26	17	16	25	21	32	35	35	32	21	33	34	45						
19	27	11	31	14	19	25	23	27	27	19	29	11	26	21	19	26	32	36					
20	37	29	30	34	40	44	45	43	45	17	20	25	24	30	27	39	26	30	17				
21	37	31	17	35	32	26	31	36	27	41	40	36	43	18	23	35	17	36	33	41			
22	41	23	25	38	44	39	40	36	48	16	30	19	28	24	25	28	27	32	34	46	37		
23	47	35	38	34	44	43	41	50	50	26	25	35	38	24	26	36	29	27	30	51	45	50	
24	28	21	20	25	42	43	44	39	42	53	41	41	36	30	17	26	33	41	37	37	45	38	43

Note: Decimals omitted.

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that, to a slight extent, it measures the opposite of this factor; that is, high scores on Series Completion tend to signify low scores on factor II, and vice versa.

The factors may seem quite mysterious, but in reality they are conceptually quite simple. A factor is nothing more than a weighted linear sum of the variables; that is, each factor is a precise statistical combination of the tests used in the analysis. In a sense, a factor is produced by "adding in" carefully determined portions of some tests and perhaps "subtracting out" fractions of other tests. What makes the factors special is the elegant analytical methods used to derive them. Several different methods exist. These methods differ in subtle ways beyond the scope of this text; the reader can gather a sense of the differences by examining names of procedures: principal components factors, principal axis factors, method of unweighted least squares, maximum-likelihood method, image factoring, and alpha factoring (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Most of the methods yield highly similar results.

The factor loadings depicted in Table 5.3 are nothing more than correlation coefficients between

TABLE 5.3 The Principal Axes Factor Analysis for 24 Variables

	Factors				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
23. Series Completion	.71	−.11	.14	.11	.07
8. Word Classification	.70	−.24	−.15	−.11	−.13
5. General Information	.70	−.32	−.34	−.04	.08
9. Word Meaning	.69	−.45	−.29	.08	.00
6. Paragraph Comprehension	.69	−.42	−.26	.08	−.01
7. Sentence Completion	.68	−.42	−.36	−.05	−.05
24. Arithmetic Problems	.67	.20	−.23	−.04	−.11
20. Deduction	.64	−.19	.13	.06	.28
22. Problem Reasoning	.64	−.15	.11	.05	−.04
21. Numerical Puzzles	.62	.24	.10	−.21	.16
13. Straight and Curved Capitals	.62	.28	.02	−.36	−.07
1. Visual Perception	.62	−.01	.42	−.21	−.01
11. Code (Perceptual Speed)	.57	.44	−.20	.04	.01
18. Number-Figure	.55	.39	.20	.15	−.11
16. Figure Recognition	.53	.08	.40	.31	.19
4. Flags	.51	−.18	.32	−.23	−.02
17. Object-Number	.49	.27	−.03	.47	−.24
2. Cubes	.40	−.08	.39	−.23	.34
12. Count Groups of Dots	.48	.55	−.14	−.33	.11
10. Add Digits	.47	.55	−.45	−.19	.07
3. Paper Form Board	.44	−.19	.48	−.12	−.36
14. Word Recognition	.45	.09	−.03	.55	.16
15. Number Recognition	.42	.14	.10	.52	.31
19. Figure-Word	.47	.14	.13	.20	−.61

variables and factors. These correlations can be interpreted as showing the weight or loading of each factor on each variable. For example, variable 9, the test of Word Meaning, has a very strong loading (.69) on factor I, modest negative loadings (−.45 and −.29) on factors II and III, and negligible loadings (.08 and .00) on factors IV and V.

Geometric Representation of Factor Loadings

It is customary to represent the first two or three factors as reference axes in two- or three-dimensional space.[2] Within this framework the factor loadings for each variable can be plotted for examination. In our

[2]Technically, it is possible to represent all the factors as reference axes in *n*-dimensional space, where *n* is the number of factors. However, when working with more than two or three reference axes, visual representation is no longer feasible.



FIGURE 5.1 **Geometric Representation of the First Two Factors from 24 Ability Tests**

example, five factors were discovered, too many for simple visualization. Nonetheless, we can illustrate the value of geometric representation by oversimplifying somewhat and depicting just the first two factors (Figure 5.1). In this graph, each of the 24 tests has been plotted against the two factors that correspond to axes I and II. The reader will notice that the factor loadings on the first factor (I) are uniformly positive, whereas the factor loadings on the second factor (II) consist of a mixture of positive and negative.

The Rotated Factor Matrix

An important point in this context is that the position of the reference axes is arbitrary. There is nothing to prevent the researcher from rotating the axes so that they produce a more sensible fit with the factor loadings. For example, the reader will notice in Figure 5.1 that tests 6, 7, and 9 (all language tests) cluster together. It would certainly clarify the interpretation of factor I if it were to be redirected near the center of this cluster (Figure 5.2). This manipulation would also bring factor II alongside interpretable tests 10, 11, and 12 (all number tests).

Although rotation can be conducted manually by visual inspection, it is more typical for researchers to rely on one or more objective statistical criteria to produce the final rotated factor matrix. Thurstone's (1947) criteria of positive manifold and simple structure are commonly applied. In a **rotation to positive manifold**, the computer program seeks to eliminate as many of the negative factor loadings as possible. Negative factor loadings make little sense in ability testing, because they imply that high scores on a factor are correlated with poor test performance. In a **rotation to simple structure**, the computer program seeks to simplify the factor loadings so that each test has significant loadings on as few factors as possible.



FIGURE 5.2 Geometric Representation of the First Two Rotated Factors from 24 Ability Tests

The goal of both criteria is to produce a rotated factor matrix that is as straightforward and unambiguous as possible.

The rotated factor matrix for this problem is shown in Table 5.4. The particular method of rotation used here is called varimax rotation. Varimax should not be used if the theoretical expectation suggests that a general factor may occur. Should we expect a general factor in the analysis of ability tests? The answer is as much a matter of faith as of science. One researcher may conclude that a general factor is likely and, therefore, pursue a different type of rotation. A second researcher may be comfortable with a Thurstonian viewpoint and seek multiple ability factors using a varimax rotation. We will explore this issue in more detail later, but it is worth pointing out here that a researcher encounters many choice points in the process of conducting a factor analysis. It is not surprising, then, that different researchers may reach different conclusions from factor analysis, even when they are analyzing the same data set.

The Interpretation of Factors

Table 5.4 indicates that five factors underlie the intercorrelations of the 24 ability tests. But what shall we call these factors? The reader may find the answer to this question disquieting, because at this juncture we leave the realm of cold, objective statistics and enter the arena of judgment, insight, and presumption. In order to interpret or name a factor, the researcher must make a reasoned judgment about the common processes and abilities shared by the tests with strong loadings on that factor. For example, in Table 5.4 it appears that factor I is verbal ability, because the variables with high loadings stress verbal skill (e.g., Sentence Completion loads .86, Word Meaning

TABLE 5.4 The Rotated Varimax Factor Matrix for 24 Ability Variables

	Factors				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
7. Sentence Completion	**.86**	.15	.13	.03	.07
9. Word Meaning	**.84**	.06	.15	.18	.08
6. Paragraph Comprehension	**.81**	.07	.16	.18	.10
5. General Information	**.79**	.22	.16	.12	−.02
8. Word Classification	**.65**	.22	.28	.03	.21
22. Problem Reasoning	**.43**	.12	.38	.23	.22
10. Add Digits	.18	**.85**	−.10	.09	−.01
12. Count Groups of Dots	.02	**.80**	.20	.03	.00
11. Code (Perceptual Speed)	.18	**.64**	.05	.30	.17
13. Straight and Curved Capitals	.19	**.60**	.40	−.05	.18
24. Arithmetic Problems	.41	**.54**	.12	.16	.24
21. Numerical Puzzles	.18	**.52**	.45	.16	.02
18. Number-Figure	.00	**.40**	.28	.38	.36
1. Visual Perception	.17	.21	**.69**	.10	.20
2. Cubes	.09	.09	**.65**	.12	−.18
4. Flags	.26	.07	**.60**	−.01	.15
3. Paper Form Board	.16	−.09	**.57**	−.05	.49
23. Series Completion	.42	.24	**.52**	.18	.11
20. Deduction	.43	.11	**.47**	.35	−.07
15. Number Recognition	.11	.09	.12	**.74**	−.02
14. Word Recognition	.23	.10	.00	**.69**	.10
16. Figure Recognition	.07	.07	.46	**.59**	.14
17. Object-Number	.15	.25	−.06	**.52**	.49
19. Figure-Word	.16	.16	.11	.14	**.77**

Note: Boldfaced entries signify subtests loading strongly on each factor.

loads .84, and Paragraph Comprehension loads .81). The variables with low loadings also help sharpen the meaning of factor I. For example, factor I is not related to numerical skill (Numerical Puzzles loads .18) or spatial skill (Paper Form Board loads .16). Using a similar form of inference, it appears that factor II is mainly numerical ability (Add Digits loads .85, Count Groups of Dots loads .80). Factor III is less certain but appears to be a visual-perceptual capacity, and factor IV appears to be a measure of recognition. We would need to analyze the single test on factor V (Figure-Word) to surmise the meaning of this factor.

These results illustrate a major use of factor analysis, namely, the identification of a small number of marker tests from a large test battery. Rather

than using a cumbersome battery of 24 tests, a researcher could gain nearly the same information by carefully selecting several tests with strong loadings on the five factors. For example, the first factor is well represented by test 7, Sentence Completion (.86) and test 9, Word Meaning (.84); the second factor is reflected in test 10, Add Digits (.85), while the third factor is best illustrated by test 1, Visual Perception (.69). The fourth factor is captured by test 15, Number Recognition (.74), and Word Recognition (.69). Of course, the last factor loads well on only test 19, Figure-Word (.77).

Issues in Factor Analysis

Unfortunately, factor analysis is frequently misunderstood and often misused. Some researchers appear to use factor analysis as a kind of divining rod, hoping to find gold hidden underneath tons of dirt. But there is nothing magical about the technique. No amount of statistical analysis can rescue data based on trivial, irrelevant, or haphazard measures. If there is no gold to be found, then none will be found; factor analysis is not alchemy. Factor analysis will yield meaningful results only when the research was meaningful to begin with.

An important point is that a particular kind of factor can emerge from factor analysis only if the tests and measures contain that factor in the first place. For example, a short-term memory factor cannot possibly emerge from a battery of ability tests if none of the tests requires short-term memory. In general, the quality of the output depends upon the quality of the input. We can restate this point as the acronym GIGO, or "garbage in, garbage out."

Sample size is crucial to a stable factor analysis. Comrey (1973) offers the following rough guide:

Sample Size	Rating
50	Very poor
100	Poor
200	Fair
300	Good
500	Very good
1,000	Excellent

In general, it is comforting to have at least five subjects for each test or variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).

Finally, we cannot overemphasize the extent to which factor analysis is guided by subjective choices and theoretical prejudices. A crucial question in this regard is the choice between orthogonal axes and oblique axes. With **orthogonal axes**, the factors are at right angles to one another, which means that they are uncorrelated (Figures 5.1 and 5.2 both depict orthogonal axes). In many cases the clusters of factor loadings are situated such that oblique axes provide a better fit. With **oblique axes**, the factors are correlated among themselves. Some researchers contend that oblique axes should always be used, whereas others take a more experimental approach. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) recommend an exploratory strategy based on repeated factor analyses. Their approach is unabashedly opportunistic:

> During the next few runs, researchers experiment with different numbers of factors, different extraction techniques, and both orthogonal and oblique rotations. Some number of factors with some combination of extraction and rotation produces the solution with the greatest scientific utility, consistency, and meaning; this is the solution that is interpreted.

With oblique rotations it is also possible to factor analyze the factors themselves. Such a procedure may yield one or more second-order factors. Second-order factors can provide support for the hierarchical organization of traits and may offer a rapprochement between ability theorists who posit a single general factor (e.g., Spearman) and those who promote several group factors (e.g., Thurstone). Perhaps both camps are correct, with the group factors sitting underneath the second-order general factor.

We turn now to a review of major theories of intelligence. A reminder: The justification for reviewing theories is to illustrate how they have influenced the structure and content of intelligence tests. In addition, the construct validity of IQ tests depends on the extent to which they embody specific theories of intelligence, so a review of theories is pertinent to test validation as well.

GALTON AND SENSORY KEENNESS

The first theories of intelligence were derived in the Brass Instruments era of psychology at the turn of the twentieth century. The reader will recall from Topic 2A that Sir Francis Galton and his disciple J. McKeen Cattell thought that intelligence was underwritten by keen sensory abilities. This incomplete and misleading assumption was based on a plausible premise:

> The only information that reaches us concerning outward events appears to pass through the avenues of our senses; and the more perceptive the senses are of difference, the larger is the field upon which our judgment and intelligence can act. (Galton, 1883)

The sensory keenness theory of intelligence promoted by Galton and Cattell proved to be largely a psychometric dead end. However, we do see vestiges of this approach in modern chronometric analyses of intelligence such as the Reaction Time–Movement Time (RT-MT) apparatus, an experimental method favored by Jensen (1980) for the culture-reduced study of intelligence (Figure 5.3). In RT-MT studies, the subject is instructed to place the index finger of the preferred hand on the home button; then an auditory warning signal is sounded, followed (in 1 to 4 seconds) by one of the eight green lights going on, which the subject must turn off as quickly as possible by touching the microswitch button directly below it. RT is the time the subject takes to remove his or her finger from the home button after a green light goes on. MT is the interval between removing the finger from the home button and touching the button that turns off the green light. Jensen (1980) reported that indices of RT and MT correlated as high as .50 with traditional psychometric tests of intelligence.[3] P. A. Vernon has also reported substantial relationships—as high as .70 for multiple correlations—between speed-of-processing RT-type measures and traditional measures of intelligence (Vernon, 1994). These findings suggest that speed-of-processing measures such as RT might be a useful addition to standardized intelligence test batteries. In general, test developers have resisted the implications of this line of research.



FIGURE 5.3 Schematic Diagram of a Reaction Time—Movement Time Apparatus

Note: The square box □ indicates the starting point; the open circles O indicate the signal lights; the dark circles ● indicate the push buttons.

One reason for the lack of ongoing progress in mental chronometry is the absence of standardization in measurement and data analysis. Not all devices for measuring reaction time are the same; consequently, the data from one laboratory cannot be compared to results from another setting. Making matters worse, many "reaction time" devices lump together RT (the time needed to lift the finger off the home button) and MT (the time in transit to the target button), which drastically obscures the relationship between chronometric data and intelligence (Jensen, 2006). The problem with combining the two is that RT is related to IQ, whereas MT is a motor measure uncorrelated with IQ. In addressing these issues, Jensen (2011) has commissioned a leading electronics company to create a standard apparatus for administering and recording reaction time and other indices of mental chronometry. Use of a single standard instrument would provide an vital foundation for progress in this area of assessment.

SPEARMAN AND THE *g* FACTOR

Based on extensive study of the patterns of correlations between various tests of intellectual and sensory ability, Charles Spearman (1904, 1923, 1927)

[3]Actually, the raw correlation coefficient is negative because *faster* reaction times (*lower* numerical scores) are associated with *higher* intelligence scores.

proposed that intelligence consisted of two kinds of factors: a single **general factor** *g* and numerous **specific factors** s_1, s_2, s_3, and so on. As a necessary adjunct to his theory, Spearman helped invent factor analysis to aid his investigation of the nature of intelligence. Spearman used this statistical technique to discern the number of separate underlying factors that must exist to account for the observed correlations between a large number of tests.

In Spearman's view, an examinee's performance on any homogeneous test or subtest of intellectual ability was determined mainly by two influences: *g,* the pervasive general factor, and *s,* a factor specific to that test or subtest. (An error factor *e* could also sway scores, but Spearman sought to minimize this influence by using highly reliable instruments.) Because the specific factor *s* was different for each intellectual test or subtest and was usually less influential than *g* in determining performance level, Spearman expressed less interest in studying it. He concentrated mainly on defining the nature of *g,* which he likened to an "energy" or "power" that serves in common the whole cortex. In contrast, Spearman considered *s,* the specific factor, to have a physiological substrate localized in the group of neurons serving the particular kind of mental operation demanded by a test or subtest. Spearman (1923) wrote, "These neural groups would thus function as alternative 'engines' into which the common supply of 'energy' could be alternatively distributed."

Spearman reasoned that some tests were heavily loaded with the *g* factor, whereas other tests—especially purely sensory measures—were representative mainly of a specific factor. Two tests each heavily loaded with *g* should correlate quite strongly. In contrast, psychological tests not saturated with *g* should show minimal correlation with one another. Much of Spearman's research was aimed at demonstrating the truth of these basic propositions derived from his theory. We have illustrated these points graphically in Figure 5.4. In this figure, each circle represents an intelligence test, and the degree of overlap between circles indicates the strength of correlation. Notice that tests A and B, each heavily loaded on *g,* correlate quite strongly. Tests C and D have weak loadings on *g* and subsequently do not correlate well.



FIGURE 5.4 Spearman's Two-Factor Theory of Intelligence

Note: Tests *A* and *B* correlate strongly, whereas *C* and *D* correlate weakly. See text.

Spearman (1923) believed that individual differences in *g* were most directly reflected in the ability to use three principles of cognition: apprehension of experience, eduction of relations, and eduction of correlations. Incidentally, the little-used term *eduction* refers to the process of figuring things out. These three principles can be explained by examining how we solve analogies of the form *A*:*B*::*C*:? that is, *A* is to *B* as *C* is to? A simple example might be HAMMER:NAIL::SCREWDRIVER:? To solve this analogy, we must first perceive and understand each term based on past experience; that is, we must have apprehension of experience. If we have no idea what a hammer, nail, and screwdriver are, there is little chance we can complete the analogy correctly. Next, we must infer the relation between the first two analogy terms, in this case, HAMMER and NAIL. Using a somewhat stilted phrase, Spearman referred to the ability to infer the relation between two concepts as eduction of relations. The final step, eduction of correlates, refers to the ability to apply the inferred principle to the new domain, in this case, applying the rule inferred to produce the correct response, namely, SCREWDRIVER:SCREW.

Although Spearman's physiological speculations have been largely dismissed, the idea of a general factor has been a central topic in research on intelligence and is still very much alive today (Jensen, 1979). The correctness of the *g* factor viewpoint is more than an academic issue. If it is true that a single, pervasive general factor is the essential wellspring of intelligence, then psychometric efforts to produce factorially pure subtests (e.g., measuring verbal comprehension, perceptual organization,

short-term memory, and so on) are largely misguided. To the extent that Spearman is correct, test developers should forgo subtest derivation and concentrate on producing a test that best captures the general factor.

The most difficult issue faced by Spearman's two-factor theory is the existence of group factors. As early as 1906, Spearman and his contemporaries noted that relatively dissimilar tests could have correlations higher than the values predicted from their respective *g* loadings (Brody & Brody, 1976). This finding raised the possibility that a group of diverse measures might share in common a unitary ability other than *g*. For example, several tests might share a common unitary memorization factor that was halfway between the *g* factor and the various *s* factors unique to each test. Of course, the existence of group factors is incompatible with Spearman's meticulous two-factor theory.

THURSTONE AND THE PRIMARY MENTAL ABILITIES

Thurstone (1931) developed factor-analysis procedures capable of searching correlation matrices for the existence of group factors. His methods permitted a researcher to discover empirically the number of factors present in a matrix and to define each factor in terms of the tests that loaded on it. In his analysis of how scores on different kinds of intellectual tests correlated with each other, Thurstone concluded that several broad group factors—and not a single general factor—could best explain empirical results. At various points in his research career, he proposed approximately a dozen different factors. Only seven of these factors have been frequently corroborated (Thurstone, 1938; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941) and they have been designated **primary mental abilities** (PMAs). They are as follows:

- Verbal Comprehension: The best measure is vocabulary, but this ability is also involved in reading comprehension and verbal analogies.
- Word Fluency: Measured by such tests as anagrams or quickly naming words in a given category (e.g., foods beginning with the letter *S*).
- Number: Virtually synonymous with the speed and accuracy of simple arithmetic computation.
- Space: Such as the ability to visualize how a three-dimensional object would appear if it was rotated or partially disassembled.
- Associative Memory: Skill at rote memory tasks such as learning to associate pairs of unrelated items.
- Perceptual Speed: Involved in simple clerical tasks such as checking for similarities and differences in visual details.
- Inductive Reasoning: The best measures of this factor involve finding a rule, as in a number series completion test.

Thurstone (1938) published the Primary Mental Abilities Test consisting of separate subtests, each designed to measure one PMA. However, he later acknowledged that his primary mental abilities correlated moderately with each other, proving the existence of one or more second-order factors. Ultimately, Thurstone acknowledged the existence of *g* as a higher-order factor. By this time, Spearman had admitted the existence of group factors representing special abilities, and it became apparent that the differences between Spearman and Thurstone were largely a matter of emphasis (Brody & Brody, 1976). Spearman continued to believe that *g* was the major determinant of correlations between test scores and assigned a minor role to group factors. Thurstone reversed these priorities.

P. E. Vernon (1950) provided a rapprochement between these two viewpoints by proposing a hierarchical group factor theory. In his view, *g* was the single factor at the top of a hierarchy that included two major group factors labeled verbal-educational (V:ed) and practical-mechanical-spatial-physical (k:m). Underneath these two major group factors were several minor group factors resembling the PMAs of Thurstone; specific factors occupied the bottom of the hierarchy.

Thurstone's analysis of PMAs continues to influence test development even today. Schaie (1985) has revised and modified the Primary Mental Abilities Test and used these measures in an enormously influential longitudinal study of adult intelligence. If intelligence were mainly a matter of *g*, then the group factors should change at about the same rate with aging. In support of the group factor approach to intellectual testing, Schaie (1985) reports

that some PMAs show little age-related decrement (Verbal Comprehension, Word Fluency, Inductive Reasoning), whereas other PMAs decline more rapidly in old age (Space, Number). Thus, there may be practical real-world reasons for reporting group factors and not condensing all of intelligence into a single general factor.

CATTELL-HORN-CARROLL (CHC) THEORY

Raymond Cattell (1941, 1971) proposed an influential theory of the structure of intelligence that has been revised and extended by John Horn (1968, 1994) and John Carroll (1993). Based on the reanalysis of 461 data sets from hundreds of independent studies published by other researchers, Carroll's contributions to the theory are especially vital. The ensuing theory, known as Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory, is a taxonomic tour de force that synthesizes the findings from almost a century of factor-analytic research on intelligence. Many psychometricians consider CHC theory to possess the strongest empirical foundation of any theory of intelligence and also to provide the most far-reaching implications for psychological testing (McGrew, 1997). Although the "big picture" of CHC theory is well established, researchers continue to refine the details. Under the direction of Kevin McGrew, the Institute for Applied Psychometrics manages an informative website dedicated to the advancement of CHC theory and applications (www.iapsych.com).

According to CHC theory, intelligence consists of pervasive, broad, and narrow abilities that are hierarchically organized. These are known as Stratum III, II, and I, respectively (Figure 5.5). At the highest and most pervasive level called Stratum III, a single general factor known as little *g* oversees all cognitive activities. Stratum II capacities, which reside beneath general intelligence, include several prominent and well-established abilities. In Figure 5.5, we have depicted eight abilities originally identified by Carroll (1993), but other researchers have proposed a slightly larger list that includes additional tentative entries such as psychomotor, olfactory, and kinesthetic abilities. The precise name given to each broad factor differs slightly from one theorist to another, as well as the scale abbreviations. Even so, there is strong consensus for the essential list. These broad factors include "basic constitutional and longstanding characteristics of individuals that can govern or influence a great variety of behaviors in a given domain" (Carroll, 1993, p. 634). The narrow abilities at Stratum I include approximately 70 abilities identified by Carroll (1993) in his comprehensive review of factor-analytic studies of intelligence. As might be expected, the list of narrow abilities is continually revised and expanded with ongoing research. These narrow abilities "represent greater specializations of abilities, often in quite specific ways that reflect the

Stratum III	*Stratum II*		*Stratum I*
General Intelligence, *g*	Fluid Intelligence/Reasoning	(*Gf*)	5 narrow abilities
	Crystallized Intelligence/Knowledge	(*Gc*)	10 narrow abilities
	Domain-Specific Knowledge	(*Gkn*)	7 narrow abilities
	Visual-Spatial Abilities	(*Gv*)	11 narrow abilities
	Auditory Processing	(*Ga*)	13 narrow abilities
	Broad Retrieval [Memory]	(*Gr*)	13 narrow abilities
	Cognitive Processing Speed	(*Gs*)	7 narrow abilities
	Decision/Reaction Time or Speed	(*Gt*)	5 narrow abilities

FIGURE 5.5 Outline of the CHC Three-Stratum Theory of Cognitive Abilities
Source: Based on Carroll, J. B. (1993). *Cognitive abilities: A survey of factor analytic studies.* New York: Cambridge University Press, and table 3 from www.iapsych.com.

effects of experience and learning, or the adoption of particular strategies of performance" (Carroll, 1993, p. 634).

Definitions of CHC Broad Ability Factors

As noted, the broad factors of CHC are more firmly established than the narrow abilities, which continue to undergo revision and extension. We provide brief definitions of the broad factors, based on Carroll (1993), McGrew (1997), and www.iapsych.com.

- Fluid Intelligence/Reasoning (*Gf*): Fluid intelligence encompasses high-level reasoning and is used for novel tasks that cannot be performed automatically. The mental operations of **fluid intelligence** may involve drawing inferences, forming concepts, generating and testing hypotheses, understanding implications, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. The classic example of fluid intelligence is found in matrix reasoning tasks such as Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000).

  The abilities that make up fluid intelligence are largely nonverbal and not heavily dependent on exposure to a specific culture. For these reasons, Cattell (1940) believed that measures of fluid intelligence were culture-free. Based on this assumption, he devised the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT) in an attempt to eliminate cultural bias in testing. Of course, calling a test culture fair does not make it necessarily so. In fact, the goal of a completely culture-free intelligence test has proved elusive. We discuss the CFIT in more detail in Topic 6A, Group Tests of Ability and Related Concepts.
- Crystallized Intelligence/Knowledge (*Gc*): This form of intelligence is typically defined as an individual's breadth and depth of acquired cultural knowledge—knowledge of the language, information, and concepts of a person's culture. The quintessential example is the extent of vocabulary that an individual understands. But **crystallized intelligence** also includes the application of verbal and cultural knowledge (e.g., oral production, verbal fluency, and communication ability). Because crystallized intelligence arises when fluid intelligence is applied to cultural products, we would expect these two kinds of cognitive ability to possess a strong correlation. In fact, it is commonly found that measures of crystallized and fluid intelligence possess a healthy relationship ($r = .5$).
- Domain-Specific Knowledge (*Gkn*): Domain-specific knowledge represents a person's acquired knowledge in one or more specialized domains that do not represent the typical experiences of individuals in the culture. This might include, for example, knowledge of biology, skill in lip reading, or knowledge of how to use computers.
- Visual-Spatial Abilities (*Gv*): This ability has to do with imagining, retaining, and transforming mental representations of visual images. For example, visual-spatial ability involves the capacity to predict how a shape will appear when it is rotated, or to identify quickly a known object from a vague, incomplete picture, or to find an object hidden in a picture. This capacity includes visual memory.
- Auditory Processing (*Ga*): This is the ability to perceive auditory information accurately, which involves the capacity to analyze, comprehend, and synthesize patterns or groups of sounds. Auditory processing involves the ability to discriminate speech sounds and to judge and discriminate tonal patterns in music. A key characteristic of *Ga* abilities is the cognitive talent needed to control the perception of auditory information (i.e., to filter signal from noise).
- Broad Retrieval [Memory] (*Gr*): Broad retrieval includes the ability to consolidate and store new information in long-term memory and then to retrieve the information later through association. Included in broad retrieval are such narrow abilities as associative memory (e.g., when provided the first part, recalling the second part of a previously learned but unrelated pair of items), ideational fluency (e.g., ability to call up ideas), and naming

facility (e.g., rapidly providing the names of familiar faces). Some researchers further divide the broad memory factor into additional subtypes. In addition, some theorists propose a separate broad factor for short-term memory (*Gsm*), the ability to retain awareness of events that have occurred in the last minute or less (Horn & Masunaga, 2000).

- Cognitive Processing Speed (*Gs*): This ability refers to the speed of executing overlearned or automatized cognitive processes, especially when high levels of attention and focused concentration are required. For example, the ability to perform simple arithmetic calculations with lightning speed would indicate a high level of *Gs* ability.
- Decision/Reaction Time or Speed (*Gt*): This is the ability to make decisions quickly in response to simple stimuli, typically measured by reaction time. For example, the capacity to quickly press the space bar whenever the letter *X* appears on a computer screen would involve the use of *Gt* ability.

Utility of CHC Theory

CHC theory is unusual in its detail, which permits robust theory testing. A number of lines of evidence support its validity. For example, the structure of intelligence as posited by CHC theory has been shown to be invariant across a number of key variables, including age, ethnicity, and gender (Bickley, Keith, & Wolfe, 1995; Keith, 1999; Carroll, 1993). In empirical studies, the broad CHC abilities also reveal theory-confirming relationships with numerous academic and occupational variables (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998). In one study, for example, measures of CHC broad and narrow cognitive abilities were selectively and appropriately related to mathematics achievement in a representative sample of children and adolescents (Floyd, Evans, & McGrew, 2003). In general, practitioners praise the CHC approach to partitioning intelligence because the broad and narrow abilities are empirically verified and possess meaningful real-world implications (Fiorello & Primerano, 2005).

GUILFORD AND THE STRUCTURE-OF-INTELLECT MODEL

After World War II, J. P. Guilford (1967, 1985) continued the search for the factors of intelligence that had been initiated by Thurstone. Guilford soon concluded that the number of discernible mental abilities was far in excess of the seven proposed by Thurstone. For one thing, Thurstone had ignored the category of creative thinking entirely, an unwarranted oversight in Guilford's view. Guilford also found that if innovative types of tests were included in the large batteries of tests he administered his subjects, then the pattern of correlations between these tests indicated the existence of literally dozens of new factors of intellect. Furthermore, Guilford noticed that some of these new factors had recurring similarities with respect to the kinds of mental processes involved, the kinds of information featured, or the form that the items of information took. As a result of these recurring similarities in the newly discovered factors of intellect, he became convinced that these multitudinous factors could be grouped along a small number of main dimensions. Guilford (1967) proposed an elegant structure-of-intellect (SOI) model to summarize his findings. Visually conceived, Guilford's SOI model classifies intellectual abilities along three dimensions called operations, contents, and products.

By *operations,* Guilford has in mind the kind of intellectual operation required by the test. Most test items emphasize just one of the operations listed here:

Cognition	Discovering, knowing, or comprehending
Memory	Committing items of information to memory, such as a series of numbers
Divergent	Retrieving from memory items of production a specific class, such as naming objects that are both hard and edible
Convergent	Retrieving from memory a correct production item, such as a crossword puzzle word
Evaluation	Determining how well a certain item of information satisfies specific logical requirements

Contents refers to the nature of the materials or information presented to the examinee. The five content categories are as follows:

Visual	Images presented to the eyes
Auditory	Sounds presented to the ears
Symbolic	Such as mathematical symbols that stand for something
Semantic	Meanings, usually of word symbols
Behavioral	The ability to comprehend the mental state and behavior of other persons

The third dimension in Guilford's model, *products,* refers to the different kinds of mental structures that the brain must produce to derive a correct answer. The six kinds of products are as follows:

Unit	A single entity having a unique combination of properties or attributes
Class	What it is that similar units have in common, such as a set of triangles or high-pitched tones
Relation	An observed connection between two items, such as two tones an octave apart
System	Three or more items forming a recognizable whole, such as a melody or a plan for a sequence of actions
Transformation	A change in an item of information, such as a correction of a misspelling
Implication	What an individual item implies, such as to expect thunder following lightning

In total, then, Guilford (1985) identified five types of operations, five types of content, and six types of products, for a total of $5 \times 5 \times 6$ or 150 factors of intellect. Each combination of an operation (e.g., memory), a content (e.g., symbolic), and a product (e.g., units) represents a different factor of intellect. Guilford claims to have verified over 100 of these factors in his research.

The SOI model is often lauded on the grounds that it captures the complexities of intelligence. However, this is also a potential Achilles' heel for the theory. Consider one factor of intellect, memory for symbolic units. A test that requires the examinee to recall a series of *spoken* digits (e.g., Digit Span on the WAIS-III) might capture this factor of intellect quite well. But so might a *visual* digit span test and perhaps even an analogous test with *tactile* presentation of symbols, such as vibrating rods applied to the skin. Perhaps we need a separate cube for hearing, vision, and touch; such an expanded model would incorporate 450 factors of intellect, surely an unwieldy number.

Although it seems doubtful that intelligence could involve such a large number of unique abilities, Guilford's atomistic view of intellect nonetheless has caused test developers to rethink and widen their understanding of intelligence. Prior to Guilford's contributions, most tests of intelligence required mainly convergent production—the construction of a single correct answer to a stimulus situation. Guilford raised the intriguing possibility that **divergent production**—the creation of numerous appropriate responses to a single stimulus situation—is also an essential element of intelligent behavior. Thus, a question such as "List as many consequences as possible if clouds had strings hanging down from them" (divergent production) might assess an aspect of intelligence not measured by traditional tests.

PLANNING, ATTENTION, SIMULTANEOUS, AND SUCCESSIVE (PASS) THEORY

Some modern conceptions of intelligence owe a debt to the neuropsychological investigations of the Russian psychologist Aleksandr Luria (1902–1977). Luria (1966) relied primarily on individual case studies and clinical observations of brain-injured soldiers to arrive at a general theory of cognitive processing. The heart of his theory is as follows:

> Analysis shows that there is strong evidence for distinguishing two basic forms of integrative activity of the cerebral cortex by which

> different aspects of the outside world may be reflected. . . . The first of these forms is the integration of the individual stimuli arriving in the brain into simultaneous, and primarily spatial groups, and the second is the integration of individual stimuli arriving consecutively in the brain into temporally organized, successive series. (Luria, 1966)

Since this approach focuses upon the mechanics by which information is processed, it is often called an information processing theory.

Luria (1970) proposed three functional units in the brain. Processing of information proceeds from lower units to higher units. The first unit is found in subcortical areas including the brain stem, midbrain, and thalamus. Attentional processes originate here, including selective attention and resistance to distraction. The second unit consists of the rearward sensory portions of the cerebral cortex (parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes). This large unit subserves the simultaneous and successive processes discussed later in this chapter. These processes are to some extent lateralized, with simultaneous processing engaged more with the right hemisphere, and successive processing connected more with the left hemisphere. However, lateralization is relative, not absolute (Springer & Deutsch, 1997). The third unit is located in the frontal lobes. This is primarily where planning occurs and also where motor output initiates.

Naglieri and Das (1990, 2005) have developed the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, Successive (PASS) theory of intelligence as a modern extension of Luria's work. Planning involves the selection, usage, and monitoring of effective solutions to problems. Anticipation of consequences and use of feedback are essential. Planning also entails impulse control. As noted, the frontal lobes are heavily engaged in this process. Even though it is listed first in the PASS acronym, Planning is actually the last stage of information processing. The first process is Attention, which requires selectively attending to some stimuli while ignoring others. In some cases, attention also entails vigilance over a period of time. Difficulties with this process underlie attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. As noted, the brain stem and other midline subcortical structures are vital to attentional processes.

Simultaneous processing of information is characterized by the execution of several different mental operations simultaneously. Forms of thinking and perception that require spatial analysis, such as drawing a cube, require simultaneous information processing. In drawing, the examinee must simultaneously apprehend the overall shape and guide hand and fingers in the execution of the shape. A sequential approach to drawing a cube (if one were even possible) would be horrifically complex. In effect, the examinee would have to draw individual lines of highly specific lengths and angular orientations, and just hope that everything would line up. In the absence of a simultaneous mental gestalt to guide the drawing, a distorted production is almost guaranteed. **Successive processing** of information is needed for mental activities in which a proper sequence of operations must be followed. This is in sharp contrast to simultaneous processing (such as drawing), for which sequence is unimportant. Successive processing is needed in remembering a series of digits, repeating a string of words (e.g., *shoe, ball, egg*), and imitating a series of hand movements (fist, palm, fist, fist, palm). Most forms of information processing require an interplay of simultaneous and successive mechanisms. Das (1994) cites the example of reading an unfamiliar word such as *taciturn*:

> The single letters are to be recognized, and that involves simultaneous coding. The reader matches the visual shape of the letter with a mental dictionary and comes up with a name for it. The letter sequences, then, have to be formed (successive coding) and blended together as a syllable (simultaneous). Then the string of syllables has to be made into a word (successive), the word is recognized (simultaneous), and a pronunciation program is then assembled (successive), leading to oral reading (successive and simultaneous).

Das admits that this may be a simplified view of what occurs when a reader is confronted with a word. The essential point is that higher-level information processing relies upon an interplay of specific, anatomically localizable forms of information processing.

The challenge of a simultaneous-successive approach to the assessment of intelligence is to design tasks that tap relatively pure forms of each approach to information processing. Tests that use this strategy are the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children II (K-ABC-II), discussed in the next topic, and the Das-Naglieri Cognitive Assessment System (Das & Naglieri, 2012). The Das-Naglieri battery includes successive tasks that involve rapid articulation (such as, "Say *can, ball, hot* as fast as you can 10 times") and simultaneous measures of both verbal and nonverbal tasks. The battery also assesses planning and attention, so as to embody the PASS theory (Naglieri & Das, 2005).

INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

Information processing conceptions of intelligence propose models of how individuals mentally represent and process information. Borrowing from Campione and Brown (1978), Borkowski (1985) has put forward a comprehensive theory that bears a loose analogy to the functioning of a computer. The **architectural system** (hardware) refers to biologically based properties necessary for information processing, such as memory span and speed of encoding/decoding information. Properties of the architectural system include capacity (e.g., number of slots in short-term memory, capacity of long-term memory), durability (rate of information loss), and efficiency of operation (e.g., rate of memory search). The architectural system is considered to be relatively "hardwired" and impervious to change by the environment.

In addition to the structural component of intelligence, there are various functional components (software). The **executive system**, which refers to environmentally learned components that steer problem solving, provides overall guidance to the functional components. Elements of the executive system include the knowledge base (retrieval of knowledge from long-term memory), schemes (rules of thinking), control processes (rules and strategies such as self-checking and rehearsal), and metacognition (self-awareness of one's own thought processes). Metacognition is the process of thinking about thinking. Flavell (1976), who pioneered research on this topic, explained it as follows:

> Metacognition refers to one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes or anything related to them, e.g., the learning-relevant properties of information or data. For example, I am engaging in metacognition if I notice that I am having more trouble learning A than B; if it strikes me that I should double check C before accepting it as fact. (p. 232)

The information processing approach to intelligence has generated a large body of research, especially on the concept of metacognition. A consistent finding in this literature is that individuals who use metacognitive strategies perform at much higher levels than those who do not (Montague & Bos, 1990). For example, in a study of 32 Israeli kindergarten children who were taught metacognition related to mathematics, metacognitive skills explained more of the variance in mathematics performance than general ability (Mevarech, 1995). Metacognition is essential to intelligence and is one of the primary influences on student learning (Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 1990).

GARDNER AND THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES

Howard Gardner (1983, 1993) has proposed a theory of multiple intelligences based loosely on the study of brain–behavior relationships. He argues for the existence of several relatively independent human intelligences, although he admits that the exact nature, extent, and number of the intelligences have not yet been definitively established. Gardner (1983) outlines the criteria for an autonomous intelligence as follows:

- Potential isolation by brain damage—the faculty can be destroyed, or spared in isolation, by brain injury.
- Existence of exceptional individuals such as savants—the faculty is uniquely spared in the midst of general intellectual mediocrity.
- Identifiable core operations—the faculty relies upon one or more basic information processing operations.

- Distinctive developmental history—the faculty possesses an identifiable developmental history, perhaps including critical periods and milestones.
- Evolutionary plausibility—admittedly speculative, a faculty should have evolutionary antecedents shared with other organisms (e.g., primate social organization).
- Support from experimental psychology—the faculty emerges in laboratory studies in cognitive psychology.
- Support from psychometric findings—the faculty reveals itself in measurement studies and is susceptible to psychometric measurement.
- Susceptibility to symbol encoding—the faculty can be communicated via symbols including (but not limited to) language, picturing, and mathematics.

Based on these criteria, Gardner (1983, 1993) proposes that the following seven natural intelligences have been substantially confirmed. The seven intelligences are linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. Three of these seven types of intelligence are well known—linguistic (i.e., verbal) intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, spatial intelligence—and numerous formal tests have been devised to measure them, so we will not discuss them further here. The other four variations of intelligence are somewhat novel and, therefore, require more detailed presentation.

Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence includes the types of skills used by athletes, dancers, mime artists, typists, or "primitive" hunters. Although Western cultures are generally loath to consider the body as a form of intelligence, this is not the case in much of the rest of the world, nor was it true in our evolutionary history. Indeed, persons who could skillfully avoid predators, climb trees, hunt animals, and prepare tools were more likely to survive and pass on their genes to succeeding generations.

The personal intelligences include the capacity to have access to one's own feeling life (intrapersonal) as well as the ability to notice and make distinctions about the moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions of others (interpersonal). Thus, personal intelligence encompasses both an intrapersonal and an interpersonal version. The former is found in great novelists who can write introspectively about their feelings, while the latter is often seen in religious and political leaders (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi or Lyndon Johnson) who can fathom the intentions and desires of others and use this information to influence them and form useful alliances.

Musical intelligence is perhaps the least understood of Gardner's intelligences. Persons with good musical intelligence easily learn to perform an instrument or to write their own compositions. Although knowledge of the structural aspects of melody, rhythm, and timbre is important to musical intelligence, Gardner notes that many experts place the affective or feeling aspects of music at its core. He believes that when the neurological underpinnings of music are finally unraveled, we will have "an explanation of how emotional and motivational factors are intertwined with purely perceptual ones" (Gardner, 1983).

The savant phenomenon provides strong support for the existence of separate intelligences, including musical intelligence.[4] A **savant** is a mentally deficient individual who has a highly developed talent in a single area such as art, rapid calculation, memory, or music. An example is the extraordinary case of Leslie Lemke, who was born blind and with mental retardation and cerebral palsy. He was not supposed to live. His adoptive mother had to coax him to suck milk from a bottle. Later, she strapped him to her back to help him learn to walk. In spite of his severe disabilities, Leslie became enamored of the piano and showed incredible precocity at picking out melodies on it. Within a few years, at the age of 18, he could listen to a piece of classical piano music a single time and then play it back flawlessly (Patton, Payne, & Beirne-Smith, 1986). The reader can find additional savant case studies in Miller (1989) and Treffert (1989).

[4]Historically, savants have also been called *idiot savants,* which refers, literally, to a person who is both profoundly retarded and yet "wise" at the same time. For obvious reasons, the prefix has been dropped.

Recently, Gardner (1998) has added three tentative candidates to his list of intelligences. These are naturalistic, spiritual, and existential intelligences. Naturalistic intelligence is the kind shown by people who are able to discern patterns in nature. Charles Darwin would be a prime example of such a person. Gardner believes that the evidence for this kind of intelligence is relatively strong. In contrast, spiritual intelligence (a concern with cosmic and spiritual issues in one's development) and existential intelligence (a concern with ultimate issues, including the meaning of life) are less well proved as independent intelligences. In general, the theory of multiple intelligence is compelling in its simplicity, but there is little empirical investigation of its validity.

STERNBERG AND THE TRIARCHIC THEORY OF SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE

Sternberg (1985b, 1986, 1996) takes a much wider view on the nature of intelligence than most previous theorists. In addition to proposing that certain mental mechanisms are required for intelligent behavior, he also emphasizes that intelligence involves adaptation to the real-world environment. His theory emphasizes what he calls successful intelligence or "the ability to adapt to, shape, and select environments to accomplish one's goals and those of one's society and culture" (Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998, p. 494).

Sternberg's theory is called *triarchic* (ruled by three) because it deals with three aspects of intelligence: componential intelligence, experiential intelligence, and contextual intelligence. Each of these types of intelligence has two or more subcomponents. The entire theory is outlined in Table 5.5.

Componential intelligence, also known as analytical intelligence, consists of the internal mental mechanisms that are responsible for intelligent behavior. The components of intelligence serve three different functions. *Metacomponents* are the executive processes that direct the activities of all the other components of intelligence. They are responsible for determining the nature of an intellectual problem, selecting a strategy for solving it, and making sure that the task is completed. The metacomponents receive constant feedback as to how things are going in problem solving. Persons who are strong on the metacomponential aspect of intelligence are very good at allocating their intellectual resources.

TABLE 5.5 An Outline of Sternberg's Triarchic Theory of Intelligence

Componential (Analytical) Intelligence
Metacomponents or executive processes (e.g., planning)
Performance components (e.g., syllogistic reasoning)
Knowledge acquisition components (e.g., ability to acquire vocabulary words)
Experiential (Creative) Intelligence
Ability to deal with novelty
Ability to automatize information processing
Contextual (Practical) Intelligence
Adaptation to real-world environment
Selection of a suitable environment
Shaping of the environment

Source: Summarized from Sternberg, R. J. (1986). *Intelligence applied: Understanding and increasing your intellectual skills.* San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

In a problem-solving study using novel forms of analogies, Sternberg (1981) found that higher intelligence is associated with spending relatively more time on global or higher-order planning, and relatively less time on local or lower-order planning. For example, consider this analogy problem:

Man: Skin:: (Dog, Tree):(Bark, Cat)

The examinee must choose the two correct terms on the right that will complete the analogy. (The correct choices are Tree and Bark.) Using reaction time measures for a series of such novel or nonentrenched problems, Sternberg (1981) found that persons of higher intelligence spend more time in global planning—forming a macrostrategy that applies to this and similar problems—than did persons of lower intelligence. Thus, a crucial aspect of intelligence is knowing when to step back and allocate intellectual effort instead of obtusely attacking a difficult problem.

Performance components are the well-entrenched mental processes that might be used to perform a task or solve a problem. These aspects of intelligence are the ones that are probably measured the best by existing intelligence tests. Examples of performance components include short-term memory and syllogistic reasoning.

Knowledge acquisition components are the processes used in learning. Sternberg has emphasized that in order to understand what makes some people more skilled than others, we must understand their increased capacity to acquire those skills in the first place. A case in point is vocabulary knowledge, which is learned mainly in context rather than through direct instruction. More-intelligent persons are better able to use surrounding contexts to figure out what a word means; that is, they have greater knowledge-acquisition skills. Their increased vocabulary results, in large measure, from their increased ability to "soak up" the meanings of words they see and hear in their environment. Thus, vocabulary is an excellent measure of intelligence because it reflects people's ability to acquire information in context.

The second aspect of Sternberg's theory involves experiential intelligence. According to the theory, a person with good **experiential intelligence** is able to deal effectively with novel tasks. Experiential intelligence is also known as creative intelligence. This aspect of his theory explains why Sternberg is so critical of most intelligence tests. For the most part, the existing tests measure things already learned by presenting tasks that the subject has already encountered. According to Sternberg, intelligence also involves the capacity to learn and think within new conceptual systems, not just to deal with tasks already encountered. A second aspect of experiential intelligence is the ability to automatize or "make routine" tasks that are encountered repeatedly. An example of automatizing that applies to most of us is reading, which is carried out largely without conscious thought. But any task or mental skill can be automatized, if it is practiced enough. Playing music is an example of an extremely high-level skill that can become automatized with enough practice.

The third aspect of Sternberg's theory involves contextual intelligence. **Contextual intelligence**, also known as practical intelligence, is defined as "mental activity involved in purposive adaptation to, shaping of, and selection of real-world environments relevant to one's life" (Sternberg, 1986, p. 33). This aspect of Sternberg's theory appears to acknowledge that human behavior has been shaped by selective pressures during our evolutionary history. Contextual intelligence has three parts: adaptation, selection, and shaping.

Adaptation refers to developing skills required by one's particular environment. Successful adaptation will differ from one culture to the next. In the pygmy cultures of Africa, adaptation might involve the ability to track elephants and kill them with poison-tipped spears. In the Western industrial nations, adaptation might involve presenting oneself favorably in a job interview.

Selection might be called niche finding. This aspect of contextual intelligence involves the ability to leave the environment we are in and to select a different environment more suitable to our talents and needs. Feldman (1982) has illustrated how selection can operate in the career choices of gifted children, thereby determining whether they are highly accomplished as adults. She followed up on the Quiz Kids who were featured in radio and television shows of the 1950s. These were extremely bright children by conventional standards, most with IQs of 140 and higher. A few became highly successful as adults. However, most of them led rather ordinary lives, devoid of the spectacular accomplishments that might have been predicted from their childhood precocity. Those who were most successful had found occupations highly suited to their abilities and interests. In sum, they had selected environmental niches that fitted them well. Sternberg would argue that the ability to select such environments is an important aspect of intelligence.

Shaping is another way to improve the fit between oneself and the environment, especially when selection of a new environment is not practical. In this application of contextual intelligence, we shape the environment itself so that it better fits our needs. An employee who convinces the boss to do things differently has used shaping to make the work environment more suited to his or her talents.

Sternberg (1993) has developed a research instrument based on his theory and has used the test to examine the validity of the triarchic approach. The Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (STAT) is unique in going beyond the typical questions that invoke analytical intelligence; the test includes creative and practical questions as well. For example, in one subtest examinees are presented with a map of an area, such as an entertainment park, and then must answer questions about navigating effectively through the area shown in the map (practical intelligence). In another subtest examinees are presented with verbal analogies preceded by incorrect, counterfactual premises (e.g., money falls off trees). Examinees must solve the analogies as though the counterfactual premises were true (creative intelligence). In factor-analytic studies of American, Finish, and Spanish samples, the triarchic model was a better fit to the data than the usual outcome of finding a single factor of general intelligence (Sternberg, Castejon, Prieto, Hautamaki, & Grigorenko, 2001).

Although Sternberg's triarchic theory is the most comprehensive and ambitious model yet proposed, not all psychometric researchers have rushed to embrace it. Detterman (1984) cautions that we should investigate the basic cognitive components of intelligence before introducing higher-order constructs that may be unnecessary. Rogoff (1984) questions whether the three subtheories (componential, experiential, contextual) are sufficiently linked. Other comments on the triarchic theory can be found in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (1984, pp. 287–304).

Whatever the final verdict on the triarchic theory of intelligence, Sternberg's insistence that intelligence has several components not measured by traditional tests rings true to anyone who has studied or administered these tests. He cites the case of a colleague who was asked to test a number of residents at an institution for those with mental retardation. These residents had just planned and successfully executed an escape from the security-conscious school, a feat requiring high levels of practical intelligence. Yet, when administered the Porteus Maze Test (Porteus, 1965), a standardized test reputed to involve planning ability, they could not solve even the simplest maze correctly. Sternberg (1986) has made it clear that intelligence just has too many components to be measured by any single test.

Topic 5B Individual Tests of Intelligence and Achievement

Orientation to Individual Intelligence Tests
The Wechsler Scales of Intelligence
The Wechsler Subtests: Description and Analysis
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-IV
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales: Fifth Edition
Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude-4
The Cognitive Assessment System-II
Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test-2 (KBIT-2)
Individual Tests of Achievement
Nature and Assessment of Learning Disabilities

Individual intelligence testing is one of the major achievements of psychology since the founding of the discipline. In response to the success of the Binet-Simon scales in the early 1900s, psychologists developed and refined dozens of individual tests of intelligence patterned after this pathbreaking instrument. The explosive growth in group tests of intelligence, fostered by the enthusiastic acceptance of the Army Alpha and Beta tests during and after World War I, also provided impetus to the individual testing movement. Many contemporary individual tests of intelligence owe their lineage to Binet, Simon, and the Army testing programs.

The successful application of intelligence tests inspired educators and psychologists to look for ways to appraise the academic progress of students with school-based achievement tests. In turn, this led to the puzzling discovery that many children of normal or even superior intelligence lagged far behind in school achievement. From this discovery, the concept of learning disability gradually developed, and a whole new field of assessment was born.

The purpose of this topic is to provide an overview of noteworthy approaches to the testing of individual intelligence and achievement, and to introduce the reader to the essentials of learning disability assessment. However, an exhaustive survey of individual cognitive tests is simply beyond the scope of this or any other basic reference. New and revised tests appear practically every month, and thousands of new research findings are published every year. We have chosen to review tests that are widely used or that illustrate interesting developments in theory or method. Readers can find information on additional tests in the *Mental Measurements Yearbook* series, now published every two or three years by the Buros Institute.

ORIENTATION TO INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE TESTS

The individual intelligence tests reviewed in this topic include the following:

- Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV)
- Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-IV (WISC-IV)
- Stanford-Binet: Fifth Edition (SB5)
- Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude-4 (DTLA-4)
- Cognitive Assessment System-II (CAS-II)
- Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test-2 (KBIT-2)

Collectively, these instruments probably account for 95 percent of the intellectual assessments conducted in the United States.

The Wechsler scales have dominated intelligence testing in recent years, but they are by no means the only viable choices for individual assessment. Many other instruments measure general intelligence just as well—some would say better. Consider the implications of a now familiar

observation: For large, heterogeneous samples, scores on any two mainstream instruments (e.g., Wechsler, Stanford-Binet, McCarthy, Kaufman scales) typically correlate .80 to .90. Often the correlation between two mainstream instruments is nearly as high as the test–retest correlation for either instrument alone. For purposes of producing a global score, it would appear that any well-normed mainstream intelligence test will suffice.

But producing an overall score is not the only goal of assessment. In addition, the examiner usually desires to gain an understanding of the subject's intellectual functioning. For this purpose, the overall IQ is important, but there are instances in which the global score may be irrelevant or even misleading. To understand a referral's intellectual functioning, the examiner should also inspect the subtest scores in search of hypotheses that might explain the unique functioning of that individual. Of course, examiners need to undertake subtest analysis cautiously, armed with research-based findings on the nature and meaning of subtest scatter for the test in use (Gregory, 1994b).

If the examiner's goal is to understand intellectual functioning and not merely to determine an overall score, the differences between tests become quite real. Every instrument approaches the measurement of intelligence from a different perspective and yields a distinctive set of subtest scores. Furthermore, a test well suited for one referral issue might perform abysmally in another context. For example, the WAIS-IV performs admirably in the testing of mild mental retardation but contains too few simple items for the effective assessment of persons with moderate or severe developmental disability.

A central axiom of assessment is that the choice of a testing instrument should be based on knowledge of its strengths and weaknesses as they pertain to the referral question. Put simply, the skilled examiner does not blindly rely on a single test for every referral! Instead, the skilled examiner flexibly chooses one or more instruments in light of the perceived assessment needs of the examinee. Each of the tests discussed in this topic has its special merits and also its particular shortcomings. The test user must know these strong and weak facets in order to choose the instruments best suited for each unique referral.

THE WECHSLER SCALES OF INTELLIGENCE

Beginning in the 1930s, David Wechsler, a psychologist at Bellevue Hospital in New York City, conceived a series of elegantly simple instruments that virtually defined intelligence testing in the mid- to late twentieth century. His influence on intelligence testing is exceeded only by the pathbreaking contributions of Binet and Simon. It is fitting that we begin the survey of individual tests with a historical summary of the Wechsler tradition, followed by a discussion of individual instruments.

Origins of the Wechsler Tests

Wechsler began work on his first test in 1932, seeking to devise an instrument suitable for testing the diverse patients referred to the psychiatric section of Bellevue Hospital in New York (Wechsler, 1932). In describing the development of his first test, he later wrote, "Our aim was not to produce a set of brand new tests but to select, from whatever source available, such a combination of them as would meet the requirements of an effective adult scale" (Wechsler, 1939). In fact, the content of his scales was largely inspired by earlier efforts such as the Binet scales and the Army Alpha and Beta tests (Frank, 1983). Readers who peruse *Psychological Examining in the United States Army,* a volume edited by Yerkes (1921) just after World War I, might be astonished to discover that Wechsler purloined dozens of test items from this source, many of which have survived to the present day in contemporary revisions of the Wechsler tests. Wechsler was not so much a creative talent as a pragmatist who fashioned a new and useful instrument from the spare parts of earlier, discontinued attempts at intelligence testing.

The first of the Wechsler tests, named the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scales, was published in 1939. In discussing the rationale for his new test, Wechsler (1941) explained that existing instruments such as the Stanford-Binet were woefully inadequate

for assessing adult intelligence. The Wechsler-Bellevue was designed to rectify several flaws noted in previous tests:

- The test items possessed no appeal for adults.
- Too many questions emphasized mere manipulation of words.
- The instructions emphasized speed at the expense of accuracy.
- The reliance on mental age was irrelevant to adult testing.

To correct these shortcomings, Wechsler designed his test specifically for adults, added performance items to balance verbal questions, reduced the emphasis upon speeded questions, and invented a new method for obtaining the IQ. Specifically, he replaced the usual formula

$$\text{IQ} = \frac{\text{Mental Age}}{\text{Chronological Age}}$$

with a new age-relative formula

$$\text{IQ} = \frac{\text{Attained or Actual Score}}{\text{Expected Mean Score for Age}}$$

This new formula was based on the interesting presumption—stated in the form of an axiom—that IQ remains constant with normal aging, even though raw intellectual ability might shift or even decline. The assumption of **IQ constancy** is basic to the Wechsler scales. As Wechsler (1941) put it:

> The constancy of the I.Q. is the basic assumption of all scales where relative degrees of intelligence are defined in terms of it. It is not only basic, but absolutely necessary that I.Q.'s be independent of the age at which they are calculated, because unless the assumption holds, no permanent scheme of intelligence classification is possible.

Although Wechsler's view has been largely accepted by contemporary test developers, it is important to stress that the assumption of IQ invariance with age is really a statement of values, a philosophical choice, and not necessarily an inherent characteristic of human nature.

Wechsler also hoped to use his test as an aid in psychiatric diagnosis. In pursuit of this goal, he divided his scale into separate verbal and performance sections. This division allowed the examiner to compare an examinee's facility in using words and symbols (verbal subtests) versus the ability to manipulate objects and perceive visual patterns (performance subtests). Large differences between verbal ability (V) and performance ability (P) were thought to be of diagnostic significance. Specifically, Wechsler believed that organic brain disease, psychoses, and emotional disorders gave rise to a marked $V > P$ pattern, whereas adolescent psychopaths and persons with mild mental retardation yielded a strong $P < V$ pattern. Subsequent research demonstrated many exceptions to these simple diagnostic rules, and also helped refine the nature of these two major elements of intelligence. For example, verbal intelligence is now better known as verbal comprehension, and performance intelligence is more commonly recognized as perceptual reasoning. Nonetheless, the distinction between verbal and performance skills has proved useful for many purposes, such as studying brain–behavior relationships, and examining age effects on intelligence. Wechsler's armchair division of subtests into verbal and performance sections, even though refined and extended by others, continues to endure as a major contribution to contemporary intelligence testing (Kaufman, Lichtenberger, & McLean, 2001).

General Features of the Wechsler Tests

Including revisions, David Wechsler and his followers have produced more than a dozen intelligence tests in a span of about 70 years. A major reason for the continued success of these instruments has been the faithful adherence to the familiar content and format first introduced in the Wechsler-Bellevue. By sticking with a single successful formula, Wechsler and company ensured that examiners could switch from Wechsler test to another with minimal retraining. This was not only good psychometrics but also shrewd marketing insofar as it guaranteed several generations of faithful test users.

The latest editions of the Wechsler intelligence tests—the WPPSI-IV, WISC-IV, and WAIS-IV—possess the following common features:

- Thirteen to fifteen subtests. The multisubtest approach allows the examiner to analyze intra-individual strengths and weaknesses rather than just to compute a single global score. In addition, it is possible to combine subtest scores in theoretical meaningful ways that provide useful information on the broad factors of intelligence. As the reader will learn subsequently, the pattern of subtest and factor scores may convey useful information that is hidden in the overall level of performance.
- An empirically based breakdown into composite scores and a full scale IQ. Whereas the original Wechsler intelligence scales provided only two composite scores—Verbal IQ and Performance IQ—the revisions have been moving toward a more sophisticated partitioning into composites confirmed from factor-analytic research. The WISC-IV and WAIS-IV now yield composite or index scores in the same four areas:

  Verbal Comprehension
  Perceptual Reasoning
  Working Memory
  Processing Speed

  The WPPSI-IV provides five index scores similar to the above (for ages 4:0 to 7:7) but also includes a Fluid Reasoning composite.
- A common metric for IQ and Index scores. The mean for IQ and Index scores is 100 and the standard deviation is 15 for all tests and all age groups. In addition, the scaled scores on each subtest have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of approximately 3, which permits the examiner to analyze the subtest scores of the examinee for relative strengths and weaknesses.
- Common subtests for the different test versions. For example, the preschool, child, and adult Wechsler tests (WPPSI-IV, WISC-IV, and WAIS-IV) all share a common core of the same six subtests (Table 5.6). An examiner who masters the administration of a core subtest on any of the Wechsler tests (such as the Information subtest on the WAIS-IV) easily can transfer this skill within the Wechsler family of intellectual measures.

TABLE 5.6 Subtest Composition of the Wechsler Intelligence Tests

	WPPSI-IV	*WISC-IV*	*WAIS-IV*
Similarities	×	×	×
Vocabulary	×	×	×
Comprehension	×	×	×
Information	×	×	×
Word Reasoning		×	
Receptive Vocabulary	×		
Picture Naming	×		
Block Design	×	×	×
Picture Concepts	×	×	
Matrix Reasoning	×	×	×
Picture Completion		×	×
Visual Puzzles			×
Figure Weights			×
Object Assembly	×		
L-N Sequencing[a]		×	×
Arithmetic		×	×
Digit Span		×	×
Coding		×	×
Symbol Search		×	×
Cancellation		×	×
Picture Memory		×	
Bug Search		×	
Zoo Memory		×	

[a]Letter–Number Sequencing.

Note: The subtests common to all Wechsler intelligence tests are in boldface. Some subtests are optional or used as substitutions. See text for details.

THE WECHSLER SUBTESTS: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Wechsler (1939) defined *intelligence* as "the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with his environment." He also believed that we can only know intelligence by what it enables a person to do. In designing his tests, then, Wechsler selected components to represent a wide array of underlying abilities so as to estimate the global capacity of intelligence. Furthermore, he asked his subjects to do things, not merely to answer questions. The Wechsler subtests are quite diverse and often rely on what Wechsler referred to as "mental productions."

We present here a description of subtests from the WISC-IV and WAIS-IV. We also analyze the abilities tapped by each subtest and offer research-based comments. The reader is referred to Topic 7A, Infant and Preschool Assessment, for a description of the subtests unique to the WPPSI-IV.

Information

The Information subtest is found on all three Wechsler intelligence tests. Factual knowledge of persons, places, and common phenomena is tested here. Questions for children are like the following:

"How many eyes do you have?"

"Who invented the telephone?"

"What causes a solar eclipse?"

"Which is the largest planet?"

Questions for adults are similar but progress to higher levels of difficulty. Difficult questions on the adult Information subtest resemble:

"Which is the most common element in air?"

"What is the population of the world?"

"How does fruit juice get converted to wine?"

"Who wrote *Madame Bovary*?"

Information items test general knowledge normally available to most persons raised in the cultural institutions and educational systems of Western industrialized nations. Indirectly, this subtest measures learning and memory skills insofar as subjects must retain knowledge gained from formal and informal educational opportunities in order to answer the Information items.

Information is usually regarded as one of the best measures of general ability among the Wechsler subtests (Kaufman, McLean, & Reynolds, 1988). For example, the WAIS-IV manual reveals that Information typically has the second or third highest correlation with Full Scale IQ across the 13 age groups (Wechsler, Coalson, & Raiford, 2008). Information consistently loads strongly on the first factor identified in factor analyses of the WAIS-IV subtest correlations (see the following). The first factor is labeled Verbal Comprehension. However, Information tends to reflect formal education and motivation for academic achievement and may therefore yield spuriously high ability estimates for perpetual students and avid readers.

Digit Span

Digit Span consists of two separate sections, Digits Forward and Digits Backward. In Digits Forward, the examiner reads a series of digits at one per second, then asks the subject to repeat them. If the subject answers correctly on two consecutive trials of the same length, the examiner proceeds to the next series, which is one digit longer, up to a maximum length of nine digits. For Digits Backward, a similar procedure is used, except the examinee must repeat the digits in reverse order, up to a maximum length of eight digits. For example, the examiner reads:

"6–1–3–4–2–8–5"

and the subject tries to repeat the numbers in the reverse order:

"5–8–2–4–3–1–6."

On the WAIS-IV only, the Digit Span subtest also includes a third section called Digit Sequencing. For this part, the examinee is asked to sort the series of digits into their correct order. For example, if the examiner says:

"1–7–4–9–2"

the examinee should respond:

"1–2–4–7–9."

Digit Span is a measure of immediate auditory recall for numbers. Facility with numbers, good attention, and freedom from distractibility are required. Performance on this subtest may be affected by anxiety or fatigue, and many clinicians have noted that patients hospitalized for medical or psychiatric reasons frequently perform poorly on Digit Span.

Digits Forward and Digits Backward may assess fundamentally different abilities. Digits Forward seems to require the examinee to access an auditory code in sequential fashion. In contrast, to perform Digits Backward, the examinee must form an internal visual memory trace from the orally presented numerical sequences and then visually scan from end to beginning. Digits Backward is clearly the more complex test; not surprisingly, it loads higher on general intelligence than does Digits Forward (Jensen & Osborne, 1979). Gardner (1981) argues that examiners should supplement standard reporting procedures and list separate subscores for Digit Span. He presents separate means, standard deviations, and percentile ranks on Digits Forward and Backward for children ages 5 to 15.

Vocabulary

The Vocabulary subtest is found on all three Wechsler intelligence tests. The examinee is asked to define up to several dozen words of increasing difficulty while the examiner writes down each response verbatim. For example, on an easy item the examiner might ask, "What is a cup?" and the examinee would get partial credit for answering, "You drink with it" and full credit for answering, "It has a handle, holds liquids, and you drink from it." For adults and bright children, the advanced items on the Wechsler Vocabulary subtests can be very challenging, on a par with *tincture, obstreperous,* and *egregious.*

Vocabulary is learned largely in context from reading books and listening to others. It is a rare individual who picks up vocabulary by reading the dictionary or memorizing word lists from the "Building Your Wordpower" section of popular magazines. In the main, a person's vocabulary is a measure of sensitivity to new information and the ability to decipher meanings based on the context in which words are encountered. Precisely because the acquisition of word meaning depends on contextual inference, the Vocabulary subtest turns out to be the single best measure of overall intelligence on the Wechsler scales (Gregory, 1999). This is a surprise to many laypersons who regard vocabulary as merely synonymous with educational exposure and, therefore, a mediocre index of general intelligence. However, there is simply no denying the empirical evidence: Vocabulary has among the highest subtest correlations with Full Scale IQ on both the WISC-IV and also the WAIS-IV.

Arithmetic

Except for the very easiest items for young people or persons who have mental retardation, the Arithmetic subtest consists of orally presented mathematics problems. The examinee must solve the problems without paper or pencil within a time limit (usually 30 to 60 seconds). The simple items stress fundamental operations of addition or subtraction, for example:

> "If you have fifteen apples and give seven away, how many are left?"

The more difficult items require proper conceptualization of the problem and the application of two arithmetic operations, for example:

> "John bought a stereo that was marked down 15 percent from the original sales price of $600. How much did John pay for the stereo?"

Although the mathematical requirements of the Arithmetic items are not excessively demanding, the necessity of solving the problems mentally within a time limit makes this subtest quite challenging for most examinees. In addition to rudimentary arithmetic skills, successful performance on Arithmetic requires high levels of concentration and the ability to maintain intermediate calculations in short-term memory. In factor analyses of the WISC-IV and WAIS-IV, Arithmetic often loads on a third factor interpreted as Working Memory.

Comprehension

Found on all three Wechsler intelligence tests, the Comprehension subtest is an eclectic collection of items that require explanation rather than mere factual knowledge. The easy questions stress common sense, whereas the more difficult questions require an understanding of social and cultural conventions.

On the WAIS-IV, several of the most difficult questions require the examinee to interpret proverbs.

An easy item on Comprehension is of the form "Why do people wear clothes?" Difficult items resemble the following:

> "What does this saying mean: 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'"
>
> "Why are Supreme Court Judges appointed for life?"

Comprehension would appear to be, in part, a measure of "social intelligence" in that many items tap the examinee's understanding of social and cultural conventions. Sipps, Berry, and Lynch (1987) found that Comprehension scores were moderately related to measures of social intelligence on the California Psychological Inventory. Of course, a high score signifies only that the examinee is knowledgeable about social and cultural conventions; choosing the right action may or may not flow from this knowledge. However, studies by Campbell and McCord (1996) and Lipsitz, Dworkin, and Erlenmeyer-Kimling (1993) provide no support for the commonly accepted clinical lore that Comprehension scores are sensitive to social functioning.

Similarities

In this subtest, the examinee is asked questions of the type, "In what way are shirts and socks alike?" The Similarities subtest evaluates the examinee's ability to distinguish important from unimportant resemblances in objects, facts, and ideas. Indirectly, these questions assess the assimilation of the concept of likeness. The examinee must also possess the ability to judge when a likeness is important rather than trivial. For example, "shirts" and "socks" are alike in that both begin with the letter *s,* but this is not the essential similarity between these two items. The important similarity is that shirts and socks are both exemplars of a concept, namely, "clothes." As this example illustrates, Similarities can be thought of as a test of verbal concept formation and is found on all three Wechsler intelligence tests.

Letter–Number Sequencing

The examiner orally presents a series of letters and numbers that are in random order. The examinee must reorder and repeat the list by saying the numbers in ascending order and then the letters in alphabetical order. For example, if the examiner says "R-3-B-5-Z-1-C," the examinee should respond "1-3-5-B-C-R-Z." This test measures attention, concentration, and freedom from distractibility. Together with Arithmetic and Digit Span, this subtest contributes to the Working Memory Index score on the WAIS-IV (see the following). Donders, Tulsky, and Zhu (2001) found the Letter–Number Sequencing subtest to be highly sensitive to the effects of moderate and severe traumatic brain injury.

Picture Completion

For this subtest, the examiner asks the examinee to identify the "important part" that is missing from a picture. For example, a simple item might be of this type: a picture of a table with one leg missing. The items get harder and harder; testing continues until the examinee misses several in a row. Figure 5.6 depicts an item similar to those found on the WAIS-IV. The Picture Completion subtest presupposes that the examinee has been exposed to the object or situation represented. For this reason, Picture Completion may be inappropriate for culturally disadvantaged persons.



FIGURE 5.6 Picture Completion Item Similar to Those Found on the WAIS-IV

Picture Concepts

This subtest is found on the WPPSI-IV and the WISC-IV. For each item, the child is shown a card with two or three rows of pictures and instructed to choose one picture from each row to form a group with a common characteristic. This is a recent subtest designed to measure abstract, categorical reasoning. The 28 items reflect increasingly more difficult levels of abstraction. For example, for an easy item the commonality might be that a fruit is found in each row, whereas for a more difficult item the commonality might be that a device used for signaling (bell, flashlight, flags) is found in each row.

Block Design

On the Block Design subtest, the examinee must reproduce two-dimensional geometric designs by proper rotation and placement of three-dimensional colored blocks. For all of the Wechsler scales, the first few Block Design items can be solved through trial and error. However, the more difficult items require the analysis of spatial relations, visual-motor coordination, and the rigid application of logic. Block Design demands much more problem-solving and reasoning ability than most of the Performance subtests in which memory and prior experience are more heavily weighted.

Block Design is a strongly speeded test. Consider the WAIS-IV version, which consists of 14 designs of increasing difficulty. To obtain a high score on this subtest, adults must not only reproduce each of the designs correctly, but they must also earn bonus points on the last six designs by completing them quickly. An examinee who solves all the designs within the time limit but who fails to garner any bonus points will test out at just slightly above average on this subtest. Block Design scores may be misleading for examinees who do not value speeded performance.

Matrix Reasoning

Matrix Reasoning is included on all of the Wechsler intelligence tests. The subtest consists of figural reasoning problems arranged in increasing order of difficulty (Figure 5.7). Finding the correct answer



FIGURE 5.7 Matrix Reasoning Item Similar to Those Found on the WAIS-IV

requires the examinee to identify a recurring pattern or relationship between figural stimuli drawn along a straight line (simple items) or in a 3 × 3 grid (hard items) in which the last item is missing. Based on nonverbal reasoning about the patterns and relationships, the examinee must infer the missing stimulus and select it from five choices provided at the bottom of the card.

Matrix Reasoning was designed to be a measure of fluid intelligence, which is the capacity to perform mental operations such as manipulation of abstract symbols. The items tap pattern completion, reasoning by analogy, and serial reasoning. Overall, the subtest is an excellent measure of inductive reasoning based on figural stimuli. Matrix Reasoning is not timed. Interestingly, Donders et al. (2001) report that the Matrix Reasoning subtest is relatively unaffected by moderate and severe traumatic brain injury.

Object Assembly

This subtest is found only on the WPPSI-III. For each item, the examinee must assemble the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to form a common object (Figure 5.8). The examiner does not identify the items, so the examinee must first discern the identity of each item from its disarranged parts. Success on this subtest requires high levels of perceptual organization; that is, the examinee must grasp a larger pattern or gestalt based on perception of the relationships among the individual parts.

Object Assembly is one of the least reliable of the Wechsler subtests. The modest reliability of Object Assembly may reflect, in part, the small number of items as well as the role of chance factors in solving jigsaw puzzles.

Coding

The WISC-IV version consists of two separate and distinct parts, one for examinees under age 8 (Coding A) and another for those 8 years of age and over (Coding B). In Coding A, the child must draw the correct symbol inside a series of randomly sequenced shapes. The task utilizes five shapes (star, circle, triangle, cross, and square), and each shape is assigned a unique symbol (vertical line, two horizontal lines, single horizontal line, circle, and two vertical lines, respectively). After a brief practice session, the child is told to draw the correct symbol inside 43 of the randomly sequenced shapes. However, since there is a two-minute time limit, high scores require rapid performance.

Coding B on the WISC-IV and Coding on the WAIS-IV are identical in format (Figure 5.9). For both subtests, the examinee must associate one symbol with each of the digits 0 through 9 and quickly draw the appropriate symbol underneath a long series of random digits. The time limit for both versions is two minutes. Very few examinees manage to code all the stimuli in this amount of time.

Estes (1974) analyzed the Coding subtest from the standpoint of learning theory and concluded that efficient performance requires the ability to quickly produce distinctive verbal codes to represent each of the symbols in memory. For example, in Figure 5.9, the examinee might code the symbol underneath the number 2 as an "inverted T." Verbal coding mediates quick performance by simplifying a difficult task. Efficient performance also demands immediate learning of the digit-symbol pairings so that



FIGURE 5.8 Object Assembly Item Similar to Those Found on the WPPSI-III



FIGURE 5.9 Digit Symbol Items Similar to Those Found on the WAIS-IV

the examinee need not look from each digit to the reference table to determine the correct response. In this regard, Coding is unique: It is the only Wechsler subtest that necessitates on-the-spot learning of an unfamiliar task.

Coding scores show a steep decrement with advancing age. In cross-sectional studies, raw scores on Coding decline by as much as 50 percent from age 20 to age 70 (Wechsler, 1981). The decrement is approximately linear and not easily explained by superficial references to motivational differences or motor slowing. Of course, cross-sectional results are not necessarily synonymous with longitudinal trends. However, the age decrement on Coding is so steep that it must indicate, in part, a real age change in the speed of basic information processing skills. Coding is one of the most sensitive subtests to the effects of organic impairment (Donders et al., 2001; Lezak, 1995).

Symbol Search

This is a highly speeded subtest in which the examinee looks at a target group of symbols, then quickly examines a search group of symbols, and finally marks a "YES" or "NO" box to indicate whether one or more of the symbols in the target group occurred within the search group. A Symbol Search item is depicted in Figure 5.10. This subtest would appear to be a measure of processing speed. Symbol Search is highly sensitive to the impact of traumatic brain injury (Donders et al., 2001).

Cancellation

On the WISC-IV, this is a timed subtest in which the child is instructed to draw a line through or "cancel" drawings of animals placed randomly among drawings of inanimate objects (e.g., umbrella, car, hydrant, lightbulb). For example, on a standard-sized sheet of paper, about 160 stimuli are pictured, including 30 animals (horse, bear, seal, fish, chicken). Cancellation consists of two trials: one with a random arrangement of visual stimuli, and one with clearly structured rows and columns of stimuli. In addition to a total subtest score, separate process scores for the random and the structured trials are available for comparison. This subtest is similar to existing cancellation tasks designed to measure processing speed, vigilance, and visual attention. It is well established that examinees with neuropsychological impairments perform poorly, especially on the random trial (e.g., Bate, Mathias, & Crawford, 2001; Geldmacher, 1996). On the WAIS-IV, Cancellation is somewhat more complex, involving *two* target stimuli consisting of geometric shapes. The examinee is told, for example, to cancel "red squares and yellow triangles" among an array of red and yellow squares and red and yellow triangles. A second trial involves stars and circles in orange and blue. This timed task (45 seconds per trial) is much more difficult than it seems.



FIGURE 5.10 Symbol Search Item Similar to Those Found on the WISC-IV

Note: The examinee's task is to determine whether either shape at the left occurs among the five shapes to the right.

Visual Puzzles

Visual Puzzles is found only on the WAIS-IV. The examinee is shown a picture of a completed shape such as a rectangle, and asked to select from six smaller shapes the three that could be used to assemble the larger completed shape. Successful performance requires visual-spatial analysis and the mental rotation of shapes. According to the WAIS-IV Technical Manual, this subtest taps for "visual perception, broad visual intelligence, fluid intelligence, simultaneous processing, spatial visualization and manipulation, and the ability to anticipate relationships among parts (Wechsler, 2008b, p. 14). The 26 items have strict time limits of 20 seconds for the initial easy items and 30 seconds for the remaining items. Visual Puzzles is a core subtest that contributes to the Perceptual Reasoning Index of the WAIS-IV.

Figure Weights

Figure Weights is found only on the WAIS-IV. It is a supplemental subtest that contributes to the Perceptual Reasoning Index. The examinee is shown

a picture of an old-fashioned fulcrum scale that is missing weight(s) on one side. The task is to select from six options the response that would bring the scale into balance. This subtest is a measure of quantitative and analogical reasoning; inductive and deductive logic are essential for success. Easy items provide a time limit of 20 seconds, hard items allow 40 seconds.

WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE-IV

The WAIS-IV is a significant revision of the WAIS-III, even though many of the previous items were retained (Wechsler, 2008). The most significant changes include the addition of two subtests, a simplified test structure, and an emphasis on index scores that provide a sharper demarcation of discrete domains of cognitive functions. In addition, the WAIS-IV abandons the familiar (but psychometrically indefensible) bifurcation of intelligence into Verbal IQ and Performance IQ, preferring instead the fourfold breakdown discussed below. In addition to traditional approaches to scoring the WAIS-IV subtests, the new edition also provides neuropsychologically relevant process scores for four of the subtests. These scores are useful mainly for advanced forms of test interpretation in the context of a comprehensive test battery. We do not discuss process scores in this section. Because of improvements in the WAIS-IV protocol forms (e.g., prominent display of discontinue rules), this test is somewhat easier to administer than its predecessor. Lichtenberger and Kaufman (2009) provide an outstanding overview of the WAIS-IV in clinical practice.

The WAIS-IV is comprised of 15 subtests, but only 10 of the subtests, known as core subtests, are needed to obtain the traditional IQ score and the component index scores. The other five subtests are deemed supplemental. These are often used to provide additional clinical information; in specific instances, supplemental subtests may be used as acceptable substitutes for core subtests.

In addition to the traditional Full Scale IQ score, normed to a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the WAIS-IV is scored for four index scores, each based on 2 or 3 of the 10 core subtests. These are derived from factor analysis of the subtests, which revealed four domains: Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Reasoning, Working Memory, and Processing Speed. The index scores are also based on the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. The breakdown of subtests for the four index scores is as follows:

Verbal Comprehension Index
- Similarities
- Vocabulary
- Information

Perceptual Reasoning Index
- Block Design
- Matrix Reasoning
- Visual Puzzles

Working Memory Index
- Digit Span
- Arithmetic

Processing Speed Index
- Symbol Search
- Coding

The Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) is similar to the outdated notion (used on the WAIS-III) of Verbal IQ or VIQ. However, from a psychometric standpoint, VCI is a cleaner and more direct measure of verbal comprehension than VIQ, hence it is now the preferred index. Likewise, the Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) is similar to the former notion (from the WAIS-III) of Performance IQ or PIQ. Yet, as a more refined measure of perceptual reasoning, PRI is therefore the preferred index. Put simply, VCI and PRI fit the factor analytic data better. Long-held conventions tend to persist, but it is time to let the outdated notions of Verbal IQ and Performance IQ fade into oblivion.

The Working Memory Index (WMI) is comprised of subtests sensitive to attention and immediate memory (Digit Span and Arithmetic). A relatively low score on this index may signify that the examinee has an attentional or memory problem, especially with orally presented materials. The Processing Speed Index (PSI) comprises subtest that require the *highly* speeded process of visual information (Symbol Search and Coding). The PSI

is sensitive to a wide variety of neurological and neuropsychological conditions (Tulsky, Zhu, & Ledbetter, 1997).

WAIS-IV Standardization

The standardization of the WAIS-IV was undertaken with great care and based on data gathered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 2005. The total sample of 2,200 adults (ages 16 to 91) was carefully stratified on these variables: gender, race/ethnicity, education level, and geographic region. Census figures from 2005 were used as the target values for the stratification variables. For example, of persons in the 55- to 64-year-old range, the Census Bureau found that 3.35 percent are African Americans with high school education. In like manner, 3.00 percent of the standardization participants were African Americans with high school education.

The standardization sample was divided into 13 age bands: 16–17, 18–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65–69, 70–74, 75–79, 80–84, 85–90. Except for the four oldest age groups, each sample included 200 participants carefully stratified on the demographic variables noted earlier; the last four age groups included 100 participants each. The resulting sample bears a very close correspondence to the U.S. Census proportions. However, persons suspected of even mild cognitive impairment were excluded, so that the standardizations sample likely is healthier than its census counterparts. Specifically, several exclusionary criteria were used in the standardization sample, including: uncorrected visual or hearing impairment, current hospitalization, evidence of drug/alcohol problems, upper extremity impairment, use of certain prescription drugs such as anticonvulsants, and a variety of potentially brain-impairing conditions (e.g., head injury, stroke, epilepsy, dementia, and mood disorder). Uncooperative participants and those for whom English was a second language also were excluded. In sum, the standardization sample was restricted to cooperative, reasonably healthy, English-speaking individuals who did not manifest significant brain-impairing conditions.

Although the WAIS-IV is similar to the WAIS-III and has a substantial item overlap, the two tests do not yield analogous IQs. In counterbalanced studies comparing scores of 240 adults on the two tests, WAIS-IV IQ scores are lower by 3 points. In sum, the WAIS-IV is a harder test than the WAIS-III. There is a troubling enigma here: Why does the normative sample for the WAIS-IV appear to be smarter than the normative sample for the WAIS-III? We take up this point in more detail in Topic 6B, Test Bias and Other Controversies.

Reliability

The reliability of the WAIS-IV is exceptionally good. Composite split-half reliabilities averaged across all age groups for the Index scores and IQ are: VCI .96, PCI .95, WMI .94, PSI .90, and Full Scale IQ 98. Further supporting the reliability of the WAIS-IV, reliability estimates for subtest scores of special groups (e.g., persons with intellectual disability, probable Alzheimer's disease, traumatic brain injury, major depression, autism) are equal to or higher than reliability estimates found in the general population (Wechsler, 2008b). This suggests that the WAIS-IV is a reliable tool not just with the general population but also with the special populations who are more likely to be the focus of assessment.

For Full Scale IQ, the standard error of measurement is 2.6 points for the youngest examinees (ages 16 and 17), but even smaller at 2.1 points for all other age groups. Consider what this means: 95 percent of the time, an examinee's *true* Full Scale IQ will be with ± 4 points (2 standard errors of measure) of the obtained value. In common parlance, psychometrists would say that WAIS-IV IQ has an 8-point band of error, that is, IQ scores are accurate within about ± 4 points. In contrast to the strong reliabilities found for IQ and Index scores, the reliabilities of the 15 individual subtests are generally much weaker. The only subtests with stability coefficients in excess of .90 are Information (.90) and Vocabulary (.91). For the remaining subtests, reliability values range from the low .70s to the mid .80s. The most important implication of these weaker reliability findings is that examiners should approach subtest profile analysis with extreme caution. Subtest scores that appear discrepantly high (or low) for an

individual examinee might be a consequence of the generally weak reliability of certain subtests rather than indicating true cognitive strengths or weaknesses. Some reviewers conclude that profile analysis (the identification of specific cognitive strengths and weaknesses based on analysis of peaks and valleys in the subtest scores) is not justified by the evidence.

Validity

The developers of the WAIS-IV provide a number of different lines of evidence to support the validity of this instrument (Wechsler, 2008b). Good content validity was built in from the beginning through comprehensive literature review and consultation with experts to assure that items and subtests tap the relevant range of cognitive processes. Good criterion-related validity was demonstrated in several studies correlating the WAIS-IV with mainstream intelligence tests and other measures. For example, WAIS-IV Full Scale IQ correlates strongly with global scores on other mainstream measures: .94 with the WAIS-III, .91 with the WISC-IV (for 16-year-olds in the overlapping age group), and .88 with the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test-II. The WAIS-IV also reveals appropriate convergent and discriminant validity in the patternings of strong and weak correlations with a wide variety of other instruments, including measures of attention deficit disorder, executive functions, and memory. As a generalization, correlations are appropriately strong among similar subtests and constructs from the WAIS-IV and other tests, and appropriately weak among dissimilar subtests and constructs.

Studies with special groups also provide theory-confirming results that speak to the validity of the WAIS-IV. The multiplicity of these studies is such that we can only provide a few examples here. Specifically, when 41 young adults with diagnosed Mathematics Disorder were compared to matched controls on WAIS-IV subtests, the most substantial difference by far was found on the Arithmetic subtest, where the clinical group averaged 6.6 compared to 8.8 for the matched controls (a subtest score of 10 is average in the general population). This corroborates the sensitivity of the instrument to the elements of one specific learning disability. In like manner, when 22 individuals with a history of moderate or severe brain injury were compared to matched controls, the largest difference among the four index scores was found on the Processing Speed Index (mean of 80.5 versus mean of 97.6), whereas the smallest difference among the four index scores was found on the Verbal Comprehension Index (mean of 92.1 versus mean of 100.8). These findings are exactly what would be predicted from a wide body of research on the impact of traumatic brain injury (e.g., Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004).

The construct validity of the WAIS-IV is also supported by confirmatory factor analyses of the subtest scores from the standardization sample, as detailed in the technical manual (Wechsler, 2008b). These complex analyses were designed to determine if the relations among observed subtest scores support the existence of the hypothesized factors of intelligence measured by the four index scores of VCI, PRI, WMI, and PSI. The goodness-of-fit of the four factor hierarchical model of intelligence (Full Scale IQ at the top, sitting above the four index scores, each sitting above two or three constituent subtest scores) turns out to be exceptionally strong, although difficult to summarize in visual form. A simple way to depict the strong confirmatory fit is through a 4×10 table that shows the correlations among the four index scores and the 10 core subtest scores (Table 5.7). Where appropriate, these correlations are corrected for overlap between the subtest scores and the index scores. For example, Similarities is a component of VCI, so the simple correlation between these two variables is artificially inflated. The values shown in Table 5.7 are corrected for this kind of overlap. The reader will notice that with only a single exception, the subtests that compose each index score reveal their highest correlations with that index score. The only exception is the Arithmetic subtest, which is factorially more complex than other subtests, showing an almost identical relationship with VCI, PRI, and WMI.

Finally, the validity of the WAIS-IV is also buttressed by its strong overlap with the previous three editions of the test, for which there is an impressive array of validity data. For a full review of these findings the reader can consult Matarazzo (1972) and Kaufman (1990).

TABLE 5.7 Correlations Among WAIS-IV Subtests and Index Scores

	VCI	*PRI*	*WMI*	*PSI*
Verbal Comprehension Subtests				
Similarities	74	57	57	42
Vocabulary	81	55	60	41
Information	63	54	56	37
Perceptual Reasoning Subtests				
Block Design	51	67	53	45
Matrix Reasoning	56	59	55	46
Visual Puzzles	48	66	49	41
Working Memory Subtests				
Digit Span	53	52	60	47
Arithmetic	63	59	60	44
Processing Speed Subtests				
Symbol Search	38	47	43	65
Coding	43	48	49	65

Source: Based on data in Wechsler, D. (2008). *WAIS-IV technical and interpretive manual.* San Antonio, TX: Pearson.

Note: Decimals have been omitted. Where appropriate, these correlations are corrected for overlap. For example, because Similarities is a component of VCI, the simple uncorrected correlation between these two variables would be artificially inflated. The values above are corrected for any componential overlap between subtests and index scores.

WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN-IV

The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) was published in 1949 as a downward extension of the original Wechsler-Bellevue. Although used widely in the next two decades, psychometricians perceived a number of flaws in the WISC: absence of nonwhites in the standardization sample, ambiguities of scoring, inappropriate items for children (e.g., reference to "cigars"), and absence of females and African Americans in the pictorial content of items. The WISC-R, WISC-III, and WISC-IV corrected these flaws.

The WISC-IV consists of 15 subtests, 10 of which are designated as core subtests used in the computation of composite scores and Full Scale IQ, and five of which are designated as supplemental:

Core Subtests

Block Design	Vocabulary
Similarities	Letter–Number Sequencing
Digit Span	Matrix Reasoning
Picture Concepts	Comprehension
Coding	Symbol Search

Supplemental Subtests

- Picture Completion
- Cancellation
- Information
- Arithmetic
- Word Reasoning

Although the supplemental subtests are not required for the computation of Full Scale IQ and composite scores (discussed later), careful examiners

nonetheless may choose to administer them because of the important diagnostic information they often provide. For example, the Cancellation subtest is supplemental but affords important information about vigilance and visual attention; hence, many examiners use it. The Arithmetic subtest also is supplemental but often chosen by examiners because it is helpful in the assessment of auditory attention (the questions are presented orally).

Another function of the supplementary subtests is suitable substitution for a core subtest. In well-defined circumstances, an examiner may elect to give a supplemental subtest in place of a core subtest. For example, when testing a child with fine motor problems—such as might be observed in a child with cerebral palsy—an examiner would be well advised to use Cancellation in place of Coding, and Picture Completion in place of Block Design. Both of these supplementary tests (Cancellation and Picture Completion) are relatively unaffected by fine motor difficulties. In contrast, the core subtests (Coding and Block Design) would be severely impacted by fine motor difficulties and, therefore, could yield unfair assessments of cognitive functioning. Substitutions also are allowed when a core subtest accidentally is invalidated. However, an examiner may not elect to substitute a supplemental subtest merely because a child has performed poorly on a core subtest.

The standardization of the WISC-IV is first class, based on 100 boys and girls at each year of age from 6½ through 16½ (total $N = 2{,}200$). These cases were carefully selected and stratified on the basis of the 2000 U.S. Census with respect to gender, race/ethnicity (white, African American, Hispanic, and Asian), geographic region, and parent educational level. A desirable feature of the standardization sample is that 5.7 percent of the sample consisted of children with defined characteristics such as giftedness, learning disability, expressive language disorder, head injury, autism, and motor impairment. The purpose of adding these children was to ensure that the normative sample accurately represented the population of children attending school. The correspondence between the standardization sample and the U.S. Census data on essential stratification variables was nearly perfect (Wechsler, 2003, p. 40).

The reliability of the WISC-IV is strong and comparable to previous editions of the test. For example, the IQ and composite scores show split-half and test–retest reliabilities in the .90s, whereas the individual subtests possess somewhat lower reliability coefficients, ranging from .79 (Cancellation and Symbol Search) to .90 (Letter–Number Sequencing). Most reliabilities are in the high .80s, for example, Block Design and Similarities at .86, and Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning at .89. Test–retest reliabilities tend to be slightly lower.

The validity of the WISC-IV rests, in part, on its overlap with the WISC-III, for which dozens of supportive studies could be cited. We do not want to overwhelm with excessive detail, so we refer the interested reader to Sattler (2001) for a good review of earlier studies. The WISC-IV manual cites an impressive array of validity studies, which we summarize here. First, we discuss correlations of WISC-IV test scores with its predecessor and with other Wechsler intelligence tests. The preliminary findings indicate strong correlations with comparable WISC-III subtests, most in the high .70s or low .80s. The correlation for Full Scale IQ is much higher, $r = .89$. Likewise, correlations with the WPPSI-III are strong for comparable subtests, and, again, exceptionally strong for Full Scale IQ, $r = .89$. A similar pattern is found with 16-year-old examinees, who can be tested legitimately with both the WISC-IV and the WAIS-III. In a sample of 198 children tested in counterbalanced order over a period of about three weeks, correlations were strong for comparable subtests and exceptionally strong for composite and Full Scale IQ scores ($r = .89$). Overall, these are remarkable correlations, nearly as strong as the reliabilities of the respective scales would allow. An interesting finding is that WISC-IV IQs are an average of 2.5 points lower than WISC-III IQs and 3 points lower than WAIS-III IQs. This is a consistent finding in the history of individual intelligence tests; namely, newer tests almost invariably yield lower Q scores in comparison to older tests. We discuss this intriguing result, called the Flynn effect, in the next chapter.

Factor-analytic studies of the standardization sample provided additional evidence for the utility of the WISC-IV in the diagnostic assessment of

children. The results of numerous factor analyses, including separate analyses for four age groups (6–7, 8–10, 11–13, 14–16) strongly confirmed a four-factor solution that was used to define the composite scores, called Index scores, for the test (Wechsler, 2003). The factors and the core subtests assigned to them were as follows:

Verbal Comprehension Index
Similarities
Vocabulary
Comprehension

Perceptual Reasoning Index
Block Design
Picture Concepts
Matrix Reasoning

Working Memory Index
Digit Span
Letter–Number Sequencing

Processing Speed Index
Coding
Symbol Search

The four Index scores are based on the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. Thus, the WISC-IV provides substantial detail about the nuances of intellectual functioning—up to 15 subtest scores, four Index scores, and the Full Scale IQ. The robust findings of the four-factor solution to the WISC-IV provided the rationale for abandoning Wechsler's original two-factor division of Verbal IQ and Performance IQ. In fact, there is no longer any method on the WISC-IV to obtain a Verbal IQ or a Performance IQ—precisely because these partitions no longer fit with the emerging consensus about the nature of intelligence.

The WISC-IV also revealed theory-confirming correlations with a variety of cognitive, ability, and achievement tests (Wechsler, 2003). In general, correlations with other measures were appropriately high for similar constructs and predictably low for dissimilar constructs—these are the prerequisites for convergent validity and discriminant validity, respectively. For example, in a sample of 550 children aged 6–16, reading achievement subtest scores from the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test-II correlated more strongly with Verbal Comprehension Index scores from the WISC-IV than with the other Index scores. Likewise, in a sample of 126 children aged 6–16, the Attention/Concentration subtest from the Children's Memory Scale (Cohen, 1997) correlated substantially ($r = .74$) with Working Memory Index scores from the WISC-IV but less robustly with the other Index scores. These and other findings indicate general support for the convergent validity of the WISC-IV Index scores. Discriminant validity was confirmed by the negligible relationships among WISC-IV Index scores and measures of emotional intelligence from the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory (BarOn EQI, Bar-On & Parker, 2000). For the most part, research has shown that emotional intelligence is independent of cognitive intelligence. Thus, relationships among Index scores from the WISC-IV and subtest scores from the BarOn EQI should bear out as insignificant. In fact, the correlations were negligible, in the range of .06 to .20. The only exceptions were sensible ones. For example, scores on the Adaptability subscale from the BarOn EQI correlated .34 with WISC-IV Full Scale IQ. Certainly, it is plausible that adaptability as measured by the BarOn EQI is rooted, in part, in a foundation of cognitive skills, as mirrored in IQ, thus illuminating the modest correlation between these two measures.

STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES: FIFTH EDITION

With a lineage that goes back to the Binet-Simon scale of 1905, the Stanford-Binet: Fifth Edition (SB5) has the oldest and perhaps the most prestigious pedigree of any individual intelligence test. In Table 5.8, we outline some important milestones in the development of the SB5 and its predecessors. Released in 2003, the SB5 is a very new test (Roid, 2002, 2003). For this reason, evaluation of this instrument is based, in part, on its resemblance in content and subtests to the SB4, for which a large body of independent research literature has been amassed.

The SB5 Model of Intelligence

In early editions of the Stanford-Binet, the examiner obtained only a composite IQ. Although the pattern

TABLE 5.8 Milestones in the Development of the Stanford-Binet and Predecessor Tests

Year	*Test/Authors*	*Comment*
1905	Binet and Simon	Simple 30-item test
1908	Binet and Simon	Introduced the mental age concept
1911	Binet and Simon	Expanded to include adults
1916	Stanford-Binet Terman and Merrill	Introduced the IQ concept
1937	Stanford-Binet-2 Terman and Merrill	First use of parallel forms (L and M)
1960	Stanford-Binet-3 Terman and Merrill	Modern item-analysis methods used
1972	Stanford-Binet-3 Terman and Merrill	SB-3 restandardized on 2,100 persons
1986	Stanford-Binet-4 Thorndike, Hagen, and Sattler	Complete restructuring into 15 subsets
2003	Stanford-Binet-5 Roid	Five factors of intelligence

of right and wrong answers could be analyzed qualitatively, the earlier Stanford-Binet tests (prior to the fourth edition) did not provide a basis for quantitative analysis of the subcomponents of the entire scale. The fourth and fifth editions corrected this shortcoming.

The organization of the SB5 was guided by the principle that each of five factors of intelligence can be assessed in two distinct domains—nonverbal and verbal. The five factors—derived from modern cognitive theories such as Carroll (1993) and Baddeley (1986)—are fluid reasoning, knowledge, quantitative reasoning, visual-spatial processing, and working memory. When these five factors of intelligence are "crossed" with the two domains (nonverbal and verbal), the result is an instrument with 10 subtests (Figure 5.11). Thus, the SB5 provides a number of different perspectives on the cognitive functioning of an examinee: 10 subtest scores (mean of 10, SD of 3), three IQ scores (the familiar Full Scale IQ, Verbal IQ, and Nonverbal IQ), as well as five factor scores (Fluid Reasoning, Knowledge, Quantitative Reasoning, Visual-Spatial Processing, and Working Memory). The IQ and factor scores are normed to a mean of 100 and SD of 15.

Routing Procedure and Tailored Testing

The SB5 maintains the historical tradition of this instrument by using a **routing procedure** to estimate the general cognitive ability of the examinee before proceeding to the remainder of the test. The purpose of the routing procedure is to identify the appropriate starting points for subsequent subtests. The routing items are both nonverbal (object series and matrices) and verbal (vocabulary). These items also provide the Abbreviated IQ, sometimes used for screening purposes. Roid (2002) describes the advantages of using a routing procedure:

> This tailored approach to assessment provides greater richness of factor measurement within



FIGURE 5.11 **Structure of the Stanford-Binet: Fifth Edition**

a shorter, efficient test administration. The use of modern item response theory in the design of SB5 allows for greater precision of measurement due to the adaption of the test to the functional level of the examinee in an efficient time frame.

Thus, the purpose of the routing procedure is not just to reduce the number of items administered (and, therefore, save time), but to do so without loss of measurement precision. This is possible because the SB5 was constructed according to the principles of item response theory (Embretson, 1996). When a test is constructed within the framework of item response theory, item difficulty levels and other parameters are precisely calibrated during the development phase.

Special Features of the SB5

In addition to providing a more familiar partition of intelligence into Full Scale IQ, Verbal IQ, and Nonverbal IQ, the SB5 also features a number of other improvements over its predecessor, the SB4. The test now includes extensive high-end items, designed to assess the highest level of gifted performance. Many of these items are updates from very early editions of the Stanford-Binet, when the instrument was renowned for its very high ceiling. At the other extreme, improved low-end items provide better assessment for very young children (as young as age 2) and adults with mental retardation. In addition, the items and subtests that contribute to the Nonverbal IQ do not require expressive language, which makes this part of the test ideal for assessing individuals with limited English, deafness, or communication disorders. The developers of the SB5 also screened test items for fairness based on religious as well as traditional concerns. Expert panels examined the entire test on fairness issues related to the standard variables (gender, race, ethnicity, and disability) and religious tradition (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist backgrounds). This is the first time in the history of intelligence testing that religious tradition has been considered in test development. Finally, the Working Memory factor, consisting of both verbal and nonverbal subtests, shows promise in helping to assess and understand children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

Standardization and Psychometric Properties of the SB5

The SB5 is suitable for children age 2 through adults age 85 and older, and the standardization sample consists of 4,800 individuals stratified by gender,

ethnic, regional, and educational levels in the United States, based on the year 2000 census. In part because item selection was determined by modern item response theory, the reliability of subtests, indices, and IQ scores is very strong and comparable to other mainstream individual intelligence tests. For example, the Verbal IQ, Nonverbal IQ, and Full Scale IQ each have reliabilities in the .90s, and the individual subtests are in the range of .70 to .85 (Roid, 2002).

As is typical in the release of a new test, the manual for the SB5 (Roid, 2003) reports on numerous affirming correlational studies (e.g., with the Wechsler scales, the SB4, the UNIT) that provide strong support for criterion-related validity. The validity of the test as a measure of general intelligence is also supported by its resemblance to the SB4, about which a large body of research can be cited. For example, Lamp and Krohn (2001) studied the longitudinal predictive validity of the SB4 in a sample of 89 Head Start children (39 African American and 50 white) from impoverished backgrounds who ranged in age from about 4 to 6½. These children were retested several times over an eight-year period on both the SB4 and the Metropolitan Achievement Test. The correlations between the initial SB4 score and the subsequent achievement scores were very strong (mainly in the .50s), and the test was equally good at predicting outcome for African American and white children. In another study (Atkinson, Bevc, Dickens, & Blackwell, 1992), the concurrent validity of the SB4 was tested against the Leiter International Performance Scale and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales in a sample of 24 children with developmental delays. The correlations were very robust (.78 and .70, respectively). These and many other studies strongly support the validity of the SB4 as a measure of general intelligence. As new research is reported on the SB5, it is likely that this recent edition also will prove to be highly valid and even more useful than its predecessor as a measure of intelligence.

In summary, the SB5 is a very promising new test that is especially useful at both ends of the cognitive spectrum—the very young or those with developmental delays, and very gifted persons. Based on the care with which the instrument was constructed, the test is likely to become a mainstay of individual intelligence testing in a wide variety of settings.

DETROIT TESTS OF LEARNING APTITUDE-4

The Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude-4 (DTLA-4; Hammill, 1999) is a recent revision of an instrument first published in 1935. The test is individually administered and designed for schoolchildren from 6 through 17 years of age. The DTLA-4 consists of 10 subtests that form the basis for computing 16 composites, including general intelligence, optimal level, and 14 ability areas. The subtests are largely within the Binet-Wechsler tradition, although there are a few surprises such as the inclusion of Story Construction, a measure of storytelling ability (Table 5.9).

The General Mental Ability composite is formed by combining standard scores for all 10 subtests in the battery. The Optimal Level composite is based on the highest four standard scores earned by the examinee and is thought to represent how well the examinee might perform under optimal circumstances. Each of the remaining 14 composite scores is derived from a combination of several subtests thought to measure a common attribute. For example, subtests that involve knowledge of words and their use are combined to form the Verbal Composite, whereas subtests that do not involve reading, writing, or speech comprise the Nonverbal Composite. Several of the composite scores are designed to represent major constructs within contemporary theories of intelligence. In addition to the General Mental Ability composite and the Optimal Level composite, the remaining 14 DTLA-4 composite scores are as follows:

Verbal	Nonverbal	(Linguistic)
Attention-enhanced	Attention-reduced	(Attentional)
Motor-enhanced	Motor-reduced	(Motoric)
Fluid	Crystallized	(Horn & Cattell)
Simultaneous	Successive	(Das)
Associative	Cognitive	(Jensen)
Verbal	Performance	(Wechsler)

The 16 composite scores are based on the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. The 10 subtests are normed for a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3.

The composites were designed to offer contrasting assessments such that a difference between scores may be of diagnostic significance. For example, an examinee who scored well on Attention-Reduced aptitude but poorly on Attention-Enhanced aptitude (in the Attentional domain) presumably experiences difficulty with immediate recall, short-term memory, or focused concentration.

The DTLA-4 was standardized on 1,350 students whose backgrounds closely matched census data for sex, race, urban/rural residence, family income, educational attainment of parents, and geographic area. The reliability of this instrument is similar to other individual tests of intelligence, with internal consistency coefficients generally exceeding .80 for the subtests and .90 for the composites, and test-retest coefficients for the subtests and the composites in the .80s and .90s. Criterion-related validity is well established through correlational studies with other mainstream instruments such as the WISC-III, K-ABC, and Woodcock-Johnson.

A concern with the DTLA-4 is that the conceptual breakdown into composites is not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. For example, while it may be true that the Simultaneous composite does measure the simultaneous cognitive processes proposed by Das, Kirby, and Jarman (1979), there is scant empirical support to buttress this claim. Another problem with this instrument is that there are more composites than there are subtests! Inevitably, the composites will be highly intercorrelated, because each subtest occurs in several composites. In sum, DTLA-4 may be a good measure of general intelligence, but the use of composite scores for purposes of psychoeducational planning requires additional empirical study. Smith (2001) provides a thorough review of the DTLA-4.

TABLE 5.9 Brief Description of the DTLA-4 Subtests

Subtest	*Task*
Word Opposites	Provide antonyms—word opposites.
Design Sequences	Discriminate and remember nonsensical graphic material.
Sentence Imitation	Repeat orally presented sentences.
Reversed Letters	Short-term visual memory and attention.
Story Construction	Create a logical story from several pictures.
Design Reproduction	Copy designs from memory.
Basic Information	Knowledge of everyday facts and information.
Symbolic Relations	Select from a series of designs the part that was missing from a previous design.
Word Sequences	Repeat a series of unrelated words.
Story Sequences	Organize pictorial material into meaningful sequences.

THE COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT SYSTEM-II

The Cognitive Assessment System-II (CAS-II) is an individually administered test of cognitive abilities designed for children and adolescents ages 5 through 17 (Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2012). The CAS-II was explicitly constructed to embody the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive (PASS) theory of intelligence discussed at the beginning of the chapter (Das, Kirby, & Jarman, 1979; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994). The Standard Battery consists of 12 subtests and takes about 60 minutes to complete (Figure 5.12). A shorter version of eight subtests is available, but most practitioners recommend the full battery because it provides a better picture for diagnosis and intervention.

The CAS-II provides a standard score (mean of 100, *SD* of 15) for each of the four process scales (Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive), as well as a Full Scale standard score. The 12

Scale	*Subtests*
Planning	Matched Numbers
	Planned Codes
	Planned Connections
Attention	Expressive Attention
	Number Detection
	Receptive Attention
Simultaneous	Nonverbal Matrices
	Verbal Spatial Relations
	Figure Memory
Successive	Word Series
	Sentence Repetition
	Sentence Questions or
	Speech Rates (ages 5–7)

FIGURE 5.12 Cognitive Assessment System-II Scales and Subtests

subtests are normed to a mean of 10 and *SD* of 3. The Planning Scale is a measure of the ability to develop strategies for task completion. For example, in the *Matched Numbers* subtest, the child views rows of six numbers and is instructed to underline the two numbers in each row that are identical. The numbers increase in length from one digit to seven digits. The subtest score is based on a combination of time to completion and number correct. In the *Planned Codes* subtest, the task is to learn a code depicted at the top of the page (such as A goes with X-O, B goes with O-O, C goes with X-X, D goes with O-X) and then fill in missing codes in the remainder of the page (for example, A _ _, C_ _, B_ _, A_ _, D_ _, etc.). In the *Planned Connections* subtest (a variation of the Trail Making Test, part B, Reitan & Wolfson, 1993), the child draws a pencil line to connect randomly placed numbers and letters in sequential order, alternating between numbers and letters (1-A-2-B-3-C, etc). The Planning subtests involve cognitive control and self-regulation.

The Attention Scale is a measure of the mental processes involved in resistance to distraction and focused attention over time. For example, in the *Expressive Attention* subtest, a variation of the Stroop procedure (Stroop, 1935), the child first reads a long list of color words (Blue, Yellow, Red, Green) repeated in random order, then quickly names blocks of color printed in these four colors. These tasks are preamble to the final task, the only part that is scored. In the final section of the Expressive Attention subtest, a lengthy list of the color words (Blue, Yellow, Red, Green) is presented, *each word printed in a competing color* (e.g., the word *Blue* printed in *red* ink), with instructions to name the colors, not read the words. The raw score is the ratio of the total number correct to the time needed for completion of the last section. In the *Number Detection* subtest, the child is required to underline specific digits in particular fonts, for example, the task might be to detect the numbers 1, 2, and 3 among random digits, but only when printed in bold font. In the *Receptive Attention* subtest, the child first underlines letter pairs that are physically the same (e.g., TT but not Tt) and then underlines letter pairs that are the same name (e.g., Bb but not Ba). The score is based on accuracy and total time.

The Simultaneous Scale is a measure of the ability to organize information into coherent wholes. Both nonverbal and verbal processes are utilized to analyze and synthesize spatial and verbal relationships. *Nonverbal Matrices* is a variation on the familiar matrix reasoning task first employed in the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1938) and found in many intelligence tests. A 3 × 3 matrix of geometric shapes is shown, with a missing shape in the lower right-hand corner. Below the matrix are six shapes, one of which completes the rules of progression in the matrix from left to right and top to bottom. Based on inference, the task is to choose the correct shape. In the *Verbal Spatial Relations* subtest, the child views six drawings, each depicting a particular spatial relationship between shapes, and then encounters a series of printed question such as *Show me the square to the right of the circle*. The task is to choose the one drawing among six

that depicts the relationship. In the *Figure Memory* subtest, the child views a two- or three-dimensional drawing for five seconds, and then must correctly locate the original drawing embedded within a larger, more complex drawing. The Simultaneous subtests involve the perception of stimuli as a whole, in contrast to what is needed in successive processing.

The Successive Scale involves mental processes needed to remember and complete a task in a specific order or sequence. In *Word Series*, the task is to recall in correct order a series of two to nine words orally presented at one word per second. This task is similar to measures of digit span, except words are used instead of digits. The same nine words (one-syllable, high-frequency words such as Car, Dog, Shoe) are used. In the *Sentence Repetition* subtest, the child reads 20 sentences aloud, one by one. After each sentence is read, the child is asked to repeat it exactly, word for word, after the sentence is withdrawn from view. Color words are used so as to minimize meaning (e.g., *The green is yellowing*). The sentences are of varying lengths. The raw score is the number of words correctly recalled. For younger children (ages 5 to 7), the child repeats a specific three-word combination (like cat-book-ball) 10 times in quick succession. The raw score is the total time required. In the *Sentence Questions* subtest (ages 8 to 17), the child answers questions about orally presented sentences similar to those used in *Sentence Repetition* (e.g., *The green is yellowing. Who is yellowing?*). For younger children (ages 5 to 7), *Speech Rates* is administered instead. This subtest requires the repetition of a one-syllable and two-syllable word combination 10 times as quickly as possible. The raw score is the total time needed to complete the repetitions. Correct sequencing of stimuli or activities is essential to the Successive subtests.

In addition to 12 subtest scores and 4 process scores, The CAS also yields a Full Scale score based on the familiar mean of 100 and *SD* of 15. Psychometric properties of the test are excellent. The average internal consistency reliabilities are: Planning (.88), Attention (.88), Simultaneous (.93), Successive (.93), and Full Scale (.96). The standardization sample consisted of 2,200 children and adolescents, stratified on demographic variables to closely match the U.S. population (Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2012). The validity of the CAS-II rests in large measure on its similarity to the first edition, the CAS, which stands up well in factor analytic studies and yields meaningful results for special groups. For example, using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, Naglieri, Taddei, and Williams (2012) found that the factorial structure of the CAS was highly similar in two cross-cultural samples, one comprised of 1,174 U.S. children and the other consisting of 809 Italian children. Further, results for both samples were broadly supportive of the four factors of the PASS theory embodied in the CAS.

In a study of 60 children meeting the criteria for Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Naglieri and colleagues found that subtest and process scores were theoretically consistent with current understandings of ADHD. Specifically, average scores on the four process scales were: Planning 89.1, Attention 92.3, Simultaneous 101.2, and Successive 101.7 (Naglieri & Paolitto, n.d.). These findings fit well with the hypothesis that children with ADHD manifest problems with goal-directed planning and show difficulties with attention due to distractibility (Barkley, 1996).

An intriguing result with the CAS is that differences between Black and White children on the Full Scale score are minimal when key demographic variables such as socioeconomic status are controlled. Naglieri, Rojahn, Matto, and Aquilino (2005) found an estimated CAS Full Scale mean score difference of 4.8 points between Black ($N = 298$) and White ($N = 1{,}691$) children, smaller than typically reported with traditional IQ tests. The relationships between CAS scores and school achievement were strongly positive and highly similar for both groups as well. Overall, these results indicate that the CAS is useful for assessment in special education. On a similar note, Naglieri and Rojahn (2001) found that CAS scores classified a smaller proportion of Blacks as having intellectual disability than did WISC-III scores. They argued that the problem of disproportionate representation of Blacks in special education classes might be mitigated if the CAS were used for this assessment purpose. The CAS-II is a promising test that deserves to see wider use in assessment and research.

KAUFMAN BRIEF INTELLIGENCE TEST-2 (KBIT-2)

The individual intelligence tests previously discussed in this and the preceding topic are excellent measures of intellectual ability, but they are not without their drawbacks. One problem is the time required to administer them. Testing sessions with the Wechsler scales, Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, and the Stanford-Binet easily can last one hour, and two hours is not unusual if the examinee is bright and highly verbal. A second disadvantage to these mainstream tests is the amount of training required to administer them. Proper administration of most individual intelligence tests is based upon the assumption that the examiner has an advanced degree in psychology or a related field and has received extensive supervised experience with the instruments in question.

Alan Kaufman responded to the need for a brief, easily administered screening measure of intelligence by developing the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT), recently released in a second edition, the KBIT-2 (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). The KBIT-2 consists of a Verbal or Crystallized scale that includes two types of items (Verbal Knowledge and Riddles) and a Nonverbal or Fluid Scale that consists of Matrices items (2×2 and 3×3 figural analogies).

The KBIT-2 is normed for examinees ages 4 to 90 and can be administered in approximately 20 minutes. The test yields standard scores with means of 100 and standard deviation of 15 for Verbal, Nonverbal, and combined scores. In spite of the comparability of these scoring dimensions with well-known intelligence tests, the KBIT-2 authors make it clear that their instrument is not intended as a substitute for traditional approaches (e.g., WPPSI-III, KABC-2, WISC-IV, or SB5). The KBIT-2 is mainly a screening test useful in signaling the need for more extensive assessment. The brevity of this test makes it a natural choice for research on intelligence.

The test authors suggest a number of uses for the instrument, including the following:

- Provide a quick estimate of intelligence where accuracy is not essential
- Estimate verbal versus nonverbal intelligence in children or adults
- Reevaluate intellectual status of previously tested examinees
- Screen students who may benefit from placement in gifted programs
- Screen high-risk students who may need further assessment
- Obtain a quick estimate of intelligence in adult treatment or institutional settings

The KBIT-2 manual reports highly supportive validity data from numerous correlational studies. However, the most compelling evidence for the validity of the instrument is its strong resemblance to the K-BIT, for which a substantial body of research has been published. For example, Naugle, Chelune, and Tucker (1993) compared K-BIT results and WAIS-R scores for 200 referrals to a neuropsychological assessment center.

The patient sample included persons with seizure disorders, head injuries, substance abuse, psychiatric disturbance, stroke, dementia, and other neurological conditions. The heterogeneity of the referral sample guaranteed a wide range of functional ability, a desirable feature in a validation study. Although the K-BIT scores tended to be about 5 points higher than their WAIS-R counterparts, the correlations between these two instruments were extremely high and theory-confirming. Vocabulary IQ (K-BIT) and Verbal IQ (WAIS-R) correlated .83; Matrices IQ (K-BIT) and Performance IQ (WAIS-R) correlated .77; and overall IQs from the two instruments correlated an amazing .88. In a study comparing the K-BIT and the WISC-III scores for 50 referred students, Prewett (1995) also reported strong correlations ($r = .78$ for overall scores) and also discovered that the K-BIT scores tended to be about 5 points higher than their WISC-III counterparts. In a sample of 65 children with reading disability, Chin, Ledesma, Cirino, and others (2001) also found that the K-BIT overestimated WISC-III IQs by 1.2 to 5.0 points, on average. However, their study also showed that, in individual cases, K-BIT scores can underestimate or overestimate WISC-III scores by as much as 25 points, reaffirming that the K-BIT is not appropriate for placement and diagnostic purposes. Canivez (1995) found comparable scores between the K-BIT and the WISC-III for 137 elementary and middle school children and also

reported very strong correlations between the two tests, especially for overall scores (r = .87). Eisenstein and Engelhart (1997) found that the K-BIT performed well in estimating IQs in adult neuropsychology referrals, but Donders (1995) recommends caution when using the test with brain-injured children. The reason for caution is that K-BIT scores show a negligible relationship with length of coma; that is, the test is not a good index of neuropsychological status in children. In spite of these cautions about its predecessor, the KBIT-2 is an outstanding screening measure of general intelligence for use in research or in those situations listed earlier in which time constraints preclude use of a longer instrument.

INDIVIDUAL TESTS OF ACHIEVEMENT

Whereas intelligence tests are designed to measure the broad mental abilities of the individual, achievement tests are intended to appraise what a person has learned in school or some other course of study. Group achievement tests are paper-and-pencil measures given to dozens of students at a time. These kinds of measures are discussed in Topic 6A, Group Tests of Ability and Related Concepts. Our focus here is on *individual* achievement tests administered one-on-one and, therefore, better suited for the appraisal of learning problems.

Of course, scores on intelligence and achievement tests should bear a strong relationship to one another—brighter children likely are capable of higher achievement. In fact, as we shall see, the notion that intelligence and achievement typically parallel one another is at the very heart of the concept of learning disability—which commonly involves a discrepancy between the two. We introduce the reader here to the makeup of individual achievement tests as a backdrop to the final topic in this chapter, the assessment of learning disabilities.

More than a dozen individually administered intelligence tests exist, but only a few are widely used in clinical and educational assessment. A number of prominent individual achievement tests are summarized in Table 5.10. Owing to limitations of space, we have selected one test, the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement-II (KTEA-II), for more detailed presentation (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004b). Readers who seek further information are encouraged to consult Sattler (2001, Chapter 17) or the *Mental Measurements Yearbook* series.

Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement-II (KTEA-II)

The KTEA-II is an untimed test of educational achievement for children ages $4\frac{1}{2}$ through 25. A brief, three-subtest version exists and extends the age range to 90+, but for diagnostic assessment of learning difficulties the Comprehensive Form is preferred. The core of the KTEA-II Comprehensive Form consists of eight subtests in four areas:

Reading
Letter and Word Recognition
Reading Comprehension

Mathematics
Math Concepts and Applications
Math Computation

Written Language
Written Expression
Spelling

Oral Language
Listening Comprehension
Oral Expression

In addition to yielding scores on each subtest, the battery provides three composite scores (Reading, Mathematics, and Written Language) and a Total Battery Composite. For diagnostic purposes, a number of supplemental subtests designed to evaluate reading skills (e.g., Phonological Awareness) are also available. For older children, the test takes about 80 minutes to administer; for younger children about 30 minutes are needed. The KTEA-II is co-normed with the KABC-II.

Brief examples of KTEA-II-like items are shown in Table 5.11. These examples would be at the upper end of the subtests, suitable for high school students. The KTEA-II utilizes entry and exit rules for each subtest to ensure that students only encounter items of appropriate difficulty. Scoring is

TABLE 5.10 Survey of Widely Used Individual Achievement Tests

Diagnostic Achievement Battery-3 (DAB-3) (Newcomer, 2001)

Suitable for ages 6 through 14, the DAB-3 consists of 14 subtests used to compute eight diagnostic composites. The composite scores include Listening, Speaking, Reading, Writing, Mathematics, Spoken Language, Written Language, and Total Achievement. More comprehensive than most achievement tests, the DAB-3 takes up to two hours to administer. The test was carefully normed on 1,534 children nationwide.

Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA-II) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004b)

A well-normed individual test of educational achievement, a special feature of the KTEA-II is the detailed error analysis (see text). Currently, norms extend from age 4½ through age 25. A separate brief form that can be administered in 30 minutes or less is useful for screening purposes.

Mini-Battery of Achievement (MBA) (Woodcock, McGrew, & Werder, 1994)

Assesses four broad achievement areas—reading, writing, mathematics, and factual knowledge—for persons ages 4 through 90+. The complete battery can be administered in 30 minutes. The MBA provides a more extensive coverage of basic and applied skills than any other brief battery. For example, the reading component assesses letter-word identification, vocabulary, and comprehension.

Peabody Individual Achievement Test-Revised-Normative Update (PIAT-R/NU) (Markwardt, 1997)

For ages 5 through 22, this 60-minute test includes subtests of general information, reading recognition, reading comprehension, mathematics, and spelling. A new subtest, written expression, is now offered for screening written language skills. Administration of the PIAT-R/NU requires minimal training; the test can be administered by properly trained classroom teachers.

Wechsler Individual Achievement Test-II (WIAT-III) (Wechsler, 2009)

The WIAT-III consists of 16 subtests organized into seven composites. The composites are Oral Language, Total Reading, Basic Reading, Reading Comprehension and Fluency, Written Expression, Mathematics, and Math Fluency. The test is suitable for children ages 4 through adults age 50, and is empirically linked with all of the Wechsler intelligence scales. The feature of linkage allows for direct comparisons of achievement and intelligence, which facilitates the assessment of learning disabilities. A new element of the third edition is the Essay Composition subtest, which requires the examinee to write a 10-minute essay supporting an argument and giving reasons why. Testing time with older children and adults typically is 90 minutes or more.

Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement (WJ III) (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001)

The WJ III covers individuals from 2 years of age through adulthood. The WJ III is co-normed with a separate set of cognitive measures, the WJ III Tests of Cognitive Abilities. The achievement battery is perhaps the most extensive and comprehensive of any test in this area and provides for assessment in reading, oral language, math, written language, and academic knowledge. Area scores are directly linked to federal standards of Public Law 94-142.

Wide Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4) (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006)

Well normed for ages 5 through 94, the WRAT-IV is widely used as a screening instrument. The subtests include: Word Reading (letter and word recognition as gauged by correct pronunciation), Sentence Comprehension (ability to comprehend ideas and information in sentences), Spelling (traditional dictated spelling test), and Math Computation (ability to perform basic mathematical computations). This brief test (15 to 25 minutes) is not suited for the identification of specific achievement deficits.

objective and highly reliable. Raw scores are converted to standard scores (mean of 100, SD of 15) for each subtest, the composite scores, and the Total Battery Composite.

In addition to formal scoring, the KTEA-II provides a systematic method for evaluating the qualitative nature of subtest errors. For example, on the Spelling subtest, errors can be classified according to

TABLE 5.11 Examples of Characteristic KTEA-II Items Applicable to Older Children

Letter and Word Recognition
The examiner points to each word in turn and says, "What word is this?"

duodecagon *obstreperous* *correlative*
indolence *perspicacity*

Reading Comprehension
The examiner says, "Do what this says."

Utter a fallacious response to the question, "How many eyes does a cyclops have?"

Math Concepts and Applications
The examiner says, "The Missoula Muggers played 80 ball games last year. They won 16 games. What percentage of the games did they win?"

Mathematics Computation
The examiner says "Now I want you to work these problems."

$(X-7)(X-9) =$

5 lb 5 oz
−2 lb 14 oz

Written Expression
The examiner shows a picture depicting people interacting and asks the student to write a story about the picture.

Spelling
The examiner explains the rules for a traditional spelling test concluding with, "I want you to write the word on this sheet."

"Paramour. One's lover is called a paramour."

Listening Comprehension
The examiner plays an audio CD track of a story. Then the examiner asks questions about the story designed to assess comprehension.

Oral Expression
The student is shown a full-color picture and then asked to tell a story about it. Due to similar format, results can be compared to Written Expression.

whether they involve prefixes, suffixes, vowel digraphs (such as *ue* in *blue*) and diphthongs, consonant clusters (such as *scr* in *unscrupulous*), *r*-controlled patterns (such as *er* in *inferior*), and several other patterns.

Kaufman and Kaufman (2004b) stress that the error analysis provides the diagnostician with a source of information from which instructional objectives can be developed. For example, a weakness in vowel digraphs and diphthongs on the Spelling subtest translates directly to classroom objectives: practice in the spelling and reading of these elements in isolation, progressing to spelling and pronouncing words containing digraphs and diphthongs, and ending in writing and reading sentences containing words with vowel digraphs and diphthongs. The KTEA-II manual contains many useful clinical insights with educational ramifications.

The content validity of the KTEA-II appears to be very strong, but this point may vary from one school system to another. After all, individual school systems may choose to emphasize different domains of achievement. Salvia and Ysseldyke (1991) warn that users must be sensitive to the correspondence of test content with the students' curriculum. As with any achievement test, the user should verify that the content of the KTEA-II is appropriate within the curricular setting. Nonetheless, Kaufman and Kaufman (2004b) offer sufficient evidence for the validity of the test to make a case for general adequacy.

NATURE AND ASSESSMENT OF LEARNING DISABILITIES

Because individual intelligence and achievement tests are foundational to the assessment of learning disabilities, we close this chapter with brief review of this topic. The learning disability (LD) field is one of the fastest growing areas within assessment. Paradoxically, it is also one of the most controversial and perplexing domains of psychological testing. Some background is needed to understand the role of intelligence and achievement tests in the evaluation of learning disabilities. We begin by asking a seemingly simple question that turns out to have a complicated answer: What is a **learning disability**?

Definitions of learning disability have gone through at least three phases in the last several decades. Early views were influenced heavily by federal

legislation and relied on a discrepancy between intelligence and achievement as the defining characteristic. These ideas were followed by a model that featured intra-individual weakness in one or more core psychological processes as the essential attribute. Most recently, responsiveness to intervention has been featured as the prevailing quality. We turn now to a survey of these shifting paradigms in the history of LD assessment.

The Federal Definition of Learning Disabilities

For decades the essential nature of learning disabilities was understood in terms of a definition embedded in federal law. In 1975, Congress passed Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. One of the provisions of this act was a definition of learning disabilities as follows:

> The term "specific learning disability" means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not include children who have learning disabilities which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, or emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. (USDE, 1977, p. 65083)

The commitment to a federally mandated definition was reaffirmed in 1990 by passage of Public Law 101-476, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

The federal definition embodied in IDEA also stipulated an operational approach to the identification of children with learning disabilities. Specifically, candidates for an LD diagnosis had to demonstrate a severe discrepancy between general ability (intelligence) and specific achievement in one or more of these seven areas:

Oral expression
Listening comprehension
Written expression
Basic reading skill
Reading comprehension
Mathematics calculation
Mathematics reasoning

The discrepancy model for the identification of LD children functioned as a directive for school psychologists. In effect, the model mandated that psychologists should administer an individual intelligence test (general ability measure) and an individual achievement test (specific achievement measure) and then look for a discrepancy between Full Scale IQ and one or more areas of school achievement (e.g., reading, mathematics, written expression).

In practical terms, a severe discrepancy was defined as a difference of one standard deviation or more between general intelligence and specific achievement. A common practice in identification of LD children was to compare Full Scale IQ on an individual intelligence test such as the WISC-III with specific achievement scores on an individual achievement test such as the WIAT (Wechsler Individual Achievement Test) or similar instrument that has subtests normed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. A difference of 15 points or more between Full Scale IQ and specific achievement in any of the previously listed areas would then raise the suspicion of learning disability.

Unfortunately, the federal definition did not serve its intended purposes, and, increasingly, school psychologists and other professionals looked to other approaches for understanding and assessing learning disabilities in children. The fundamental problem was that many, many children who exhibit serious learning problems in school and who would benefit from services for LD simply did not meet the psychometric criteria of a severe discrepancy.

The National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities Definition

After a lengthy period of confusion and struggle over the definition of learning disabilities, specialists and

educators began to rally around a consensus view in the early 1990s. The new definition was proposed by the National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities (NJCLD), a group of representatives from eight national organizations with a special interest in learning disabilities. Although similar to the federal definition, the new approach contains important contrasts:

> *Learning disabilities* is a general term that refers to a heterogeneous group of disorders manifested by significant difficulties in the acquisition and use of listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning, or mathematical abilities. These disorders are intrinsic to the individual, presumed to be due to central nervous system dysfunction, and may occur across the life span. Problems in self-regulatory behaviors, social perception and social interaction may exist with learning disabilities but do not by themselves constitute a learning disability. Although learning disabilities may occur concomitantly with other handicapping conditions (for example, sensory impairment, mental retardation [MR], serious emotional disturbance [ED]) or with extrinsic influences (such as cultural differences, insufficient or inappropriate instruction), they are not the result of those conditions or influences. (NJCLD, 1988, p. 1)

The new definition avoided vague reference to "basic psychological processes," specifies that the disorder is intrinsic to the individual, identifies central nervous system dysfunction as the origin of LD problems, and states explicitly that learning disabilities may extend into adulthood.

Perhaps most important of all, the NJCLD approach abandoned the excessive reliance upon discrepancy between ability and achievement as the hallmark of LD. Instead, the new model specified that the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of LD was that the individual (child or adult) exhibit an intraindividual weakness in one or more of the core areas of academic functioning (listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning, or mathematical abilities). Shaw et al. (1995) described how the NJCLD model might look in practice. In this approach, the first task is to identify one or more intraindividual weaknesses in the core areas. These are always relative to strengths in several other core areas. In other words, persons who are slow learners in all areas do not meet the criteria of LD. The second step is to trace the learning difficulties to central nervous system dysfunction, which may manifest as problems with information processing. For example, a young adult with a severe weakness in listening (as judged by her inability to learn from the traditional lecture approach to teaching) might exhibit a deficit on a test of verbal memory—confirming that an information processing problem was at the heart of her disability. The purpose of the third step (examining psychosocial skills, physical and sensory abilities) is to specify additional problems that may need to be addressed for program-planning purposes. Finally, in the fourth step the examiner rules out non-LD explanations for the learning difficulties (since these explanations would mandate a different strategy for remediation).

The New Face of Learning Disabilities: Response to Intervention

In 2004, Congress reauthorized the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which is the ongoing legislation governing special services, including the assessment of LD, in school systems that receive federal funding. IDEA 2004 changed the law about how to identify children with specific learning disabilities by moving away from the discrepancy model that had reigned supreme since the 1970s. Instead, the new law recommended **response to intervention (RTI)** as the preferred method for identifying children with learning disabilities. In particular, IDEA 2004 says that a school "may use a process that determines if the child responds to scientific, research-based intervention as part of the evaluation procedures . . . " in its evaluation for LD.

RTI is a broader concept than LD and refers both to (1) methods for increasing the capacity of school systems to respond effectively to the diverse academic needs of students and (2) approaches for identifying LD children who need special education services. The RTI approach specifically deemphasizes cognitive discrepancies in the diagnostic process,

focusing instead on low age-based achievement levels and failure to respond to evidence-based instructional approaches (Fletcher & Vaughn, 2009; Torgerson, 2009).

The implementation of RTI is complicated and multifaceted. The process involves multiple feedback loops and decision points. Yet, proponents of RTI view it as an improvement because it provides for early, preventive intervention in contrast to the "wait to fail" approach of the discrepancy model. Fuchs and Fuchs (2005) describe a systematic approach to using RTI in a school system. The first step is school-wide screening in the first weeks of the school year to identify children "at risk" for school failure. Those scoring below a certain prescribed cut-off (perhaps the 25th percentile in reading or math) would be noted. Teachers would then implement empirically validated curricular interventions for these children, who would be monitored for progress after eight weeks. Those who do not respond would receive another interval of supplementary instruction for an additional eight weeks. Those who still do not respond would receive a comprehensive, individualized evaluation to rule out sources of underachievement such as intellectual disability, visual problems, or emotional disturbance. Finally, with the involvement of parents, the child would receive a designation of LD and become eligible for special education placement.

In sum, RTI is a shift in perspective that focuses on early results and outcomes with at-risk children instead of later spending excessive time and resources on questions of discrepancy-based eligibility after children are already failing because of their LD. The hope is that the RTI perspective will catch at-risk children earlier and thereby reduce the number of children needing special education services.

Essential Features of Learning Disabilities

Even though the definition of LD remains a point of contention, we can cite several features of these disorders that are less controversial. As the reader will discover, the features discussed in the following dictate, to some extent, the nature of testing practices in the assessment of learning disabilities. There is general agreement—with occasional dissenting votes—on five features of learning disabilities.

First, a learning disability involves an intraindividual discrepancy in cognitive functioning. The child (or adult) with LD reveals a relative weakness in one area compared to strengths in most other areas. According to the federal definition followed within many school systems, the discrepancy is between general ability (intelligence) and specific achievement. We have described previously some of the pitfalls of this definition and prefer the NJCLD approach in which the discrepancy is not rigidly tied to a difference between IQ and achievement test scores.

Second, an exclusionary clause is included in most definitions of learning disability. If the academic difficulties are primarily caused by other disabling conditions (mental retardation, emotional disturbance, visual or hearing impairment, cultural or social disadvantage), then a diagnosis of learning disability is typically ruled out. This clause is often misinterpreted. A person can be both learning disabled and impaired in other ways (e.g., have mental retardation). The important point is that the coexisting condition must not be the primary cause of the learning difficulties.

Third, Learning disabilities are heterogeneous; that is, there are many different varieties. Research on the identification of subtypes is still in its infancy, but most researchers express optimism that meaningful subgroups of persons with learning disabilities can be identified. Pending further research and refinement, only two broad categories of learning disability are recognized currently. These two types are dyslexia or verbal learning disability, and right hemisphere or nonverbal learning disability. Our coverage here is based on Forster (1994). The primary manifestation of dyslexia is an unexpected difficulty in learning to read or spell. The fundamental deficiency is thought to be a problem with phonological coding, which is the ability to automatically associate sounds with specific letter combinations. Verbal learning disability constitutes about 90 percent of all LD cases, and is much more common in boys than girls. In contrast, right hemisphere or nonverbal learning disability manifests as poor skills in mathematics, handwriting, and, often, social

cognition. The fundamental problem is thought to be a problem in spatial cognition, which is the visuospatial perception of relationships. The problem likely originates in right cerebral hemisphere dysfunction, and constitutes about 10 percent of all LD cases. Boys and girls are equally affected.

Fourth, a learning disability is a developmental phenomenon that is usually evident in early childhood that may persist into adulthood. Even though remediation efforts should be based upon optimism—so as to avoid self-fulfilling prophecies—a dose of realism is needed, too. Longitudinal studies of children with severe learning disabilities suggest that marked improvement in academic achievement is the exception, not the rule, even when these subjects receive intensive educational intervention. For example, Frauenheim and Heckerl (1983) re-tested 11 adults diagnosed as having learning disabilities in childhood. All the participants had received special help for reading; nine had graduated from high school, and two completed the 10th grade. Full Scale IQs were typically in the low 90s, with Verbal IQ below average (mean of 85) and Performance IQ above average (mean of 104). In spite of the remedial intervention, when retested as adults on *exactly* the same achievement test (Wide Range Achievement Test), these examinees were scarcely improved from their elementary school results. These findings are corroborated by several other follow-up studies (see Kolb & Whishaw, 1990, chap. 29, for a review). Such results indicate that specialists who work with children with learning disabilities should not become fixated solely on academic concerns. Social and emotional problems—which may be more amenable to intervention—also cry out for notice.

Fifth, individuals with learning disabilities frequently experience social and emotional difficulties that are as pervasive and consequential as the deficits in academic achievement. These problems may persist into adolescence and adulthood. In fact, the socioemotional sequelae often become the primary presenting complaint, which can complicate the testing process and obscure the diagnosis. For example, in a needs assessment study of 381 adults with learning disabilities, Hoffman, Sheldon, Minskoff, and others (1987) identified several crucial nonacademic areas meriting intervention by service providers. These adults self-endorsed several social and emotional problems with high frequency: feeling frustrated (40 percent), talking or acting before thinking (33 percent), being shy (31 percent), no self-confidence (28 percent), controlling emotions and temper (28 percent), and dating (27 percent). Many other problems were also endorsed, but by less than 25 percent of the sample. These findings indicate that learning disability assessments should incorporate measures of social and emotional functioning. Vaughn and Haager (1994) provide an excellent overview on the measurement of social skills in persons with learning disability.

Causes and Correlates of Learning Disabilities

Approximately 4 to 5 percent of all school-aged children receive a diagnosis of LD, so this is not a rare problem (Lyon, 1996). The most common form of LD is dyslexia, and boys outnumber girls by about 3:1 or 4:1 (Forster, 1994). In a minority of cases, the etiology is clear and can be attributed to a specific cause such as a known brain injury. Left hemisphere impairment is especially likely to result in verbal difficulties, whereas right hemisphere impairment may lead to problems with spatial thinking or other nonverbal skills. Thus, head injury or other neurological problems can be the proximate cause of a child receiving an LD diagnosis.

However, in the majority of cases the direct etiology of LD problems is unclear. A number of possibilities have been proposed and these may explain some but not all cases of LD. For example, pathological neurodevelopmental processes have been identified in some persons with severe dyslexia (Culbertson & Edmonds, 1996). Individuals with this disorder appear to have alterations in brain structures such as the planum temporale (the flat surface on the top of the temporal lobes) known to be important for language processing. Whereas in normal individuals the planum temporale is much larger in the left temporal lobe than in the right, persons with severe dyslexia do not show this pattern of asymmetry (tending toward symmetry instead). Moreover, researchers have identified microscopic cortical malformations called polymicrogyria

(numerous small convolutions) that parallel these structural differences. Several postmortem studies of persons with severe dyslexia have revealed these deviations at the cellular level. Spreen (2001) provides an outstanding review of the possible neurological substrates of learning disabilities. Dyslexia also appears to show a significant genetic component for some persons such that the idea of familial dyslexia needs to be taken seriously. However, what must be emphasized is that for most individuals the etiology of LD (whether dyslexia or other forms) remains a mystery.

Achievement Tests in LD Assessment: A Final Word

Learning disabilities manifest primarily as academic problems; that is, a child with LD is typically unable to master skills important for school success such as reading, mathematics, or written communication. Because school-based accomplishment is at the heart of the problem, an evaluation for LD must include relevant measures of academic achievement. Furthermore, the evaluation of school achievement—one small part of an LD assessment—must be based on an *individual* test of achievement. Even though a group achievement test might raise the suspicion of a learning disability, practitioners must rely on individual achievement tests for definitive assessment.

Individual achievement tests typically are administered one-on-one with the examiner sitting across from the respondent and posing structured questions and problems. Of course, any well-standardized achievement test will yield normative data about the functioning of a schoolchild. But the special virtue of individual achievement tests is that the examiner can observe the clinical details of deficient (or superior) performance and form hypotheses about the cognitive capacities of the examinee.

Consider the problem of poor spelling, widely observed in children and adults with verbal LD. Any good spelling achievement test will document the disability; however, little insight is gained from mere scores. What the examiner should seek to know is the qualitative nature of the problem, not just its quantitative dimensions. Individual achievement tests are invaluable in this regard. By observing the details of deficient performance, an astute examiner can form hypotheses about the origin of an achievement problem. For example, a child whose spelling is phonetically correct is at least *hearing* the words correctly, whereas a child with nonphonetic spelling might very well display a problem with auditory processing of speech sounds.

CHAPTER 6

Ability Testing: Group Tests and Controversies

TOPIC 6A Group Tests of Ability and Related Concepts

Nature, Promise, and Pitfalls of Group Tests
Group Tests of Ability
Multiple Aptitude Test Batteries
Predicting College Performance
Postgraduate Selection Tests
Educational Achievement Tests

The practical success of early intelligence scales such as the 1905 Binet-Simon test motivated psychologists and educators to develop instruments that could be administered simultaneously to large numbers of examinees. Test developers were quick to realize that group tests allowed for the efficient evaluation of dozens or hundreds of examinees at the same time. As reviewed in an earlier chapter, one of the first uses of group tests was for screening and assignment of military personnel during World War I. The need to quickly test thousands of Army recruits inspired psychologists in the United States, led by Robert M. Yerkes, to make rapid advances in psychometrics and test development (Yerkes, 1921). Many new applications followed immediately—in education, industry, and other fields. In Topic 6A, Group Tests of Ability and Related Concepts, we introduce the reader to the varied applications of group tests and also review a sampling of typical instruments. In addition, we explore a key question raised by the consequential nature of these tests—can examinees boost their scores significantly by taking targeted test preparation courses? This is but one of many unexpected issues raised by the widespread use of group tests. In Topic 6B, Test Bias and Other Controversies, we continue a reflective theme by looking into test bias and other contentious issues in testing.

NATURE, PROMISE, AND PITFALLS OF GROUP TESTS

Group tests serve many purposes, but the vast majority can be assigned to one of three types: ability, aptitude, or achievement tests. In the real world, the distinction among these kinds of tests often is quite fuzzy (Gregory, 1994a). These instruments differ mainly in their functions and

applications, less so in actual test content. In brief, ability tests typically sample a broad assortment of proficiencies in order to estimate current intellectual level. This information might be used for screening or placement purposes, for example, to determine the need for individual testing or to establish eligibility for a gifted and talented program. In contrast, aptitude tests usually measure a few homogeneous segments of ability and are designed to predict future performance. Predictive validity is foundational to aptitude tests, and often they are used for institutional selection purposes. Finally, achievement tests assess current skill attainment in relation to the goals of school and training programs. They are designed to mirror educational objectives in reading, writing, math, and other subject areas. Although often used to identify educational attainment of students, they also function to evaluate the adequacy of school educational programs.

Whatever their application, group tests differ from individual tests in five ways:

- Multiple-choice versus open-ended format
- Objective machine scoring versus examiner scoring
- Group versus individualized administration
- Applications in screening versus remedial planning
- Huge versus merely large standardization samples

These differences allow for great speed and cost efficiency in group testing, but a price is paid for these advantages.

Although the early psychometric pioneers embraced group testing wholeheartedly, they recognized fully the nature of their Faustian bargain: Psychologists had traded the soul of the individual examinee in return for the benefits of mass testing. Whipple (1910) summed up the advantages of group testing but also pointed to the potential perils:

> Most mental tests may be administered either to individuals or to groups. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. The group method has, of course, the particular merit of economy of time; a class of 50 or 100 children may take a test in less than a fiftieth or a hundredth of the time needed to administer the same test individually. Again, in certain comparative studies, e.g., of the effects of a week's vacation upon the mental efficiency of school children, it becomes imperative that all S's should take the tests at the same time. On the other hand, there are almost sure to be some S's in every group that, for one reason or another, fail to follow instructions or to execute the test to the best of their ability. The individual method allows E to detect these cases, and in general, by the exercise of personal supervision, to gain, as noted above, valuable information concerning S's attitude toward the test.

In sum, group testing poses two interrelated risks: (1) some examinees will score far below their true ability, owing to motivational problems or difficulty following directions and (2) invalid scores will not be recognized as such, with undesirable consequences for these atypical examinees. There is really no simple way to entirely avoid these risks, which are part of the trade-off for the efficiency of group testing. However, it is possible to minimize the potentially negative consequences if examiners scrutinize very low scores with skepticism and recommend individual testing for these cases.

We turn now to an analysis of group tests in a variety of settings, including cognitive tests for schools and clinics, placement tests for career and military evaluation, and aptitude tests for college and postgraduate selection.

GROUP TESTS OF ABILITY

Multidimensional Aptitude Battery-II (MAB-II)

The Multidimensional Aptitude Battery-II (MAB-II; Jackson, 1998) is a recent group intelligence test designed to be a paper-and-pencil equivalent of the WAIS-R. As the reader will recall, the WAIS-R is a highly respected instrument (now replaced by the WAIS-III), in its time the most widely used of the available adult intelligence tests. Kaufman (1983) noted that the WAIS-R was "the criterion of adult intelligence, and no other instrument even comes

close." However, a highly trained professional needs about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours just to administer the Wechsler adult test to a single person. Because professional time is at a premium, a complete Wechsler intelligence assessment—including administration, scoring, and report writing—easily can cost hundreds of dollars. Many examiners have long suspected that an appropriate group test, with the attendant advantages of objective scoring and computerized narrative report, could provide an equally valid and much less expensive alternative to individual testing for most persons.

The MAB-II was designed to produce subtests and factors parallel to the WAIS-R but employing a multiple-choice format capable of being computer scored. The apparent goal in designing this test was to produce an instrument that could be administered to dozens or hundreds of persons by one examiner (and perhaps a few proctors) with minimal training. In addition, the MAB-II was designed to yield IQ scores with psychometric properties similar to those found on the WAIS-R. Appropriate for examinees from ages 16 to 74, the MAB-II yields 10 subtest scores, as well as Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs.

Although it consists of original test items, the MAB-II is mainly a sophisticated subtest-by-subtest clone of the WAIS-R. The 10 subtests are listed as follows:

Verbal	**Performance**
Information	Digit Symbol
Comprehension	Picture Completion
Arithmetic	Spatial
Similarities	Picture Arrangement
Vocabulary	Object Assembly

The reader will notice that Digit Span from the WAIS-R is not included on the MAB-II. The reason for this omission is largely practical: There would be no simple way to present a Digit-Span-like subtest in paper-and-pencil format. In any case, the omission is not serious. Digit Span has the lowest correlation with overall WAIS-R IQ, and it is widely recognized that this subtest makes a minimal contribution to the measurement of general intelligence.

The only significant deviation from the WAIS-R is the replacement of Block Design with a Spatial subtest on the MAB-II. In the Spatial subtest, examinees must mentally perform spatial rotations of figures and select one of five possible rotations presented as their answer (Figure 6.1). Only mental rotations are involved (although "flipped-over" versions of the original stimulus are included as distractor items). The advanced items are very complex and demanding.

The items within each of the 10 MAB-II subtests are arranged in order of increasing difficulty, beginning with questions and problems that most adolescents and adults find quite simple and proceeding upward to items that are so difficult that very few persons get them correct. There is no penalty for guessing and examinees are encouraged to respond to every item within the time limit. Unlike the WAIS-R in which the verbal subtests are untimed power measures, every MAB-II subtest incorporates elements of both power and speed: Examinees are allowed only seven minutes to work on each subtest. Including instructions, the Verbal and Performance portions of the MAB-II each take about 50 minutes to administer.

The MAB-II is a relatively minor revision of the MAB, and the technical features of the two versions are nearly identical. A great deal of psychometric information is available for the original version, which we report here. With regard to reliability, the results are generally quite impressive. For example, in one study of over 500 adolescents ranging in age from 16 to 20, the internal consistency reliability of Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs was in the high .90s. Test–retest data for this instrument also excel. In a study of 52 young psychiatric patients, the individual subtests showed reliabilities that ranged from .83 to .97 (median of .90) for the Verbal scale and from .87 to .94 (median of .91) for the Performance scale (Jackson, 1984). These results compare quite favorably with the psychometric standards reported for the WAIS-R.

Factor analyses of the MAB-II are broadly supportive of the construct validity of this instrument and its predecessor (Lee, Wallbrown, & Blaha, 1990). Most recently, Gignac (2006) examined the factor structure of the MAB-II using a series of confirmatory factor analyses with data on 3,121 individuals reported in Jackson (1998). The best fit to the

Picture Completion — Choose the letter that begins the word describing the missing part of the picture.



The answer is **Light**, so **A** should be marked.

Spatial — Choose one figure to the right of the vertical line which is the same as the figure on the left. One figure can be turned to look like the figure on the left; the others would have to be flipped over.



The correct answer is **A,** so **A** should be marked. The others **BCDE** would have to be flipped over.

Object Assembly — Choose the order, from left to right, in which these parts should be placed to form the object.

The correct answer is **C-132** so **C** should be marked. Only this order would create the object **teacup.**

FIGURE 6.1 Demonstration Items from Three Performance Tests of the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery-II (MAB)
Source: Reprinted with permission from Jackson, D. N. (1984a). *Manual for the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery.* Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment Systems, Inc. (800) 265–1285.

data was provided by a nested model consisting of a first-order general factor, a first-order Verbal Intelligence factor, and a first-order Performance Intelligence factor. The one caveat of this study was that Arithmetic did not load specifically on the Verbal Intelligence factor independent of its contribution to the general factor.

Other researchers have noted the strong congruence between factor analyses of the WAIS-R (with Digit Span removed) and the MAB. Typically,

separate Verbal and Performance factors emerge for both tests (Wallbrown, Carmin, & Barnett, 1988). In a large sample of inmates, Ahrens, Evans, and Barnett (1990) observed validity-confirming changes in MAB scores in relation to education level. In general, with the possible exception that Arithmetic does not contribute reliably to the Verbal factor, there is good justification for the use of separate Verbal and Performance scales on this test.

In general, the validity of this test rests upon its very strong physical and empirical resemblance to its parent test, the WAIS-R. Correlational data between MAB and WAIS-R scores are crucial in this regard. For 145 persons administered the MAB and WAIS-R in counterbalanced fashion, correlations between subtests ranged from .44 (Spatial/Block Design) to .89 (Arithmetic and Vocabulary), with a median of .78. WAIS-R and MAB IQ correlations were very healthy, namely, .92 for Verbal IQ, .79 for Performance IQ, and .91 for Full Scale IQ (Jackson, 1984a). With only a few exceptions, correlations between MAB and WAIS-R scores exceed those between the WAIS and the WAIS-R. Carless (2000) reported a similar, strong overlap between MAB scores and WAIS-R scores in a study of 85 adults for the Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQ scores. However, she found that 4 of the 10 MAB subtests did not correlate with the WAIS-R subscales they were designed to represent, suggesting caution in using this instrument to obtain detailed information about specific abilities.

Chappelle et al. (2010) obtained MAB-II scores for military personnel in an elite training program for AC-130 gunship operators. The officers who passed training ($N = 59$) and those who failed training ($N = 20$) scored above average (mean Full Scale IQs of 112.5 and 113.6, respectively), but there were no significant differences between the two groups on any of the test indices. This is a curious result insofar as IQ typically demonstrates at least mild predictive potential for real world vocational outcomes. Further research on the MAB-II as a predictor of real world results would be desirable.

The MAB-II shows great promise in research, career counseling, and personnel selection. In addition, this test could function as a screening instrument in clinical settings, as long as the examiner views low scores as a basis for follow-up testing with an individual intelligence test. Examiners must keep in mind that the MAB-II is a group test and, therefore, carries with it the potential for misuse in individual cases. The MAB-II should not be used in isolation for diagnostic decisions or for placement into programs such as classes for intellectually gifted persons.

A Multilevel Battery: The Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT)

One important function of psychological testing is to assess students' abilities that are prerequisite to traditional classroom-based learning. In designing tests for this purpose, the psychometrician must contend with the obvious and nettlesome problem that school-aged children differ hugely in their intellectual abilities. For example, a test appropriate for a sixth grader will be much too easy for a tenth grader, yet impossibly difficult for a third grader.

The answer to this dilemma is a multilevel battery, a series of overlapping tests. In a multilevel battery, each group test is designed for a specific age or grade level, but adjacent tests possess some common content. Because of the overlapping content with adjacent age or grade levels, each test possesses a suitably low floor and high ceiling for proper assessment of students at both extremes of ability. Virtually every school system in the United States uses at least one nationally normed multilevel battery.

The Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT) is one of the best school-based test batteries in current use (Lohman & Hagen, 2001). A recent revision of the test is the CogAT Multilevel Edition, Form 6, released in 2001. Norms for 2005 also are available. We discuss this instrument in some detail.

The CogAT evolved from the Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Tests, one of the first group tests of

intelligence intended for widespread use within school systems. The CogAT is primarily a measure of scholastic ability but also incorporates a nonverbal reasoning battery with items that bear no direct relation to formal school instruction. The two primary batteries, suitable for students in kindergarten through third grade, are briefly discussed at the end of this section. Here we review the multilevel edition intended for students in 3rd through 12th grade.

The nine subtests of the multilevel CogAT are grouped into three areas: Verbal, quantitative, and nonverbal, each including three subtests. Representative items for the subtests of the CogAT are depicted in Figure 6.2. The tests on the Verbal Battery evaluate verbal skills and reasoning strategies (inductive and deductive) needed for effective reading and writing. The tests on the Quantitative Battery appraise quantitative skills important for mathematics and other disciplines. The Nonverbal Battery can be used to estimate cognitive level of students with limited reading skill, poor English proficiency, or inadequate educational exposure.

For each CogAT subtest, items are ordered by difficulty level in a single test booklet. However, entry and exit points differ for each of eight overlapping levels (A through H). In this manner, grade-appropriate items are provided for all examinees.

The subtests are strictly timed, with limits that vary from 8 to 12 minutes. Each of the three batteries can be administered in less than an hour. However, the manual recommends three successive testing days for younger children. For older children, two batteries should be administered the first day, with a single testing period the next.

Verbal Battery

1. *Verbal Classification*

Circle the item below that belongs with these three:

milk butter cheese

A. eggs **B.** yogurt **C.** grocery
D. bacon **E.** recipe

2. *Sentence Completion*

Circle the word below that best completes this sentence:

Fish _____ in the ocean.

A. sit B. next C. fly
D. swim E. climb

3. *Verbal Analogies*

Circle the word that best fits this analogy:

Right → Left : Top →

A. Side B. Out C. Wrong
D. On E. Bottom

Quantitative Battery

4. *Quantitative Relations*

Circle the choice that depicts the relationship between I and II:

I. 6/2 + 1
II. 9/3 – 1

A. I is greater than II B. I is equal to II
C. I is less than II

5. *Number Series*

Circle the number below that comes next in this series:

1 11 6 16 11 21 16

A. 31 B. 16 C. 26 D. 6 E. 11

6. *Equation Building*

Circle the choice below that could be derived from these:

1 2 4 + –

A. –1 B. 7 C. 0 D. 1 E. –3

FIGURE 6.2 Subtests and Representative Items of the Cognitive Abilities Test, Form 6

Nonverbal Battery

7. *Figure Classification*

Circle the item below that belongs with these three figures:





8. *Figure Analogies*

Circle the figure below that best fits with this analogy:



9. *Figure Analysis*

Circle the choice below that fits this paper folding and hole punching:





FIGURE 6.2 ***continued***

Note: These items resemble those on the CogAT 6. Correct answers: *1: B. yogurt* (the only dairy product). *2: D. swim* (fish swim in the ocean). *3: E. bottom* (the opposite of top). *4: A. I is greater than II* (4 is greater than 2). *5: C. 26* (the algorithm is add 10, subtract 5, add 10 . . .). *6: A.* –1 (the only answer that fits) *7: A* (four-sided shape that is filled in). *8: D* (same shape, bigger to smaller). *9: E* (correct answer).

Raw scores for each battery can be transformed into an age-based normalized standard score with mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. In addition, percentile ranks and stanines for age groups and grade level are also available. Interpolation was used to determine fall, winter, and spring grade-level norms.

The CogAT was co-normed (standardized concurrently) with two achievement tests, the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and the Iowa Tests of Educational Development. Concurrent standardization with achievement measures is a common and desirable practice in the norming of multilevel intelligence tests. The particular virtue of joint norming is that the expected correspondence between intelligence and achievement scores is determined with great precision. As a consequence, examiners can more accurately identify underachieving students in need of remediation or further assessment for potential learning disability.

The reliability of the CogAT is exceptionally good. In previous editions, the Kuder-Richardson-20 reliability estimates for the multilevel batteries averaged .94 (Verbal), .92 (Quantitative), and .93 (Nonverbal) across all grade levels. The six-month test–retest reliabilities for alternate forms ranged from .85 to .93 (Verbal), .78 to .88 (Quantitative), and .81 to .89 (Nonverbal).

The manual provides a wealth of information on content, criterion-related, and construct validity of the CogAT; we summarize only the most pertinent points here. Correlations between the CogAT and achievement batteries are substantial. For example, the CogAT verbal battery correlates in the .70s to .80s with achievement subtests from the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills.

The CogAT batteries predict school grades reasonably well. Correlations range from the .30s to the .60s, depending on grade level, sex, and ethnic group. There does not appear to be a clear trend as to which battery is best at predicting grade point average. Correlations between the CogAT and individual intelligence tests are also substantial, typically ranging from .65 to .75. These findings speak well for the construct validity of the CogAT insofar as the Stanford-Binet is widely recognized as an excellent measure of individual intelligence.

Ansorge (1985) has questioned whether all three batteries are really necessary. He points out that correlations among the Verbal, Quantitative, and Nonverbal batteries are substantial. The median values across all grades are as follows:

Verbal and Quantitative	.78
Nonverbal and Quantitative	.78
Verbal and Nonverbal	.72

Since the Quantitative battery offers little uniqueness, from a purely psychometric point of view there is no justification for including it. Nonetheless, the test authors recommend use of all batteries in hopes that differences in performance will assist teachers in remedial planning. However, the test authors do not make a strong case for doing this.

A study by Stone (1994) provides a notable justification for using the CogAT as a basis for student evaluation. He found that CogAT scores for 403 third graders provided an unbiased prediction of student achievement that was more accurate than teacher ratings. In particular, teacher ratings showed bias against Caucasian and Asian American students by underpredicting their achievement scores.

Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM)

First introduced in 1938, Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) is a nonverbal test of inductive reasoning based on figural stimuli (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1986, 1992). This test has been very popular in basic research and is also used in some institutional settings for purposes of intellectual screening.

RPM was originally designed as a measure of Spearman's *g* factor (Raven, 1938). For this reason, Raven chose a special format for the test that presumably required the exercise of *g*. The reader is reminded that Spearman defined *g* as the "eduction of correlates." The term *eduction* refers to the process of figuring out relationships based on the perceived fundamental similarities between stimuli. In particular, to correctly answer items on the RPM, examinees must identify a recurring pattern or relationship between figural stimuli organized in a 3×3 matrix. The items are arranged in order of increasing difficulty, hence the reference to progressive matrices.

Raven's test is actually a series of three different instruments. Much of the confusion about validity, factorial structure, and the like stems from the unexamined assumption that all three forms should produce equivalent findings. The reader is encouraged to abandon this unwarranted hypothesis. Even though the three forms of the RPM resemble one another, there may be subtle differences in the problem-solving strategies required by each.

The Coloured Progressive Matrices is a 36-item test designed for children from 5 to 11 years of age. Raven incorporated colors into this version of the test to help hold the attention of the young children. The Standard Progressive Matrices is normed for examinees from 6 years and up, although most of the items are so difficult that the test is best suited for adults. This test consists of 60 items grouped into 5 sets of 12 progressions. The Advanced Progressive Matrices is similar to the Standard version but has a higher ceiling. The Advanced version consists of 12 problems in Set I and 36 problems in Set II. This form is especially suitable for persons of superior intellect.

Large sample U.S. norms for the Coloured and Standard Progressive Matrices are reported in Raven and Summers (1986). Separate norms for Mexican American and African American children are included. Although there was no attempt to use a stratified random-sampling procedure, the selection of school districts was so widely varied that the American norms for children appear to be reasonably sound. Sattler (1988) summarizes the relevant norms for all versions of the RPM. Raven, Court, and Raven (1992) produced new norms for the Standard Progressive Matrices, but Gudjonsson (1995) has raised a concern that these data are compromised because the testing was not monitored.

For the Coloured Progressive Matrices, split-half reliabilities in the range of .65 to .94 are reported, with younger children producing lower values (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1986). For the Standard Progressive Matrices, a typical split-half reliability is .86, although lower values are found with younger subjects (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1983). Test–retest reliabilities for all three forms vary considerably from one sample to the next (Raven, 1965; Raven et al., 1986). For normal adults in their late teens or older, reliability coefficients of .80 to .93 are typical. However, for preteen children, reliability coefficients as low as .71 are reported. Thus, for younger subjects, RPM may not possess sufficient reliability to warrant its use for individual decision making.

Factor-analytic studies of the RPM provide little, if any, support for the original intention of the test to measure a unitary construct (Spearman's *g* factor). Studies of the Coloured Progressive Matrices reveal three orthogonal factors (e.g., Carlson & Jensen, 1980). Factor I consists largely of very difficult items and might be termed closure and abstract reasoning by analogy. Factor II is labeled pattern completion through identity and closure. Factor III consists of the easiest items and is defined as simple pattern completion (Carlson & Jensen, 1980). In sum, the very easy and the very hard items on the Coloured Progressive Matrices appear to tap different intellectual processes.

The Advanced Progressive Matrices breaks down into two factors that may have separate predictive validities (Dillon, Pohlmann, & Lohman, 1981). The first factor is composed of items in which the solution is obtained by adding or subtracting patterns (Figure 6.3a). Individuals performing well on these items may excel in rapid decision making and in situations where part–whole relationships must be perceived. The second factor is composed of items in which the solution is based on the ability to perceive the progression of a pattern (Figure 6.3b). Persons who perform well on these items may possess good mechanical ability as well as good skills for estimating projected movement and performing mental rotations. However, the skills represented by each factor are conjectural at this point and in need of independent confirmation.

A huge body of published research bears on the validity of the RPM. The early data are well summarized by Burke (1958), while later findings are compiled in the current RPM manuals (Raven & Summers, 1986; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1983, 1986, 1992). In general, validity coefficients with achievement tests range from the .30s to the .60s. As might be expected, these values are somewhat lower than found with more traditional (verbally loaded) intelligence tests. Validity coefficients with other intelligence tests range from the .50s to the .80s.



FIGURE 6.3 Raven's Progressive Matrices: Typical Items

Also, as might be expected, the correlations tend to be higher with performance than with verbal tests. In a massive study involving thousands of schoolchildren, Saccuzzo and Johnson (1995) concluded that the Standard Progressive Matrices and the WISC-R showed approximately equal predictive validity and no evidence of differential validity across eight different ethnic groups. In a lengthy review, Raven (2000) discusses stability and variation in the norms for the Raven's Progressive Matrices across cultural, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups over the last 60 years. Indicative of the continuing interest in this venerable instrument, Costenbader and Ngari (2001) describe the standardization of the Coloured Progressive Matrices in Kenya. Further indicating the huge international popularity of the test, Khaleefa and Lynn (2008) provide standardization data for 6- to 11-year-old children in Yemen.

Even though the RPM has not lived up to its original intentions of measuring Spearman's *g* factor, the test is nonetheless a useful index of nonverbal, figural reasoning. The recent updating of norms was a much-welcomed development for this well-known test, in that many American users were leary of the outdated and limited British norms. Nonetheless, adult norms for the Standard and Advanced Progressive Matrices are still quite limited.

The RPM is particularly valuable for the supplemental testing of children and adults with hearing, language, or physical disabilities. Often these examinees are difficult to assess with traditional measures that require auditory attention, verbal expression, or physical manipulation. In contrast, the RPM can be explained through pantomime, if necessary. Moreover, the only output required of the examinee is a pencil mark or gesture denoting the chosen alternative. For these reasons, the RPM is ideally suited for testing persons with limited command of the English language. In fact, the RPM is about as culturally reduced as possible: The test protocol does not contain a single word in any language. Mills and Tissot (1995) found that the Advanced Progressive Matrices identified a higher proportion of minority children as gifted than did a more traditional measure of academic aptitude (the School and College Ability Test).

Bilker, Hansen, Brensinger, and others (2012) developed a psychometrically sound 9-item version of the 60-item Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test. The short test cuts testing time to a fraction of the full test. Correlations of scores on the 9-item version with the full scale were in the range of .90 to .98, indicating a minimal loss of measurement accuracy. The short SPM promises to be highly useful for research applications.

Perspective on Culture-Fair Tests

Cattell's Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT) and Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) often are cited as examples of culture-fair tests, a concept with a

long and confused history. We will attempt to clarify terms and issues here.

The first point to make is that intelligence tests are merely samples of what people know and can do. We must not reify intelligence and overvalue intelligence tests. Tests are never samples of innate intelligence or culture-free knowledge. All knowledge is based in culture and acquired over time. As Scarr (1994) notes, there is no such thing as a culture-free test.

But what about a culture-fair test, one that poses problems that are equally familiar (or unfamiliar) to all cultures? This would appear to be a more realistic possibility than a culture-free test, but even here the skeptic can raise objections. Consider the question of what a test *means,* which differs from culture to culture. In theory, a test of matrices would appear to be equally fair to most cultures. But in practice, issues of equity arise. Persons reared in Western cultures are trained in linear, convergent thinking. We know that the purpose of a test is to find the single, best answer and to do so quickly. We examine the 3 × 3 matrix from left to right and top to bottom, looking for the logical principles invoked in the succession of forms. Can we assume that persons reared in Nepal or New Guinea or even the remote, rural stretches of Idaho will do the same? The test may mean something different to them. Perhaps they will approach it as a measure of aesthetic progression rather than logical succession. Perhaps they will regard it as so much silliness not worthy of intense intellectual effort. To assume that a test is equally fair to all cultural groups merely because the stimuli are equally familiar (or unfamiliar) is inappropriate. We can talk about degrees of cultural fairness (or unfairness), but the notion that any test is absolutely culture-fair surely is mistaken.

MULTIPLE APTITUDE TEST BATTERIES

In a multiple aptitude test battery, the examinee is tested in several separate, homogeneous aptitude areas. Typically, the development of the subtests is dictated by the findings of factor analysis. For example, Thurstone developed one of the first multiple aptitude test batteries, the Primary Mental Abilities Test, a set of seven tests chosen on the basis of factor analysis (Thurstone, 1938).

More recently, several multiple aptitude test batteries have gained favor for educational and career counseling, vocational placement, and armed services classification (Gregory, 1994a). Each year hundreds of thousands of persons are administered one of these prominent batteries: the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT), the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), and the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). These batteries either used factor analysis directly for the delineation of useful subtests or were guided in their construction by the accumulated results of other factor-analytic research. The salient characteristics of each battery are briefly reviewed in the following sections.

The Differential Aptitude Test (DAT)

The DAT was first issued in 1947 to provide a basis for the educational and vocational guidance of students in grades 7 through 12. Subsequently, examiners have found the test useful in the vocational counseling of young adults out of school and in the selection of employees. Now in its fifth edition (1992), the test has been periodically revised and stands as one of the most popular multiple aptitude test batteries of all time (Bennett, Seashore, & Wesman, 1982, 1984). Wang (1995) provides a succinct overview of the test.

The DAT consists of eight independent tests:

1. Verbal Reasoning (VR)
2. Numerical Reasoning (NR)
3. Abstract Reasoning (AR)
4. Perceptual Speed and Accuracy (PSA)
5. Mechanical Reasoning (MR)
6. Space Relations (SR)
7. Spelling (S)
8. Language Usage (LU)

A characteristic item from each test is shown in Figure 6.4.

The authors chose the areas for the eight tests based on experimental and experiential data rather than relying on a formal factor analysis of their own.

VERBAL REASONING
Choose the correct pair of words to fill in the blanks.

____ is to eye as eardrum is to ____

A.	vision	—	sound	D.	sight	—	cochlea
B.	iris	—	hear	E.	eyelash	—	earlobe
C.	retina	—	ear				

NUMERICAL ABILITY
Choose the correct answer.

4(–5) (–3) =

A. –60 B. 27 C. –27 D. 60 E. none of these

ABSTRACT REASONING
The four figures in the row to the left make a series. Find the single choice on the right that would be next in the series.

<	<>>	<<>>	<<>>>>	<>	<<<>>	<<<>>>>	<<<<>>>>
				A	B	C	D

CLERICAL SPEED AND ACCURACY
In each test item, one of the combinations is underlined. Mark the same combination on the answer sheet.

1.	AB	Ab	AA	BA	Bb	2.	5m	5M	M5	Mm	m5
	Ab	Bb	AA	BA	AB		M5	m5	Mm	5m	5M
1.	O	O	O	O	O	2.	O	O	O	O	O

MECHANICAL REASONING
Which lever will require more force to lift an object of the same weight? If equal, mark C.

?????? ? ??????

A C (equal) B

SPACE RELATIONS
Which of the figures on the right can be made by folding the pattern at the left? The pattern always displays the outside of the figure.



A B C D

FIGURE 6.4 Differential Aptitude Tests and Characteristic Items

SPELLING
Mark whether each word is spelled right or wrong.

1. irelevant	R	W
2. parsimonious	R	W
3. excellant	R	W

LANGUAGE USAGE
Decide which part of the sentence contains an error and mark the corresponding letter on the answer sheet. Mark N (None) if there is no error.

In spite of public criticism, / the researcher studied /
A B
the affects of radiation / on plant growth.
C D

FIGURE 6.4 *continued*

In constructing the DAT, the authors were guided by several explicit criteria:

- Each test should be an independent test: There are situations in which only part of the battery is required or desired.
- The tests should measure power: For most vocational purposes to which test results contribute, the evaluation of power—solving difficult problems with adequate time—is of primary concern.
- The test battery should yield a profile: The eight separate scores can be converted to percentile ranks and plotted on a common profile chart.
- The norms should be adequate: In the fifth edition, the norms are derived from 100,000 students for the fall standardization, 70,000 for the spring standardization.
- The test materials should be practical: With time limits of 6 to 30 minutes per test, the entire DAT can be administered in a morning or an afternoon school session.
- The tests should be easy to administer: Each test contains excellent "warm-up" examples and can be administered by persons with a minimum of special training.
- Alternate forms should be available: For purposes of retesting, the availability of alternate forms (currently forms C and D) will reduce any practice effects.

The reliability of the DAT is generally quite high, with split-half coefficients largely in the .90s and alternate-forms reliabilities ranging from .73 to .90, with a median of .83. Mechanical Reasoning is an exception, with reliabilities as low as .70 for girls. The tests show a mixed pattern of intercorrelations with each other, which is optimistically interpreted by the authors as establishing the independence of the eight tests. Actually, many of the correlations are quite high and it seems likely that the eight tests reflect a smaller number of ability factors. Certainly, the Verbal Reasoning and Numerical Reasoning tests measure a healthy general factor, with correlations around .70 in various samples.

The manual presents extensive data demonstrating that the DAT tests, especially the VR + NR combination, are good predictors of other criteria such as school grades and scores on other aptitude tests (correlations in the .60s and .70s). For this reason, the combination of VR + NR often is considered an index of scholastic aptitude. Evidence for the *differential* validity of the other tests is rather slim. Bennett, Seashore, and Wesman (1974) do present results of several follow-up studies correlating vocational entry/success with DAT profiles, but their research methods are more impressionistic than quantitative; the independent observer will find it difficult to make use of their results. Schmitt (1995) notes that a major problem with the battery is the

> lack of discriminant validity between the eight subtests. With the exception of the Perceptual Speed and Accuracy test, all of the subscales

are highly intercorrelated (.50 to .75). If one wants only a general index of the person's academic ability, this is fine; if the scores on the subtests are to be used in some diagnostic sense, this level of intercorrelation makes statements about students' relative strengths and weaknesses highly questionable.

Even so, the revised DAT is better than previous editions. One significant improvement is the elimination of apparent sex bias on the Language Usage and Mechanical Reasoning tests—a source of criticism from earlier reviews. The DAT has been translated into several languages and is widely used in Europe for vocational guidance and research applications (e.g., Nijenhuis, Evers, & Mur, 2000; Colom, Quiroga, & Juan-Espinosa, 1999).

A computerized version of the DAT has been available for several years, although its equivalence to the traditional paper and pencil format cannot be taken for granted (Alkhadher, Clarke, & Anderson, 1998). We will have more to say about computerized testing in a later section of the book. For now, it will suffice to mention that the psychometric qualities of a test may shift when the mode of administration is changed. Using counterbalanced testing in which examinees completed both versions (half taking the traditional version first, half taking the computerized version first), Alkhadher et al. (1998) found that oil refinery trainees (N = 122) scored higher on one subtest of the computerized version than on the traditional version of the DAT, namely, the Numerical Ability subtest. The researchers conjectured that the computerized version reduced test fatigue, alleviated time pressure, and also provided novelty—thus boosting test performance modestly.

The General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB)

In the late 1930s, the U.S. Department of Labor developed aptitude tests to predict job performance in 100 specific occupations. In the 1940s, the department hired a panel of experts in measurement and industrial-organizational psychology to create a multiple aptitude test battery to assess the 100 occupations previously studied and many more. The outcome of this Herculean effort was the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), widely acknowledged as the premiere test battery for predicting job performance (Hunter, 1994).

The GATB was derived from a factor analysis of 59 tests administered to thousands of male trainees in vocational courses (United States Employment Service, 1970). The interpretive standards have been periodically revised and updated, so the GATB is a thoroughly modern instrument even though its content is little changed. One limitation is that the battery is available mainly to state employment offices, although nonprofit organizations, including high schools and certain colleges, can make special arrangements for its use.

The GATB is composed of eight paper-and-pencil tests and four apparatus measures. The entire battery can be administered in approximately two-and-a-half hours and is appropriate for high school seniors and adults. The 12 tests yield a total of nine factor scores:

- *General Learning Ability* (intelligence) (G). This score is a composite of Vocabulary, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Three-Dimensional Space.
- *Verbal Aptitude* (V). Derived from a Vocabulary test that requires the examinee to indicate which two words in a set are either synonyms or antonyms.
- *Numerical Aptitude* (N). This score is a composite of both the Computation and Arithmetic Reasoning tests.
- *Spatial Aptitude* (S). Consists of the Three-Dimensional Space test, a measure of the ability to perceive two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional objects and to visualize movement in three dimensions.
- *Form Perception* (P). This score is a composite of Form Matching and Tool Matching, two tests in which the examinee must match identical drawings.
- *Clerical Perception* (Q). A proofreading test called Name Comparison, the examinee must match names under pressure of time.
- *Motor Coordination* (K). Measures the ability to quickly make specified pencil marks in the Mark Making test.

- *Finger Dexterity* (F). A composite of the Assemble and Disassemble tests, two measures of dexterity with rivets and washers.
- *Manual Dexterity* (M). A composite of Place and Turn, two tests requiring the examinee to transfer and reverse pegs in a board.

The nine factor scores on the GATB are expressed as standard scores with a mean of 100 and an SD of 20. These standard scores are anchored to the original normative sample of 4,000 workers obtained in the 1940s. Alternate-forms reliability coefficients for factor scores range from the .80s to the .90s. The GATB manual summarizes several studies of the validity of the test, primarily in terms of its correlation with relevant criterion measures. Hunter (1994) notes that GATB scores predict training success for all levels of job complexity. The average validity coefficient is a phenomenal .62.

The absolute scores are of less interest than their comparison to updated Occupational Aptitude Patterns (OAPs) for dozens of occupations. Based on test results for huge samples of applicants and employees in different occupations, counselors and employers now have access to a wealth of information about score patterns needed for success in a variety of jobs. Thus, one way of using the GATB is to compare an examinee's scores with OAPs believed necessary for proficiency in various occupations.

Hunter (1994) recommends an alternative strategy based on composite aptitudes (Figure 6.5). The nine specific factor scores combine nicely into three general factors: Cognitive, Perceptual, and Psychomotor. Hunter notes that different jobs require various contributions of the Cognitive, Perceptual, and Psychomotor aptitudes. For example, an assembly line worker in an automotive plant might need high scores on the Psychomotor and Perceptual composites, whereas the Cognitive score would be less important for this occupation. Hunter's research demonstrates that general factors dominate over specific factors in the prediction of job performance. Davison, Gasser, and Ding (1996) discuss additional approaches to GATB profile analysis and interpretation.

Van de Vijver and Harsveld (1994) investigated the equivalence of their computerized version of the GATB with the traditional paper-and-pencil version. Of course, only the cognitive and perceptual subtests were compared—tests of motor skills cannot be computerized. They found that the two versions were not equivalent. In particular, the computerized subtests produced faster and more inaccurate responses than the conventional subtests. Their research demonstrates once again that the equivalence of traditional and computerized versions of a test should not be assumed. This is an empirical question answerable only with careful research. Nijenhuis and van der Flier (1997) discuss a Dutch version of the GATB and its application in the study of cognitive differences between immigrants and majority group members in the Netherlands.



FIGURE 6.5 **Specific and General Factors on the GATB**

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)

The ASVAB is probably the most widely used aptitude test in existence. This instrument is used by the Armed Services to screen potential recruits and to assign personnel to different jobs and training programs. The ASVAB is also available in a computerized version that is rapidly supplanting the original paper-and-pencil test (Segall & Moreno, 1999). The computerized ASVAB is discussed in more detail at the end of this section. More than 2 million examinees take the ASVAB each year. The current version consists of nine subtests, four of which produce the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), the common qualifying exam for all services (Table 6.1). Alternate-forms reliability coefficients for ASVAB scores are in the mid-.80s to mid-.90s, and test–retest coefficients range from the mid-.70s to the mid-.80s (Larson, 1994). The one exception is Paragraph Comprehension with a reliability of only .50. The test is well normed on a representative sample of 12,000 persons between the ages of 16 and 23 years. The ASVAB manual reports a median validity coefficient of .60 with measures of training performance.

Decisions about ASVAB examinees are typically based on composite scores, not subtest scores. For example, an Electronics Composite is derived by combining Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Electronics Information, and General Science. Persons scoring well on this composite might be assigned to electronics-related positions. Since the composite scores are empirically derived, new ones can be developed for placement decisions at any time. Composite scores are continually updated and revised.

At one point, the Armed Services relied heavily on the seven composites in the following list (Murphy, 1984). The Coding Speed subtest, listed here, is no longer used. The first three constitute academic composites, whereas the remaining are occupational composites. The reader will notice that individual subtests may appear in more than one composite:

1. Academic Ability: Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Arithmetic Reasoning
2. Verbal: Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and General Science
3. Math: Mathematics Knowledge and Arithmetic Reasoning
4. Mechanical and Crafts: Arithmetic Reasoning, Mechanical Comprehension, Auto and Shop Information, and Electronics Information
5. Business and Clerical: Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Mathematics Knowledge, and Coding Speed
6. Electronics and Electrical: Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Electronics Information, and General Science
7. Health, Social, and Technology: Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Mechanical Comprehension

TABLE 6.1 The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Subtests

Arithmetic Reasoning*	16-item test of arithmetic word problems based on simple calculation
Mathematics Knowledge*	25-item test of algebra, geometry, fractions, decimals, and exponents
Word Knowledge*	35-item test of vocabulary knowledge and synonyms
Paragraph Comprehension*	15-item test of reading comprehension in short paragraphs
General Science	25-item test of general knowledge in physical and biological science
Mechanical Comprehension	25-item test of mechanical and physical principles
Electronics Information	20-item test of electronics, radio, and electrical principles
Assembling Objects	16-item test of mechanical and assembly concepts
Auto and Shop	25-item test of basic knowledge of autos, shop practices, and tool usage

*Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).

The problem with forming composites in this manner is that they are so highly correlated with one another as to be essentially redundant. In fact, the average intercorrelation among these seven composite scores is .86 (Murphy, 1984)! Clearly, composites do not always provide differential information about specific aptitudes. Perhaps that is why recent editions of the ASVAB have steered clear of multiple, complex composites. Instead, the emphasis is on simpler composites that are composed of highly related constructs. For example, a Verbal Ability composite is derived from Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension, two highly inter-related subtests. In like manner, a Math Ability composite is obtained from the combination of Arithmetic Reasoning and Mathematics Knowledge.

Some researchers have concluded that the ASVAB does not function as a multiple aptitude test battery but achieves success in predicting diverse vocational assignments because the composites invariably tap a general factor of intelligence. For example, Dunai and Porter (2001) report favorably on the ASVAB as a predictor of entry-level success of radiography students in Air Force medical training. The ASVAB may be a good test of general intelligence, but it falls short as a multiple aptitude test battery. Another concern is that the test may possess different psychometric structures for men and women. Specifically, the Electronics Information subtest is a good measure of *g* (the general factor of intelligence) for men but not women (Ree & Carretta, 1995). The likely explanation for this is that men are about nine times more likely to enroll in high school classes in electronics and auto shop, and men, therefore, have the opportunity for their general ability to shape what they learn about electronics information, whereas women do not. Scores on this subtest will, therefore, function as a measure of achievement (what has already been learned) but not as an index of aptitude (forecasting future results).

Research on a computerized adaptive testing (CAT) version of the ASVAB has been under way since the 1980s. Computerized adaptive testing is discussed in Topic 12B, Computerized Assessment and the Future of Testing. We provide a brief overview here. In CAT, the examinee takes the test while sitting at a computer terminal. The difficulty level of the items presented on the screen is continually readjusted as a function of the examinee's ongoing performance. In general, an examinee who answers a subtest item correctly will receive a harder item, whereas an examinee who fails that item will receive an easier item. The computer uses item response theory as a basis for selecting items. Each examinee receives a unique set of test items tailored to his or her ability level.

In 1990, the CAT-ASVAB began to replace the paper-and-pencil ASVAB. Currently, more than two-thirds of all military applicants are tested with the computerized version. Larson (1994) lists the reasons for adopting the CAT-ASVAB as follows:

1. Shorten overall testing time (adaptive tests require roughly one-half the items of standard tests).
2. Increase test security by eliminating the possibility that test booklets could be stolen.
3. Increase test precision at the upper and lower ability extremes.
4. Provide a means for immediate feedback on test scores, since the computers used for testing can immediately score the tests and output the results.
5. Provide a means for flexible test start times (unlike group-administered paper-and-pencil tests, for which everyone must start and stop at the same time, computer-based testing can be tailored to the examinees' personal schedules) (Larson, 1994).

Reliability and validity studies of the CAT-ASVAB provide strong support for its equivalence to the original test. In general, the computerized version of the instrument measures the same constructs as its paper-and-pencil counterpart—and does so in less time and with greater precision (Moreno & Segall, 1997). With the success of this project, the CAT-ASVAB and other tests likely will be expanded to measure new aspects of performance such as response latencies and to display unique item types such as visuospatial tests of objects in motion (Larson, 1994). The CAT-ASVAB has the potential to change the future of testing.

PREDICTING COLLEGE PERFORMANCE

As most every college student knows, a major use of aptitude tests is the prediction of academic performance. In most cases, applicants to college must contend with the Scholastic Assessment Tests (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) assessment program. Institutions may set minimum standards on the SAT or ACT tests for admission, based on the knowledge that low scores foretell college failure. In this section we will explore the technical adequacy and predictive validity of the major college aptitude tests.

The Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)

Formerly known as the Scholastic Aptitude Tests, the Scholastic Assessment Test, or SAT, is the oldest of the college admissions tests, dating back to 1926. The SAT is published by the College Board (formerly the College Entrance Examination Board), a group formed in 1899 to provide a national clearinghouse for admissions testing. As noted by historian Fuess (1950), the purpose of a nationally based admissions test was "to introduce law and order into an educational anarchy which towards the close of the nineteenth century had become exasperating, indeed almost intolerable, to schoolmasters." Over the years, the test has been extensively revised, continuously updated, and repeatedly renormed. In the early 1990s, the SAT was renamed the Scholastic Assessment Test to emphasize changes in content and format. The new SAT assesses mastery of high school subject matter to a greater extent than its predecessor but continues to tap reasoning skills. The SAT represents state of the art for aptitude testing.

The new SAT, released in 2005, consists of the SAT Reasoning Test and the SAT Subject Tests. The SAT Reasoning Test is used for college admission decisions, whereas the optional SAT Subject Tests typically are needed for advanced college placement in fields such as Biology, Chemistry, History, Foreign Languages, and Mathematics. We restrict our discussion here to the SAT Reasoning Test. For ease of discussion, we refer to it simply as the "SAT."

The SAT consists of three sections, each containing three or four subtests (Table 6.2). The Critical Reading section involves reading individual paragraphs and then answering multiple-choice questions about the passages. The questions embody three approaches:

TABLE 6.2 Sections and Subtests of the SAT Reasoning Test

Section	*Subtests*
Critical Reading	Extended Reasoning Literal Comprehension Vocabulary in Context
Math	Numbers and Operations Algebra and Functions Geometry and Measurement Data Analysis, Statistics, and Probability
Writing	Essay Improving Sentences Identifying Sentence Errors Improving Paragraphs

> Vocabulary in Context—discerning the meaning of words from their context in the passage
>
> Literal Comprehension—understanding significant information directly available in the passage
>
> Extended Reasoning—following an argument or making inferences from the passage

Some questions in the Critical Reading section also engage a complex form of fill in the blanks. However, instead of testing for mere factual knowledge, the questions evaluate verbal comprehension. Here is a straightforward example:

> Hoping to _____ the dispute, the family therapist proposed a concession that he felt would be _____ to both mother and daughter.
>
> A. end . . . divisive
> B. overcome . . . unappealing
> C. protract . . . satisfactory
> D. resolve . . . acceptable
> E. enforce . . . useful

The correct answer is D. Of course, the SAT incorporates more difficult items of this genre.

The second part of the SAT is the Math section, consisting of three subtests. Collectively, these subtests assess basic math skills in algebra, geometry, statistics, and data analysis needed for successful navigation of college. Most of the questions are multiple-choice format, for example:

A special lottery was announced to select the student who will live in the only luxury apartment in student housing. In all, 50 juniors, 125 sophomores, and 175 freshmen applied. However, juniors were allowed to purchase 4 tickets each. What is the probability that the room will be awarded to a junior?

A. 1/5
B. 1/2
C. 2/5
D. 1/7
E. 2/7

The correct answer is C. In addition to multiple-choice questions, the Math section includes several items that require the student to generate a single correct answer and then enter it on the response sheet. For example:

What value of x satisfies both equations below?

$$x^2 - 4 = 0$$

$$|4x + 6| = 2$$

The correct answer is –2. Strategies for finding a solution that might work with a multiple-choice question—trial and error, or process of elimination—are not likely to help with this style of question. Here the examinee must generate the correct answer by dint of careful analysis.

The Writing portion of the SAT now consists of a 25-minute Essay section and three multiple-choice subtests that evaluate the ability of the examinee to improve sentences, identify sentence errors, and improve paragraphs. In the Essay test, the examinee reads a short excerpt and then writes a short paper that takes a point of view. Here is an example of an excerpt and assignment:

> A sense of happiness and fulfillment, not personal gain, is the best motivation and reward for one's achievements. Expecting a reward of wealth or recognition for achieving a goal can lead to disappointment and frustration. If we want to be happy in what we do in life, we should not seek achievement for the sake of winning wealth and fame. The personal satisfaction of a job well done is its own reward.
>
> Assignment: Are people motivated to achieve by personal satisfaction rather than by money or fame? Plan and write an essay in which you develop your point of view on this issue. Support your position with reasoning and examples taken from your reading, studies, experience, or observations. (College Board, 2005)

The essay is evaluated by two trained readers on a 1 to 6 scale, resulting in a total score of 2 to 12 for the Essay test. Students also receive a separate score on a scale from 20 to 80 for the multiple-choice portion of the Writing section. Both these scores are combined for the overall section score for Writing. SAT scores for each of the three sections—Critical Reading, Math, and Writing—are now reported on the familiar 200- to 800-point scale, with an approximate mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100.

Great care is taken in the construction of new forms of the SAT because unfailing reliability and a high degree of parallelism are essential to the mission of this testing program. Historically, the internal consistency reliability of all sections is repeatedly in the range of .91 to .93; with only a few exceptions, test–retest correlations vary between .87 and .89. The standard error of measurement is 30 to 35 points.

Frey and Detterman (2004) conducted a sophisticated factor analytic study of the relationship between the SAT and *g* or general intelligence. Results for 917 youth who took the SAT and the ASVAB indicated a correlation of .82 between *g* (as extracted from ASVAB results) and SAT scores. They concluded that the SAT is an excellent measure of general cognitive ability.

The primary evidence for SAT validity is criterion-related, in this case, the ability to predict first-year college grades. Donlon (1984, chap. VIII) reports a wealth of information on this point for earlier editions; we can only summarize trends here. In 685 studies, the combined SAT Verbal

and Math scores correlated .42, on average, with college first-year grade point average. Interestingly, high school record (e.g., rank or grade point average) fares better than the SAT in predicting college grades ($r = .48$). But the combination of SAT and high school record proves even more predictive; these variables correlated .55, on average, with college first-year grade point average. Of course, these findings reflect a substantial restriction of range: low SAT-scoring high school students tend not to attend college. Donlon (1984) estimated that the real correlation without restriction of range (SAT + high school record) would be in the neighborhood of .65. According to the College Board website, the combination of SAT and high school GPA continues to provide a robust correlation ($r = .62$) with freshman grades. Based on a sample of 151,316 students attending 110 colleges and universities across the United States, these results leave no room for doubt as to the general predictive power of SAT scores (www.collegeboard.com). However, the results also show that for students whose best language is not English (e.g., children of recent immigrants), the crucial reading and writing portions of the SAT underpredict freshman grades.

The American College Test (ACT)

The American College Test (ACT) assessment program is a recent program of testing and reporting designed for college-bound students. In addition to traditional test scores, the ACT assessment program includes a brief 90-item interest inventory (based on Holland's typology) and a student profile section (in which the student may list subjects studied, notable accomplishments, work experience, and community service). We will not discuss these ancillary measures here, except to note that they are useful in generating the Student Profile Report, which is sent to the examinee and the colleges listed on the registration folder.

Initiated in 1959, the ACT is based on the philosophy that direct tests of the skills needed in college courses provide the most efficient basis for predicting college performance. In terms of the number of students who take it, the ACT occupies second place behind the SAT as a college admissions test. The four ACT tests require knowledge of a subject area, but emphasize the use of that knowledge:

- English (75 questions, 45 minutes). The examinee is presented with several prose passages excerpted from published writings. Certain portions of the text are underlined and numbered, and possible revisions for the underlined sections are presented; in addition, "no change" is one choice. The examinee must choose the best option.
- Mathematics (60 questions, 60 minutes). Here the examinee is asked to solve the kinds of mathematics problems likely to be encountered in basic college mathematics courses. The test emphasizes concepts rather than formulas and uses a multiple-choice format.
- Reading (40 questions, 35 minutes). This subtest is designed to assess the examinee's level of reading comprehension; subscores are reported for social studies/sciences and arts/literature reading skills.
- Science Reasoning (40 questions, 35 minutes). This test assesses the ability to read and understand material in the natural sciences. The questions are drawn from data representations, research summaries, and conflicting viewpoints.

In addition to the area scores listed previously, ACT results are also reported as an overall Composite score, which is the average of the four tests. ACT scores are reported on a standard score 36-point scale. In 2012, the average ACT Composite score of high school graduates was 21.1, with a standard deviation of about 5 points.

Critics of the ACT program have pointed to the heavy emphasis on reading comprehension that saturates all four tests. The average intercorrelation of the tests is typically around .60. These data suggest that a general achievement/ability factor pervades all four tests; results for any one test should not be overinterpreted. Fortunately, college admission officers probably place the greatest emphasis on the Composite score, which is the average of the four separate tests. The ACT test appears to measure much the same thing as the SAT; the correlation between these two tests approaches .90. It

is not surprising, then, that the predictive validity of the ACT Composite score rivals the SAT combined score, with correlations in the vicinity of .40 to .50 with college first-year grade point average. The predictive validity coefficients are virtually identical for advantaged and disadvantaged students, indicating that the ACT tests are not biased.

Kifer (1985) does not question the technical adequacy of the ACT and similar testing programs but does protest the enormous symbolic power these tests have accrued. The heavy emphasis on test scores for college admissions is not a technical issue, but a social, moral, and political concern:

> Selective admissions means simply that an institution cannot or will not admit each person who completes an application. Choices of who will or will not be admitted should be, first of all, a matter of what the institution believes is desirable and may or may not include the use of prediction equations. It is just as defensible to select on talent broadly construed as it is to use test scores however high. There are talented students in many areas—leaders, organizers, doers, musicians, athletes, science award winners, opera buffs—who may have moderate or low ACT scores but whose presence on a campus would change it.

The reader may wish to review Topic 6B, Test Bias and Other Controversies, for further discussion of this point.

POSTGRADUATE SELECTION TESTS

Graduate and professional programs also rely heavily on aptitude tests for admission decisions. Of course, many other factors are considered when selecting students for advanced training, but there is no denying the centrality of aptitude test results in the selection decision. For example, Figure 6.6 depicts a fairly typical quantitative weighting system used in evaluating applicants for graduate training in psychology. The reader will notice that an overall score on the

GRE Scores GRE-V + GRE-Q total:	**0**	**6** 1,000	**12** 1,100	**18** 1,200	**24** 1,300	**30** 1,400
Undergraduate GPA	**0**	**5** 3.0	**10** 3.2	**15** 3.4	**20** 3.6	**25** 3.8
Psychology GPA	**0**	**1** 3.0	**2** 3.2	**3** 3.4	**4** 3.6	**5** 3.9
Background in Statistics/Experimental	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Background in Biology/Chemistry	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Background in Math/Computer Science	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Research Experience	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Positive Interpersonal Skills	**0**	**2**	**4**	**6**	**8**	**10**
Ethnic/Linguistic/Cultural Diversity	**0**	**2**	**4**	**6**	**8**	**10**
					Maximum Total:	**100**

FIGURE 6.6 **Representative Weighting Scheme Used by Graduate Program Admission Committees in Psychology**

Graduate Record Exam (GRE) receives the single highest weighting in the selection process. We review the GRE in the following sections, as well as admission tests used by medical schools and law schools.

Graduate Record Exam (GRE)

The GRE is a multiple-choice and essay test widely used by graduate programs in many fields as one component in the selection of candidates for advanced training. The GRE offers subject examinations in many fields (e.g., Biology, Computer Science, History, Mathematics, Political Science, Psychology), but the heart of the test is the general test designed to measure verbal, quantitative, and analytical writing aptitudes. The verbal section (GRE-V) includes verbal items such as analogies, sentence completion, antonyms, and reading comprehension. The quantitative section (GRE-Q) consists of problems in algebra, geometry, reasoning, and the interpretation of data, graphs, and diagrams. The analytical writing section (GRE-AW) was added in October 2002 as a measure of higher-level critical thinking and analytical writing skills. It consists of two writing tasks: A 30-minute essay in which the applicant analyzes an issue, and a 30-minute essay in which the applicant analyzes an argument. Here is an example of an issue question:

> As people rely more and more on technology to solve problems, the ability of humans to think for themselves will surely deteriorate.
>
> Discuss the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement and explain your reasoning for the position you take. In developing and supporting your position, you should consider ways in which the statement might or might not hold true and explain how these considerations shape your position. (www.ets.org/gre).

The argument questions entail reading a short paragraph that invokes an argument, and writing a critique of the argument.

Beginning in 2012, the first two scores (GRE-V and GRE-Q) were reported as standard scores with a mean of about 150 and a range of 130 to 170. This new scaling metric represents a substantial change from the familiar GRE scale employed since the 1950s. Prior to 2012, the first two scores (GRE-V and GRE-Q) were reported as standard scores with a mean of about 500 and standard deviation of 100 (range of 200 to 800). Actually, the mean scores shifted from year to year because all test results were anchored to a standard reference group of 2,095 college seniors tested in 1952 on the verbal and quantitative portions of the test. Historically, graduate programs have paid more attention to the first two parts of the test (GRE-V and GRE-Q). Recently, programs have acknowledged the importance of writing skills in their applications, which explains the addition of the analytical writing section (GRE-AW).

Scoring of the analytical writing section is based on 6-point holistic ratings provided independently by two trained raters. If the two scores differ by more than one point on the scale, the discrepancy is adjudicated by a third GRE-AW reader. According to the GRE Board (www.gre.org), the GRE-AW test reveals smaller ethnic group differences than found in the multiple-choice sections. For example, the differences between African American and Caucasian examinees and between Hispanic and Caucasian examinees are smaller on the GRE-AW than on the GRE-V or GRE-Q. This suggests that the new test does not unduly penalize ethnic groups traditionally underrepresented in graduate programs.

The reliability of the GRE is strong, with internal consistency reliability coefficients typically around .90 for the three components. The validity of the GRE commonly has been examined in relation to the ability of the test to predict performance in graduate school. Performance has been operationalized mainly as grade point average, although faculty ratings of student aptitude also have been used. For example, based on a meta-analytic review of 22 studies with a total of 5,186 students, Morrison and Morrison (1995) concluded that GRE-V correlated .28 and GRE-Q correlated .22 with graduate grade point average. Thus, on average, GRE scores accounted for only 6.3 percent of the variance in graduate-level academic performance. In a recent study of 170 graduate students in psychology at Yale University, Sternberg and Williams (1997) also found minimal correlations between GRE scores and graduate grades. When

GRE scores were correlated with faculty ratings on five variables (analytical, creative, practical, research, and teaching abilities), the correlations were even lower, for the most part hovering right around zero. The single exception was the GRE analytical thinking score, which correlated modestly with almost all of the faculty ratings. However, this correlation was observed *only* for men (on the order of $r = .3$), whereas for women it was almost exactly zero in every case! Based on these and similar studies, the consensus would appear to be that excessive reliance on the GRE for graduate school selection may overlook a talented pool of promising graduate students.

However, other researchers are more supportive in their evaluation of the GRE, noting that the correlation of GRE scores and graduate grades is not a good index of validity because of the restriction of range problem (Kuncel, Campbell, & Ones, 1998). Specifically, applicants with low GRE scores are unlikely to be accepted for graduate training in the first place and, thus, relatively little information is available with respect to whether low scores predict poor academic performance. Put simply, the correlation of GRE scores with graduate academic performance is based *mainly* on persons with middle to high levels of GRE scores, that is, GRE-V + GRE-Q totals of 1,000 and up. As such, the correlation will be attenuated precisely because those with low GREs are not included in the sample. Another problem with validating the GRE against grades in graduate school is the unreliability of the criterion (grades). Based on the expectation that graduate students will perform at high levels, some professors may give blanket A's such that grades do not reflect real differences in student aptitudes. This would lower the correlation between the predictor (GRE scores) and the criterion (graduate grades). When these factors are accounted for, many researchers find reason to believe the GRE is still a valid tool for graduate school selection (Powers, 2004).

In a comprehensive meta-analysis of 1,753 independent groups of students, Kuncel, Hezlett, and Ones (2001) confirmed the validity of the GRE tests (Verbal, Quantitative, and Analytical) for the prediction of graduate student performance. The total sample size for their analysis was huge, including 82,659 students. The breadth of their investigation allowed them to code studies for several different forms of student accomplishment. GRE general test scores were significantly associated with the following student outcomes: first-year GPA, overall GPA, comprehensive exam scores, faculty ratings, and publication citation counts. The researchers also discovered that the GRE Psychology subject test outperformed the general test as a predictive measure of student success.

Medical College Admission Test (MCAT)

The MCAT is required of applicants to almost all medical schools in the United States. The test is designed to assess achievement of the basic skills and concepts that are prerequisites for successful completion of medical school. There are three multiple-choice sections (Verbal Reasoning, Physical Sciences, Biological Sciences) (40 questions). The Verbal Reasoning section is designed to evaluate the ability to understand and apply information and arguments presented in written form. Specifically, the test consists of several passages of about 500 to 600 words each, taken from humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Each passage is followed by several questions based on information included in the passage. The Physical Sciences section (52 questions) is designed to evaluate reasoning in general chemistry and physics. The Biological Sciences section (52 questions) is designed to evaluate reasoning in biology and organic chemistry. These physical and biological science sections contain 10 to 11 problem sets described in about 250 words each, with several questions following.

Following the three required parts of the MCAT, an optional trial section of 32 questions is administered. This portion is not scored. The purpose of the trial section is to pretest questions for future exams. Some trial questions are designed for a new section of the MCAT, *Psychological, Social, and Biological Foundations of Behavior*, scheduled to commence in 2015. This new section will test knowledge of important concepts in introductory psychology, sociology, and biology, related to mental processes and behavior. The addition of this section acknowledges that effective doctors need to understand the whole person, including social and cultural determinants of health and health-related behaviors.

Each of the MCAT scores is reported on a scale from 1 to 15 (means of about 8.0 and standard deviations of about 2.5). The reliability of the test is lower than that of other aptitude tests used for selection, with internal consistency and split-half coefficients mainly in the low .80s (Gregory, 1994a). MCAT scores are mildly predictive of success in medical school, but once again the restriction of range conundrum (previously discussed in relation to the GRE) is at play. In particular, examinees with low MCAT scores who would presumably confirm the validity of the test by performing poorly in medical school are rarely admitted, which reduces the apparent validity of the test.

Julian (2005) confirmed the validity of the MCAT for predicting medical school performance by following 4,076 students who entered 14 medical schools in 1992 and 1993. Outcome variables included GPA and national medical licensing exam scores. When corrected for restriction of range, the predictive validity coefficients for MCAT scores were impressive, on the order of .6 for medical school grades, and as high as .7 for licensing exam scores. In fact, the MCAT scores were so strongly predictive of licensing exam scores that adding undergraduate GPAs into the equation did not appreciably boost the correlation. Julian (2005) concludes that MCAT scores essentially replace the need for undergraduate GPAs in medical school student selection because of their remarkable capacity to predict medical licensing exam scores.

Law School Admission Test (LSAT)

The LSAT is more than 60 years old. The test arose in the 1940s as a group effort from deans of leading law schools, who used first year grades in the early validation of the instrument (LaPiana, 1998). Practicality was a major impetus for test development, as law schools were flooded with worthy applicants. Also, there was an idealistic desire to ensure that admission to law school was based on aptitude and potential, not on privilege or connection. A leading figure in LSAT development has noted:

> What makes us Americans is our adherence to the system that governs our nation. If that's true, then being a lawyer is one of the most important jobs in American society because it is the lawyer's job to make sure the law works and serves people. And if that is true, than the American legal profession is much too important to be left in the hands of a self-perpetuating elite. It has to be open to all Americans with the talent and ability to do legal work, no matter how their last names are spelled or where they or their ancestors were born or the color of their skin (LaPiana, 1998, p. 12).

About 150,000 individuals take the LSAT each year. Of course, many other variables come into play in law school admissions, but test results probably are the single most important factor.

The LSAT is a half-day standardized test required of applicants to virtually every law school in the United States. The test is designed to measure skills considered essential for success in law school, including the reading and understanding of complex material, the organization and management of information, and the ability to reason critically and draw correct inferences. The LSAT consists of multiple-choice questions in four areas: reading comprehension, analytical reasoning, and two logical reasoning sections. An additional section is used to pretest new test items and to preequate new test forms, but this section does not contribute to the LSAT score. The score scale for the LSAT extends from a low of 120 to a high of 180. In addition to the objective portions, a 35-minute writing sample is administered at the end of the test. The section is not scored, but copies of the writing sample are sent to all law schools to which the examinee applies.

The LSAT has acceptable reliability (internal consistency coefficients in the .90s) and is regarded as a moderately valid predictor of law school grades. Yet, in one fascinating study, LSAT scores correlated more strongly with state bar test results than with law school grades (Melton, 1985). This speaks well for the validity of the test, insofar as it links LSAT scores with an important, real-world criterion.

In recent years, those responsible for law school admissions have shown interest in selection methods that go beyond the LSAT. One example is a promising project from the University of California, Berkeley, which ambitiously seeks to assess

26 traits identified as crucial to effective performance of lawyers (Chamberlin, 2009). Using focus groups and individual interviews, psychologist Sheldon Zedeck and lawyer Marjorie Shultz distilled these 26 traits, which include varied capacities like practical judgment, researching the law, writing, integrity/honesty, negotiation skills, developing relationships, stress management, fact finding, diligence, listening, and community involvement/service. Next they developed realistic scenarios designed to evaluate one or more of these qualities. A sample question might ask the applicant to take the role of a team leader in a law firm. A verbal fight breaks out between two of the team members over the best way to proceed with the project. What should the team leader do? A number of options are listed, and the applicant is asked to rank them from best to worst. The format of the questions is varied. For other questions, the applicant might be asked to provide a short written response. Initial research with this yet-unnamed instrument indicates that it predicts success in the practice of law substantially better than the LSAT.

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT TESTS

Achievement tests permit a wide range of potential uses. Practical applications of group achievement tests include the following:

- To identify children and adults with specific achievement deficits who might need more detailed assessment for learning disabilities
- To help parents recognize the academic strengths and weaknesses of their children and thereby foster individual remedial efforts at home
- To identify classwide or schoolwide achievement deficiencies as a basis for redirection of instructional efforts
- To appraise the success of educational programs by measuring the subsequent skill attainment of students
- To group students according to similar skill level in specific academic domains
- To identify the level of instruction that is appropriate for individual students

Thus, achievement tests serve institutional goals such as monitoring schoolwide achievement levels, but also play an important role in the assessment of individual learning difficulties. As previously noted, different kinds of achievement tests are used to pursue these two fundamental applications (institutional and individual). Institutional goals are best served by group achievement test batteries, whereas individual assessment is commonly pursued with individual achievement tests (even though group tests may play a role here, too). Here we focus on group educational achievement tests.

Virtually every school system in the nation uses at least one educational achievement test, so it is not surprising that test publishers have responded to the widespread need by developing a panoply of excellent instruments.

In the following section, we describe several of the most widely used group standardized achievement tests. We limit our coverage here to three educational achievement tests, each distinctive in its own way. The Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) is representative of the huge industry of standardized achievement testing used in virtually all school systems nationwide. The Metropolitan Achievement Test is of the same genre as the ITBS but embodies a new and powerful technique of reading assessment known as the Lexile approach and, thus, merits special attention. Finally, almost everyone has heard of the Tests of General Educational Development, known familiarly as the "GED." We would be remiss not to discuss this testing program.

Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS)

First published in 1935, the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) were most recently revised and restandardized in 2001. The ITBS is a multilevel battery of achievement tests that covers grades K through 8. A companion test, the Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP), covers grades 9 through 12. In order to expedite direct and accurate comparisons of achievement and ability, the ITBS and the TAP were both concurrently normed with the Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT), a respected group test of general intellectual ability.

The ITBS is available in several levels that correspond roughly with the ages of the potential

examinees: levels 5–6 (grades K–1), levels 7–8 (grades 2–3), and levels 9–14 (grades 3–8). The basic subtests for the older levels measure vocabulary, reading, language, mathematics, social studies, science, and sources of information (e.g., uses of maps and diagrams). A brief description of the subtests for grades 3–8 is provided in Table 6.3.

From the first edition onward, the ITBS has been guided by a pragmatic philosophy of educational measurement. The manual states the purpose of testing as follows:

> The purpose of measurement is to provide information which can be used in improving instruction. Measurement has value to the extent that it results in better decisions which directly affect pupils.

To this end, the ITBS incorporates a criterion-referenced skills analysis to supplement the usual array of norm-referenced scores. For example, one feature available from the publisher's scoring service is item-level information. This information indicates topic areas, items sampling the topic, and correct or wrong response for each item. Teachers, therefore, have access to a wealth of diagnostic-instructional information for each student. Whether this information translates to better instruction—as the test authors desire—is very difficult to quantify. As Linn (1989) notes, "We must rely mostly on logic, anecdotes, and opinions when it comes to answering such questions."

The technical properties of the ITBS are beyond reproach. Historically, internal consistency and equivalent-form reliability coefficients are mostly in the mid-.80s to low .90s. Stability coefficients for a one-year interval are almost all in the .70 to .90 range. The test is free from overt racial and gender bias, as determined by content evaluation and item bias studies. The year 2000 norms for the test were empirically developed from large, representative national probability samples.

Item content of the ITBS is judged relevant by curriculum experts and reviewers, which speaks to the content validity of the test (Lane, 1992; Linn, 1989). Although the predictive validity of the latest ITBS has not been studied extensively, evidence from prior editions is very encouraging. For example, ITBS scores correlate moderately with high

TABLE 6.3 Brief Description of ITBS Subtests for Grades 3–8

Vocabulary: A word is presented in the context of a short phrase or sentence, and students select the correct meaning from multiple-choice alternatives.
Reading Comprehension: Students read a brief passage and answer multiple-choice questions that require inference or generalization.
Spelling: Each multiple-choice item presents four words, one of which may be misspelled, and fifth option, *no mistakes.*
Capitalization: Test items require students to identify errors of under- or overcapitalization present in brief written passages.
Punctuation: Multiple-choice items require students to identify errors of punctuation involving commas, apostrophes, quotation marks, colons, and so on, or choose *no mistakes.*
Usage and Expression: In the first part, students identify errors in usage or expression; in the second part, students choose the best way to express an idea.
Math Concepts and Estimation: Questions deal with computation, algebra, geometry, measurement, and probability and statistics.
Math Problem Solving and Data Interpretation: Questions may involve multistep word problems or interpretation of tables and graphs.
Math Computation: These test items require the use of one arithmetic operation (addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division) with whole numbers, fractions, and decimals.
Social Studies: These questions involve aspects of history, geography, economics, and so on that are ordinarily covered in most school systems.
Science: These test items involve aspects of biology, ecology, space science, and physical sciences ordinarily covered in most school systems.
Maps and Diagrams: These questions evaluate the ability to use maps for a variety of purposes such as determining locations, directions, and distances.
Reference Materials: These questions measure the ability to use reference materials and library resources.

school grades (*r*'s around .60). The ITBS is not a perfect instrument, but it represents the best that modern test development methods can produce.

Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT)

The Metropolitan Achievement Test dates back to 1930 when the test was designed to meet the curriculum assessment needs of New York City. The stated purpose of the MAT is "to measure the achievement of students in the major skill and content areas of the school curriculum." The MAT is concurrently normed with the Otis-Lennon School Ability Test (OLSAT).

Now in its eighth edition, the MAT is a multilevel battery designed for grades K through 12 and was most recently normed in 2000. The areas tested by the MAT include the traditional school-related skills:

Reading
Mathematics
Language
Writing
Science
Social Studies

An attractive feature of the MAT is that student reading scores are reported as Lexile measures, a new and practical indicator of reading level. Lexile measures are likely to become a standard feature in most group achievement tests in the years ahead, so it is worth a brief detour to explain their nature and significance.

Lexile Measures

The Lexile approach is a major new improvement in the assessment of reading skill. It was developed over a span of more than 12 years using millions of dollars in grant funds from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) (www.lexile.com). The Lexile approach is based on two simple, commonsense assumptions, namely (1) reading materials can be placed on a continuum as to difficulty level (comprehensibility) and (2) readers can be ordered on a continuum as to reading ability. The Lexile framework provides a common metric for matching readers and text, which, in turn, permits parents and educators to choose appropriate reading materials for children.

The **Lexile scale** is a true interval scale. The Lexile measure for a reading selection is a specific number indicating the reading demand of the text based on the semantic difficulty (vocabulary) and syntactic complexity (sentence length). Lexile measures for reading selections typically range from 200L to 1,700L (Lexiles). The Lexile score for a student, obtained from the Reading Comprehension test of the MAT or other achievement tests, is a precise index of the student's reading ability, calibrated on the same scale as the Lexile measure for text. The value of the Lexile approach is that student comprehension can be predicted as a function of the disparity between the demands of the text and the student's ability. For example, when readers are well targeted (the difference between text and reader is close to 0 Lexiles), research indicates that reader comprehension will be about 75 percent. When the text difficulty exceeds the reader's ability by 250L, comprehension drops to about 50 percent. When the skill of the reader exceeds the demands of the text by 250L, comprehension is about 90 percent (www.lexile.com).

The Lexile approach has a number of potential benefits and applications for teachers and parents. Teachers can look up Lexile measures for specific books (the Lexile corporation has evaluated over 30,000 titles to date) as a way of building a library of titles at varying levels. Also, they can produce individualized reading lists suitable for each student. Likewise, parents can select well-matched books to read to their children. Stenner (2001) captures the allure of the Lexile approach as follows:

> One of the great strengths of the Lexile Framework is the way it encourages thought about what forecasted comprehension rate would be optimal for different instructional contexts. *Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire* is a 910L text. Readers at 400L to 500L can nonetheless enjoy listening to this story read aloud. A 700L reader could read the text in a one-on-one tutoring context. A 900L reader will disappear for an hour or two, fully capable of self-engaging with the text, and a 1600L adult reader can become so engrossed that a two-hour plane ride flies by.

The Lexile approach is not a panacea, but it is a major improvement in the assessment of reading skill.

Tests of General Educational Development (GED)

Another widely used achievement test battery is the Tests of General Educational Development (GED), developed by the American Council on Education and administered nationwide for high school equivalency certification (www.acenet.edu). The GED consists of multiple-choice examinations in five educational areas:

Language Arts—Writing
Language Arts—Reading
Mathematics
Science
Social Studies

The Language Arts—Writing section also contains an essay question that examinees must answer in writing. The essay question is scored independently by two trained readers according to a 6-point holistic scoring method. The readers make a judgment about the essay based on its overall effectiveness in comparison to the effectiveness of other essays.

The GED comes in numerous alternate forms. Typically, internal consistency reliabilities for the subscales are above .90. However, the interrater reliability of scoring on the writing samples is more modest, typically between .6 and .7. These findings indicate that a liberal criterion for passing this subtest is appropriate so as to reduce decision errors. Regarding validity, the GED correlates very strongly (r = .77) with the graduation reading test used in New York (Whitney, Malizio, & Patience, 1985). Furthermore, the standards for passing the GED are more stringent than those employed by most high schools: Currently, individuals who receive a passing score for a GED credential outperform at least 40 percent of graduating high school seniors (www.acenet.edu).

The GED emphasizes broad concepts rather than specific facts and details. In general, the purpose of the GED is to allow adults who did not graduate from high school to prove that they have obtained an equivalent level of knowledge from life experiences or independent study. Employers regard the GED as equivalent (if not superior) to earning a high school diploma. Successful performance on the GED enables individuals to apply to colleges, seek jobs, and request promotions that require a high school diploma as a prerequisite. Rogers (1992) provides an unusually thorough review of the GED.

Additional Group Standardized Achievement Tests

In addition to the previously described batteries, a few other widely used group standardized achievement tests deserve brief listing. These instruments are depicted in Table 6.4.

TABLE 6.4 Selected Group Achievement Tests for Elementary and Secondary School Assessment

Iowa Tests of Educational Development (ITED)
Designed for grades 9 through 12, the objective of this test battery is to measure the fundamental goals or generalized skills of education that are independent of the curriculum. Most of the test items require the synthesis of knowledge or a multiple-step solution.

Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP)
This instrument is designed to provide a comprehensive appraisal of student progress toward traditional academic goals in grades 9 through 12. This test is co-normed with the ITED and the CogAT.

Stanford Achievement Test (SAchT)
Along with the ITBS, the SAchT is one of the leading contemporary achievement tests. Dating back more than 80 years and now in its tenth edition, it is administered to more than 15 million students every year.

TerraNova CTBS
For grades 1 through 12, this multi-level test combines multiple-choice questions with constructed response items that require students to produce correct answers, not just select them from alternatives.

TOPIC 6B Test Bias and Other Controversies

The Question of Test Bias
Case Exhibit 6.1 The Impact of Culture on Testing Bias
Social Values and Test Fairness
Genetic and Environmental Determinants of Intelligence
Origins and Trends in Racial IQ Differences
Age Changes in Intelligence
Generational Changes in IQ Scores

An intelligence test is a neutral, inconsequential tool until someone assigns significance to the results derived from it. Once meaning is attached to a person's test score, that individual will experience many repercussions, ranging from superficial to life-changing. These repercussions will be fair or prejudiced, helpful or harmful, appropriate or misguided—depending on the meaning attached to the test score.

Unfortunately, the tendency to imbue intelligence test scores with inaccurate and unwarranted connotations is rampant. Laypersons and students of psychology commonly stray into one thicket of harmful misconceptions after another. Test results are variously overinterpreted or underinterpreted, viewed by some as a divination of personal worth but devalued by others as trivial and unfair.

The purpose of this topic is to clarify further the meaning of intelligence test scores in the light of relevant behavioral research. We begin by dispelling a number of everyday misconceptions about IQ and then pursue several empirically based issues—some would say controversies—that bear on the meaning of intelligence test scores:

- The question of test bias
- Genetic and environmental effects on intelligence
- Origins of IQ differences between African Americans and Caucasian Americans
- The fate of intelligence in middle and old age
- Generational changes in intelligence test scores

The underlying theme of this section is that intelligence test scores are best understood within the framework of modern psychological research. The reader is warned that the research issues pursued here are complex, confusing, and occasionally contradictory. However, the rewards for grappling with these topics are substantial. After all, the meaning of intelligence tests is demarcated, sharpened, and refined entirely by empirical research.

THE QUESTION OF TEST BIAS

Beyond a doubt, no practice in modern psychology has been more assailed than psychological testing. Commentators reserve a special and often vehement condemnation for ability testing in particular. In his wide-ranging response to the hundreds of criticisms aimed at mental testing, Jensen (1980) concluded that test bias is the most common rallying point for the critics. In proclaiming **test bias**, the skeptics assert in various ways that tests are culturally and sexually biased so as to discriminate unfairly against racial and ethnic minorities, women, and the poor. We cite here a sampling of verbatim criticisms (Jensen, 1980):

- Intelligence tests are sadly misnamed because they were never intended to measure intelligence and might have been more aptly called CB (cultural background) tests.
- Persons from backgrounds other than the culture in which the test was developed will always be penalized.
- There are enormous social class differences in a child's access to the experiences necessary to acquire the valid intellectual skills.
- IQ scores reported for African Americans and low socioeconomic groups in the United States reflect characteristics of the test rather than of the test takers.

- The poor performance of African American children on conventional tests is due to the biased content of the tests; that is, the test material is drawn from outside the African American culture.
- Women are not so good as men at mathematics only because women have not taken as much math in high school and college.

Are these criticisms valid? The investigation of this question turns out to be considerably more complicated than the reader might suppose. A most important point is that appearances can be deceiving. As we will explain subsequently, the fact that test items "look" or "feel" preferential to one race, sex, or social class does not constitute proof of test bias. Test bias is an objective, empirical question, not a matter of personal judgment.

Although critics may be loath to admit it, dispassionate and objective methods for investigating test bias do exist. One purpose of this section is to present these methods to the reader. However, an aseptic discussion of regression equations and statistical definitions of test bias would be incomplete, only half of the story. Conceptions of test bias are irretrievably intermingled with notions of test fairness. A full explanation of the story surrounding the test-bias controversy requires that we investigate the related issue of test fairness, too.

Differences in terminology abound in this area, so it is important to set forth certain fundamental distinctions before proceeding. Test bias is a technical concept amenable to impartial analysis. The most salient methods for the objective assessment of test bias are discussed in the following. In contrast, test fairness reflects social values and philosophies of test use, particularly when test use extends to selection for privilege or employment. Much of the passion that surrounds the test-bias controversy stems from a failure to distinguish test bias from test fairness. To avoid confusion, it is crucial to draw a sharp distinction between these two concepts. We include separate discussions of test bias and test fairness, beginning with an analysis of why test bias is such a controversial topic.

The Test-Bias Controversy

The test-bias controversy has its origins in the observed differences in average IQ among various racial and ethnic groups. For example, African Americans score, on average, about 15 points lower than White Americans on standardized IQ tests. This difference reduces to 7 to 12 IQ points when socioeconomic disparities are taken into account. The existence of marked racial/ethnic differences in ability test scores has fanned the fires of controversy over test bias. After all, employment opportunities, admission to college, completion of a high school diploma, and assignment to special education classes are all governed, in part, by test results. Biased tests could perpetuate a legacy of racial discrimination. Test bias is deservedly a topic of intense scrutiny by both the public and the testing professions.

One possibility is that the observed IQ disparities indicate test bias rather than meaningful group differences. In fact, most laypersons and even some psychologists would regard the magnitude of race differences in IQ as prima facie evidence that intelligence tests are culturally biased. This is an appealing argument, but a large difference between defined subpopulations is not a sufficient basis for proving test bias. The proof of test bias must rest on other criteria outlined in the following section.

When do test score differences between groups signify test bias? We begin by reviewing the criteria that should be used to investigate test bias of any kind, whether for race, gender, or any other defining characteristic.

Criteria of Test Bias and Test Fairness

The topic of test bias has received wide attention from measurement psychologists, test developers, journalists, test critics, legislators, and the courts. Cole and Moss (1998) underscore an unsettling consequence of the proliferation of views held on this topic, namely, concepts of test bias have become increasingly intricate and complex. Furthermore, the understanding of test bias is made difficult by the implicit and often emotional assumptions—held even by scholars—that may lead honest persons to view the same information in different ways.

In part, disagreements about test bias are perpetuated because adversaries in this debate fail to

clarify essential terminology. Too often, terms such as *test bias* and *test fairness* are considered interchangeable and thrown about loosely without definition. We propose that test bias and test fairness commonly refer to markedly different aspects of the test-bias debate. Careful examination of both concepts will provide a basis for a more reasoned discussion of this controversial topic.

As interpreted by most authorities in this field, *test bias* refers to objective statistical indices that examine the patterning of test scores for relevant subpopulations. Although experts might disagree about nuances, on the whole there is a consensus about the statistical criteria that indicate when a test is biased. We will expand this point later, but we can provide the reader with a brief preview here: In general, a test is deemed biased if it is differentially valid for different subgroups. For example, a test would be considered biased if the scores from appropriate subpopulations did not fall on the same regression line for a relevant criterion.

In contrast to the narrow concept of test bias, *test fairness* is a broad concept that recognizes the importance of social values in test usage. Even a test that is unbiased according to the traditional technical criteria of homogeneous regression might still be deemed unfair because of the social consequences of using it for selection decisions. The crux of the debate is this: Test bias (a statistical concept) is not necessarily the same thing as test fairness (a values concept). Ultimately, test fairness is based on social conceptions such as one's image of a just society. In the assessment of test fairness, subjective values are of overarching importance; the statistical criteria of test bias are merely ancillary. We will return to this point later when we analyze the link between social values and test fairness. But let us begin with a traditional presentation of technical criteria for test bias.

The Technical Meaning of Test Bias: A Definition

One useful way to examine test bias is from the technical perspective of test validation. The reader will recall from an earlier chapter that a test is valid when a variety of evidence supports its utility and when inferences derived from it are appropriate, meaningful, and useful. One implication of this viewpoint is that test bias can be equated with differential validity for different groups:

> Bias is present when a test score has meanings or implications for a relevant, definable subgroup of test takers that are different from the meanings or implications for the remainder of the test takers. Thus, bias is differential validity of a given interpretation of a test score for any definable, relevant subgroup of test takers. (Cole & Moss, 1998)

Perhaps a concrete example will help clarify this definition. Suppose a simple word problem arithmetic test were used to measure youngsters' addition skills. The problems might be of the form "If you have two six-packs of pop, how many cans do you have altogether?" Suppose, however, the test is used in a group of primarily Spanish-speaking seventh graders. With these children, low scores might indicate a language barrier, not a problem with arithmetic skills. In contrast, for English-speaking children low scores would most likely indicate a deficit in arithmetic skills. In this example, the test has differential validity, predicting arithmetic deficits quite well for English-speaking children but very poorly for Spanish-speaking children. According to the technical perspective of test validation, we would conclude that the test is biased.

Although the general definition of test bias refers to differential validity, in practice the particular criteria of test bias fall under three main headings: content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. We will review each of these categories, discussing relevant findings along the way. The coverage is illustrative, not exhaustive. Interested readers should consult Jensen (1980), Cole and Moss (1998), and Reynolds and Brown (1984b).

Bias in Content Validity

Bias in content validity is probably the most common criticism of those who denounce the use of standardized tests with minorities (Helms, 1992; Hilliard, 1984; Kwate, 2001). Typically, critics rely

on their own expert judgment when they expound one or more of the following criticisms of the content validity of ability tests:

1. The items ask for information that ethnic minority or disadvantaged persons have not had equal opportunity to learn.
2. The scoring of the items is improper, since the test author has arbitrarily decided on the only correct answer and ethnic minorities are inappropriately penalized for giving answers that would be correct in their own culture but not that of the test maker.
3. The wording of the questions is unfamiliar, and an ethnic minority person who may "know" the correct answer may not be able to respond because he or she does not understand the question (Reynolds, 1998).

Any of these criticisms, if accurate, would constitute bona fide evidence of test bias. However, merely stating a criticism does not comprise proof. Where these criticisms fall short is that they are seldom buttressed by empirical evidence.

Reynolds (1998) has offered a definition of **content bias** for aptitude tests that addresses the preceding points in empirically defined, testable terms:

> An item or subscale of a test is considered to be biased in content when it is demonstrated to be relatively more difficult for members of one group than another when the general ability level of the groups being compared is held constant and no reasonable theoretical rationale exists to explain group differences on the item (or subscale) in question.

This definition is useful because it proposes an empirical approach to the question of test bias.

In general, attempts to prove that expert-nominated items are culturally biased have not yielded the conclusive evidence that critics expect. McGurk (1953a, 1953b, 1975) has written extensively on this topic, and we will use his classic study to illustrate this point. For his doctoral dissertation, McGurk asked a panel of 78 judges (professors, educators, and graduate students in psychology and sociology) to classify each of 226 items from well-known standardized tests of intelligence into one of three categories: least cultural, neutral, most cultural. McGurk administered these test items to hundreds of high school students. His primary analysis involved the test results for 213 African American students and 213 White students matched for curriculum, school, length of enrollment, and socio economic background.

McGurk (1953a, 1953b) discovered that the mean difference between African American and White students for the total hybrid test, expressed in standard deviation units, was .50. More pertinent to the topic of test bias in content validity was his comparison of scores on the 37 "most cultural" items versus the 37 "least cultural" items. For the "most cultural" items—the ones nominated by the judges as highly culturally biased—the difference was .30. For the "least cultural" items—the ones judged to be more fair to African Americans and other cultural minorities—the difference was .58. In other words, the items nominated as most cultural were relatively easier for African Americans; the items nominated as least cultural were relatively harder. This finding held true even after item difficulty was partialed out. Furthermore, the item difficulties for the two groups were almost perfectly correlated (r = .98 for "most cultural" and r = .96 for "least cultural" items). There is an important lesson here that test critics often overlook: "Expert" judges cannot identify culturally biased test items based on an analysis of item characteristics. Recent studies continue to reaffirm this conclusion (Reynolds, Lowe, & Saenz, 1999).

In general, with respect to well-known standardized tests of ability and aptitude, research has not supported the popular belief that the specific content of test items is a source of cultural bias against minorities. This conclusion does not exonerate these tests with respect to other criteria of test bias, discussed in the following sections. Furthermore, we can point out that savvy test developers should be vigilant even to the impression of bias in test content, since the appearance of unfairness can affect public attitudes about psychological tests in quite tangible ways.

Bias in Predictive or Criterion-Related Validity

The prediction of future performance is one important use of intelligence, ability, and aptitude tests.

For this application of psychological testing, predictive validity is the most crucial form of validity in relation to test bias. In general, an unbiased test will predict future performance equally well for persons from different subpopulations. For example, an unbiased scholastic aptitude test will predict future academic performance of African Americans and White Americans with near-identical accuracy.

Reynolds (1998) offers a clear, direct definition of test bias with regard to criterion-related or **predictive validity bias**:

> A test is considered biased with respect to predictive validity if the inference drawn from the test score is not made with the smallest feasible random error or if there is constant error in an inference or prediction as a function of membership in a particular group.

This definition of test bias invokes what might be referred to as the criterion of homogeneous regression. According to this viewpoint, a test is unbiased if the results for all relevant subpopulations cluster equally well around a single regression line. In order to clarify this point, we need to introduce concepts relevant to simple regression. The discussion is modeled after Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, and Wesman (1975).

Suppose we are using a scholastic aptitude test to predict first-year grade point average (GPA) in college. In the case of a simple regression analysis, prediction of future performance is made from an equation of the form:

$$Y = bX + a$$

where Y is the predicted college GPA, X is the score on the aptitude test, and b and a are constants derived from a statistical analysis of test scores and grades of prior students. We will not concern ourselves with how b and a are derived; the reader can find this information in any elementary statistics textbook.

The values of b and a correspond to important aspects of the regression line—the straight line that facilitates the most accurate prediction of the criterion (college grades) from the predictor (aptitude score) (Figure 6.7). In particular, b corresponds to the slope of the line, with higher values of b indicating a steeper slope and more accurate prediction. The value of a depicts the intercept on the vertical axis. The units of measurement for b and a cannot



FIGURE 6.7 Test Scores, Grades, and Regression Line for a Hypothetical Large Group of College Students

Note: The dotted line shows how the regression line can be used to predict grade point average from the test score for a single, new subject.

be specified in advance because they depend on the underlying scales used for *X* and *Y*. Notice in Figure 6.7 that the regression line is the reference for predicting grades from observed aptitude score.

According to the criterion of homogeneous regression, in an unbiased test a single regression line can predict performance equally well for all relevant subpopulations, even though the means for the different groups might differ. For example, in Figure 6.8 group A performs better than group B on both predictor and criterion. Yet, the relationship between aptitude score and grades is the same for both groups. In this hypothetical instance, the graph depicts the absence of bias on the aptitude test with respect to criterion-related validity.

A more complicated situation known as intercept bias is shown in Figure 6.9. In this case, scores for the two groups do not cluster tightly around the single best regression line shown as a dotted line in the graph. Separate, parallel regression lines (and, therefore, separate regression equations) would be needed to facilitate accurate prediction. If a single regression line were used (the dotted line), criterion scores for group A would be overpredicted, whereas criterion scores for group B would be underpredicted. Thus, the use of a single regression line would constitute a clear instance of test bias, because the test has differential predictive validity for different subgroups.[1] This is referred to as **intercept bias** because the *Y*-axis intercept is different for the two groups.

But what about using separate regression lines for each subgroup? Would this solve the problem and rescue the test from criterion-related test bias? Opinions differ on this point. Although there is no doubt that separate regression equations would maximize predictive accuracy for the combined sample, whether this practice would produce test fairness is debated. We return to this issue later, when we discuss the relevance of social values to test fairness.

The Scholastic Aptitude Test (now known as the Scholastic Assessment Test and discussed in a later chapter) has been analyzed by several researchers with regard to test bias in criterion-related validity (Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, & Wesman,



FIGURE 6.8 **Test Scores, Grades, and Single Regression Line for Two Hypothetical Large Subpopulations of College Students**

[1]Contrary to widely held belief, test bias in these cases actually favors the *lower*-scoring group because its performance on the criterion is overpredicted. On occasion, then, test bias can favor minority groups.



FIGURE 6.9 **Test Scores, Grades, and Parallel Regression Lines for Two Hypothetical Large Subpopulations of College Students**

1975; Manning & Jackson, 1984). A consistent finding is that separate, parallel, regression lines are needed for African American and White examinees. For example, in one school the best regression equations for African American, White, and combined students were as follows:

African American: $Y = .055 + .0024V + .0025M$

White: $Y = .652 + .0026V + .0011M$

Combined: $Y = .586 + .0027V + .0012M$

where Y is the predicted college grade point, V is the SAT Verbal score, and M is the SAT Mathematics score (Cleary et al., 1975, p. 29). The effect of using the White or the combined formula is to overpredict college grades for African American subjects based on SAT results. On the traditional four-point scale (A = 4, B = 3, etc.), the average amount of overprediction from 17 separate studies was .20 or one-fifth of a grade point (Manning & Jackson, 1984). What these results mean is open to debate, but it seems clear, at least, that the SAT and similar entrance examinations do not underpredict college grades for minorities.

The most peculiar regression outcome, known as **slope bias**, is depicted in Figure 6.10. In this case, the regression lines for separate subgroups are not even parallel. Using a single regression line (the dotted line) for prediction might, therefore, result in both under- and overprediction of scores for selected subjects in both groups. Professional opinion would be unanimous in this case: This test possesses a high degree of test bias in criterion-related validity.

Bias in Construct Validity

The reader will recall that the construct validity of a psychological test can be documented by diverse forms of evidence, including appropriate developmental patterns in test scores, theory-consistent intervention changes in test scores, and confirmatory factor analysis. Because construct validity is such a broad concept, the definition of **bias in construct validity** requires a general statement amenable to research from a variety of viewpoints with a broad range of methods. Reynolds (1998) offers the following definition:

> Bias exists in regard to construct validity when a test is shown to measure different hypothetical traits (psychological constructs) for one group than for another; that is, differing interpretations of a common performance are shown to be appropriate as a function of ethnicity, gender, or another variable of interest, one typically but not necessarily nominal.



FIGURE 6.10 **Test Scores, Grades, and Nonparallel Regression Lines for Two Hypothetical Large Subpopulations of College Students**

From a practical standpoint, two straightforward criteria for nonbias flow from this definition (Reynolds & Brown, 1984a). If a test is nonbiased, then comparisons across relevant subpopulations should reveal a high degree of similarity for (1) the factorial structure of the test and (2) the rank order of item difficulties within the test. Let us examine these criteria in more detail.

An essential criterion of nonbias is that the factor structure of test scores should remain invariant across relevant subpopulations. Of course, even within the same subgroup, the factor structure of a test might differ between age groups, so it is important that we restrict our comparison to same-aged persons from relevant subpopulations. For same-aged subjects, a nonbiased test will possess the same factor structure across subgroups. In particular, for a nonbiased test the number of emergent factors and the factor loadings for items or subscales will be highly similar for relevant subpopulations.

In general, when the items or subscales of prominent ability and aptitude tests are factor-analyzed separately in White and minority samples, the same factors emerge in the relevant subpopulations (Reynolds, 1982; Jensen, 1980, 1984). Although minor anomalies have been reported in a handful of studies (Scheuneman, 1987; Gutkin & Reynolds, 1981; Johnston & Bolen, 1984), research in this area is more notable for its consistent findings with respect to factorial invariance across subgroups (e.g., Geary & Whitworth, 1988).

A second criterion of nonbias in construct validity is that the rank order of item difficulties within a test should be highly similar for relevant subpopulations. Since age is a major determinant of item difficulty, this standard is usually checked separately for each age group covered by a test. The reader should note what this criterion does not specify. It does not specify that relevant subgroups must obtain equivalent passing rates for test items. What is essential is that the items that are the most difficult (or least difficult) for one subgroup should be the most difficult (or least difficult) for other relevant subpopulations.

The criterion of similar rank order of item difficulties can be tested in a very straightforward and objective manner. If the difficulty level of each item is computed by means of the *p* value (percentage passing) for each relevant subpopulation, then it is possible to compare the relative item difficulties across same-aged subgroups. In fact, the similarity of the rank order of item difficulties for any two

groups can be gauged objectively by means of a correlation coefficient (r_{xy}). The paired p values for the test items constitute the values of x and y used in the computation. The closer the value of r to 1.00, the more similar the rank ordering of item difficulties for the two groups.

In general, cross-group comparisons of relative item difficulties for prominent aptitude and ability tests have yielded correlations bordering on 1.00; that is, most tests show extremely similar rank orderings for item difficulties across relevant subpopulations (Jensen, 1980; Reynolds, 1982). In a representative study, Miele (1979) investigated the relative item difficulties of the WISC for African American and White subjects at each of four grade levels (preschool, first, third, and fifth grades). He found that the average cross-racial correlations (holding grade level constant) for WISC item p values was .96 for males and .95 for females. These values were hardly different from the cross-sex correlations (holding grade level constant) within race, which were .98 (Whites) and .97 (African Americans). As noted, these findings are not unusual.

In general, for mainstream cognitive tests, the rank order of item difficulties is nearly identical for relevant subpopulations, including minority groups. However, some exceptions have been noted. For example, Urquhart-Hagie, Gallipo, and Svien (2003) report some striking examples of apparent item bias in a WISC-III study of 28 teenage children on the Lakota Sioux reservation in South Dakota. These authors computed the passing rates for the WISC-III subtest items and found dramatic deviations in the relative difficulty levels of consecutive items on a few of the subtests. For example, consider the Information subtest, which consists of 30 items ranked from very easy (nearly 100% passing rate) to very hard (less than 1% passing rate). These items evaluate the child's fund of basic information, with questions on a par with "How many legs does a cat have?" (easy) or "Which continent includes Argentina?" (medium) or "Who is the Dalai Lama?" (hard). The problem noted by Urquhart-Hagie et al. (2003) on the Information subtest is that item 13 was passed at a substantially lower rate than expected. Specifically, the percentage of the sample passing items 11 through 15 did not show a smooth decline, as would be found in a nonbiased test:

Item Number	Percent Passing
Item 11	81
Item 12	61
Item 13	**16**
Item 14	45
Item 15	31

Item 13 reveals clear evidence of bias in construct validity—it is substantially more difficult than the preceding and following items. We cannot reveal the content of these copyrighted test items. However, we can say that item 13 requires the child to know about a well-known Italian explorer who reputedly discovered America. Actually, which foreigners first landed on American shores is an item of dispute—but that is another issue (Menzies, 2003). What is clear in this case is that item 13 on the WISC-III Information subtest requires knowledge that is unpalatable to most Native American examinees. The explorer in question is not a revered figure in this subculture. As Gregory (2009) notes:

> We can well imagine the confusion of these indigenous people who have been on this continent for many thousands of years trying to fathom the notion that a European "discovered" their land.

In fairness, we should mention that clear examples of psychometrically confirmed test bias such as this are not common in published literature. Even so, this example serves as a reminder that ongoing investigations of test bias are still needed.

Reprise on Test Bias

Critics who hypothesize that tests are biased against minorities assert that the test scores underestimate the ability of minority members. As we have argued in the preceding sections, the hypothesis of test bias is a scientific question that can be answered empirically through such procedures as factor analysis, regression equations, intergroup comparisons of the

difficulty levels for "biased" versus "unbiased" items, and rank ordering of item difficulties. In general, most investigators have found by these criteria that major ability and aptitude tests lack bias (Jensen, 1980; Reynolds, 1994a; Kuncel & Sackett, 2007; Sackett, Borneman, & Connelly, 2008).

Recently, however, Aguinis, Culpepper, and Pierce (2010) have called into question the prevailing wisdom, using a complex statistical simulation to demonstrate that tests of bias are themselves biased. Their method, called Monte Carlo simulation, is beyond the scope of coverage here. They deduced that most studies of slope bias (rarely found in bias studies) do not possess sufficient statistical power to detect it. As noted earlier, slope bias results in the overprediction *and* underprediction of minority performance at different levels of the predictor variable. They also conclude that most studies of intercept bias (often found in bias studies, favoring minorities) are the result of a complex statistical artifact. Intercept bias is the systematic overprediction of scores for one group at all levels of the predictor variable. They conclude:

> We are aware that we have set a tall-order goal of reviving research on test bias in preemployment testing in the face of established conclusions in the fields of I/O psychology, management, and others concerned with high-stakes testing. Our results indicate that the accepted procedure to assess test bias is itself biased: Slope-based bias is likely to go undetected and intercept based bias favoring minority group members is likely to be found when in fact it does not exist (Aguinis et al., 2010, p. 653).

The authors call for a renewal of interest in research on test bias in high-stakes testing and suggest methods to improve research in this area, including the use of power analysis to determine sample sizes needed for valid inferences about differential prediction.

Analyses of test bias focus mainly on the statistical properties of selected instruments, looking for differential validity in the application of tests with minority examinees. But it is good to remember that potential bias does not reside solely within the qualities of the testing instrument. Bias can arise within the complexities of clinical interactions, especially when cultural differences exist between the practitioner and the client. The choice of a test and the timing of its application may impact the validity of the results, as we illustrate in Case Exhibit 6.1

CASE EXHIBIT 6.1

The Impact of Culture on Testing Bias

The most commonly used tests of cognitive functioning come from the United States or western European nations. These instruments embody a Western perspective, with a focus on skills valued in urban and industrial settings (Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 2004). But culture impacts more than just test content, culture also shapes our understanding of the assessment process itself. For example, most Westerners recognize that the purpose of consultation with a health care professional is to convey useful information to the practitioner. They know that the practitioner will conduct needed tests or procedures to help identify appropriate interventions. An implicit social contract guides the understanding of all parties.

But not every culture has the same understanding of this practitioner–patient covenant. We consider here the case of Mr. Kim, a 70-year-old man brought to a Latina psychologist by his daughter (Hayes, 2008). Mr. Kim was a second-generation Korean referred by his physician because of concerns about "memory loss." The psychologist—we will call her Dr. Santiago—met initially with Mr. Kim and his adult daughter, Insook. The daughter seemed thoroughly acculturated to the United States, readily offering her thoughts. In contrast, Mr. Kim seemed more traditionally Korean, spoke rarely, and then in a low voice with a slight accent. He seldom made eye contact. Dr. Santiago made the cultural mistake of beginning the consultation by directing questions to Insook, an affront to Mr. Kim. In many Asian cultures, elderly persons expect to be treated with dignity and reverence, especially by their children (Kim, Kim, & Rue, 1997). The psychologist sensed that something was amiss,

and switched to interviewing Mr. Kim directly. She asked if he experienced memory difficulties. He responded in a barely audible voice that he noticed "some" but that his daughter was "too bothered."

At this point in the consultation, many psychologists would wonder if Mr. Kim was experiencing the onset of dementia. Typically, the practitioner might want to assess the mental status of the patient, perhaps using a test with good sensitivity and specificity like the Mini-Mental State Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). This is a simple measure with 30 scorable items of orientation, memory, and other cognitive skills. It is so easy that normal adults score in the range of 27 to 30 points. But Dr. Santiago resisted the temptation to jump straight into testing, recognizing that Mr. Kim likely would be further alienated and perform poorly for cultural reasons, regardless of his cognitive status.

Instead of administering a test that would yield invalid and biased results, the psychologist chose to offer tea to Mr. Kim and his daughter. Afterward, she engaged Mr. Kim alone in a socially oriented conversation about his extended family, looking for signs of cognitive impairment such as word-finding problems, confusion, or difficulty staying on topic. Within this relaxed atmosphere, a better picture of his performance emerged. His cognitive slips were minor, yet his mood conveyed deep and abiding sadness. Dr. Santiago suspected that Mr. Kim suffered from depression, which can cause significant cognitive impairment, especially in the elderly (Reppermund, Brodaty, Crawford, and others, 2011). She offered no conclusions from this first consultation, but left the door open for further assessment of Mr. Kim. In the meantime, she planned to confer with an experienced Korean American psychologist.

An important lesson from this case is that the cultural background of the patient impacts the suitability, validity, and bias of assessment methods. An instrument appropriate in one context may yield invalid, biased results in a different cultural milieu. Hayes (2008) concluded that

> the psychologist initially misinterpreted the father's emotional restraint, lesser eye contact, and apparent acceptance of his difficulties as signs of dementia. She later learned that Mr. Kim's demeanor is not uncommon among people of Korean and Buddhist cultures, for whom emotional restraint is often seen as a sign of maturity and problems are considered a fact of life (p. 145).

Sometimes choosing *not* to administer an ostensibly suitable test is the proper course of action, the necessary antidote to bias in testing.

We turn now to the broader concept of test fairness. How well do existing instruments meet reasonable criteria of test fairness? As the reader will learn, **test fairness** involves social values and is, therefore, an altogether more debatable—and more debated—topic than test bias.

SOCIAL VALUES AND TEST FAIRNESS

Even an unbiased test might still be deemed unfair because of the social consequences of using it for selection decisions. In contrast to the narrow, objective notion of test bias, the concept of test fairness incorporates social values and philosophies of test use. We will demonstrate to the reader that, in the final analysis, the proper application of psychological tests is essentially an ethical conclusion that cannot be established on objective grounds alone.

In a classic article that deserves detailed scrutiny, Hunter and Schmidt (1976) proposed the first clear distinction between statistical definitions of test bias and social conceptions of test fairness. Although the authors reviewed the usual technical criteria of test bias with incisive precision, their article is most famous for its description of three mutually incompatible ethical positions that can and should affect test use.

Hunter and Schmidt (1976) noted that psychological tests are often used for institutional selection procedures such as employment or college admission. In this context, the application of test results must be guided by a philosophy of selection. Unfortunately, in many institutions the selection philosophy is implicit, not explicit. Nonetheless, when underlying values are made explicit, three

ethical positions can be distinguished. These positions are unqualified individualism, quotas, and qualified individualism. Since these ethical stances are at the very core of public concerns about test fairness, we will review these positions in some detail.

Unqualified Individualism

In the American tradition of free and open competition, the ethical stance of **unqualified individualism** dictates that, without exception, the best qualified candidates should be selected for employment, admission, or other privilege. Hunter and Schmidt (1976) spell out the implications of this position:

> Couched in the language of institutional selection procedures, this means that an organization should use whatever information it possesses to make a scientifically valid prediction of each individual's performance and always select those with the highest predicted performance. This position looks appealing at first glance, but embraces some implications that most persons find troublesome. In particular, if race, sex, or ethnic group membership contributed to valid prediction of performance in a given situation over and above the contributions of test scores, then those who espouse unqualified individualism would be ethically bound to use such a predictor.

Quotas

The ethical stance of **quotas** acknowledges that many bureaucracies and educational institutions owe their very existence to the city or state in which they function. Since they exist at the will of the people, it can be argued that these institutions are ethically bound to act in a manner that is "politically appropriate" to their location. The logical consequence of this position is quotas. For example, in a location whose population is one-third African American and two-thirds White, selection procedures should admit candidates in approximately the same ratio. A selection procedure that deviates consistently from this standard would be considered unfair.

By definition, fair share quotas are based initially upon population percentages. Within relevant subpopulations, factors that predict future performance such as test scores would then be considered. However, one consequence of quotas is that those selected do not necessarily have the highest scores on the predictor test.

Qualified Individualism

Qualified individualism is a radical variant of individualism:

> This position notes that America is constitutionally opposed to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex. A qualified individualist interprets this as an ethical imperative to refuse to use race, sex, and so on, as a predictor even if it were in fact scientifically valid to do so. (Hunter & Schmidt, 1976)

For selection purposes, the qualified individualist would rely exclusively on tested abilities, without reference to age, sex, race, or other demographic characteristics. This seems laudable, but examine the potential consequences. Suppose a qualified individualist used SAT scores for purposes of college admission. Even though SAT scores for African Americans and Whites produce separate regression lines for the criterion of college grades, the qualified individualist would be ethically bound to use the single, less-accurate regression line derived for the entire sample of applicants. As a consequence, the future performance of African Americans would be overpredicted, which would seemingly boost the proportion of persons selected from this applicant group. With respect to selection ratios, the practical impact of qualified individualism is therefore midway between quotas and unqualified individualism.

Reprise on Test Fairness

Which philosophy of selection is correct? The truth is, this problem is beyond the scope of rational solution. At one time or another, each of the ethical stances outlined previously has been championed by wise, respected, and thoughtful citizens. However,

no consensus has emerged, and one is not likely to be found soon. The dispute reviewed here

> is typical of ethical arguments—the resolution depends in part on irreconcilable values. Furthermore, even among those who agree on values there will be disagreements about the validity of certain relevant scientific theories that are not yet adequately tested. Thus, we feel that there is no way that this dispute can be objectively resolved. Each person must choose as he sees fit (and in fact we are divided). (Hunter & Schmidt, 1976)

When ethical stances clash—as they most certainly do in the application of psychological tests to selection decisions—the court system may become the final arbiter, as discussed later in this book.

GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF INTELLIGENCE

Genetic Contributions to Intelligence

The nature–nurture debate regarding intelligence is a well-known and overworked controversy that we will largely sidestep here. We concur with McGue, Bouchard, Iacono, and Lykken (1993) that a substantial genetic component to intelligence has been proved by decades of adoption studies, familial research, and twin projects, even though individual studies may be faulted for particular reasons:

> When taken in aggregate, twin, family, and adoption studies of IQ provide a demonstration of the existence of genetic influences on IQ as good as can be achieved in the behavioral sciences with nonexperimental methods. Without positing the existence of genetic influences, it simply is not possible to give a credible account for the consistently greater IQ similarity among monozygotic (MZ) twins than among like-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins, the significant IQ correlations among biological relatives even when they are reared apart, and the strong association between the magnitude of the familial IQ correlation and the degree of genetic relatedness. (p. 60)

Of course, the demonstration of substantial genetic influence for a trait does not imply that heredity alone is responsible for differences between individuals—environmental factors are formative, too, as reviewed subsequently.

The genetic contribution to human characteristics such as intelligence (as measured by IQ tests) is usually measured in terms of a heritability index that can vary from 0.0 to 1.0. The **heritability index** is an estimate of how much of the total variance in a given trait is due to genetic factors. Heritability of 0.0 means that genetic factors make no contribution to the variance in a trait, whereas heritability of 1.0 means that genetic factors are exclusively responsible for the variance in a trait. Of course, for most measurable characteristics, heritability is somewhere between the two extremes. McGue et al. (1993) discuss the various methods for computing heritability based on twin and adoption studies.

It is important to stress that heritability is a population statistic that cannot be extended to explain an individual score. Furthermore, heritability for a given trait is not a constant. As Jensen (1969) notes, estimates of heritability "are specific to the population sampled, the point in time, how the measurements were made, and the particular test used to obtain the measurements." For IQ, most studies report heritability estimates right around .50, meaning that about half of the variability in IQ scores is from genetic factors. For some studies, the heritability of IQ is much higher, in the .70s (Bouchard, 1994; Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990; Pedersen, Plomin, Nesselroade, & McClearn, 1992).

Yet, the heritability of IQ defies any simple summary. For one thing, genetic influence on IQ appears to demonstrate an interaction effect with socioeconomic status (SES). Turkheimer et al. (2003) studied IQ results for 7-year-old twins, many living at or below the poverty level, others reared in middle class or higher families. The proportion of variance in IQ accounted for by genetic factors was inferred from the similarities/differences in IQ scores of identical versus fraternal twins. For families with the lowest levels of SES, environmental factors accounted for almost all of the variation in IQ. But in families with the highest levels of SES (middle and upper class), genetic factors accounted for almost

all of the variation in IQ. These striking results have been only partially confirmed by other twin studies. The interaction effect is minimal in studies conducted in other countries (Nisbett et al. 2012).

If genuine, as appears to be the case in the United States, the interaction between SES and heritability, with IQ revealing little genetic influence for low SES children, carries important policy implications:

> One interpretation of the finding that heritability of IQ is very low for lower SES individuals is that children in poverty do not get to develop their full genetic potential. If true, there is room for interventions with that group to have large effects on IQ (Nisbett et al., 2012, p. 134).

We investigate the impact of enriched environments such as early educational intervention in a later topic.

A most fascinating demonstration of the genetic contribution to IQ is found in the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart (Segal, 2012). In this ongoing study, identical twins reared apart are reunited for extensive psychometric testing. Bouchard (1994) reports that the IQs of identical twins reared apart correlate almost as highly as those of identical twins reared together, even though the twins reared apart often were exposed to different environmental conditions (in some cases, sharply contrasting environments). In sum, differences in environment appeared to cause very little divergence in the IQs of identical twin pairs reared apart. These findings strongly suggest a genetic contribution to intelligence, with heritability estimated in the vicinity of .70.

The Minnesota Study and other twin studies have been criticized on methodological and philosophical grounds. Methodologically, one concern is that identical twins separated early in life for adoption might be placed in highly similar environments, which would inflate the estimated genetic influence when reunited and tested in adulthood. Philosophically, some skeptics question the utility and purpose of churning out one heritability estimate after another:

> It is not apparent what scientific purposes are served by the sustained flow of heritability numbers for psychological characteristics. Perhaps molecular geneticists need those numbers to guide their search for the underlying genes? Perhaps clinical psychologists need those numbers to guide their selection of therapies that work? Or perhaps educators need those numbers to guide their choice of teaching interventions that will be successful? We have seen no indication of the usefulness of the heritability numbers for any of those purposes. Indeed, it has been widely recognized that malleability is not the opposite of heritability. (Kamin & Goldberger, 2001, p. 28)

In sum, traits with high heritability might still prove to be malleable in the face of environmental factors. If this is so, what constructive purpose is served by the flood of heritability estimates found in the research literature?

Thus, we must avoid the tendency to view any corpus of research in a simplistic either/or frame of mind. Even the most diehard hereditarians acknowledge that a person's intelligence is shaped also by the quality of experience. The crucial question is: To what extent can enriched or deprived environments modify intelligence upward or downward from the genetically circumscribed potential? The reader is reminded that the genetic contribution to intelligence is indirect, most likely via the gene-coded physical structures of the brain and nervous system. Nonetheless, the brain is quite malleable in the face of environmental manipulations, which can even alter its weight and the richness of neuronal networks (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987). How much can such environmental impacts sway intelligence as measured by IQ tests? We will review several studies indicating that environmental extremes help determine intellectual outcome within a range of approximately 20 IQ points, perhaps more.

Environmental Effects: Impoverishment and Enrichment

First, we examine the effects of environmental disadvantage. Vernon (1979, chap. 9) has reviewed the early studies of severe deprivation, noting that children reared under conditions in which they received little or no human contacts can show striking

improvements in IQ—as much as 30 to 50 points—when transferred to a more normal environment. Yet, we must regard this body of research with some skepticism, owing to the typically exceptional conditions under which the initial tests were administered. Can a meaningful test be administered to 7-year-old children raised almost like animals (Koluchova, 1972)?

Typical of this early research is the follow-up study by Skeels (1966) of 25 orphaned children originally diagnosed as having mental retardation (Skeels & Dye, 1939). These children were first tested at approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ years of age when living in a highly unstimulating orphanage. Thirteen of them were then transferred to another home where they received a great deal of supervised, doting attention from older girls with mental retardation. These children showed a considerable increase in IQ, whereas the 12 who remained behind decreased further in IQ. When traced at follow-up 26 years later, the 13 transferred cases were normal, self-supporting adults, or were married. The other subjects—the contrast group—were still institutionalized or in menial jobs. The enriched group showed an average increase of 32 IQ points when retested with the Stanford-Binet, whereas the contrast group fell below their original scores. Even though we are disinclined to place much credence in the original IQ scores and might, therefore, quarrel with the exact magnitude of the change, the Skeels (1966) study surely indicates that the difference between a severely depriving early environment and a more normal one might account for perhaps 15 to 20 IQ points.

More recently, Breslau, Chilcoat, Susser, and others (2001) conducted a rigorous longitudinal study that illustrates the detrimental impact of growing up in a racially segregated and economically disadvantaged community. Using the WISC-R, they collected longitudinal IQ scores at age 6 and age 11 for large samples of urban and suburban children, some low birth weight ($\leq$2500 grams) and some normal birth weight ($>$2500 grams). The urban samples were primarily Black, from inner city Detroit, and reared by a single mother with high school (or less) education. These children typically experienced economic deprivation, inferior education, family stress, and racial segregation. The suburban samples were primarily White, from economically advantaged communities, and reared by a married mother with college education. As the authors note, "the sampling design provided for a comparison of populations with starkly contrasting social conditions." (p. 712)

The mean IQ scores for all samples at both times of testing (age 6 and age 11) are depicted in Figure 6.11. The reader will observe that suburban samples scored higher than inner city samples, and that normal birth weight children scored higher than low-birth-weight children. These results are not especially remarkable—the negative impacts of low birth weight and economic disadvantage are well documented in the literature on group differences in IQ outcomes (e.g., Breslau, 1994; Ceci, 1996). What is noteworthy about the results—one might even say astonishing—is that both of the inner city samples



FIGURE 6.11 Average IQ Scores for Urban and Suburban Children at Age 6 and Age 11

S-N: Suburban Normal Birth Weight
S-L: Suburban Low Birth Weight
U-N: Urban Normal Birth Weight
U-L: Urban Low Birth Weight

Source: Based on data in Breslau, N., Chilcoat, H., Susser, E., and others (2001). Stability and change in children's Intelligence Quotient scores: A comparison of two socioeconomically disparate communities. *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 154, 711–717.

(low birth weight and normal birth weight) apparently *lost* an average of 5 IQ points during the five years between initial testing at age 6 and follow-up testing at age 11. In contrast, the suburban samples held constant in IQ during the same time period. It is difficult to conceive a benign explanation for these findings. Apparently, growing up in the poverty, segregation, and turmoil of the inner city imposes hardships that lead to a decline in IQ scores from age 6 to age 11. The authors summarize the significance of their study as follows:

> On average, the IQs of urban children declined by more than 5 points. A change of 5 points in an individual child might be judged by some as clinically nonsignificant. Nevertheless, a change of this size in a population's mean IQ, which reflects a downward shift in the distribution (rather than a change in the shape of the distribution), means that the proportion of children scoring 1 standard deviation or more below the standardized IQ mean of 100 would increase substantially. In this study, the change from age 6 to age 11 years increased the percentage of urban children scoring less than 85 on the WISC-R from 22.2 to 33.2. (Breslau et al., 2001, p. 716)

Sadly, the apparent drop of 5 points in average IQ from age 6 to age 11 found in this study may represent only part of the overall impact of environmental deprivation. The full effect over a lifetime could be substantially greater.

Jensen (1977) found similar results in a methodologically novel study of severely impoverished African American children in rural Georgia. Comparing older and younger siblings on the California Test of Mental Maturity (CTMM), he found that children from this setting, which was "as severely disadvantaged, educationally and economically, as can be found anywhere in the United States," appeared to lose up to one IQ point a year, on average, between the ages of 6 and 16. The cumulative loss totaled 5 to 10 IQ points. Furthermore, if we factor in the probable IQ deficit that occurred between birth and age 5, we can surmise that the overall effect of a depriving environment is probably more than the 5- to 10-point IQ decrement reported by Jensen (1977).

Scarr and Weinberg (1976, 1983) reversed the question probed by Jensen (1977), namely, they asked: What happens to their intelligence when African American children are adopted into the relatively enriched environment provided by economically and educationally advantaged White families? As discussed later, it is well known that African American children reared by their own families obtain IQ scores that average about 15 points below Whites (Jensen, 1980). Some portion of this difference—perhaps all of it—is likely due to the many social, economic, and cultural differences between the two groups. We put that issue aside for now. Instead, we pursue a related question that bears on the malleability of IQ: What difference does it make when African American children are adopted into a more economically and educationally advantaged environment?

Scarr and Weinberg (1976, 1983) found that 130 African American and interracial children adopted into upper-middle-class White families averaged a Full Scale IQ of 106 on the Stanford-Binet or the WISC, a full 6 points higher than the national average and some 18 to 21 points higher than typically found with African American examinees. African American children adopted early in life, before 1 year of age, fared even better, with a mean IQ of 110. We can only wonder what the IQ scores would have been if the adoptions had taken place at birth and if excellent prenatal care had been provided. This study indicates that when the early environment is optimal, IQ can be boosted by perhaps 20 points.

Limitations of space prevent us from further detailed discussion of environmental effects on IQ. It is worth noting, though, that a huge literature has emerged from early intervention and enrichment-stimulation studies of children at risk for school failure and mental retardation (e.g.,Barnett & Camilli, 2002; Ramey & Ramey, 1998). In general, these studies show that intervention and enrichment can boost IQ in children at risk for school failure and mental retardation. Summarizing four decades of research, Ramey and Ramey (1998) extracted six principles from the research on early intervention for at-risk children. They refer to these as "remarkable

consistencies in the major findings" on intervention studies:

1. Interventions that begin earlier (e.g., during infancy) and continue longer provide the best benefits to participating children.
2. More-intensive interventions (e.g., number of visits per week) produce larger positive effects than less-intensive interventions.
3. Direct enrichment experiences (e.g., working directly with the kids) provide greater impact than indirect experiences.
4. Programs with comprehensive services (e.g., multiple enhancements) produce greater positive changes than those with a narrow focus.
5. Some children (e.g., those with normal birth weight) show greater benefits from participation than other children.
6. Initial positive benefits diminish over time if the child's environment does not encourage positive attitudes and continued learning.

One concern about early intervention programs is their cost, which has been excessive for some of the demonstration projects. Skeptics wonder about the practicality and also the ultimate payoff of providing extensive, broad-based, continuing intervention virtually from birth onward for the millions of children at risk for developmental problems. This is a realistic concern because "relatively few early intervention programs have received long-term follow-up" (Ramey & Ramey, 1998). Critics also wonder if the programs merely teach children how to take tests without affecting their underlying intelligence very much (Jensen, 1981). Finally, there is the issue of cultural congruence. Intervention programs are mainly designed by White psychologists and then applied disproportionately to minority children. This is a concern because programs need to be culturally relevant and welcomed by the consumers, otherwise the interventions are doomed to failure.

One popular intervention program is Head Start, created in 1965 and funded continuously by the federal government. The original program provided comprehensive services for children 3 to 5 years of age. In 1995, with the inception of Early Head Start under President Clinton, coverage was expanded to children from birth to 5 years of age. In 2012, funding for Head Start was approximately $8 billion. These funds provided a broad range of services including preschool education centers for low-income families, child care homes, medical and dental services, and home-based consultation by developmental experts. Over one million infants and children receive Head Start services each year. Low-income pregnant women also are eligible for services. Interventions are designed to be culturally sensitive and involve the parents as much as possible. School readiness is the overriding goal, which is facilitated through the support of cognitive, language, physical, social, and emotional development.

Zhai, Brooks-Gunn, and Waldfogel (2011) recently completed a study of school readiness in 2,803 Head Start children from 18 cities. When compared with children from any other child care arrangement, children in Head Start demonstrated, at age 5, gains in cognitive development as measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III and a letter-word identification task, improvements in social competence as measured by a subscale from the Adaptive Social Behavior Inventory (Hogan, Scott, & Bauer, 1992), and reductions in their attention problems as measured by a subscale from the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL, Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000). There were no statistically significant effects on internalizing or externalizing behavior problems on the CBCL. The researchers emphasize that Head Start impacts more than cognitive development. It also enhances attentional and emotional skills essential for school readiness.

Teratogenic Effects on Intelligence and Development

In normal prenatal development, the fetus is protected from the external environment by the placenta, a vascular organ in the uterus through which the fetus is nourished. However, some substances known as **teratogens** cross the placental barrier and cause physical deformities in the fetus. Especially if the deformities involve the brain, teratogens may produce lifelong behavioral disorders, including low IQ and mental retardation. The list of

potential teratogens is almost endless and includes prescription drugs, hormones, illicit drugs, smoking, alcohol, radiation, toxic chemicals, and viral infections (Berk, 1989; Martin, 1994). We will briefly highlight the most prevalent and also the most preventable teratogen of all, alcohol.

Heavy drinking by pregnant women causes their offspring to be at very high risk for **fetal alcohol syndrome** (FAS), a specific cluster of abnormalities first described by Jones, Smith, Ulleland, and Streissguth (1973). Intelligence is markedly lower in children with FAS. When assessed in adolescence or adulthood, about half of all persons with this disorder score in the range of mental retardation on IQ tests (Olson, 1994). Prenatal exposure to alcohol is one of the leading known causes of mental retardation in the Western world. The defining criteria of FAS include the following:

1. Prenatal and/or postnatal growth retardation—weight below the tenth percentile after correcting for gestational age
2. Central nervous system dysfunction—skull or brain malformations, mild to moderate mental retardation, neurological abnormalities, and behavior problems
3. Facial dysmorphology—widely spaced eyes, short eyelid openings, small up-turned nose, thin upper lip, and minor ear deformities (Sokol & Clarren, 1989)

The full-blown FAS syndrome occurs mainly in offspring of women alcoholics—those who ingest many drinks per occasion.

Children exposed to lesser levels of alcohol during pregnancy may manifest a range of consequences known collectively as Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) (Bertrand, Floyd, Weber, and others, 2004). FASD is an unofficial umbrella term that encompasses the entire range of adverse consequences. These outcomes include full-blown FAS, the most devastating result of prenatal exposure to alcohol, and other manifestations referred to with terms such as fetal alcohol effect, alcohol-related neurodevelopmental disorder, and similar designations. Even though the existence of adverse effects from prenatal exposure to low or moderate drinking is still disputed (Abel, 2009), the best advice to pregnant women is to refrain entirely from alcohol. A child with FASD might function in the borderline range of intelligence and manifest poor coordination, difficulty with concept formation, hyperactivity, and problems with executive functions. In the absence of intervention, the consequences to the child, the family, and society are profound, as confirmed by Streissguth, Bookstein, Barr, and others (2004). They studied 415 children and adults with confirmed FASD, searching patient records and interviewing knowledgeable informants. The median IQ of the group was 86, with a range of 29 to 126. Most were young (median age of 14, range 6 to 51), but many had reached adolescence and adulthood. For these older individuals, 60 percent had experienced trouble with the law, 50 percent had been in a jail, prison, or inpatient setting, 49 percent had engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors, and 35 percent experienced alcohol or drug problems. In spite of these markers of turmoil and social disruption, early diagnosis of FASD and placement in a stable environment dramatically reduced the likelihood of these adverse outcomes.

FASD likely is more common than previously thought. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2012), 7.6 percent of pregnant women report using alcohol, including 1.4% who engage in binge drinking (6 or more drinks per occasion). These data probably underestimate alcohol intake during pregnancy, because some women will be reluctant to report honestly on their drinking. Clearly, a small proportion of pregnant women continue to drink, in spite of widespread public health warnings. As a result, FASD persists as a public health problem.

Many affected children do not show the characteristic facial anomalies and therefore never receive proper diagnosis and early intervention. In a thorough study of elementary school children in two counties in Washington State, Clarren, Randels, Sanderson, and Fineman (2001) found that only 1 in 7 children with FAS had been previously diagnosed. Based on epidemiological findings and the convergence of evidence from several research methods, May, Gossage, Kalberg, and others (2009) concluded that the current prevalence of FASD among younger school children may be as high as 2 to 5 percent

in the United States and some western European countries. The social, health, and economic consequences of these estimated prevalence rates are cause for concern.

Effects of Environmental Toxins on Intelligence

Many industrial chemicals and by-products may impair the nervous system temporarily, or even cause permanent damage that affects intelligence. Examples include lead, mercury, manganese, arsenic, thallium, tetra-ethyl lead, organic mercury compounds, methyl bromide, and carbon disulphide (Lishman, 1997). Long-term exposure to organophosphate pesticides such as encountered by some farm workers is known to cause neurobehavioral deficits in memory, fine motor control, response speed, and mental flexibility (Mackenzie Ross, Brewin, & Curran, 2010; Roldán-Tapia, Parrón, & Sánchez-Santed, 2005). Certainly, the most widely studied of these environmental toxins is lead, which we examine in modest detail here.

Sources of human lead absorption include eating of lead-pigmented paint chips by infants and toddlers; breathing of particulate lead from smelter emissions; eating of food from lead-soldered cans or lead-glazed pottery; and the drinking of water that has passed through lead pipes. Because the human body excretes lead slowly, most citizens of the industrialized world carry a lead burden substantially higher—perhaps 500 times higher—than known in pre-Roman times (Patterson, 1980).

The hazards of high-level lead exposure are acknowledged by every medical and psychological researcher who has investigated this topic. High doses of lead are irrefutably linked to cerebral palsy, seizure disorders, blindness, mental retardation, even death. The more important question pertains to "asymptomatic" lead exposure: Can a level of absorption that is insufficient to cause obvious medical symptoms nonetheless produce a decrement in intellectual abilities?

Research findings on this topic are complex and controversial. Using tooth lead from shed teeth of young children as their index of cumulative lead burden, Needleman and associates (1979) reported that "asymptomatic" lead exposure was associated with decrements in overall intelligence (about 4 IQ points) and lowered performance on verbal subtests, auditory and speech processing tests, and a reaction time measure of attention. These differences persisted at follow-up 11 years later (Needleman, Schell, Bellinger, Leviton, & Allred, 1990). Yet, using a similar study method, Smith, Delves, Lansdown, Clayton, and Graham (1983) found a nonsignificant effect from children's lead exposure when social factors such as the parents' level of education and social status were controlled.

In part, research findings on this topic are contradictory because it is difficult to disentangle the effects of lead from those of poverty, stress, poor nutrition, and other confounding variables (Kaufmann, 2001a, b). Most likely, asymptomatic lead exposure has harmful effects on the nervous system that translate to reduced intelligence, impaired attention, and a host of other undesirable behavioral consequences.

Recent studies continue to raise alarm about the impact of very low levels of lead exposure on the behavioral and neurocognitive functioning of children. Marcus et al. (2010) completed a meta-analysis of 19 studies on lead (from hair samples) and behavior problems in 8,561 children. The average correlation across all studies was $r = .19$ ($p < .001$), that is, the higher the lead level, the greater the severity of conduct problems. Strayhorn and Strayhorn (2012) studied achievement scores in relation to elevated blood lead levels in children for the 57 counties of New York State, using family income as a covariate. Achievement scores were taken from state-wide English and mathematics testing conducted in the third and eighth grades. The partial correlations between incidence of elevated lead and number of children in the lowest achievement levels ranged from .29 to .40 ($p < .05$). The researchers found a direct linear relationship: for each one percent increase in children with lead levels elevated beyond the official CDC limit, there was a corresponding one percent increase in children in the lowest achievement group.

These recent studies probably help explain why the CDC recently lowered the level of acceptable blood lead burden from 10 to 5 μg/dL, the first change in 20 years (*New York Times*, May 17,

2012, CDC lowers recommended lead-level limits in children). The current level, 5 μg/dL, is an exceedingly small level of exposure. One μg (microgram) is one-millionth of a gram, and a dL (deciliter) is one-tenth of a liter or almost half a cup.

In addition to the health burden from lead exposure, the overall national costs are substantial, as outlined in a recent social policy report from the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD):

> Children's exposure to lead is expensive, incurring costs associated with health care and losses associated with lowered intellectual development, earnings, and tax contributions. One study put the overall cost of exposure in children 6 and under at $192 to $270 billion over six years. Another cost analysis concluded that reducing children's blood lead levels just 1 μg/dL would save $7.56 billion annually (SRCD, 2010, p. 2).

Prudence dictates that we should reduce lead exposure in humans to the lowest levels possible.

ORIGINS AND TRENDS IN RACIAL IQ DIFFERENCES

Early Studies of African American and White IQ Differences

Racial differences in IQ have been recorded since the beginnings of standardized testing. The most widely studied disparity is between African American and White samples, where a discrepancy favoring Whites of about one standard deviation (15 points) is historically reported. We should add that the term *Black* is used interchangeably with African American, and that White refers to non-Hispanic White individuals. The IQ difference fluctuates from one analysis to the next—as small as 10 points in a few studies but as large as 20 points in others. For example, in the 1960 restandardization of the Stanford-Binet, the White sample (M = 101.8) outscored the Black sample (M = 80.7) by slightly more than 20 IQ points (Kennedy, Van de Riet, & White, 1963). A lesser difference was revealed on the 1981 WAIS-R where Whites (M = 101.4) outscored Blacks (M = 86.9) by 14½ points (Reynolds, Chastain, Kaufman, & McLean, 1987). In the standardization sample for the fourth edition of the Stanford-Binet (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986) a difference of about 17½ points (mean of 103.5 versus 86.1) was observed. For these early studies, when demographic variables such as socioeconomic status are taken into account, the size of the mean difference reduces to .5 to .7 standard deviations (7 to 10 IQ points) but does not disappear (Reynolds & Brown, 1984a). Put simply, the existence of race differences in IQ has been reported with such consistency that is it no longer the focus of serious dispute.

However, the *interpretation* of race differences in IQ is an issue of fierce ongoing debate. Why the disparity exists, what it means from a practical standpoint, and whether the gap is narrowing—all these topics engender a full range of opinions (Fagan & Holland, 2007; Rushton & Jensen, 2005). We begin our discussion with the question of origins—what are the causes of the Black-White IQ difference?

One viewpoint (discussed previously) is that the observed IQ disparity is caused, partly or wholly, by test bias. This is a popular and widely held viewpoint rarely supported by technical studies of test bias. Test bias may play a small role in race differences, but it cannot explain the persistent difference in IQ scores between Black and White Americans. Here we intend to examine a different hypothesis; namely: Is the IQ difference between Black and White Americans due, in significant part, to genetic sources?

The Genetic Hypothesis for Race Differences in IQ

The hypothesis of a genetic basis for race differences in IQ first gained scholarly prominence in 1969 when Arthur Jensen published a provocative paper titled "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" (Jensen, 1969). Jensen set the tone for his paper in the opening sentence when he asserted that "compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed." He further contended that compensatory education programs were based on two fallacious theoretical underpinnings, namely, the "average child concept," which views children as

more or less homogeneous, and the "social deprivation hypothesis," which asserts that environmental deprivation is the primary cause of lowered achievement and IQ scores. Jensen argued forcefully against both suppositions. Furthermore, leaning heavily on the literature in behavior genetics, Jensen implied that the reason Whites scored higher than African Americans on IQ tests was probably related more to genetic factors than to the effects of environmental deprivation. The thrust of his paper was to suggest that, since compensatory education has proved ineffectual, and since the evidence suggests a strong genetic component to IQ, therefore, it is appropriate to entertain a genetic explanation for the well-documented difference in favor of Whites on IQ tests. He formulated the genetic hypothesis in a careful, tentative, scholarly manner:

> The fact that a reasonable hypothesis has not been rigorously proved does not mean that it should be summarily dismissed. It only means that we need more appropriate research for putting it to the test. I believe such definitive research is entirely possible but has not been done. So all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which is definitive alone, but which, viewed all together, make it a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference. The preponderance of the evidence is, in my opinion, less consistent with a strictly environmental hypothesis than with a genetic hypothesis, which, of course, does not exclude the influence of environment or its interaction with genetic factors. (Jensen, 1969)

With the articulation of a genetic hypothesis for race differences in IQ, Jensen provoked an intense debate that has raged on, with periodic lulls, to the present day.

In the mid-1990s the controversy over a genetic basis for race differences in IQ was intensified once again with the publication of *The Bell Curve* by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray (1994). This massive tome was primarily a book about the importance of IQ as a predictor of poverty, school leaving, unemployment, illegitimacy, crime, and a host of other social pathologies. But two chapters on ethnic differences in intelligence caused an uproar among social scientists and the lay public. The authors reviewed dozens of studies and concluded that the IQ gap between African Americans and Whites has changed little in this century. They also argued that test bias cannot explain the race differences. Furthermore, they noted that races differ not just in average IQ scores but also in the profile of intellectual abilities. In addition, they concluded that intelligence is only slightly malleable even in the face of intensive environmental intervention. As did Jensen, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) stated their genetic hypothesis with considerable circumspection:

> It seems highly likely to us that both genes and the environment have something to do with racial differences [in cognitive ability]. What might the mix be? We are resolutely agnostic on that issue; as far as we can determine, the evidence does not yet justify an estimate.

Although the authors declined to provide an estimate of the genetic contribution to race differences in IQ, it is clear from the tone of their pessimistic book that they believe it to be substantial. Recently, Arthur Jensen has reentered the debate on the origins of IQ differences between African Americans and White Americans and reaffirmed his earlier judgment that the disparity is "partly heritable" (Rushton & Jensen, 2005). Is this conclusion warranted by the evidence?

Tenability of the Genetic Hypothesis

The genetic hypothesis for race IQ differences is an unpopular idea that is anathema to many laypersons and social scientists. But contempt for an idea does not constitute disproof, and superficiality is no substitute for a reasoned examination of evidence. In light of additional analysis and research, is the genetic hypothesis for IQ differences tenable? We will examine three lines of evidence here that indicate that the answer is "no."

Several critics have pointed out that the genetic hypothesis is based on the questionable assumption

that evidence of IQ heritability within groups can be used to infer heritability between racial groups. Jensen (1969) expressed this premise rather explicitly, pointing to the substantial genetic component in IQ as suggestive evidence that differences in IQ between African Americans and White Americans are, in part, genetically based. Echoing earlier critics, Kaufman (1990) responds as follows:

> One cannot infer heritability between groups from studies that have provided evidence of the IQ's heritability within groups. Even if IQ is equally heritable within the black and white races separately, that does not prove that the IQ differences between the races are genetic in origin. Scarr-Salapatek's (1971, p. 1226) simple example explains this point well: Plant two randomly drawn samples of seeds from a genetically heterogeneous population in two types of soil—good conditions versus poor conditions—and compare the heights of the fully grown plants. Within each type of soil, individual variations in the heights are genetically determined; but the average difference in height between the two samples is solely a function of environment.

Another criticism of the genetic hypothesis is that careful analysis of environmental factors provides a sufficient explanation of race differences in IQ, that is, the genetic hypothesis is simply unnecessary. This is the approach taken by Brooks-Gunn, Klebanov, and Duncan (1996) in a study of 483 African American and White low birth weight children. What makes their study different from other similar analyses is the richness of their data. Instead of using only one or two measures of the environment (e.g., a single index of poverty level), they collected longitudinal data on income level and many other cofactors of poverty such as length of hospital stay, maternal verbal ability, home learning environment, neighborhood condition, and other components of family social class. When the children's IQs were tested at age 5 with the WPPSI, the researchers found the usual disparity between the White children (mean IQ of 103) and the African American children (mean IQ of 85). However, when poverty and its cofactors were statistically controlled, the IQ differences were almost completely eliminated. Their study suggests that previous research has underestimated the pervasive effects of poverty and its cofactors as a contribution to African American and White IQ differences.

A third criticism of the genetic hypothesis is that race as a biological entity is simply nonexistent, that is, *there are no biological races.* Fish (2002) and other proponents of this viewpoint argue that "race" is a socially constructed concept, not a biological reality:

> *Homo sapiens* has no extant subspecies: There are no biological races. Human physical appearance varies gradually around the planet, with the most geographically distant peoples generally appearing the most different from one another. The concept of human biological races is a construction socially and historically localized to 17th and 18th-century European thought. Over time, different cultures have developed different sets (folk taxonomies) of socially defined "races." (p. 29)

Put another way, racial categories are social constructions based on superficial physical differences (especially skin color) that serve cultural-psychological objectives (e.g., reducing uncertainty about how we should respond to one another). However, racial categories do not signify meaningful biological differences. A biologist expresses the point this way: "All of humanity shares in common the vast majority of its molecular genetic variation and the adaptive traits that define us as a single species" (Templeton, 2002, p. 51). Thus, insofar as race has no biological reality, the argument that "race" differences in IQ originate from a genetic basis is not only pernicious, it is also absurd. Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard, and others (1996) offer additional perspectives on race differences in IQ and related topics.

Before leaving the topic of race differences in IQ, we should point out that the emotion attached to this topic is largely undeserved, for two reasons. First, racial groups always show large overlaps in IQ—meaning that the peoples of the earth are much more alike than they are different. Second, as previously noted, the existing race differences in IQ certainly reflect cultural differences and environmental factors

to a substantial degree. Wilson (1994) has catalogued the numerous differences in cultural background between African Americans and White Americans. In 1992, for example, 64 percent of African American parents were divorced, separated, widowed, or never married; 63 percent of African American births were to unmarried mothers; and 30 percent of African American births were to adolescents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993). On average, these realities of family life for many African Americans inevitably will lead to lowered performance on intelligence tests. Lest the reader conclude that we are hereby endorsing a subtle form of Anglocentric superiority, consider Lynn's (1987) conclusion that the mean IQ of the Japanese is 107, a full 7 points higher than the average for American Whites. So what?

Recent Trends in Race Differences in IQ

An important question is whether Black–White IQ differences have remained stable over recent decades (which could support a genetic basis for the IQ disparity) or whether the gap has narrowed in response to environmental progress (which could indicate a substantial ecological source for the IQ disparity). The former conclusion (stability of the IQ difference) has been stated by Jensen and others who hypothesize, in part, a genetic basis for the discrepancy (Jensen, 1980; Jensen & Rushton, 2005).

In contrast, a recent analysis by Dickens and Flynn (2006) supports a significant narrowing of the racial IQ gap. These researchers considered comparative longitudinal data for Black and White examinees for the period 1970 to 2000 with successive editions of four carefully standardized instruments: The Stanford-Binet, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, and the Armed Forces Qualifying Test. Their findings are complex and statistically laden, but here is the big picture: on all four instruments, Blacks gained in IQ compared to Whites during 1970 to 2000, the average gain amounting to 4 to 7 IQ points. The authors conclude:

> The constancy of the Black-White IQ gap is a myth and therefore cannot be cited as evidence that the racial IQ gap is genetic in origin. (p. 917)

Overall, the average IQ for Black schoolchildren was estimated to be 90.5 in 2002, indicating that Black children have made large IQ gains relative to Whites since the 1960s. Dickens and Flynn (2006) conclude that further Black economic progress would produce additional gains in IQ. This conclusion provides an optimistic outlook on a contentious social issue.

AGE CHANGES IN INTELLIGENCE

We turn now to another controversial topic—whether intelligence declines with age. Certainly, one of the most pervasive stereotypes about aging is that we lose intellectual ability as we grow older. This stereotype is so pervasive that few laypersons question it. But we should question it.

In general, the empirical study of this topic provides a more optimistic conclusion than the common stereotype suggests. However, the research also reveals that age changes in intelligence are complex and multifaceted. The simple question, "Does intelligence decline with age?" turns out to have several labyrinthine answers.

We can trace the evolution of research on age-related intellectual changes as follows:

1. Early cross-sectional research with instruments such as the WAIS painted a somber picture of a slow decline in general intelligence after age 15 or 20 and a precipitously accelerated descent after age 60.
2. Just a few years later, more sophisticated studies using sequential testing with multidimensional instruments such as the Primary Mental Abilities Test suggested a more optimistic trajectory for intelligence: minimal change in most abilities until at least age 60.
3. Parallel research utilizing the fluid/crystallized distinction posited a gradual increase in crystallized intelligence virtually to the end of life, juxtaposed against a rapid decline in fluid intelligence.
4. Most recently, a few psychologists have proposed that adult intelligence is qualitatively different, akin to a new Piagetian stage that might be called postformal reasoning. This research calls into question the ecological validity of using standard instruments with older examinees.

We examine each of these research epochs in more detail in the following sections.

Early Cross-Sectional Research

One of the earliest comprehensive studies of age trends on an individually administered intelligence test was reported by Wechsler (1944) shortly after publication of the Wechsler-Bellevue Form I. As is true of all the Wechsler tests designed for adults, raw scores on the W-B I subtests were first transformed into standard scores (referred to as scaled scores) with a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3. Regardless of the age of the subject, these scaled scores were based on a fixed reference group of 350 subjects ages 20 to 34 included in the standardization sample. By consulting the appropriate age table, the sum of the 11 scaled scores was then used to find an examinee's IQ.

However, the sum of the scaled scores by itself is a direct index of an examinee's ability relative to the reference group. Wechsler used this index to chart the relationship between age and intelligence. His results indicated a rapid growth in general intelligence in childhood through age 15 or 20, followed by a slow decline to age 65. He was characteristically blunt in discussing his findings:

> If the fact that intellectual growth stops at about the age of fifteen has been a hard fact to accept, the indication that intelligence after attaining its maximum forthwith begins to decline just as any other physiological capacity, instead of maintaining itself at its highest level over a long period of time, has been an even more bitter pill to swallow. It has, in fact, proved so unpalatable that psychologists have generally chosen to avoid noticing it. (Wechsler, 1952)

Normative studies with subsequent Wechsler adult tests revealed exactly the same pattern. For example, results for the WAIS-IV have been computed in Figure 6.12, which shows the average uncorrected subtest scores for all age groups in the normative sample, relative to results for the highest scoring age group (25- to 29-year-olds).



FIGURE 6.12 The Curve of Supposed Age-Related Decline in Average WAIS-IV Subtest Scores
Source: Based on data in Wechsler, D. (2008). *Manual for the Wechsler adult intelligence scale—fourth edition*. San Antonio, TX: Pearson.

Overlooked by Wechsler and many other **cross-sectional design** researchers was the influence of their methodology on their findings. It has been recognized for quite some time that cross-sectional studies often confound age effects with educational disparities or other age-group differences (see Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977; Kausler, 1991). For example, in the normative studies of the Wechsler tests, it is invariably true that the younger standardization subjects are better educated than the older ones. In all likelihood, the lower scores of the older subjects are caused, in part, by these educational differences rather than signifying an inexorable age-related decline.

Sequential Studies of Intelligence

To control for age-group differences, many researchers prefer a **longitudinal design** in which the same subjects are retested one or more times over periods of 5 to 10 years and, in rare cases, up

to 40 years later. Because there is only one group of subjects, longitudinal designs eliminate age-group disparities (e.g., more education in the young than the old subjects) as a confounding factor. However, the longitudinal approach is not without its shortcomings. Longitudinal studies are prone to practice effects, which is the finding that participants learn the answers when they take the same test on several occasions; selective attrition, which is the observation that the least healthy participants are the most likely to drop out; and history, which is the discovery that major historical events (e.g., the Great Depression) can distort the intellectual and psychological development of entire generations.

The most efficient research method for studying age changes in ability is a **cross-sequential design** that combines cross-sectional and longitudinal methodologies (Schaie, 1977):

> In brief, the researchers begin with a cross-sectional study. Then, after a period of years, they retest these subjects, which provides longitudinal data on several cohorts—a longitudinal sequence. At the same time, they test a new group of subjects, forming a second cross-sectional study—and, together with the first cross-sectional study, a cross-sectional sequence. This whole process can be repeated over and over (every five or ten years, say) with retesting of old subjects (adding to the longitudinal data) and first-testing of new subjects (adding to the cross-sectional data). (Schaie & Willis, 1986)

In 1956, Schaie began the most comprehensive cross-sequential study ever conducted in what is referred to as the Seattle Longitudinal Study (Schaie, 1958, 1996, 2005). He administered Thurstone's test of five primary mental abilities (PMAs) and other intelligence-related measures to an initial cross-sectional sample of 500 community-dwelling adults. The PMA Test subtests include Verbal Meaning, Space, Reasoning, Number, and Word Fluency. In 1963, he retested these subjects and added a new cross-sectional cohort. Additional waves of data were collected in 1970, 1977, 1984, 1991, and 1998.

Three conclusions emerged from Schaie's cross-sequential study of adult mental abilities:

1. Each cross-sectional study indicated some degree of apparent age-related decrement in mental abilities, postponed until after age 50 for some abilities, but beginning after age 35 for others. In particular, Number skills and Word Fluency showed an age-related decrement only after age 50, whereas Verbal Meaning, Space, and Reasoning scores appeared to decline sooner, after age 35.
2. Successive cross-sectional studies—the cross-sectional sequence—revealed significant intergenerational differences in favor of those born most recently. Even holding age constant, those born and tested most recently performed better than those born and tested at an earlier time. For example, 30-year-old examinees tested in 1977 tended to score better than 30-year-old examinees tested in 1970, who tended to score better than 30-year-old examinees tested in 1963, who, in turn, outperformed 30-year-old examinees tested in 1956. However, these cohort differences in intelligence were not uniform across the different abilities measured by the PMA Test. The pattern of rising abilities was most apparent for Verbal Meaning, Reasoning, and Space. Cohort changes for Number and Word Fluency were more complex and contradictory.
3. In contrast to the moderately pessimistic findings of the cross-sectional comparisons, the *longitudinal* comparisons showed a tendency for mean scores either to rise slightly or to remain constant until approximately age 60 or 70. The only exceptions to this trend involved highly speeded tests such as Word Fluency, in which the examinee must name words in a given category as quickly as possible, and Number, in which the examinee must complete arithmetic computations quickly and accurately.

The results of the Schaie study are even more optimistic when individual longitudinal findings are disentangled from the group averages. As previously noted, the longitudinal findings differed from

one mental ability to another. Nonetheless, taking the average of the five PMAs and using the 25th percentile for 25-year-olds as his standard of meaningful decline, Schaie has shown that no more than 25 percent of those studied had declined by age 67. From age 67 to age 74 about a third of the subjects had declined, whereas from age 74 to age 81, slightly more than 40 percent had declined (Schaie, 1980, 1996; Schaie & Willis, 1986). In sum, the vast majority of us show no meaningful decline in the skills measured by the Primary Mental Abilities Test until we are well into our seventies. Perhaps even more impressive is the fact that approximately 10 percent of the sample improved significantly when retested in their seventies and eighties. Based on his research and other longitudinal studies, Schaie arrives at this conclusion:

> If you keep your health and engage your mind with the problems and activities of the world around you, chances are good that you will experience little if any decline in intellectual performance in your lifetime. That's the promise of research in the area of adult intelligence. (Schaie & Willis, 1986)

A recent study by Gow, Johnson, Pattie, and others (2011) provides additional insight into the fate of intelligence in old age. They obtained follow-up test data from elderly persons at ages 70, 79, and 87, using the same instrument first administered to participants at age 11. One cohort, born in 1921, was retested at age 79 and again at age 87. A second cohort, born in 1936, was retested at age 70. Sample sizes were very large, in the hundreds at each testing. The same test, the Moray House Test, No. 12 (MHT), was used throughout. The MHT consists of 71 items involving diverse domains of general intelligence, including following directions, same-opposites, word classification, analogies, practical items, and reasoning. Although little recognized in the United States, the MHT is a respected instrument used in Scotland and elsewhere for tracking epidemiological changes in intelligence. MHT total scores correlate about .80 with Stanford-Binet IQ scores (Gow et al., 2011). The test does not provide an IQ. Results are given as a total raw score, with a maximum possible score of 76. Participants also took the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE) when tested in old age. As noted, this measure is a simple 30-item test of orientation, memory, and other cognitive skills. The MMSE is used for dementia screening, and normal adults typically score in the range of 27 to 30 points.

Mindful that the data come from separate cohorts born in 1921 and 1936, the results appeared to indicate a decline, after age 70, in general intelligence as measured by the MHT. Specifically, average scores at age 70, 79, and 87 were 64.2, 59.2, and 54.1, respectively, indicating a gradual decline in general intelligence after age 70. In contrast, orientation, memory, and everyday cognitive skills declined little, about a half a point (on the 30-item MMSE), on average, every decade or so. The scores for both the MHT and the MMSE revealed greater variability with advancing age, a common finding in research on aging.

Gow et al. (2011) also sought to determine whether high intelligence in youth buffers against cognitive decline in old age. This was the special virtue of possessing test scores for all participants at age 11, which allowed researchers to map the trajectories of cognitive capacity as a function of initial ability. In the 1921 cohort tested at ages 79 and 87, they found that higher intelligence at age 11 did not slow the decline experienced in later life. Participants with initially higher MHT scores showed just as much cognitive decline as those with initially lower scores, but still maintained their relative advantage when tested in old age.

Age and the Fluid/Crystallized Distinction

Although we concur with the conclusions of Schaie and Willis (1986), it would be unfair to leave the impression that all authorities in this area agree. Horn and Cattell have been the most vocal skeptics, arguing for a significant age-related decrement in fluid intelligence because of its reliance upon neural integrity, which is presumed to decline with advancing age (Horn & Cattell, 1966; Horn, 1985). Cross-sectional studies certainly support this view. For example, Wang and Kaufman (1993) plotted age differences in vocabulary and matrices scores from

the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test and found little change in vocabulary (crystallized measure) but a sharp drop in matrices (fluid measure). These results held true even when the scores were adjusted for educational level. Of course, cross-sectional studies are open to rival interpretations and can, therefore, only suggest longitudinal patterns. Readers who wish to pursue this controversy should consult Hofer, Sliwinski, & Flaherty (2002) and Lindenberger and Baltes (1994).

More recently, Schaie, Caskie, Revell, and others (2005) demonstrated the same age-related patterns (negligible changes in crystallized measures, large decrements in fluid measures) in a follow-up study of older participants from the Seattle Longitudinal Study. Their participants comprised three groups: early-old (ages 60–69, $N = 180$), middle-old (ages 70–79, $N = 205$), and old-old (ages 80–95, $N = 114$). On average, the three groups were 64.2, 74.6, and 84.3 years of age, respectively. These individuals were administered a battery of 37 cognitive and neuropsychological measures assembled from well-known instruments, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981), the Primary Mental Abilities test (PMA, Schaie, 1985), and several other tests. In Figure 6.13, we have depicted the results from four key subtests. Two of these subtests depend heavily on fluid cognitive factors (Reasoning and Spatial Thinking from the PMA), and two require significant crystallized abilities (Vocabulary and Comprehension from the WAIS-R). Scores are depicted as a percentage of the early-old group (ages 60–69), which typically earned the highest average score on all subtests. The reader will notice that raw scores on Comprehension and Vocabulary (crystallized abilities) reveal a nearly flat trend for the three age groups, whereas raw scores on Reasoning and Spatial Thinking (fluid abilities) disclose a steep decline for individuals in their 70s, 80s, and beyond.



FIGURE 6.13 Cross-Sectional Comparison of Age Trends for Four Cognitive Subtests *Source:* Based on data from Schaie, K. W., Caskie, G., Revell, A., & others (2005). Extending neuropsychological assessments in the Primary Mental Ability space. *Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition*, 12, 245–277.

GENERATIONAL CHANGES IN IQ SCORES

What happens to the intelligence of a population from one generation to the next? For example, how does the intelligence of Americans in the year 2010 compare to the intelligence of their forebears in the early 1900s? We might expect that any differences would be small. After all, the human gene pool has remained essentially constant for centuries, perhaps millennia. Furthermore, only a small fraction of any generation is exposed do the extremes of environmental deprivation or enrichment that might stunt or boost intelligence dramatically. Common sense dictates that any generational changes in population intelligence would be minimal.

On this issue, common sense appears to be incorrect. Flynn (1984, 1987) charted the comparison data from successive editions of the Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler tests from 1932 to 1981 and found that, with only one exception, each edition established a higher standard than its predecessor. For example, when the latest edition of the WISC-R was released in the 1970s, a large sample of five- and six-year-old children was tested on both this

instrument and the earlier WPPSI, released in the 1960s. The testing was counterbalanced, half of the sample taking the WPPSI first, half taking the WISC-R first. The average WPPSI IQ for these 140 children was 112.8, whereas the same children earned an average WISC-R IQ of about 108.6. Because each new test is calibrated to a general population average of 100, this difference indicates an apparent 4-point gain in the population from the time the WPPSI was standardized (in 1965) to the time the WISC-R was standardized (in 1972). When new revisions are charted against their predecessors in the manner described here, the total apparent gain in mean IQ amounts to about 14 points in the five decades from 1932 to 1981 (Flynn, 1984).

This apparent rise in IQ over generations is known as the **Flynn effect** in honor of the psychologist who first delineated the occurrence (Flynn, 2007a). Although the Flynn effect may have slowed down in recent decades, in some countries, it is still found in nearly every comparison of average IQs for successive editions of mainstream intelligence tests. This trend of rising performance has been observed in many nations using other tests as well, including Raven's Progressive Matrices and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Daley, Whaley, Sigman, Espinosa, & Neuman, 2003; Nettelbeck & Wilson, 2004).

However, IQ gains of the magnitude observed pose a serious problem of causal explanation. Flynn (1994) is skeptical that any real and meaningful intelligence of a population could vault upward so quickly. He concludes that current tests do not measure intelligence but rather a correlate with a weak causal link to intelligence:

> Psychologists should stop saying that IQ tests measure intelligence. They should say that IQ tests measure abstract problem-solving ability (APSA), a term that accurately conveys our ignorance. We know people solve problems on IQ tests; we suspect those problems are so detached, or so abstracted from reality, that they ability to solve them can diverge over time from the real-world problem-solving ability called intelligence; thus far we know little else. (Flynn, 1987)

Other explanations for the Flynn effect include better nutrition, improved prenatal care, greater educational access, and increased environmental complexity (Lynn, 2009; Sundet, Borren, & Tambs, 2008). On this last point, environmental complexity, Flynn (2007b) provides a telling illustration by way of generational changes in TV programs. He notes that early 1960s shows like *I Love Lucy* or *Dragnet* required almost no concentration to follow, whereas in the 1980s dramas like *Hill Street Blues* introduced up to 10 threads in the story line. More recently, the hit action-thriller drama *24* portrays as many as 20 characters and multiple plot lines.

In a recent interview, Flynn has suggested that ways of thinking and solving problems have undergone dramatic worldwide shifts in the last century.

> Today we take it for granted that using logic on the abstract is an ability we want to cultivate and we are interested in the hypothetical. People from 1900 were not scientifically oriented but utilitarian and they used logic, but to use it on the hypothetical or on abstractions was foreign to them. Alexander Luria [a Soviet psychologist] went to talk to headmen in villages in rural Russia and he said to them: "Where there is always snow, bears are white. At the North Pole there is always snow, what colour are the bears there?" And they said: "I've only seen brown bears." And he said: "What do my words convey?" And they said: "Such a thing as not to be settled by words but by testimony." They didn't settle questions of fact by logic, they settled them by experience (Witchalls, 2012, p. 1).

Regardless of the causes, the Flynn effect has sensitized psychologists to the dangers of rendering conclusions based on ever-shifting intelligence test norms. Changes in IQ over time make it imperative to restandardize tests frequently, otherwise examinees are being scored with obsolete norms and will receive inaccurate IQ scores. This is especially a problem when IQ scores are used for important decisions such as eligibility for learning disability programs, or entitlement to social security benefits. At the other extreme, issues literally of life and death

can be at stake when IQ scores impact capital punishment decisions via the diagnosis of mental retardation (Kanaya, Scullin, & Ceci, 2003).

Several recent studies indicate that the Flynn effect may have abated or even reversed in the beginning of the twenty-first century, at least in some countries. Reviewing data from more than a half-million Danish men over the period 1959 to 2004, Teasdale and Owen (2005) found that average performance on a military entry intelligence test gained slowly, peaked in the late 1990s, and has since declined slowly. Sundet, Barlaug, and Torjussen (2004) found a similar pattern with Norwegian conscripts on a test of matrix reasoning, with improved performance from the 1950s until the 1990s, followed by a reversal and decline. Using Piagetian tests of conservation of weight, volume, and quantity with seventh-grade British schoolchildren, Shayer, Ginsburg, and Coe (2007) documented a steady decline in performance from 1975 to 2003, a phenomenon they dubbed the "anti-Flynn effect."

Yet, in many countries the Flynn effect continues unabated. Flynn and Rossi-Casé (2012) found large gains on Raven's Progressive Matrices in Argentina between 1964 and 1998. In South Korea, te Nijenhuis, Cho, Murphy, and Lee (2012) reported large IQ gains as well. The Flynn effect continues to be a puzzling and complex phenomenon.

CHAPTER 7

Assessing Special Populations

TOPIC 7A Infant and Preschool Assessment

Assessment of Infant Capacities
Assessment of Preschool Intelligence
Practical Utility of Infant and Preschool Assessment
Screening for School Readiness
Dial-4

The individual and group tests reviewed in previous chapters are suitable for persons with normal or near-normal capacities in speech, hearing, vision, movement, and general intellectual ability. However, not every examinee falls within the ordinary spectrum of physical and mental abilities. By reason of immature age, physical disability, language weakness, or diminished intellect, a large proportion of the population falls outside the reach of traditional tests and procedures.

Infants and very young children certainly require exceptional approaches to assessment because of their limited capacities for communication. In Topic 7A, Infant and Preschool Assessment, we review the nature and application of infant and early childhood assessment devices and then investigate a fundamental question pertaining to these tests: What is the practical utility of testing children early in life? In particular, is there any predictive validity for test results obtained from infants or toddlers? If instruments for very young examinees do not predict important outcomes later in life, then using them would appear to be pointless and perhaps even misleading. We examine this quandary in some detail. Finally, we conclude the topic with a discussion of an important application of preschool testing—screening for school readiness. In Topic 7B, Testing Persons with Disabilities, we scrutinize a variety of tests needed for the assessment of individuals with special needs. These special needs cover a wide spectrum, including language, hearing, and visual impairments. Of course, persons with developmental disabilities also require special approaches to assessment, and we provide coverage of this field as well. By one estimate, as many as 7.5 million U.S. citizens manifest intellectual disabilities, and 1 in 10 families are directly affected by this functional impairment (Grossman, Richards, Anglin, & Hutson, 2000).

ASSESSMENT OF INFANT CAPACITIES

The infant and preschool period extends from birth to roughly 6 years of age. The changes that occur during this period obviously are profound. The infant develops basic reflexes, masters developmental milestones (grasping, crawling, sitting, standing, and so forth), learns a language, and establishes the capacity for symbolic thought. For most children, the pattern and pace of development is visibly within normal limits.

However, parents and professionals trained in the assessment of infants and preschoolers occasionally encounter children whose development seems to be slow, delayed, or even overtly impaired. These children elicit a flurry of anxious questions: How delayed is this child? What are the prospects for normal functioning in school? Will this child achieve personal independence in the adult years?

Another area of concern for many parents is the emotional development of their infants and children. Even normal children display trials and challenges that would test the saints. Visit any busy shopping mall and you will encounter scenes of hysterical, screaming children with frazzled parents attempting to cope. Listen to any honest parent with a toddler and you will hear a story or two of food smeared on walls, puppies tormented, obstinate refusal to stay in bed, or similar unpleasant actions. At what point do difficult and problematic behaviors portend a life of emotional troubles, when not promptly treated?

At the opposite extreme are those precocious children who achieve developmental milestones months or years ahead of the normative schedule. In these cases, the proud parents have a different set of concerns: How advanced is my child? What are the strongest and weakest areas of intellectual functioning? Will this child be a gifted adult?

Infant and preschool assessment tools can help answer questions about the intellectual and emotional development of children, whether they are developmentally delayed, intellectually gifted, at-risk for emotional disorder, or within the normal spectrum. In this topic, we review the nature and application of representative infant and preschool measures. These tools include individual tests, developmental schedules, and rating scales. We begin with a description of several prominent instruments and then investigate the fundamental question of purpose or utility. What is the use of these measures? What is the meaning of a score on a developmental schedule or preschool intelligence test? To what extent do these procedures allow us to prognosticate adult functioning or, for that matter, help us to predict early school performance? These questions will be more meaningful if we first review the relevant instruments.

We divide the review into two parts: infant measures for children from birth to age 2½, and preschool tests for children from age 2½ to age 6. The division is somewhat arbitrary, but not entirely so. Infant tests tend to be multidimensional and to load significantly on sensory and motor development. Beginning at age 2½, standardized measures such as the Stanford-Binet: Fifth Edition, Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children-2, and Differential Ability Scales-II are typically used in the assessment of preschool children. These tests load heavily on cognitive skills such as verbal comprehension and spatial thinking. Thus, infant scales and preschool tests measure somewhat different components of intellectual ability.

Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale (NBAS)

The Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale (NBAS) is unique because of its theoretical basis, which emphasizes the need to document the contributions of the newborn to the parent–infant system. The pediatrician T. Berry Brazelton (Brazelton & Nugent, 1995) developed this instrument to identify and understand the "deviant" infant and to explore the baby's reciprocal impact on parents:

> My goal in developing the NBAS was to assess the baby's contributions to the failures that resulted, when parents were presented with a difficult or deviant infant. If we could understand the reasons behind the infant's deviant behavior, perhaps we could in turn lead parents to a better understanding of their role. This then could lead to a more optimal outcome. (Brazelton & Nugent, 1995)

The NBAS is suitable for infants up to two months of age but is most commonly administered in the first week of life. The scale assesses the infant's behavioral repertoire on 28 behavior items, each scored on a 9-point scale. Examples of the behavior items include the following:

- Response decrement to light
- Orientation to inanimate visual stimulus
- Cuddliness
- Consolability

In addition, the infant's neurological status is evaluated on 18 reflex items, each scored on a 4-point scale. Examples include the following:

- Plantar grasp
- Babinski reflex
- Rooting reflex
- Sucking reflex

Finally, seven supplementary items can be used to summarize the qualities of responsiveness of frail, high-risk infants, including these:

- Quality of alertness
- General irritability
- Examiner's emotional response to infant

Brazelton and Nugent (1995) do not provide an integrative scoring system; that is, there are no summary scores for the entire battery or its subcomponents. Instead, the "scoring" of the NBAS consists of a summary sheet with ratings on each specific item. In clinical work, the instrument is used to provide feedback to parents. Specifically, Brazelton recommends that health care professionals demonstrate the NBAS in order to sensitize parents to their baby's uniqueness and to promote a positive parent–infant relationship. Hawthorne (2009) describes the clinical application of the instrument for promoting successful caregiving strategies. Regarding clinical use of the test, Fowles (1999) compared mothers who received a demonstration of the NBAS with a matched control group and showed that the intervention group subsequently rated their infants as significantly more predictable. Thus, the NBAS was found to be useful in helping mothers anticipate their infants' responses to environmental stimuli. However, based on a comprehensive review of published studies, Britt and Myers (1994) provide a less optimistic review of the effects of the NBAS intervention, noting inconsistent findings in areas such as parent–infant interaction, infant development, temperament, and parental attitudes and satisfaction.

For research on newborn outcomes, various investigators have developed scoring systems for the NBAS, including a popular seven-cluster scoring method proposed by Lester (1984). This method provides summary scores for identified clusters (habituation, orientation, motor performance, arousal/lability, regulation, autonomic stability, and reflexes). Using a quantitative scoring approach, researchers have linked prenatal cocaine exposure to inferior performance on the NBAS (Morrow et al., 2001; Schuler, 1999). In addition, the NBAS is also sensitive to the detrimental effects of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) on babies born to women who consumed contaminated Lake Ontario fish (Stewart, Reihman, Lonky, Darvill, & Pagano, 1999). The NBAS also shows sensitivity to the impact of major depression in mothers by revealing greater arousal and less attentiveness to face/voice stimuli in their newborn babies (Hernandez-Reif, Field, Diego, & Ruddock, 2006). Further, the instrument is sensitive to changes in feeding behavior of premature infants (Medoff-Cooper & Ratcliffe, 2005). In general, these studies demonstrate the value of the NBAS in a wide variety of research endeavors with infants.

In spite of the proven utility of the NBAS as a clinical and research tool, reviewers have been somewhat skeptical about the psychometric properties of the instrument. For example, Majnemer and Mazer (1998) point to very low test–retest reliability coefficients ($r = -0.15$ to $+0.32$ for the individual items) and weak interrater agreement. One likely explanation is that in newborn infants, individual traits may fluctuate rapidly over short periods of time, which would produce an underestimate of true reliability when the NBAS is given twice over a period of days or weeks. For this reason, deviant scores from a single administration of the NBAS should not be overinterpreted.

Bayley-III

Originally released in 1969, the Bayley test is now in its third edition (Bayley, 2006). Suitable for children 1 month to 42 months of age, this instrument is an important mainstay for the evaluation of developmental delay in infants and toddlers. Known formally as the Bayley Scales of Infant and Toddler Development-III and informally as the Bayley-III, the most recent version represents a vast extension and revision of the earlier editions. For example, the first edition of the test evaluated only the cognitive and motor capacities of infants, whereas the latest edition provides for the assessment of five domains. The domains and representative capacities tested are listed here.

- *Cognitive Scale:* 91 items involving sensory acuity, perceptual skill, attention, object permanence, exploration and manipulation, puzzle solving, color matching, and counting. The Cognitive Scale does not contain separate subtests.
- *Language Scale:* 48 items involving receptive and expressive communication. Items involve recognition of sounds, nonverbal expression, following simple directions, identifying action pictures, naming objects, and answering questions. The Language Scale yields separate scores for Expressive Communication and Receptive Communication as well as a composite Language Scale score.
- *Motor Scale:* 138 items pertaining to gross motor and fine motor skills. Items involve object manipulation, functional hand skills, postural control, dynamic movement, and motor planning. The Motor Skill yields separate scores for Gross Motor and Fine Motor as well as a composite Motor Scale score.
- *Social-Emotional:* 35 items involving interactive and purposeful use of emotions, ability to convey feelings, and connection of ideas and emotions. The Social-Emotional Scale does not contain separate subtests.
- *Adaptive Behavior Scale:* Caregivers complete items on a 4-point scale of 0 (*is not able*), 1 (*never when needed*), 2 (*sometimes when needed*), or 3 (*always when needed*); items pertain to Communication, Community Use, Health and Safety, Leisure, Self-Care, Self-Direction, Functional Pre-Academics, Home Living, Social, and Motor. This scale yields separate scaled scores for each of the ten areas listed, as well as a General Adaptive Composite (GAC).

The five major clusters listed above each yield a composite score reported as a standard score ($M = 100$, $SD = 15$). Note that the Bayley-III does not yield an overall score akin to an IQ score on a traditional test. Such a score could be misleading in light of the broad range of diverse skills now assessed in the third edition of the test. Instead, the instrument seeks to yield a profile of scores useful in infant assessment and diagnosis. To this end, all scores on the instrument (including the many subscales listed above) can be reported as scaled scores (mean = 10, SD = 3) for purposes of intra-individual comparison. This yields a useful chart that helps pinpoint areas of needed intervention. For example, the child depicted in Table 7.1, a 37-month-old boy referred for assessment, appears to present with mild intellectual disability characterized by problems with expressive communication, fine motor skills, communication, functional pre-academics, and self-direction.

TABLE 7.1 Bayley-III Scaled Score Results for a 37-Month-Old Infant

Cog	***Language***		***Motor***		***SE***
Cog	RC	E	FM	GM	SE
6	7	**4**	**3**	8	**4**

Adaptive Behavior									
Com	CU	FA	HL	HS	LS	SC	SD	Soc	MO
4	7	**4**	8	7	7	5	**4**	6	6

Cog = Cognitive, RC = Receptive Communication, EC = Expressive Communication, FM = Fine Motor, GM = Gross Motor, SE = Social-Emotional, Com = Communication, CU = Community Use, FA = Functional Pre-Academics, HL = Home Living, HS = Health and Safety, LS = Leisure, SC = Self-Care, SD = Self-Direction, Soc = Social, MO = Motor.

Note: An average score in the general population is 10, and scores between 8 and 12 typically are considered normal. Scores of 4 or below, indicated in bold, are areas of potential concern.

The technical quality and excellent standardization of the Bayley-III mark this test as the psychometric pinnacle of its field. The normative sample of 1,700 children was stratified according to age and essential demographic variables, and the test developers also collected extensive data on children with high-incidence clinical diagnoses such as autism and intellectual disability. Internal consistency reliability of the five composite scores appears to be strong, with average reliability coefficients as high as .93 (Language) and .91 (Cognitive). Test–retest reliability over a short period (average of 6 days) is predictably lower, with coefficients ranging from .67 (Fine Motor) to .80 (Expressive Communication). Average stability coefficient across all ages for the major composites was .80, which is decent given that infants and toddlers are notoriously distractible.

Validity evidence for the Bayley-III is scant at this time, but wholly supportive. For example, confirmatory factor analysis of the subtests of the Cognitive, Language, and Motor scales supported the three-factor model across all age groups of the standardization sample, except for the youngest age group (Bayley, 2006). Concurrent validity coefficients with other instruments are strong as well. For example, The WPPSI-III Full Scale IQ scores correlated .72 to .79 with Bayley-III Cognitive composites. Correlations of the Motor and Adaptive Behavior composites with suitable instruments also were appropriately strong, on the order of .50 to .70. We agree with reviewers who assert that the Bayley-III continues to set the standard for early childhood assessment, and will maintain its status as the most frequently used measure of infant and toddler development (Albers & Grieve, 2007).

Devereux Early Childhood Assessment-Clinical Form (DECA-C)

The Devereux Early Childhood Assessment-Clinical Form (DECA-C) is a refreshing addition to the assessment field. The scale is designed for the assessment of preschoolers aged 2:0 through 5:11 with social and emotional troubles or significant behavioral concerns (LeBuffe & Naglieri, 1999ab, 2003). What makes the instrument unique is the noteworthy focus on *protective factors* that can buffer the impact of social, emotional, or behavior difficulties. DECA-C consists of three protective factor scales (Initiative, Self-control, and Attachment), as well as four problem scales (Attention Problems, Aggression, Withdrawal/Depression, and Emotional Control Problems). The measure can be completed by both parents and teachers. The response options for the 62 items require that the parent or teacher rate the frequency of various behaviors on a 5-point scale (*never*, *rarely*, *occasionally*, *frequently*, *very frequently*).

When combined, the three protective factor scale scores provide a Total Protective Factors score that indicates possible sources of resilience for the child. These scales include:

> *Initiative*: Assesses the child's ability to use independent thought and behavior to meet his or her needs. Items resemble "Retrieves things by himself or herself."
>
> *Self-control*: Measures the child's capacity to experience and express a range of emotions in a socially acceptable manner. Items resemble "Controls his or her temper."
>
> *Attachment*: Assesses the child's formation of strong and long-lasting relationships with parents, teachers, and family members. Items resemble: "Accepts adult comforting when upset."

The DECA-C is based, in part, on resilience theory, as proposed by Werner (1990) and described by others (e.g., Masten, Best, & Garmezy, 1990). Resilience theory is a strengths-based approach that concentrates on protective factors at three levels: environmental (high-quality childcare and schools), family (nurturing parents and extended family), and within-child (adaptive personality traits). LeBuffe and Naglieri (1999b) summarize the essentials:

> Children whose behavior reflects these protective factors tend to have positive outcomes despite stress and are often characterized as resilient. Children lacking or with underdeveloped protective factors are more likely to develop emotional and behavioral problems under similar risk conditions and are described as vulnerable (p. 75).

The purpose of appraising protective factors is so that interventions can build upon the child's strengths. The focus on resilience provides a hopeful

supplement to the usual, customary appraisal of problem areas.

In addition to protective factors, the DECA-C also provides a well-conceived analysis of behavioral concerns. When combined, the four problem scales yield a Total Behavioral Concerns score that indicates the vulnerability of the child to social and emotional difficulties. These scales include:

> *Attention Problems*: Assesses the child's ability to focus on a task and ignore distracting environmental stimuli. Items resemble: "Loses focus on the task at hand."
>
> *Aggression*: Measures aggressive or destructive acts directed at other persons or things. Items resemble: "Destroys personal property of others."
>
> *Withdrawal/Depression*: Assesses self-absorption and emotional/social withdrawal. Items resemble: "Appears wrapped up in his/her own world."
>
> *Emotional Control Problems:* Measures difficulties in controlling negative emotions that interfere with goal directed behavior. Items resemble: "Loses temper when things don't go his/her way."

Standardization of the DECA-C is exemplary, based on 1,108 preschool-aged children rated by parents or teachers. The sample approximated national data for preschoolers with respect to race, ethnicity, geographic region, and family income. Internal consistency reliability with these samples was good. For the parents, coefficient alphas for the subscales were typically in the high .70s (median .78), whereas the values for teachers were higher, typically in the high .80s (median .88). Discriminant analysis with the Total Behavior Concerns scale scores revealed a 74 percent accuracy in classifying clinical versus community cases, suggesting good criterion validity (LeBuffe & Naglieri, 1999b).

Several recent studies support the validity and utility of the DECA-C. Ogg et al. (2010) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of scores for 1,344 children on the protective factors scales, and determined that the factor structure proposed by the original authors was adequate, with minor modifications in wording. Specifically, a few items revealed differential item functioning for boys versus girls, suggesting that minor adjustments to item wordings would strengthen their respective subscales. Jaberg, Dixon, and Weis (2009) replicated the original factor structure as well and found adequate internal consistency for the protective factors scales in a sample of 780 kindergarten children. Lien and Carlson (2009) favorably describe use of the instrument with Head Start populations.

Additional Measures of Infant Capacity

As we have learned, the assessment of infants can be vital and yet is so tricky. Infants ordinarily do not follow directions and they may not be able to verbalize what they know. Assessment is a huge challenge. Nonetheless, dozens of test developers have risen to the summons. Even a brief review of alternative instruments would be chapter-length. We refer the reader to the remarkable 400-page review provided by Berry, Bridges, and Zaslow (2004), which is available online at www.childtrends.org. This compendium provides thoughtful reviews of dozens of scales for learning, cognition, language, literacy, math, social-emotional, and Head Start outcomes.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESCHOOL INTELLIGENCE

Preschool children exhibit wide variability in emotional maturity and responsiveness to adults. One child may warm up to the examiner and strive for optimal performance on all questions. Another child may stare mutely at the floor rather than attempt a simple block design task. For the first child, we can be rest assured that the test results are an appropriate index of cognitive functioning. But for the second child, uncertainty prevails. Does the nonresponsiveness signal a lack of skill or a lack of cooperation? With preschool children, a large measure of humility is required of the examiner. Scarr (1981) has expressed this sentiment as follows:

> Whenever one measures a child's cognitive functioning, one is also measuring cooperation, attention, persistence, ability to sit still, and social responsiveness to an assessment situation.

The special danger in preschool assessment is that the examiner may infer that a low score indicates

low cognitive functioning when, in truth, the child is merely unable to sit still, attend, cooperate, and so forth. Preschool assessment needs to be approached with unusual caution to avoid negative consequences of labeling and overdiagnosis of disabling conditions.

There are several individually administered intelligence tests suitable for preschool children. The most commonly used instruments include:

- Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children-2 (KABC-2)
- Differential Ability Scales-II (DAS-II)
- Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-IV (WPPSI-IV)
- Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales for Early Childhood, Fifth Edition (Early SB5)

The KABC-2 was described in the previous chapter. We will focus here on the Differential Ability Scales-II, the WPPSI-IV, and the Early SB5.

Differential Ability Scales-II

The Differential Ability Scales-II (DAS-II) is the latest edition of a highly respected test initially published in 1990 (Elliott, 1990, 2007). The test consists of three batteries: The Early Years Battery (lower-level) for ages 2-6 to 3-5, the Early Years Battery (upper-level) for ages 3-6 to 6-11, and the School-Age Battery for ages 7-0 to 17-11. We focus here on the battery used with preschool children aged 3-6 to 6-11.

The DAS-II includes 10 core subtests and 10 diagnostic subtests; however, rarely is a child administered all 20 subtests. The core subtests are the primary measures of cognitive abilities, whereas the diagnostic subtests provide supplementary information about school readiness and information processing. The particular combination of subtests administered depends on the child's age, ability level, and the purposes of assessment. For preschool children age 3½ and above, a comprehensive test battery would include six core subtests and seven diagnostic subtests, which are described in Table 7.2.

The core subtests are heavily saturated with the *g* factor and are used to derive three core cluster scores (Verbal, Nonverbal Reasoning, and Spatial) and an overall composite score known as General Conceptual Ability (GCA). An optional cluster score known as the Special Nonverbal Composite (SNC) can be computed from four nonverbal subtests as well. In developing the DAS and its revision, Elliott (2007) steered away from concepts of intelligence and IQ, using the more neutral designation of GCA instead. Even so, most experts in the field would consider GCA to be essentially the same as IQ.

The diagnostic subtests measure early number concepts, phonological processing, short-term memory, and processing speed. These subtests and the diagnostic composites derived from them are used for clinical analysis only. The diagnostic subtests are less dependent on the *g* factor and therefore do not figure in the GCA or any core composites. The diagnostic subtests contribute to three diagnostic cluster scores (School Readiness, Working Memory, and Processing Speed). These subtests provide information useful in assessing learning problems and school readiness, thereby complementing the core subtests. The DAS-II is normed to standard scores ($M = 100$, $SD = 15$) for the GCA and cluster scores, whereas the individual subtests are based on *T* scores ($M = 50$, $SD = 10$). The DAS-II was normed on 3,480 U.S. children, with careful stratification (2002 census data) on age, gender, race/ethnicity, parental education, and geographic region.

The reliability of DAS-II scores is commendable for an instrument used at the preschool level. Typically, preschool children are easily distracted and plainly influenced by situational factors, which tends to lower the reliability of test scores. The DAS-II seems relatively immune to these influences. For preschoolers, GCA internal consistency reliability is reported to be .95. The cluster scores also show excellent reliability with values ranging from .89 to .95. Internal consistency reliability of the subtests is predictably lower, although still laudable, ranging from .81 to .91. As is often found in reliability studies, test–retest reliability figures were significantly lower, based on retesting of 369 children after a period ranging from 7 to 63 days. These coefficients ranged from .51 to .92, with most values in the .70s and .80s.

The validity of the DAS-II looks promising from several perspectives. First, the measure reveals very strong correlations with other tests of preschool cognitive functioning and achievement. For example, DAS-II GCA scores correlate strongly with mainstream intelligence tests, for example, $r = .87$

TABLE 7.2 DAS-II Subtests on the Early-Years Battery, Upper Level

Subtest	*Abilities Measured*	*Contribution to Composite(s)*
Core Subtests		
Verbal Comprehension	Receptive language, understanding of oral instructions	GCA, Verbal Ability
Naming Vocabulary	Expressive language, knowledge names and object	GCA, Verbal ability
Picture Similarities	Nonverbal reasoning, matching pictures with common themes	GCA, Nonverbal reasoning ability
Matrices	Abstract reasoning, deducing the missing pattern in a matrix	GCA, Nonverbal reasoning ability
Pattern Construction	Nonverbal, spatial visualization with colored blocks and squares	GCA, Spatial Ability
Copying	Design copying, fine-motor coordination, visual-spatial matching	GCA, Spatial Ability
Diagnostic Subtests		
Early Number Concepts	Knowledge of numerical concepts—number, order, addition, subtraction	School Readiness
Matching Letter-Like Forms	Seeing spatial relationships, visually discriminating similar forms	School Readiness
Phonological Processing	Ability to process syllables, sounds, and phonemes, e.g., rhyming, blending	School Readiness
Recall of Sequential Order	Visualization and recall, e.g., order of body parts (belly, hair, toe, chin)	Working Memory
Recall of Digits Backward	Short-term auditory recall for sequences, mental manipulation	Working Memory
Speed of Information Processing	Rapid visual scanning and simple decision-making	Processing Speed
Rapid Naming	Naming colors and pictures as quickly as possible	Processing Speed

Note: GCA = General Conceptual Ability. Also, a Special Nonverbal Composite (SNC) can be computed from the four nonverbal core subtests.

with WPPSI-III IQ, and $r = .84$ with WISC-IV IQ. Likewise strong correlations are observed with major achievement tests, for example, $r = .82$ with WIAT-II total achievement, and $r = .81$ with KTEA-II total achievement. Another line of validity evidence for the DAS-II consists of test data for 12 special groups, including children with giftedness, mental retardation, reading disorder, ADHD and learning disorder, and limited English proficiency. In general, these groups reveal theory-consistent patterning of scores, for example, those with reading disorders score relatively low on the Verbal Ability cluster, those with ADHD and learning disorder score relatively low on the School Readiness cluster, those known to be gifted earn average GCA scores of 125, and so forth.

Confirmatory factor analyses reported in the technical manual leave a confusing picture as to the underlying structure of the DAS-II. The number of factors providing the best fit to the test data differs by age group, ranging from a 2-factor solution for the youngest age group (age 2-6 to 3-5) to a 7-factor solution for children ages 6-0 to 12-11, with 5- and 6-factor models for other age groups. On the other hand, the DAS-II is not predicated on any particular model of intelligence, so the pertinence of confirmatory factor analyses is questionable.

Even though the DAS-II has been available for a few years, there is almost no published research using the test. One study found the instrument valuable in the evaluation of specific learning disability (SLD). In particular, regression equations using the cluster scores were helpful in identifying children with SLD in mathematics (Hale, Fiorello, Dumont, and others, 2008). Beran (2007) reviews the test favorably, with this understatement: "The test is complex." In fact, the summary page of the record form for hand scoring proves so difficult to follow that computer scoring is nearly mandatory. Sattler (2008) provides an especially thorough overview of the DAS-II.

Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-IV (WPPSI-IV)

The WPPSI-IV is a significant revision of its predecessor, the WPPSI-III, and continues a long tradition of excellence in the assessment of preschool and primary school children (Wechsler, 2012). The test is suitable for children ages 2½ to 7 years and 7 months, although a slightly different mix of subtests is used for younger children (ages 2-6 to 3-11) than for older children (ages 4:0 to 7:7). We discuss only the version for older children here.

The full battery includes up to 13 subtests, but only 6 are needed to obtain a Full Scale IQ (FSIQ), although this is rarely the solitary goal of assessment. In most situations, examiners will find it indispensable to compare and contrast the various subcomponents of general intelligence, not just to get a FSIQ. For this more useful assessment, an additional 4 subtests are needed, for a total of 10 subtests, which is the most common WPPSI-IV battery. The final 3 subtests (for a total of 13 subtests) are needed only for special ancillary index scales discussed later. We begin our discussion in reference to the standard 10 subtests normally administered.

Based on factor analytic studies, clinical considerations, and a comprehensive review of the latest research on cognitive abilities, the developers of the WPPSI-IV concluded that five Primary Index Scales, each based on two subtests, are needed to capture the complexity of cognitive abilities in older children. The structure of the WPSSI-IV is outlined in Table 7.3.

One desirable feature of the new edition is the use of child-friendly and developmentally appropriate stimulus materials. For example, in the new subtest Zoo Locations, one part of the working memory composite, the child views one or more animal cards placed on a large zoo layout for a predetermined time, then works with an "empty" zoo to place each card in the correct location. Another example of adapting test materials to the needs of children is the use of an ink dauber (essentially a large felt-tip pen) rather than a pencil to indicate responses on processing speed subtests. This reduces the confounding of the subtest (a measure of processing speed) with fine motor demands (a measure of motor prowess).

The WPPSI-IV is a recent revision, so there is little independent research on its psychometric properties or clinical utility. However, the similarities of

TABLE 7.3 Primary Index Structure of the WPPSI-IV at Ages 4:0 to 7:7

Primary Index	*Subtests Used*
Verbal Comprehension	**Information, Similarities**
Visual Spatial	**Block Design**, Object Assembly
Fluid Reasoning	**Matrix Reasoning**, Picture Concepts
Working Memory	**Picture Memory**, Zoo Locations
Processing Speed	**Bug Search**, Cancellation

Note: The six subtests in boldface are used in the computation of Full Scale IQ.

this instrument with other Wechsler tests suggest that it will be a mainstay of preschool and primary school assessment. In closing, we should mention that the test allows for the computation of four Ancillary Index Scales:

> *Vocabulary Acquisition*: 2 subtests, Receptive Vocabulary and Picture Naming.
>
> *Nonverbal*: 9 subtests with minimal verbal demand, including Block Design and Matrix Reasoning.
>
> *General Ability*: 8 subtests, mainly untimed, including Information, Similarities, and Matrix Reasoning.
>
> *Cognitive Proficiency*: 5 subtests, including Picture Memory, Cancellation, and Animal Coding.

These index scales can be useful in special circumstances such as the assessment of deaf children (Nonverbal battery), evaluation of bright children with slower processing (General Ability battery), and assessment of mental proficiency (Cognitive Proficiency battery). The Cognitive Proficiency battery includes measures of memory and speeded visual search.

Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales for Early Childhood

Known informally as the Early SB5, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales for Early Childhood (Roid, 2005) combine the subtests from the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB5) with a new Test Observation Checklist and a software-generated Parent Report. The subtests of the SB5 were described in the previous chapter. We focus here on the Test Observation Checklist (TOC), which summarizes essential information about child test-taking behaviors—in particular, behaviors that may have a stunning impact on test scores.

The Early SB5 was developed for children ages 2 years to 7 years and 3 months. This is precisely the age range in which a child's true level of functioning can be radically underestimated due to behavior problems such as distractibility, low frustration tolerance, or noncompliance. For example, many preschool children simply stop responding when subtest items become difficult—they may look down, or look away, or offer a comment on an unrelated topic. Noncompliant behavior of this nature is common; in fact, occasional refusals are reported in 41 percent of young children (Aylward & Carson, 2005). But a refusal can mean many things. Perhaps the child really doesn't know the answer; or perhaps the child knows the answer but is bored with testing, or afraid to hazard a guess, or simply distracted. The examiner will never know for sure, but there is a good chance that the true cognitive abilities of a noncompliant child will be underestimated. The purpose of the TOC is to provide a qualitative but highly structured format for describing a wide range of behaviors, including noncompliance, known to affect test performance.

The test-taking behaviors listed on the TOC are divided into two groups: (1) Characteristics and (2) Specific Behaviors. The former are general traits most likely found in many situations, whereas the latter are specific behaviors actually observed du.ring the testing session. The focus of the TOC is behaviors that negatively impact test performance. Many of the characteristics and behaviors are rated on a continuum, whereas others are categorical.

The characteristics rated include (Aylward & Carson, 2005):

> Motor Skills—includes gross motor skills such as clumsiness and fine motor skills such as pencil dexterity.
>
> Activity Level—includes both excessive restlessness as well as underactivity in relation to child's age.
>
> Attention/Distractibility—refers to age-inappropriate inattention, a need for redirection.
>
> Impulsivity—indicates the examiner saw fit to intervene, slow the child down.
>
> Language—includes articulation, receptive language, and expressive language.

The specific behaviors rated include (Aylward & Carson, 2005):

> Consistency in Performance—may indicate a haphazard approach to the test.
>
> Mood—includes specific behavioral indicators such as negative mood, tantrums, or crying.

Frustration Tolerance—includes aggressiveness, refusal to participate.

Change in Mental Set—includes noted tendencies toward rigidity of approach or perseveration.

Motivation—includes disinterest or boredom and related behaviors.

Fear of Failure—is qualitatively judged through inference and can be corroborated through parental report.

Degree of Cooperativeness/Refusals—a crucial category because numerous refusals can lead to underestimating cognitive ability.

Anxiety—includes excessive fearfulness, shyness, or need for parental presence.

Need for Redirection—is noted when the child cannot stay on task and constantly needs reminders.

Parental Behaviors—includes items such as parental reassurance, tacit approval for misbehavior, or giving verbal cues.

Representativeness of Test Behaviors—is based on brief interview with parent(s), if present during testing.

The TOC helps the examiner identify problematic behaviors that may affect the validity of the test results. But this is not the only purpose of this instrument. In addition, the documentation of these behavior problems may prove helpful in the early detection of developmental difficulties such as learning disabilities, behavior problems, attentional difficulties, borderline cognitive function, and neuropsychological deficits (Aylward & Carson, 2005).

PRACTICAL UTILITY OF INFANT AND PRESCHOOL ASSESSMENT

The history of child assessment has shown time and again that, in general, test scores earned in the first year or two of life show minimal predictive validity. For example, in her review of infant intelligence testing, Goodman (1990) concludes:

> If the successful prediction of adolescent and adult intelligence from early childhood scores is one of the great accomplishments of applied psychology, then the failure to predict intelligence from infancy to early childhood ranks as one of its greatest failures.

Given this dismal record of repeated failures of predictive validity, we must ask a difficult question: What is the purpose and practical utility of infant assessment? In fact, infant tests do have an important but limited role to play. We return to that issue after a review of predictive studies.

Predictive Validity of Infant and Preschool Tests

With heterogeneous samples of normal children, the general finding is that infant test scores correlate positively but unimpressively with childhood test scores (Goodman, 1990; McCall, 1979). A few studies are more optimistic in tone (e.g., Wilson, 1983), but most researchers agree with McCall's (1976) conclusion:

> Generally speaking, there is essentially no correlation between performance during the first six months of life with IQ score after age 5; the correlations are predominantly in the 0.20s for assessments made between 7 and 18 months of life when one is predicting IQ at 5–18 years; and it is not until 19–30 months that the infant test predicts later IQ in the range of 0.40–0.55.

McCall (1979) reconfirmed his original conclusion in a later review, finding that the correlations between infant and school-age test scores do not exceed .40 until the subjects are at least 19 months of age for the initial testing.

The findings with preschool tests are somewhat more positive in tone. The correlation between preschool test results and later IQ is typically strong, significant, and meaningful. The simplest way to investigate this question is to measure the stability of IQ results in longitudinal studies. In Table 7.4, we have summarized the age-to-age stability of children's IQ scores on the Stanford-Binet from the Fels Longitudinal Study, an early, classic follow-up investigation of children's intellectual and emotional development (Sontag, Baker, & Nelson, 1958). The

lowest correlation in this table is .43, and that is between IQ tested at age 4 and again at age 12. What stands out in the table is the robustness of the link between IQ in preschool and later childhood. The older the child at initial testing, the stronger the relationship with later IQ. In fact, the results suggest that IQ becomes reasonably stable, on average, by 8 years of age.

Collectively, these findings confirm that infant tests generally have poor prognostic value, whereas preschool tests are moderately predictive of later intelligence. This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this section: What is the purpose and practical utility of infant assessment?

Practical Utility of Infant Scales

The most important and sound use of infant tests is in screening for developmental disabilities. Early detection of children at risk for mental retardation is vital because it provides for early intervention and, consequently, allows for improved outcomes later in life. Although existing infant tests are poor predictors of childhood and adult intelligence, an exception to this rule is encountered for infants who obtain very low scores on the Bayley test and other screening tests. For example, infants who score two or more standard deviations below the mean on the original Bayley (1969) and the Bayley-II (Bayley, 1993), particularly on the Mental Scale, reveal a high probability of meeting the criteria for mental retardation later in childhood (Goodman, Malizia, Durieux-Smith, MacMurray, & Bernard, 1990). There is no longitudinal research with the very recent Bayley-III (Bayley, 2005), but this test likely possesses good predictive validity for low scores as well.

With at-risk children, the correlation between infant test scores and later childhood IQ is much stronger than for samples of normal children. The most consistent finding is that a very low score on an infant test—two or more standard deviations below the mean—accurately prognosticates mental retardation in childhood. For example, studies with the Denver Developmental Screening Test-Revised (since revised and published as the Denver-II) revealed a false-positive rate of only 5 to 11 percent, meaning that infants and preschoolers identified as at risk for mental retardation rarely achieve normal range cognitive functioning in childhood (Frankenburg, 1985). Most studies with the Bayley test also conform to this pattern. For example, VanderVeer and Schweid (1974) found that 23 young children

TABLE 7.4 Stability of IQ from 3 to 12 Years of Age

	Age at Retesting								
Age at Initial Testing	***4***	***5***	***6***	***7***	***8***	***9***	***10***	***11***	***12***
3	.83	.72	.73	.64	.60	.63	.54	.51	.46
4		.80	.85	.70	.63	.66	.55	.50	.43
5			.87	.83	.79	.80	.70	.63	.62
6				.83	.79	.81	.72	.67	.67
7					.91	.83	.82	.76	.73
8						.92	.90	.84	.83
9							.90	.82	.81
10								.90	.88
11									.90

Source: Adapted with permission from Sontag, L. W., Baker, C., & Nelson, V. (1958). Mental growth and personality development: A longitudinal study. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 23* (Whole No. 68). Copyright © by The Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

with mild, moderate, and severe mental retardation confirmed by the Bayley at ages 18 to 30 months continued to merit a diagnosis of mental retardation one to three years later. Although some of the children with moderate and severe mental retardation were functioning at a higher level (mild retardation), none of the children with initial mental retardation was normal at follow-up. In an ostensibly contradictory finding, Hack, Taylor, Drotar, and others (2005) reported that very low scores on the Bayley-II for low-birth-weight infants tested at 20 months of age did not strongly predict low scores on the K-ABC at age 8. These findings are cautionary, but not definitive, insofar as the K-ABC is not a good criterion for mental retardation.

Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII)

The infant tests discussed in this chapter could be described as traditional, in the sense that their methods are a natural outgrowth of the long sweep of individual intelligence tests reaching back to the early 1900s. But perhaps new approaches are needed with infants. Lewis has argued that traditional infant tests overlook early information processing behaviors, such as recognition memory and attentiveness to the environment, that might better predict childhood cognitive function (Lewis & Sullivan, 1985). In one study, simple visual habituation to a novel stimulus (measured by the duration of fixation) assessed at 3 months of age correlated .61 with the Bayley Mental score at 24 months of age (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1981). Fagan and McGrath (1981) reported similar findings. In their study, infants first observed a picture of a baby's face for a short period of time and were then shown the same picture alongside an unfamiliar picture (e.g., picture of a bald-headed man). The investigators kept careful track of which picture the infants looked at more. The logic of the procedure is simple: Staring mainly at the new picture signifies that an infant recognizes the old picture; that is, an infant with good recognition memory prefers to look at something new. Preference for novelty—as measured by visual fixation time on the new picture—thus becomes an index of early recognition memory. Years later, the investigators administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) to gauge early childhood intelligence. Infant recognition memory scores and early child PPVT scores correlated .37 at 4 years of age and .57 at 7 years of age. Infant cognitive measures would appear to be promising predictors of childhood intelligence (Fagan & Haiken-Vasen, 1997).

Using the paradigm described previously, Fagan (1984) developed a new approach to infant assessment known as the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII). The FTII assesses visual recognition memory using a 10-trial habituation format (Fagan & Shepherd, 1986). In each trial, a photograph of a face is shown to the infant, followed by paired presentation of the original face with either (1) a photograph of a similar but new face or (2) a photograph of the original face in a different orientation. The amount of time spent looking at the new photograph is presumed to indicate the degree to which the infant has noticed that it is different from the original picture. The examiner observes the infant's corneal reflections to determine a percent Novelty Preference, averaged across the 10 trials. The procedure shows very high interrater agreement (O'Neill, Jacobson, & Jacobson, 1994). A score of less than 53 percent for novelty preference identifies children who are at risk for later mental retardation.

Validation studies of the FTII as a predictor of childhood intelligence and as a screening tool for mental retardation are mixed in outcome. With regard to the prediction of intelligence, FTII scores obtained at 7 to 9 months of age correlated only .32 with Stanford-Binet IQ at age 3 for a sample of 200 infants (DiLalla, Thompson, Plomin, and others, 1990). In another study, overall correlations between FTII scores obtained at 7 to 9 months of age and WPPSI-R IQ at age 5 were very low, about .2, for two Norwegian samples of healthy children (Andersson, 1996). Tasbihsazan, Nettelbeck, and Kirby (2003) have identified a likely reason that FTII scores correlate weakly with later IQ, namely, the test may possess poor reliability. In particular, for healthy, not at-risk infants, the test–retest stability coefficients for percent Novelty Preference were .29 for 12 infants tested at 27 and 29 weeks, –.07 for 12 infants tested at 29 and 39 weeks, and –.17 for 13 infants tested at 39 and 52 weeks. These stability coefficients are

not just low—they are indistinguishable from zero, which raises doubts as to the soundness of the FTII instrument.

The FTII may perform better as a screening test than as a general predictor of childhood intelligence. With regard to screening infants at risk for developmental disability, Fagan, Singer, Montie, and Shepherd (1986) reported very positive findings in a study of 62 infants who experienced adverse factors such as premature birth or maternal diabetes. When evaluated at 3 years of age, eight children revealed cognitive delay (IQ ≤ 70), whereas 54 were considered normal. The FTII, previously administered between 3 and 7 months of age, correctly detected 6 of the 8 children with delay (75 percent sensitivity) and suitably identified 49 of 54 normal children (91 percent specificity). However, not all FTII screening studies of at-risk infants are positive in tone. For example, McGrath, Wypij, Rappaport, Newburger, and Bellinger (2004) used FTII scores from 1 year of age to predict low IQ at age 8 in 100 at-risk infants and found poor sensitivity of 32 percent in detecting cognitive delay (IQ ≤ 85) but fair specificity of 80 percent. Yuan (2002) published Chinese norms for the FTII and found a strong concurrent validity coefficient of .72 for 73 infants tested with the Bailey-II. Further research is needed before we abandon traditional infant measures in favor of the Fagan test and similar measures.

SCREENING FOR SCHOOL READINESS

Screening for school readiness is a controversial practice. One concern expressed by some parents is that results from screening tests might be used to delay entry into the school system, or to hold a child back a year. These are fateful decisions with the potential for long-term impact, either good or bad. Another concern is that children might be permanently labeled as slow learners or cognitively delayed. Underlying the entire controversy is the confounding complexity of definition. What is school readiness? Implicitly or explicitly, experts work from at least five different models when defining school readiness. Each model dictates a distinctive approach to assessment and intervention. Community Research Partners (2007) provide an excellent summary of the five approaches, which we paraphrase below:

> *Maturationist Model*: School readiness is a biological issue, a question of cognitive, psychomotor, and emotional maturation that stem directly from unfolding biological maturation. Because age is the best single indicator of biological maturation, some states use this viewpoint as a basis for defining school entry by age and not using readiness assessments.
>
> *Environmental Model*: In this view, school readiness is based on children's acquisition of skills learned from early socialization experiences, especially with parents and family members, which vary from child to child. This model supports the inclusion of parental involvement in school readiness assessments.
>
> *Constructivist Model*: In this approach, advocates see readiness as the extent to which children can learn tasks by interacting not just with teachers, but also with more knowledgeable peers and adults. This model supports an inclusive approach (parents, teachers, other adults) in the assessment process.
>
> *Cumulative-Skills Model*: This model views school readiness as a matter of the extent to which children possess important prerequisite skills necessary for learning foundational subjects such as reading and math. Policies that require assessment of pre-academic skills upon entrance into kindergarten flow from this approach.
>
> *Ecological Model*: This is a holistic methodology that views school readiness as an interaction between developmental status and children's environments. In other words, readiness does not reside within the child alone, but stems as well from an interaction with the readiness of families, communities, services, and preschool settings. Within this model, assessment for readiness is a complex, qualitative evaluation that involves the wider community.

In this section, we will survey a variety of screening tests, keeping in mind the complexity of the issues involved in preschool screening.

Children with low intelligence are substantially at risk for school failure, which explains why individual intelligence tests play an important role in the evaluation of preschool children. But individual intelligence tests require a substantial commitment of time (up to two hours) and must be administered by carefully trained practitioners. For practical reasons, then, individual intelligence tests are not suitable as screening instruments.

The ideal screening instrument is a short test that can be administered by teachers, school nurses, and other individuals who have received limited training in assessment. In addition, a sensible screening test is one that provides a cutoff score that is accurate in classifying children as normal or at risk. In the context of screening tests, two kinds of errors can occur. Normal children who fail the test would be referred to as false-positive cases (because they are falsely classified as positive for potential disability). At-risk children who pass the test would be referred to as false-negative cases (because they are falsely classified as negative for potential disability). The reader must keep in mind that the purpose of screening is merely to identify children in need of additional evaluation, which means that false-positive cases will receive further evaluation. Hence, a false-positive misclassification rarely leads to undesirable consequences. However, false-negative cases typically do not receive further evaluation, so this kind of misclassification is potentially more serious—because a needy child is deemed to be normal. Glascoe (1991) recommends that a useful instrument should yield a false-negative rate of less than 20 percent (meaning that 80 percent of truly at-risk children are flagged by the test) and an even lower false-positive rate of less than 10 percent (meaning that 90 percent of normal children pass the test).

Glascoe and Shapiro (2005) outline five common pitfalls of developmental and behavioral screening in infancy and early childhood:

- Waiting until the problem is observable. Some clinicians use a screening test only after the problem is manifest—a waste of time and effort.
- Ignoring screening results. Practitioners may adopt a "wait and see" outlook—early intervention is then pointlessly postponed.
- Relying on informal methods. Clinicians often employ their own informal methods—consequently, children in need of services go undetected.
- Using inappropriate tests. Some clinicians sparingly use long batteries instead of screening tests—as a result, children with disabilities are overlooked.
- Assuming services are limited or nonexistent. Practitioners often incorrectly assume that services are not available—consequently, they are reluctant to administer screening tests.

These pitfalls lead to two adverse outcomes: underdetection of developmental problems and delayed discovery of disabilities. In both cases, needy infants and children do not receive the services they need.

Qualities of a Good Preschool Screening Instrument

What are the qualities of a good preschool screening instrument? School readiness involves a number of broad areas, including motor, language, cognitive, social, and emotional functioning. Success in early schooling requires that children function at or near age-appropriate levels in all these areas. Thus, a useful screening tool must address at least a few of these prerequisite domains. In addition to appropriate coverage, other qualities are needed in a suitable preschool screening tool as well. For example, the Minnesota Interagency Developmental Screening Task Force—a leading advocacy group in preschool screening—has published extensive standards by which it recommends and approves screening instruments (www.health.state.mn.us). The following list of criteria is modeled loosely on their recommendations:

- The primary purpose is screening rather than assessment, diagnosis, or prediction of academic success.
- Screening is provided in most or all of these areas: motor, language, cognitive, social, and emotional functioning.
- Overall test–retest reliability coefficient is a minimum of .70, preferably higher.
- Concurrent validity against a comprehensive assessment is a minimum of .70, preferably higher.

- Sensitivity and specificity of "at risk" and "not at risk" classifications, respectively, are both at least .70.
- Practicality and ease of administration are built in, with testing time of 30 minutes or less.
- Cultural, ethnic, and linguistic sensitivity is evident, that is, the test accurately screens children from diverse cultures.
- Minimum expertise is required for administration, that is, the test is suitable for paraprofessionals to administer.

The Interagency Task Force further notes that social-emotional domains embedded within current screening instruments do not demonstrate sufficient reliability and validity to determine if a child needs further assessment. Thus, separate instruments may be required to determine if children are "at risk" for school failure due to social-emotional difficulties.

Instruments for Preschool Screening

As noted by Meisels and Atkins-Burnett (2005), dozens of instruments have been produced to screen for developmental delays, but only a few have withstood the test of time. In Table 7.5 we summarize a few recommended tools (Glascoe, 2005; Meisels & Atkins-Burnett, 2005). An interesting feature of these evaluations is that nearly all of them are available in multiple languages, including Spanish, French, Korean, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Hmong (the language of the ethnic group from mountainous regions of southeast Asia), and Tagalog (the language of the Philippines). These tools reflect the increasing diversity of American culture and the desire to provide adequate school-based services to recent immigrants.

We limit our discussion here to just three tests: the DIAL-3 (Developmental Indicators for the Assessment of Learning-III), the Denver II (a

TABLE 7.5 A Sample of School Readiness Screening Tests

Ages and Stages Questionnaire (Brookes Publishing Company) Birth to 60 months; parent report of language, cognition, personal-social, and motor skills; available in English, Spanish, French, and Korean; takes 10 to 20 minutes; clerical or paraprofessional tester.

Brigance Screens (Curriculum Associates) Birth to 60 months; observation of social-emotional skills, speech-language, motor, readiness, and general knowledge; available in English, Spanish, Laotian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Tagalog; takes 15 to 20 minutes; consult online training module before scoring.

Early Screening Inventory-Revised (Pearson Assessments) 36 to 60 months; observation of visual motor/adaptive, language and cognition, and gross motor skills; available in English and Spanish; takes 15 to 20 minutes; screeners and scorers can be trained with a manual and video.

FirstSTEP Preschool Screening Tool (Pearson Assessment) 33 to 62 months; observation of cognitive, communication, and motor domains and classifications of: within acceptable limits, caution, or at-risk; available in English only; takes 15 to 20 minutes; screeners and scorers can be trained with a manual and video.

Minneapolis Preschool Screening Instrument-Revised (Minneapolis Public Schools) 36 to 60 months; 64 dichotomous items pertaining to cognitive, language, literacy, motor, and perceptual development; available in English, Spanish, Somali, Hmong; takes 12 to 15 minutes to administer, 2 to 5 minutes to score; easy to learn, suitable for paraprofessionals.

Parents' Evaluation of Developmental Status (Ellsworth & Vandemeer Press) Birth to 96 months; parental response in 10 areas such as cognitive, expressive language, fine motor, social-emotional; available in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese; takes 5 minutes to administer, 2 minutes to score; suitable for paraprofessionals and clinic office staff.

revision of the Denver Developmental Screening Test-Revised), and the HOME (Home Observation for the Measurement of the Environment). The first two tests use conventional approaches for the identification of developmental delay, whereas the third instrument, the HOME, embodies a radical departure from traditional procedures.

DIAL-4

The Developmental Indicators for the Assessment of Learning-4 is an individually administered test designed for the quick and efficient screening of developmental problems in preschool children ages 2:6 through 5:11 (Mardell & Goldenberg, 2011). The test screens for difficulties in five areas, including direct behavioral assessment of three major developmental domains: motor, concepts, and language. Items in these domains are administered directly to the child by the examiner. Two additional domains (self-help and social-emotional) are appraised by means of questionnaires filled out by a parent (or both parents jointly) and a teacher. For children who have not yet entered kindergarten, the teacher form is filled out by a preschool teacher. If the child has not been to preschool, test results still are beneficial. Examples of items within the five domains include the following:

Motor: Fine-motor items include block building, cutting, copying shapes and letters, name writing, and finger touching; gross-motor items include catching, jumping, hopping, and skipping.

Concepts: Pointing to named body parts, naming or identifying colors, rote counting, counting blocks, positioning blocks, identifying concepts, and sorting shapes.

Language: Giving personal information (name, age, sex), naming objects and actions, proper articulation, and phonemic awareness (e.g., rhyming).

Self-Help: Parent and teacher fill out separate questionnaires with items relevant to the child's personal care skills, such as eating, grooming, and dressing.

Social-Emotional: Parent and Teacher fill out separate questionnaires with items relevant to the child's social skills with other children and parents, such as sharing, empathy, self-control, and rule compliance.

The DIAL-4 is available in both English and Spanish, although standardization is now based on the combined normative sample, that is, separate norms are not provided. The decision to develop unified norms was carefully considered during test development, and based on recognized requirements of school districts that serve substantial proportions of Spanish speaking/bilingual children of Hispanic origin. The large norm sample was obtained nationwide, roughly stratified by key demographics such as race and parental education. Because children are changing so quickly in preschool and early school years, norms are provided at two-month intervals.

Scoring for some items is discrete and objective, whereas for other questions the scoring criteria in the manual leave room for subjective interpretation, which detracts from the reliability of the instrument. A total score of direct academic relevance is obtained by summing the first three area scores (motor, concepts, language). The test yields a total of eight scaled scores (mean of 100, *SD* of 15). Table 7.6 depicts a 4-year-old boy with language delay and problems with social development. An interesting feature of this case is that the teacher perceives the boy as further behind than the parents do for both self-help and social development. This disparity might facilitate useful discussion in planning for academic intervention.

In addition to the eight standard scores depicted here, the DIAL-4 provides a wealth of additional information such as raw scores, cut-off scores, and percentile ranks. A key feature of the test is that for each of the eight areas shown, the manual provides cutoff scores for assigning the child to one of two outcome groups labeled "potential delay" and "okay." A finding of "potential delay" in one or more areas is a starting point for further discussion, not a mandate for any high-stakes decision-making. The publisher offers computer scoring and generation of reports by means of a secure internet service known as Q-global. This yields a printout of results and a Report to Parents which can be helpful in discussion of the child's progress among parents, caregivers, school psychologists, and teachers. A short

TABLE 7.6 DIAL-4 Scaled Score Results for a 4-Year-old Boy with Language Delay and Social-emotional Problems

Respondent	*Performance Area*	*Standard Score*
	Motor	110
Child	Concepts	95
	Language	63
	Total	89
Questionnaire Results		
	Self-Help	104
Parent		
	Social-emotional	77
	Self-Help	88
Teacher		
	Social-emotional	65

version of the test cleverly called Speed Dial Screener is available, which cuts testing time of about 40 minutes in half. However, the trade-off of reducing testing time by decreasing the number of test items (which unavoidably diminishes scale reliability) may not be a prudent exchange.

Independent research on the DIAL-4 is scant at this time. A search of PsychINFO for articles with DIAL-4 in the title did not yield a single hit. Even so, the latest release is only a minor departure from its predecessor, hence, reliability and validity evidence for the DIAL-3 buttress the standing of the new edition.

Reliability of the DIAL-3 is fair, given that it is a brief test for screening purposes. Internal consistency coefficients range from .66 for Motor to .84 for Concepts, with a total scale reliability of .87. Test–retest data are similar, which is to say, not up to the suggested minimum reliability of .90 for tests used to make individual decisions (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Validity of the instrument has been evaluated along the familiar lines of content, construct, and criterion-related. Content validity is judged to be high insofar as a panel of experts provided content reviews and helped eliminate inappropriate and biased items. Criterion-related validity is strong, as judged by correlations with similar instruments such as the Early Screening Profiles, Differential Abilities Scale, and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-IV.

A recent study favorably evaluates the construct validity of the DIAL-3 through confirmatory factor analysis (Assel & Anthony, 2009). As noted, the instrument was designed to screen for developmental delays in three domains: motor abilities, conceptual knowledge, and language competence. An essential feature of the test is that separate scores are reported for each domain. These domains and the 21 subtests comprising them were rationally preconceived by the test authors. An important question is whether the 21 subtests "hang together" statistically in a manner that supports the rational grouping into the three domains provided by the test developers. In other words, do the three domains possess a latent reality, or are they merely figments of the imaginations of the test developers? Using test results for 1,560 children ages 3 to 6, Assel and Anthony (2009) found an excellent fit between the three domains traditionally reported on the DIAL-3 and three empirically derived domains found through factor analysis, which supports the construct validity of the test. However, these authors did note that Articulation subtest was a poor index of language competence, and the Catching subtest was a poor index of motor abilities. Further, the authors found that Name

Writing, Rapid Color Naming, and Letters/Sounds demonstrated floor effects, that is, even the easiest items on these subtests were failed by young, low-socioeconomic status, and minority children. These findings indicate the need for adding simpler items on these subtests for future revisions of the test. The DIAL-3 also comes in a Spanish version that is separately validated on a sample of 588 Spanish-speaking Head Start children (Anthony & Assel, 2007).

It is with regard to practical utility that the DIAL-4 and its previous editions have raised the greatest skepticism. The value of a screening test is best judged by the extent to which it *accurately* identifies children in need of further developmental assessment, and *accurately* identifies children who are normal as normal. One useful statistic is sensitivity, which is the proportion of confirmed problem cases accurately "flagged" as problem cases by a test (i.e., children with delay who are accurately classified as "potential" delay). Unfortunately, brief screening tests such as the DIAL-4 do not reveal strong sensitivity when the recommended cutoffs are used to identify children as showing "potential delay." For example, sensitivity of the DIAL-4 is reported to be in the range of .73 to .82, depending on the target group being researched (Mardell & Goldenberg, 2011). Put another way, 18 to 27 percent of at-risk children will be missed.

Another useful statistic is specificity, which is the proportion of normal cases accurately identified as normal. For the DIAL-4, specificity is reported to be in the range of .82 to .86, depending on the scales and the comparison groups used (Mardell & Goldenberg, 2011). Stated in the converse, what these data mean is that 14 to 18 percent of the (sizable) samples of normal children initially will be flagged as "potential delay." These false-positive identifications will cause anxiety for the parents and likely trigger the need for additional consultation and testing.

The only way to achieve higher sensitivity is to liberalize the cutoff scores, that is, classify a larger proportion as showing "potential delay." But for any single test at one point in time, sensitivity and specificity are inversely related. As one goes up, the other *must* go down. There is simply no way around this psychometric reality except to design a better, longer, and much more comprehensive test. But then the test becomes the gold standard for the thing being evaluated, and is no longer a screening test. In sum, increasing sensitivity inevitably will reduce specificity (percentage of normal children correctly identified as normal). This will cause many over-referrals (children identified as "potential delay" who actually are normal).

Denver II

The Denver II (Frankenburg, Dodds, Archer, and others, 1990) is an updated version of the highly popular Denver Developmental Screening Test-Revised (Frankenburg, 1985; Frankenburg & Dodds, 1967). The Denver test is probably the most widely known and researched pediatric screening tool in the United States. The instrument is popular worldwide—it has been translated into 44 different languages. Suitable for infants and children aged 1 month to 6 years, the test consists of 125 items in four areas: personal-social, fine motor-adaptive, language, and gross motor. The items are a mix of parent report, direct elicitation, and observation. Each item is arranged chronologically on the test by age of the child and marked pass/fail. Testing begins at an age-appropriate level and continues until the child fails three items. Total time for evaluation is 20 minutes or less.

Unlike other screening tests, the Denver II does not produce a developmental quotient or score. Instead, results on about 30 age-appropriate items provide a score that can be interpreted as normal, questionable, or abnormal in reference to age-based norms. A category of "untestable" also is included. The standardization sample consisted of 2,096 children, all from the state of Colorado, stratified by age, race, and socioeconomic status. Reliability of the Denver II is reported to be outstanding for a brief screening test. Interrater reliability among trained raters averaged an outstanding .99. Test–retest reliability for total score over a 7- to 10-day interval averaged .90.

The Denver possesses excellent content validity insofar as the behaviors tested are recognized by authorities in child development as important markers of development. However, the test interpretation categories (normal, questionable, abnormal)

were based on clinical judgment and therefore await additional study for validation. A few initial studies raise significant concerns. Glascoe and Byrne (1993) evaluated 89 children in day care settings who were 7 to 70 months of age. Based on extensive independent evaluation, 18 of these 89 children were confirmed to have developmental delays according to federal definitions of disabling conditions (e.g., language delays, mental retardation, and autism). While the Denver II functioned well in correctly identifying 15 of the 18 at-risk children, the instrument performed poorly with the normal children. In fact, 38 of the 71 normal children failed the test and were classified as questionable or abnormal. Overall, almost four in six children taking the test would be referred for additional assessment, and of the four, only one would have a true disability. The researchers recommend further validational study with recalibration and possible discarding of some test items before the test receives widespread use. Other reviewers are even more skeptical. For example, a blue-ribbon review panel of the Minnesota Interagency Developmental Screening Task Force flatly concluded that the Denver-II is not suitable for developmental and social-emotional screening of preschool children (www.health.state.mn.us).

Home

The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment (HOME), popularly known as the HOME Inventory, is probably the most widely used index of children's environment. Based on in-home observation and an interview with the primary caretaker, the instrument provides a measure of children's physical and social environments. The HOME Inventory comes in three forms: Infant and Toddler, Early Childhood, and Middle Childhood. The latest editions of the instrument, dated 1984, emerged after 15 years of methodical revision and refinement (Caldwell & Richmond, 1967; Caldwell & Bradley, 1984, 1994).

Background and Description

Prior to the development of the HOME Inventory, the measurement of children's environments was based largely upon demographic data such as parental education, occupation, income, and location of residence. Often these indices were combined into a cumulative measure referred to as social class or socioeconomic status. For example, Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) developed a continuum of social class derived from residence, occupation, and education of the head of the household. The SES score for a family whose household head worked at a clerical job, was a high school graduate, and lived in a middle-rank residential area would be computed as follows (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958):

Factor	Scale Value	×	Factor Weight	=	Partial Score
Residence	3		6		18
Occupation	4		9		36
Education	4		5		20
Index of Socioeconomic Status				=	74

For research purposes, social scientists may categorize families into a fivefold hierarchy of social classes (classes I through V) based on the total score. The reader will notice that the Hollingshead and Redlich measure was derived entirely from *status* indices. The unstated assumption is that these indices reflect, indirectly, meaningful environmental variation. Put bluntly, proponents of SES as an environmental measure believe that, on average, children from a higher social class will experience a richer and more nurturant environment than children from a lower social class.

In contrast to the SES approach, the HOME Inventory was developed to provide a direct *process* measure of children's environments. The guiding philosophy of this instrument is that direct assessment of children's experiences is a better index of the home environment than such indirect measures as parental occupation and education. Although it is true that social class—as embodied in occupation, education, residence—provides an oblique measure of environmental richness, the authors of the HOME Inventory would argue that direct assessment of children's experiences provides a more accurate index of variations in the home environment. Thus, assessment with the HOME involves, in part, direct observation of children's home environments

to determine whether certain types of crucial interactions and experiences are present or absent. For example, during an hour-long visit, the examiner observes whether the parent spontaneously communicates with the child at least five times, determines whether the child has at least 10 children's books or story records, and assesses whether the neighborhood is esthetically pleasing according to detailed standards, to cite just a few examples.

The purpose of the HOME Inventory is to measure the quality and quantity of stimulation and support for cognitive, social, and emotional development available to the child in the home. The scales and items of the HOME were derived from a list of environmental processes identified from existing research and theory as important for optimal childhood development (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984). These growth-promoting processes include basic need gratification; frequent contact with a relatively small number of adults; a positive emotional climate that fosters trust of self and others; appropriate, varied, and patterned sensory input; consistency in the physical, verbal, and emotional responses of others; a minimum of social restrictions on exploratory and motor behavior; structure and order in the daily environment; provision and adult interpretation of varied cultural experiences; appropriate play materials and environment; contact with adults who value achievement; and the cumulative programming of experiences to match the child's developmental level (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984). In brief, then, the purpose of the HOME is to measure specific, designated patterns of nurturance and stimulation available to children in the home.

In order to complete the HOME Inventory, the examiner must observe the child and caregiver (usually the mother) interacting in the home environment. Ratings for a few inventory items are derived from observation of the physical environment. In addition, completion of some items is based upon self-report of the caregiver. Items are dichotomously scored, 1 for present, 0 for absent. For example, one item asks whether the child is included in grocery store shopping at least once a week. The manual for the inventory encourages a relaxed, semistructured approach to observation and interview (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984). Completion of the inventory takes about an hour.

The three forms of the HOME are Infant and Toddler (ages 0 to 3 years), Early Childhood (ages 3 to 6 years), and Middle Childhood (ages 6 to 10 years). The Infant and Toddler form consists of 45 items organized into the following six subscales:

Emotional and Verbal Responsivity of Parent
Acceptance of the Child's Behavior
Organization of the Environment
Provision of Appropriate Play Materials
Parent Involvement with Child
Variety of Stimulation

The Early Childhood version consists of 55 items organized into eight subscales, whereas the Middle Childhood version consists of 59 items organized into eight subscales.

Technical Features

Relevant norms for the HOME Inventory are available from several sources. For the Infant and Toddler version, Caldwell and Bradley (1984) report subscale means and standard deviations for 174 families from Little Rock, Arkansas. Compared to the general population, this sample appears to overrepresent lower-SES families. For example, 34 percent of the families were on welfare and 29 percent were single-parent households. For the Early Childhood version, standardization data were available from 232 families in Little Rock, with lower-SES families similarly overrepresented. For the Middle Childhood version, Bradley and Rock (1985) report subscale means and standard deviations for 141 families from Little Rock. Approximately half of these families were African American, the remainder Caucasian; boys and girls were sampled equally. These families were thought to be representative of all families rearing elementary-aged children in Little Rock, Arkansas. However, for all three versions it is clear that the standardization samples provide only local norms. These data may be useful as points of reference but should not be equated with a stratified, random, national sample.

The reliability of the HOME Inventory has been demonstrated in a variety of ways, particularly for the Infant and Toddler version, which we discuss here. The authors note that short-term test–retest

studies are inappropriate, since a respondent is quite likely to remember a specific answer given to a question, which would artificially inflate test–retest correlations (Bradley & Caldwell, 1984). Methods used for the assessment of reliability included interobserver agreement, internal consistency, and long-range test–retest stability coefficients for 91 families from the standardization sample. By definition, interobserver agreement for the subscale items is reported to be 90 percent or higher, since this is the training criterion for new raters. Internal consistency estimates using Kuder-Richardson formula 20 ranged from .67 to .89 for all subscales except Variety of Stimulation, which yielded a coefficient of only .44. This rather low reliability coefficient was due to the small number of items in the subscale (five). Test–retest data were available from 91 families tested when their infant/toddler was 6, 12, and 24 months of age. The coefficients indicated a moderate to high degree of stability for the subscales, with most correlations in the .50s, .60s, and .70s. The correlation between total score for testings at 12 and 24 months of age was a highly respectable .77.

The validity of the HOME Inventory has been bolstered by research findings that show modest correlations with SES indices. Because the inventory was proposed as a more meaningful, sensitive index of environment than social class, HOME scores should be significantly but not highly related to SES indices. For the Infant and Toddler version, HOME Inventory subscale correlations with SES are mainly in the .30s and .40s, while the total score–SES correlation is .45 (Bradley, Rock, Caldwell, & Brisby, 1989). HOME scores also revealed a strong relationship with poverty status in Caucasian and minority samples (Bradley, Corwyn, Pipes McAdoo, & Garcia Coll, 2001). Furthermore, higher HOME scores predicted that children would exhibit fewer behavior problems and better preschool ability in a study of 93 single African American mothers (Jackson, Brooks-Gunn, Huang, & Glassman, 2000).

HOME scores also show strong, theory-confirming relationships with appropriate external criteria, including language and cognitive development, school failure, therapeutic intervention, and mental retardation (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984). The correlations between HOME scores and intellectual measures such as the Stanford-Binet are particularly informative. In one study of 174 families, the total score on the HOME at 12 months of age correlated a robust $r = .58$ with Stanford-Binet IQ at 36 months of age. Factor-analytic studies of the HOME also support the construct validity of this instrument (Bradley, Mundfrom, Whiteside, and others, 1994). In sum, the HOME inventory shows promise not only in research but also as a practical adjunct to intervention.

TOPIC 7B Testing Persons with Disabilities

Origins of Tests for Special Populations
Nonlanguage Tests
Nonreading and Motor-Reduced Tests
Case Exhibit 7.1 The Challenge of Assessment in Cerebral Palsy
Testing Persons with Visual Impairments
Testing Individuals Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing
Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Intellectual Disability
Assessment of Autism Spectrum Disorders

In this topic we discuss instruments designed for exceptional and difficult consultations, such as persons with sensory/motor impairment, recent immigrants from non-English-speaking countries, and individuals with significant intellectual deficiencies. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 32 million Americans over the age of 5 (one in eight) have a sensory, physical, mental, or self-care disability (www.census.gov, 2000). This estimate does not include persons living in institutions. In these extraordinary circumstances—evaluating persons with sensory, motor, language, or intellectual disability—specialized tests are needed for valid assessment. However, before introducing specific instruments, we examine a background issue: How did these instruments arise?

ORIGINS OF TESTS FOR SPECIAL POPULATIONS

Beginning in the 1950s, a renewed commitment to the needs and rights of physically and mentally disabled persons arose in the United States (Maloney & Ward, 1979; Patton, Payne, & Beirne-Smith, 1986). Societal attitudes toward those with special needs shifted from outright disdain to a more supportive stance that favored new programs and initiatives on behalf of the disabled. Progress has been slow, but we are no longer surprised to see bathroom facilities with wheelchair access for persons with physical disability, large-print books for persons with visual impairments, or closed-captioned television programs for persons with hearing disabilities. Furthermore, the special needs of citizens with mental retardation are increasingly served by small community care facilities instead of massive, impersonal institutions.

In the early 1970s, the renewed concern for the needs of disabled persons was translated into federal legislation. In 1973, **Public Law 93-112** was passed, serving as a "Bill of Rights" for individuals with disabilities. This legislation outlawed discrimination on the basis of disability. Two years later, the landmark Education for All Handicapped Children Act (Public Law 94-142) was enacted. This legislation mandated that disabled schoolchildren receive appropriate assessment and educational opportunities. In particular, psychologists were directed to assess children in all areas of possible disability—mental, behavioral, and physical—and to use instruments validated for those express purposes. We turn now to a review of tests that can be used for the assessment of persons with sensory, motor, or mental disabilities.

NONLANGUAGE TESTS

Nonlanguage tests require little or no written or spoken language from examiner or examinee. Thus, they are particularly suited for assessment of non-English-speaking persons, referrals with speech impairments, and examinees with weak language skills. These instruments can also be used as supplementary tests for examinees who have no disabilities.

Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised

The Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised (LIPS-R, Roid & Miller, 1997) is a revision of a classic and highly praised test of nonverbal intelligence and cognitive abilities (Leiter, 1948, 1979). Leiter devised an experimental edition of the test in 1929 to assess the intelligence of those with hearing or speech impairment, those who were bilingual, or non-English-speaking examinees. The scale was field-tested with several ethnic groups in Hawaii, including children of Japanese and Chinese descent. The first edition was based on test results for American children, high school students, and World War II Army recruits. Although highly praised and widely used after its initial release, this test received strong criticism in recent years because of poor illustrations and outdated norms. The revised Leiter answers all criticisms handily, and the LIPS-R deserves wide use as a culture-reduced measure of nonverbal intelligence.

A remarkable feature of the Leiter is the complete elimination of verbal instructions. The Leiter-R does not require a single spoken word from the examiner or the examinee. With an age range of 2 years to 20 years and 11 months, the Leiter-R is particularly suitable for children and adolescents whose English language skills are weak. This includes children with any of these features: non-English-speaking, autism, traumatic brain injury, speech impairment, hearing problems, or an impoverished environment. The test is also useful in the assessment of attentional problems, as described in the following.

Testing is performed by the child or adolescent matching small laminated cards underneath corresponding illustrations on an easel display (Figure 7.1). The test is untimed. Because the initial items are transparently obvious, most examinees catch on quickly without need of pantomime demonstration. The Leiter-R contains 20 subtests organized into two batteries: Visualization and Reasoning, and Memory and Attention. The 10 subtests of the Visualization and Reasoning Battery are described in Table 7.7. Not all subtests are administered to every child. For example, the figure rotation subtest is too difficult for 2-year-olds and the immediate recognition subtest is too easy for adolescent examinees. The four Reasoning subtests include classification and design analogies. The six Visualization subtests include matching, figure-ground, paper folding, and figure rotation. The eight Memory subtests include memory span, spatial memory, associative memory, and delayed recognition memory. The two Attention subtests consist of an underlining test (e.g., marking all squares printed on a page full of geometric shapes) and a measure of divided attention (e.g., observing a moving display and simultaneously sorting cards correctly).



FIGURE 7.1 A Characteristic Item from the Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised

The Leiter-R yields a composite IQ with the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. The test also produces subtest scaled scores with a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3, as well as a variety of composite scores useful in clinical diagnosis. The test was normed on over 2,000 children and adolescents, from 2 to 21 years of age. Using 1993 census statistics, these subjects were carefully stratified according to race, age, gender, social class, and geographic region. Internal consistency reliability for subtests, domain scores, and IQ scores is excellent. Typical coefficient alphas are in the high .80s for subtests and the low .90s for domain scores and IQ scores. Extensive studies of item bias reveal that the items appear to function similarly in separate racial groups (white, African American, and Hispanic samples); that is, there is no evidence of bias (defined as differential item functioning). Coupled with the fact that the test is completely nonverbal, the absence of test bias indicates that the Leiter-R is a good choice for culture-reduced testing of minority

TABLE 7.7 Visualization and Reasoning Subtests of the Leiter-R

1. Figure Ground: Identification of designs or figures embedded within a stimulus. (All ages)
2. Design Analogies: Like the matrix analogies subtests found on many cognitive tests. (Ages 6 to 20)
3. Form Completion: Ability to recognize objects from fragmented line drawings. (All ages)
4. Matching: Matching and discrimination of simple visual stimuli. (Ages 2 to 10)
5. Sequential Order: Logical progression of pictorial or figural items. (All ages)
6. Repeated Patterns: Identify the missing part of a repeated pattern of figural items. (All ages)
7. Picture Context: Using visual cues to identify a pictured object that has been removed. (Ages 2 to 5)
8. Classification: Categorization of objects or geometric designs. (Ages 2 to 5)
9. Paper Folding: Ability to mentally "fold" an item shown in unfolded two-dimensional form. (Ages 6 to 20)
10. Figure Rotation: Capacity to mentally rotate a two-or three-dimensional object. (Ages 11 to 20)

children. But the test is useful in a wide range of other situations as well. For example, Hanzel (2003) recommends the Leiter-R for the evaluation of children with autistic disorder, a syndrome discussed later in the chapter.

Empirical research with the Leiter-R is largely supportive at this time. The test has been shown to have utility in the assessment of medically fragile children (Hooper, Hatton, Baranek, Roberts, & Bailey, 2000), the assessment of low-functioning children with autism (Tsatsanis, Dartnall, Cicchetti, and others, 2003), and the evaluation of children classified as language impaired (Farrell & Phelps, 2000). In this latter study, the Leiter-R also demonstrated a validity-confirming correlation of $r = .80$ with another nonverbal measure of intelligence. Further, in testing with ethnic minorities, the Leiter-R appears to avoid the confounding of intellectual assessment with English language proficiency that is common with other tests. For example, one study of 47 Spanish-speaking and 47 English-speaking children reported average WAIS-III IQs of 94 versus 88, respectively, whereas average Leiter-R IQs were nearly identical, 98 versus 99 (Cathers-Schiffman & Thompson, 2007).

The Leiter-R is a welcome revision of an obsolete test. In the hands of a careful clinician, the test is helpful in the intellectual assessment of children with weak skills in English. Other uses for the revised test include the assessment of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (comparisons of the Attention subtests with the other domains are crucial here) and the evaluation of giftedness in young children (the extremely high ceiling of the test proves invaluable for this application). Whereas reviewers warned against using the original Leiter for placement or decision-making purposes (Sattler, 1988; Salvia & Ysseldyke, 1991), the revised Leiter is a huge improvement in regards to psychometric quality and standardization excellence. Thorough reviews of the Leiter-R and other nonverbal assessment instruments are provided by McCallum, Bracken, and Wasserman (2001).

Human Figure Drawing Tests

Most children enjoy drawing human figures and do so routinely and spontaneously. Since the early 1900s, psychologists have tried to tap into this almost instinctive behavior as a basis for measuring

intellectual development. The first person to use human figure drawing (HFD) as a standardized intelligence test was Florence Goodenough (1926). Her test, known as the Draw-A-Man test, was revised by Harris (1963) and renamed the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test. More recently, the HFD technique has been adapted by Naglieri (1988). We should also mention that human figure drawings are *widely* used as measures of emotional adjustment, but we do not discuss that application here.

The Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test is a brief, nonverbal test of intelligence that can be administered individually or in a group. Goodenough (1926) published the first edition of this test, while Harris (1963) provided important refinements in scoring and standardization, including the use of a deviation IQ. Strictly speaking, the Goodenough-Harris test doesn't fit the criteria for nonlanguage tests insofar as the examiner must convey certain instructions in English or through a translator. However, the instructions are brief and basic ("I want you to draw a picture of a man [or woman]; make the very best picture you can"). The Goodenough-Harris test is, for all practical purposes, a nonlanguage test.

The purpose of the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test is to measure intellectual maturity, not artistic skill. Thus, the scoring guide emphasizes accuracy of observation and the development of conceptual thinking. The child receives credit for including body parts and details, as well as for providing perspective, realistic proportion, and implied freedom of movement.

The 73 scorable items are transformed to a scaled score with the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. Of course, these norms, developed in the 1960s, are now thoroughly outdated. Even so, a large body of research confirmed that the test captured something important. For example, Frederickson (1985) reported correlations between Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test scores and WPPSI Full Scale IQ in the range of .72 to .80. In several other studies, correlations with individual IQ tests are more variable, but the majority are over .50 (Abell, Briesen, & Watz, 1996; Anastasi, 1975).

In response to criticisms of the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test, Naglieri (1988) developed a quantitative scoring system and renormed the human figure drawing procedure. His scoring system, The Draw A Person: A Quantitative Scoring System (DAP), was normed on a sample of 2,622 individuals ages 5 through 17 years who were representative of the 1980 U.S. Census data on age, sex, race, geographic region, ethnic group, social class, and community size. The DAP yields standard scores with the familiar mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. In a study of 61 subjects ages 6 to 16 years, the DAP correlated .51 with WISC-R IQ and produced similar overall scores, with a mean IQ of 100 versus mean DAP score of 95 (Wisniewski & Naglieri, 1989). Lassiter and Bardos (1995) found that the DAP score underestimated IQ scores obtained from the WPPSI-R and the K-BIT in a sample of 50 kindergartners and first graders.

Reviewers praise the DAP for its clear scoring system, strong reliability, and careful standardization (Cosden, 1992). However, results of validity studies are more cautionary. Harrison and Schock (1994) note that the accumulated evidence with HFD tests indicates low to moderate predictive validity. In spite of their popularity and appeal, HFD tests do not effectively identify children with learning difficulties or developmental disabilities, and they may not be valid for use even as screening measures.

Hiskey-Nebraska Test of Learning Aptitude

The Hiskey-Nebraska Test of Learning Aptitude (H-NTLA) is a nonlanguage performance scale for use with children aged 3 to 17 years (Hiskey, 1966). This test can be administered entirely through pantomime and requires no verbal response from the examinee. However, verbal instructions can be used with children with normal and mild hearing impairment. The H-NTLA consists of 12 subtests:

Bead Patterns	Block Patterns
Memory for Color	Completion of Drawings
Picture Identification	Memory for Digits
Picture Association	Puzzle Blocks
Paper Folding	Picture Analogies
Visual Attention Span	Spatial Reasoning

Raw scores on the subtests are converted into a Deviation Learning Quotient (LQ) with mean of 100 and standard deviation of 16. For a sample of 43 hearing-impaired children, the test–retest stability of the LQ scores was reported to be .79, .85, and .62 after intervals of about 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years, respectively, which is similar to data for normal children (Watson, 1983). Even so, more than one third of the sample showed a 15-point or greater change in scores over the 5-year time span, which demonstrates the importance of basing important decisions on more than a single measure.

H-NTLA scores correlate quite robustly with achievement scales for grades 2 through 12 (median $r = .49$) and also with WISC-R Performance IQ ($r = .85$). Although the LQ yields average scores that are remarkably close to WISC-R Performance IQ for samples of children with hearing impairment and those who are deaf, the H-NTLA scores are substantially more variable (Phelps & Ensor, 1986). Thus, use of the H-NTLA may increase the risk of false-positive misclassification—labeling children as gifted when they are only bright or as having mental retardation when they are merely borderline.

The H-NTLA is useful with children who are deaf, have speech or language impairments or mental retardation, or those who are bilingual. An interesting feature of this test is the development of parallel norms: The H-NTLA was standardized on 1,079 children who were deaf and 1,074 normal-hearing children aged 2½ to 17½. However, the chief weakness of the instrument is the inadequacy of these norms. For example, the representativeness of the sample of those who were deaf—picked on an opportunistic basis from schools for those who are deaf—is largely unknown. Standardization of the normal-hearing sample was based on occupational level of parents according to the 1960 U.S. Census. A contemporary and more detailed restandardization of the test would be quite helpful. Qu (1997) reports favorably on the reliability and validity of the test with huge samples of Chinese deaf children.

Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-4 (TONI-4)

The Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-4 (TONI-4) is a language-free measure of cognitive ability designed for disabled and language-impaired populations (Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 2010). By adding new items, the fourth edition realized a higher ceiling and a lower floor than the previous version. This is a pragmatic, brief, and simple measure that can be administered in 15 to 20 minutes. Because the response format can include any simple gesture such as nodding or pointing, the TONI-4 is well suited for persons who are deaf, language impaired, or physically limited. The authors recommend the test for assessing persons with aphasia, non-English speakers, and persons who have experienced a variety of severe neurological traumas. The test instructions are pantomimed by the examiner and the examinee answers by pointing to one of six possible responses. For motorically impaired patients, the examiner can point to the alternatives, one by one, while awaiting a choice from the examinee (e.g., nod of the head, or even an eye blink from a paralyzed patient).

The TONI-4 comes in two equivalent forms (A and B). Each form consists of 60 abstract or figural items that do not include pictures or cultural symbols. Except for a few simple-matching items, the TONI-4 items require the examinee to solve problems by identifying relationships among the abstract figures. Many of the items are similar in format to those found on Raven's Progressive Matrices. The test yields three kinds of scores: age equivalents (for younger examinees), percentile ranks, and TONI-4 quotients (mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15). Suitable for persons aged 6:0 through 89:11, the standardization sample consisted of 2,272 people from 33 states stratified according to gender, race and ethnicity, parental education, and socioeconomic status. Reliability data are satisfactory, with internal consistency coefficients typically exceeding .90 and alternate-forms reliability in the range of .80 to .95.

Independent validity studies of the TONI-4 are scant, but investigation of prior editions (which are highly similar in content) is supportive of this test as a culture-reduced index of general intelligence. Overall, the TONI-4 is highly regarded as a brief nonlanguage screening tool for persons with impaired language abilities (e.g., aphasic, deaf, non-English-speaking, intellectually disabled). The test is more carefully standardized than most and possesses excellent reliability. A useful feature is that the

untimed administration of TONI-4 rarely exceeds 20 minutes. Instructions are available in seven major foreign languages. For a review, see Ritter, Kilinc, Navruz, and Bae (2011).

NONREADING AND MOTOR-REDUCED TESTS

Nonreading tests are designed for illiterate examinees who can, nonetheless, understand spoken English well enough to follow oral instructions. Nonreading tests of intelligence are well suited to young children, illiterate examinees, and persons with speech or expressive-language impairments. These tests need not be specialized or esoteric: The performance subtests of most mainstream instruments qualify as nonreading tests. For example, examiners may use the WISC-III performance subtests to estimate the intelligence of examinees with language disabilities.

However, clients with cerebral palsy or other orthopedically impairing conditions will score very poorly on nonreading tests that require manipulatory responses. Obtaining valid test results from such persons can present an enormous challenge (Case Exhibit 7.1). The motor deficits, increased tendency to fatigue, and inexactness of purposive movements common to persons with cerebral palsy will negatively affect their performance on cognitive assessment tools. Orthopedically impaired clients need tests that are both nonreading and motor reduced. In particular, tests that permit a simple pointing response are well suited to the assessment of children and adults with cerebral palsy or other motor-impairing conditions.

CASE EXHIBIT 7.1

The Challenge of Assessment in Cerebral Palsy

The challenges inherent to special consultations are well typified by a client with cerebral palsy recently tested by a consulting psychologist. The young examinee was totally confined to a battery-powered wheelchair, except when a live-in attendant would transfer him to a bed or chair. Even a dispassionate observer would have to agree that the client didn't look very capable, sitting hunched over in his chair, unable to control his drooling, one arm arched out at an awkward angle. Yet, in spite of his disability, he had achieved a fair degree of personal independence. Using a simple joystick control device, he could guide his wheelchair to the grocery store, library, and community center where he would complete simple transactions by pointing to appropriate words and phrases in a plastic-bound spiral notebook. Because of his poor motor control, interactions with this client took quite a long time. Nonetheless, he was very efficient with short communications. Here is a typical exchange, with the client's notebook-designated responses shown in capital letters:

> "I understand you have a new synthesized-voice communication box, how do you like it?" YOU ASKED TWO QUESTIONS. "You're right. I'll bet that happens a lot. Do you have a communication box?" YES. "What do you think of it?" IT'S NOT EASY. "Now that we are done testing, should I find your driver?" NO, I'LL WAIT. HE IS COMING BACK.

How intelligent is this client? What is his level of verbal comprehension? How well does he understand abstract concepts? For example, is he capable of understanding the essentials of microcomputer usage such as data entry, file storage, and directory commands? Could he learn to program a microcomputer? These are precisely the referral questions asked by a vocational rehabilitation counselor who was contemplating huge expenditures—thousands of dollars—to purchase a computer system for this disabled client.

Certainly, it would be easy to underestimate the potential of this young man with severe motor and language disabilities because—in a quite literal sense—his intelligence was hidden away, trapped inside his incapacitated body. The task of the examiner was to find the able mind inside the disabled body, a formidable challenge indeed. Using the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the examiner determined that the young client possessed at least average intelligence and could likely learn the fundamentals of data processing with microcomputers.

Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-IV

The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-IV (PPVT-4) is the best known and most widely used of the nonreading, motor-reduced tests (Dunn & Dunn, 1998). The PPVT-4 is used to obtain a rapid measure of listening vocabulary with persons who are deaf or who have neurological or speech impairments. Although the PPVT-4 is useful with any examinee who cannot verbalize well, the test is especially useful with examinees who also manifest motor-impairing conditions such as cerebral palsy or stroke.

The PPVT-4 comes in two parallel versions, each consisting of 4 practice plates and 228 testing plates. Each plate contains four line drawings of objects or everyday scenes. The examiner presents a plate, states the stimulus word orally, and asks the examinee to point to the one picture that best depicts the stated word. The test items are precisely ordered according to difficulty level, arranged in 19 sets of 12 items each for efficient identification of basal and ceiling levels. The entry level is determined by age, and examinees continue until they reach their ceiling level. Although the test is untimed, administration seldom exceeds 15 minutes. Raw scores are converted to age equivalents or standard scores (mean of 100, standard deviation of 15).

The PPVT-4 was standardized on a representative national sample of 3,540 individuals ranging from 2½ to 90 or more years of age. Reliability data for the new edition are exceptionally strong, with typical internal consistency coefficients of .94, alternate-forms reliabilities of .89, and test–retest correlations of .93. Concurrent validity studies are also highly supportive, demonstrating robust correlations with verbal measures. For example, the test developers report a correlation of .7 with scores on the latest edition of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF-4).

The test developers of the PPVT-4 took great care to minimize and balance cultural influences in the test items. Independent consultants representing the perspectives of African Americans, Asians, Hispanics, Native Americans, and women reviewed the content and artwork of the test during development, and adjustments were made following these reviews. The test items demonstrate attractive artwork that is balanced for racial and gender differences, including persons with physical disabilities. However, based on research with prior editions, the evidence is mixed as to whether the Peabody is a culturally fair instrument that serves as a valid measure with minority children. For example, Washington and Craig (1999) found that 59 African American preschoolers at risk for academic failure averaged 91 on the test (SD of 11), which was seen as commensurate with their environmental disadvantages. These authors laud the test as "culturally fair." However, Campbell, Bell, and Keith (2001) reported an average score of 82 (SD of 12) for 416 African American children of low socioeconomic status, which was 8 points lower than their overall score on the K-ABC. These researchers concluded: "Despite the attempts to reduce racial differences, the PPVT-III appears to perform similarly to prior editions of the Peabody scales. On average, the PPVT-III tends to underestimate both intellectual ability and scholastic achievement, as measured by the K-ABC, in low SES, African American children" (p. 91). Further research will be needed to clarify the utility of this test with minority children.

Several lines of evidence support the validity of the Peabody test, but only as a narrow measure of vocabulary, not as a general measure of intelligence (Altepeter & Johnson, 1989). Dunn and Dunn (1981) sought to ensure content validity by searching *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* for all words whose meanings could be represented by a picture. Thus, the authors had a specific content universe in mind, and the items from the Peabody appear to be a fair sampling from this domain. In addition, the authors used sophisticated item-selection techniques based on the Rasch-Wright latent-trait model to help build construct validity into the test. This model enables researchers to construct a growth curve for the latent trait being measured (hearing vocabulary) and to select items that best fit the curve. Using tryout and calibration data, the curve was drawn repeatedly on a computer. If an item did not fit the Rasch-Wright latent-trait model (too flat or too steep an item-characteristic curve) it was discarded from consideration.

Concurrent and predictive validity data for the Peabody are somewhat limited but promising. Several investigators have correlated the PPVT-R with achievement measures, where modest relationships

(*r*'s from .30 to .60) are common (Naglieri, 1981; Naglieri & Pfeiffer, 1983). Correlations with reading achievement tend to be higher than with spelling and arithmetic achievement, suggesting that the PPVT-R has appropriate discriminant validity (Vance, Kitson, & Singer, 1985).

Several investigators have correlated earlier versions of the Peabody with intelligence measures, particularly the WISC-R and WAIS-R, and healthy correlations (near .70) are the rule (e.g., Naglieri & Yazzie, 1983). As might be expected, correlations tend to be higher with Verbal IQ than Performance IQ.

In a very important and ingenious study, Maxwell and Wise (1984) investigated the vocabulary loading of the Peabody in a sample of 84 inpatients from psychiatry and psychology wards. Their study utilized the PPVT, but this earlier edition is similar to the PPVT-IV, so that the conclusions are pertinent here. The researchers investigated the hypothesis that the PPVT assesses more than vocabulary in adults. In addition to the PPVT, the researchers collected data on the following: WAIS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale, name-writing speed, and years of education. Name-writing speed is simply the number of seconds required for the examinee to write his or her full name. Even though all variables had significant correlations with PPVT IQ, WAIS-R Vocabulary had by far the strongest correlation (r = .88). More important, when the variance accounted for by Vocabulary was removed, none of the remaining variables had any predictive relationship with the PPVT. In short, the Peabody is a good measure of vocabulary (hearing vocabulary, in particular) but could be misleading if used as a global measure of intellect.

The PPVT-4 is a recent revision, so independent research with the test is limited. One caution with the previous edition, the PPVT-III, is that standard scores may be substantially lower than Wechsler IQs, particularly with persons with mental retardation and minority examinees. In a sample of 21 adults with mild mental retardation, Prout and Schwartz (1984) found the PPVT-R standard scores (mean of 56) to be an average of 9 points lower than the WAIS-R IQ (mean of 65). Naglieri and Yazzie (1983) found a huge 26-point difference with a sample of Navajo Indian children, who averaged a standard score of 61 on the PPVT-R in contrast to WISC-R IQ of 87. On a similar note, with the PPVT-III, Bell, Lassiter, Matthews, and Hutchinson (2001) found that the instrument tended to underestimate WAIS-III IQ scores of bright college students by about 10 points.

Overall, we may conclude that the Peabody is a well-normed measure of hearing vocabulary that is useful with nonreading and motor-impaired examinees. However, the instrument is not a substitute for a general intelligence test and PPVT-4 scores may underestimate intellectual functioning in some groups (e.g., minority children, high-functioning adults).

TESTING PERSONS WITH VISUAL IMPAIRMENTS

Many millions of American adults have some degree of visual impairment, including more than 1 million individuals who are **legally blind**—a term used in determining eligibility for government benefits. This term applies to individuals with central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the better eye (with correction) or to those with significant reduction in their visual field to a diameter of 20 degrees or less (Bradley-Johnson & Ekstrom, 1998). The number of children with visual impairment is substantially smaller, with only 0.4 percent of students between the ages of 6 and 21 years receiving special education services because of a vision problem (U.S. Department of Education, 1992). In addition to special arrangements in testing, individuals with visual impairment may require unique instruments for valid assessment.

In assessing the intellectual functioning of the visually impaired, examiners have historically relied on adaptations of the Stanford-Binet. The Hayes-Binet revision for testing those with visual impairment was based on the 1916 Stanford-Binet; this instrument has since undergone several revisions. The most recent adaptation is the Perkins-Binet (Davis, 1980). The Perkins-Binet retains most of the verbal items from the Stanford-Binet but also adapts other items to a tactual mode. The Perkins-Binet possesses acceptable split-half reliability and shows high correlations with verbal scales of the WISC-R (Teare & Thompson, 1982). The developers of

the Perkins-Binet have acknowledged that visual problems exist on a continuum by developing separate norms for children with usable vision (Form U) and no usable vision (Form N).

Test developers have also succeeded in modifying the Wechsler Performance scales for use with individuals with visual impairments. The Haptic Intelligence Scale for the Adult Blind (HISAB) consists of six subtests, four of which resemble the Digit Symbol, Block Design, Object Assembly, and Picture Completion tests of the WAIS Performance scale (Shurrager, 1961; Shurrager & Shurrager, 1964). The remaining two subtests consist of Bead Arithmetic, which involves the use of an abacus to solve arithmetic problems, and a Pattern Board, which requires the examinee to reproduce the pattern felt on a board that has rows of holes with pegs in them. The reliability of the HISAB is excellent and the authors provide normative data on a sample of adults with visual impairment. Most encouraging of all, HISAB scores correlate .65 with the WAIS Verbal IQ (Shurrager & Shurrager, 1964). Although the HISAB is still manufactured and sold by Stoelting Company, unfortunately, the test has never been investigated empirically. A search of PsychINFO for research with this instrument did not locate a single article.

Another interesting instrument is the Blind Learning Aptitude Test (BLAT), a tactile test for children from 6 to 16 years of age who are blind (Newland, 1971). The BLAT items are in bas-relief form, consisting of dots and lines similar to Braille. The items consist of six different types: recognition of differences, recognition of similarities, identification of progressions, identification of the missing element in a 2 × 2 matrix, completion of a figure, and identification of the missing element in a 3 × 3 matrix. Most of the items were adapted from Raven's Progressive Matrices and the Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test. The BLAT was standardized on 961 functionally blind children 6 to 17½ years of age, in residential and day-care settings (Newland, 1990). The sample is said to be socioeconomically and racially representative of the U.S. population. The BLAT reveals excellent reliability, with internal consistency (Kuder-Richardson) of .93, and test–retest reliability over a 7-month period of .87 and .92 (two studies). The test correlates very well with the Hayes-Binet (r = .74) and the WISC Verbal scale (r = .71). The BLAT also shows strong correlations with Braille oral reading speed and comprehension (Baker, Koenig, & Sowell, 1995). In conjunction with a verbal test, the BLAT is a promising instrument for testing the intelligence of children with visual disabilities. However, the test would profit substantially from minor revisions, updated norms, and a more thorough test manual.

Dekker (1993) has developed a promising instrument for visually impaired children: the Intelligence Test for Visually Impaired Children (ITVIC). This test includes a number of haptic subtests (those relying only on the sense of touch), which are intended to replace traditional performance subtests like Block Design that require intact vision. Boter and Hoekstra-Vrolijk (1994) provide the compelling rationale for using haptic subtests with visually impaired children:

> Although the necessity for an IQ test with haptic subtests for visually impaired children is evident in practice, the intelligence of visually impaired children is usually still measured only through the use of the verbal subtests of the WISC-R. The risk of this is that an incomplete and one-sided picture is obtained. Children with little education, with a disadvantaged background or missing a good command of the language may be underestimated. (p. 135)

Designed for children 6 to 15 years of age, the test has separate norms for partially sighted and totally blind examinees. The instrument includes five verbal subtests adapted from existing instruments such as the Wechsler scales and seven new nonverbal subtests that rely on tactile perception:

Verbal	**Nonverbal/Haptic**
Vocabulary	Perception of Objects
Digit Span	Perception of Figures
Verbal Fluency	Block Design
Verbal Analogies	Rectangle Puzzles
Learning Names	Map and Plan Tests
	Exclusion of Figures
	Figural Analogies

The full battery takes about three hours to administer. Currently, the test is published in Dutch, German, and English but has received limited use in the United States. This may be due, in part, to the size and weight of the test kit. The ITVIC comes in a large "hold-all" that cannot be easily carried from one location to another. Information about this specialized instrument can be found at www.bartimeus.nl.

TESTING INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE DEAF OR HARD OF HEARING

More than 1 million Americans are deaf or sufficiently hard of hearing that they rely on American Sign Language (ASL) as their primary means of communication (Brauer, Braden, Pollard, & Hardy-Braz, 1998). Given the typical limited mastery of the English language of persons who are deaf and, vice versa, the typical psychologist's limited (or nonexistent) skill in ASL, the proper and valid assessment of individuals who are deaf poses a profound cross-cultural challenge.

More is involved than just picking a test developed for, and normed upon, individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing and who use sign language. One problem is that sign language "can now be characterized on a multidimensional continuum encompassing numerous styles, lexical variants, syntactic structures, dialects, and approximations to or departures from English word ordering" (Brauer et al., 1998, p. 299). Thus, a test developed in standard ASL is not equally fair to all persons who are deaf. In general, the proper and valid assessment of persons who are deaf requires that interested psychologists immerse themselves in the Deaf culture and also seek relevant educational and training experiences:

> One especially needs a thorough understanding of the implications of deafness and the use of sign language for making diagnoses for people who are deaf. Few hearing psychologists have these skills. The push is for specialized training programs in deafness and psychology, a need that has been recognized for decades. (Brauer et al., 1998, p. 303)

If a consulting psychologist does not possess these skills, then the assessment of persons who are deaf should be referred to a person or agency with the requisite talents and expertise.

The use of a sign language interpreter in the testing of persons who are deaf is a complicated and controversial matter. One concern is that the interpreter may inadvertently alter the content of the test, therefore affecting the validity of the findings. Certainly, it is unwise for parents or teachers to serve as interpreters. However, it is also true that persons who are deaf and who use sign language achieve higher IQs when the directions are signed than when they are delivered in the traditional manner (Braden, 1992). The preferred resolution is for the examiner to be fluent in sign language, so that any necessary translations stay within the bounds of standardized procedure.

For the intellectual assessment of persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, the Wechsler Performance subtests remain the tools of choice (Braden & Hannah, 1998). The impact of English language facility is minimized on these subtests, so it is thought that they provide a more accurate measure of cognitive skill than the Verbal subtests. Other tests sometimes used with persons who are deaf include Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1992) and the Hiskey-Nebraska Test of Learning Aptitude, discussed previously. The WAIS-III is now available in a formal ASL translation (demonstrated on videotape), endorsed and disseminated by the test publisher (Kostrubala & Braden, 1998).

ASSESSMENT OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

The term *intellectual disability* is the currently preferred designation for the disability historically referred to as *mental retardation*. In fact, the authoritative 130-year-old agency that has promoted the interests of affected individuals, the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), recently changed its name to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). The latest edition of its authoritative manual (Schalock, Borthwick-Duffy, Buntinx, and

others, 2010) eliminated all references to the term *mental retardation*. The reasons for the change have to do with providing a more hopeful and optimistic outlook for persons with intellectual disability:

> The construct of intellectual disability belongs within the general construct of disability. Intellectual disability has evolved to emphasize an ecological perspective that focuses on the person-environment interaction and recognizes that the systematic application of individualized supports can enhance human functioning. (Schalock, Luckasson, Shogren, and others, 2007)

In contrast, the outdated concept of mental retardation gradually has taken on excess meanings that tend to isolate the problem within the individual rather than recognizing an ecological perspective.

The assessment of intellectual disability is a complex and multifaceted concern that rightfully deserves a chapter or book of its own. Owing to space limitations, our coverage is necessarily abridged; interested readers are referred to Schalock et al. (2010) and Jackson, Mulick, and Rojahn (2007). Here we briefly summarize the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability and then review several intriguing assessment instruments in modest detail.

The most authoritative source for the definition of intellectual disability is the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. That organization defines intellectual disability as follows:

> Intellectual disability is characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18 (Schalock, et al., 2007, p. 118).

The AAIDD further stipulates that significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is an IQ of 70 to 75 or below on scales with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The agency explicitly affirms the importance of professional judgment in individual cases.

A low IQ by itself is an insufficient foundation for the diagnosis of intellectual disability. As noted, the definition also specifies a second criterion—limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. A diagnosis of mental retardation is warranted only when an individual displays a sufficiently low IQ and limitations in one or more of the broad areas of adaptive functioning. Furthermore, these deficits in intellect and adaptive functioning must have arisen during the developmental period—defined as between birth and the eighteenth birthday.

Intellectual disability represents a continuum from very mild to substantially disabling. For this reason, previous terminology recognized four levels of disability: mild, moderate, severe, and profound. However, current AAIDD designations represent a departure from this terminology. Instead of focusing on the shortcomings of the person, the manual introduces a hierarchy of "Intensities of Needed Supports," which redirects attention to the rehabilitation needs of the client. The four levels of needed supports are intermittent, limited, extensive, and pervasive. However, the previous terminology referring to levels of disability will likely prevail for quite some time, so we have chosen to blend the old and the new approach in Table 7.8. The reader will notice a zone of uncertainty between levels of disability, which signifies that clinical judgment about all sources of information is required in diagnosis. Furthermore, even though these levels are calibrated by IQ ranges, we remind the reader that the examinee must also show corresponding deficits in adaptive skill. Under no circumstances is an IQ test a sufficient basis for diagnosing intellectual disability.

Limitations in adaptive skill are more difficult to confirm than a low IQ. Fortunately, the AAIDD stipulates specific skills within the three areas of adaptive functioning, namely:

- Conceptual skills—language and literacy; money, time, and number concepts; and self-direction.
- Social skills—interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e., wariness), social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules/obey laws and to avoid being victimized.

TABLE 7.8 Four Levels of Intellectual Disability

Mild Intellectual Disability: IQ of 50–55 to 70–75+, ***Intermittent Support*** required. Reasonable social and communication skills; with special education, attain sixth grade level by late teens; achieve social and vocational adequacy with special training and supervision; partial independence in living arrangements.

Moderate Intellectual Disability: IQ of 35–40 to 50–55, ***Limited Support*** required. Fair social and communication skills but little self-awareness; with extended special education, attain fourth grade level; function in a sheltered workshop but need supervision in living arrangements.

Severe Intellectual Disability: IQ of 20–25 to 35–40, ***Extensive Support*** required. Little or no communication skills; sensory and motor impairments; do not profit from academic training; trainable in basic health habits.

Profound Intellectual Disability: IQ below 20–25, ***Pervasive Support*** required. Minimal functioning; incapable of self-maintenance; need constant nursing care and supervision.

Source: Based on Schalock et al. (2010) and Beirne-Smith, Ittenbach, and Patton (2002).

- Practical skills—activities of daily living (personal care), occupational skills, health care, travel/transportation, schedules/routines, safety, use of money, use of the telephone (www.aamr.org).

In regard to the assessment of these limitations, the agency proposes that well-normed measures of adaptive skills are desirable, but the final determination is always a matter of clinical judgment.

The first standardized instrument for assessing adaptive behavior was the Vineland Social Maturity Scale (Doll, 1935). Somewhat simplistic and coarse-grained by modern standards, the original Vineland scale consisted of 117 discrete items arranged in a year-scale format. An informant familiar with the examinee would check off applicable items. From these results the examiner would calculate an equivalent social age, helpful in the diagnosis of mental retardation. Still a respected instrument, the Vineland has undergone several revisions and is now known as the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Second Edition (Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Balla, 2005).

Since the release of the original Vineland scale, over 100 scales of adaptive behavior have been published (Matson, 2007; Reschly, Myers, & Hartel, 2002). These instruments vary greatly in structure, intended purpose, and targeted population. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two types of instruments designed for two different purposes. One group of mainly norm-referenced scales is used largely to assist in diagnosis and classification. Another group of mainly criterion-referenced scales is used largely to assist in training and rehabilitation. We have chosen a few representative instruments for more detailed analysis.

Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised

The Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised (SIB-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996) is an ambitious, multidimensional measure of adaptive behavior that is highly useful in the assessment of intellectual disability. The instrument consists of 259 adaptive behavior items organized into 14 subscales. The scale is completed with the help of a parent, caregiver, or teacher well acquainted with the examinee's daily behaviors. For each subscale, the examiner reads a series of items and for each item records a score from 0 (never or rarely does task) to 3 (does task very well). A useful feature of the SIB-R is that examiners need a minimum of training and experience. Of course, a much higher level of competence is required to evaluate results and make decisions about placement or treatment.

The 14 subscales of the SIB are arranged into four clusters, as outlined in Table 7.9. In turn, these four clusters constitute the Broad Independence Scale. Each subscale consists of a small number of discrete, developmentally ordered items. For example, the subscale on Eating and Meal Preparation has 19 graded items, including spearing food with a fork, eating soup with a spoon, taking appropriate-sized portions, and preparing snacks that do not require cooking. For each subscale, items are administered until a predetermined ceiling is reached (e.g., 3 of 5 consecutive items scored 0).

TABLE 7.9 The Subscales and Clusters of the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised

1. ***Motor Skills***
   - Gross Motor—19 large muscle skills such as sitting without support or taking part in strenuous physical activities.
   - Fine Motor—19 small muscle skills such as picking up small objects or assembling small objects.
2. ***Social and Communication Skills***
   - Social Interaction—18 skills requiring interaction with other people such as handing toys to others or making plans with friends to attend social activities.
   - Language Comprehension—18 skills involving the understanding of spoken and written language such as looking toward a speaker or reading.
   - Language Expression—20 tasks involving talking such as making sounds to get attention or explaining a written contract.
3. ***Personal Living Skills***
   - Eating and Meal Preparation—19 skills related to eating and meal preparation, ranging from drinking from a glass to planning a meal.
   - Toileting—17 skills necessary to bathroom and toilet use.
   - Dressing—18 skills related to dressing, ranging from holding out arms and legs while being dressed to arranging for clothing alterations.
   - Personal Self-Care—16 tasks involved in basic grooming and health maintenance, for example, washing hands and making a medical appointment.
   - Domestic Skills—18 tasks needed to maintain a home, ranging from putting empty dishes in the sink to selecting appropriate housing.
4. ***Community Living Skills***
   - Time and Punctuality—19 tasks involving time concepts and time management such as keeping appointments.
   - Money and Value—20 skills related to money concepts, such as saving money and using credit.
   - Work Skills—20 skills related to prevocational and work habits, for example, indicating that an assigned task is completed.
   - Home–Community Orientation—18 skills involved in getting around the home and neighborhood and traveling in the community, for example, locating a dentist.

Raw scores for a subtest are added to obtain a part score. The part scores for each cluster are then added to obtain the cluster score. The score for the Broad Independence Scale is derived from the four cluster scores. The subtest scores, cluster scores, and the Broad Independence score can then be converted to a variety of normative scores to permit comparison of the examinee's performance with the performance of the national norming sample. The normative scales include age scores, percentile ranks, standard scores, stanines, and normal curve equivalents.

A separate, unique part of the SIB-R also assesses maladaptive behavior by measuring the frequency and severity of problem behaviors. The Problem Behaviors Scale includes eight major categories of personal and social maladjustment that could affect adaptive behavior: Hurtful to Self, Hurtful to Others, Destructive to Property, Disruptive Behavior, Unusual or Repetitive Habits, Socially Offensive

Behavior, Withdrawal or Inattentive Behavior, and Uncooperative Behavior. Examples of problem behaviors are listed, and the respondent must indicate the behaviors displayed by the examinee. In addition, the respondent describes the one most serious behavior in each category and rates it according to frequency of occurrence, severity, and typical management.

The standardization of the SIB-R was well conceived and executed. The norm group consisted of 2,182 persons sampled to reflect the 1990 census characteristics. The normative data cover persons from age 3 months to adults over age 80. An additional sample of persons with mental retardation, learning or hearing disabilities, and behavior disorders was also tested. The value of the SIB-R was further strengthened by anchoring it to the norms for the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised. The SIB-R is one component of this larger test battery, but can be used on its own.

The reliability of the SIB-R is generally respectable, but somewhat variable from subscale to subscale and from one age group to another. The individual subscales tend to show split-half reliabilities in the vicinity of .80; the four clusters have median composite reliabilities around .90; the Broad Independence Scale has a very robust reliability in the high .90s (Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996).

Validity data for the SIB-R are very promising. For example, the mean scores of various samples of disabled and nondisabled subjects show confirmatory relationships: SIB-R scores are lowest among those persons known to be most severely impaired in learning and adjustment. For disabled examinees, SIB-R scores correlate very strongly with intelligence scores (in the .80s), whereas with nondisabled examinees, the relationship is minimal (Bruininks et al., 1996). The SIB-R also possesses excellent convergent validity—the Broad Independence Score correlated .83 with the composite score from a similar instrument, the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Middleton, Keene, & Brown, 1990). Tan, Hultsch, Hunter, and Strauss (2010) reported that a slightly modified version of the SIB-R was helpful in the evaluation of elderly clients with mild cognitive impairment.

In sum, the SIB-R is an excellent tool for providing insights into an examinee's current level of functioning in real-life situations in the home, school, and community settings. Although this instrument does not have a precise correspondence with the areas of adaptive skill listed in the definition of intellectual disability, there is substantial similarity. For example, the following areas of adaptive skills are well covered by subscales or clusters of the SIB-R: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, health and safety, and work. The SIB-R or a similar instrument ranks as a mandatory supplement to individual intelligence testing in the diagnosis and assessment of mental retardation.

Inventory for Client and Agency Planning (ICAP)

The Inventory for Client and Agency Planning (Hill, 2005) is one of the most widely used tests in the field of developmental disabilities. This test is suitable for children and adults with mental retardation, individuals who become disabled as adults through illness or accident, and elderly persons who have slowly lost their independence and, therefore, need special assistance. The focus of the instrument is on determining the need for special services such as personal care, remedial education, vocational training, or sheltered work environment.

The test is a 16-page booklet that evaluates adaptive behavior, maladaptive behavior, and the need for assistance and supports. Amazingly, it can be completed in about 15 minutes by a parent, teacher, or caregiver who is well acquainted with the client. The scales and subscales of the ICAP are depicted in Table 7.10. Identical to the SIB-R, adaptive behaviors are rated on a scale from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating never or rarely does a behavior well (even if asked), 1 indicating does the task but not well, 2 indicating does the task fairly well, and 3 indicating does the task well without being asked. The maladaptive behaviors are assessed in a more complex manner using open-ended questions and follow-up queries as to frequency, severity, and consequences of the maladaptive behaviors. This technique provides for a maladaptive behavior subscale with enhanced reliability (r = .80) in comparison to similar

TABLE 7.10 Scales and Subscales of the Inventory for Client and Agency Planning

Scale	*Number of Items*	*Subscales or Domains Measured*
Descriptive	10	Data on age, height, weight, legal status
Primary and Additional Diagnoses	14	All relevant medical and psychological diagnoses
Special Needs	10	Special needs in vision, hearing, mobility, health care, medications
Residential Supports	2	Residential supports now and in future
School/Vocational Supports	2	School and vocational supports now and in future
Other Support Services	26	Survey of all support services needed, now and in future
Social/Leisure Activities	16	Survey of social and leisure activities
Adaptive Behavior	77	Level of functioning in motor skills, social and communication skills, personal living skills, and community living skills
Maladaptive Behavior	24	Self-injury, stereotyped, withdrawn, offensive, uncooperative, disruptive, destructive, hurts others

Note: The ICAP also yields a Service Score based on Adaptive Behavior and Maladaptive Behavior.

subscales from other instruments that reveal low reliability ($r = .60$). From a psychometric standpoint, the ICAP meets the highest standards.

One of the most useful and appealing aspects of the ICAP is that it provides an overall Service Score based on both adaptive and maladaptive behavior. The Service Score, which ranges from 0 to 100, indicates the likely level of attention, supervision, and training needed by the client. The lower the score, the greater the need for oversight. For example, a child with severe disabilities and many maladaptive behaviors might earn a score of 5, indicating the need for intensive supervision virtually 24 hours a day. At the other extreme, a normal young adult with no behavior problems might earn a score of 95, indicating almost complete self-sufficiency.

By intention, the Service Score was designed to predict not only the service intensity needed but also the costs associated with delivering the assistance. For this reason, state and regional users often collate their ICAP data in a computer database provided by the test publishers.

In many states in the United States, the human services departments have linked their disability services with results from the ICAP. For example, in Colorado, the ICAP is used by the Division of Services for People with Disabilities to determine eligibility and to allocate funds for individuals receiving residential services and day care services (www.cdhs.state.co.us). Resources are allocated for other reasons as well, but the ICAP is foundational to the entire system of disabilities services. Certainly, this is an example of consequential testing: The fate of an entire group of individuals is linked to the soundness of the ICAP for purposes of determining services.

Additional Measures of Adaptive Behavior

We remind the reader that measures of adaptive behavior vary greatly. Some scales are designed mainly for diagnosis, others for remediation. Some scales are useful with persons with severe and profound mental retardation who will never be employed, others with individuals with mild mental retardation seeking vocational training. Some scales are useful exclusively with children, others with adults. These instruments are not interchangeable, and the potential user must study their strengths and limitations carefully.

The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales-II (VABS-II, Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Balla, 2005) is the

most widely used measure of adaptive behavior in existence. The instrument is the outcome of a major revision and restandardization of the Vineland Social Maturity Scale, originally published in 1935 by Edgar A. Doll. Based on a semistructured interview with a caregiver or parent, the VABS provides an evaluation in the following domains and subdomains: Communication (receptive, expressive, written), Daily Living Skills (personal, domestic, community), Socialization (interpersonal relationships, play and leisure time, coping skills), Motor Skills (gross, fine).

The VABS-II is a widely respected instrument with good concurrent validity, including correlations in the range of .50 to .80 with the Wechsler scales and Stanford-Binet. However, some of the interview items require knowledge that the informants may not possess (e.g., whether a child says 100 recognizable words). Silverstein (1986) faults the normative data, noting discontinuous jumps in standard scores from one age group to another. Even so, the Vineland continues to be a highly popular test in clinical practice and research. A promising development in research is the increasing use of this instrument in other countries. For example, de Bildt, Kraijer, Sytema, and Minderaa (2005) report favorably on the validity of the VABS in a sample of 826 Dutch children with mental retardation, and Balboni, Pedrabissi, Molteni, and Villa (2001) established that the instrument accurately identifies mentally retarded individuals with and without communication impairment, social behavior problems, and motor disabilities.

The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disability (AAIDD) has developed several scales useful in the assessment of persons with cognitive limitations. We mention here just one of its products, the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scales: Second Edition (Nihira, Leland, & Lambert, 1993). The residential and community version of this test, suitable for persons 18 to 80 years of age, is a psychometric tour de force that borders on overkill. The normative sample includes more than 4,000 persons with developmental disabilities from 43 states residing in the community or in residential settings. In addition to assessing the appropriate behavioral domains (e.g., independent functioning, domestic activity, self-direction, responsibility), a noteworthy feature of the instrument is the careful attention to maladaptive behaviors, which are evaluated in eight domains:

- Violent and antisocial behavior
- Rebellious behavior
- Eccentric and self-abusive behavior
- Untrustworthy behavior
- Withdrawal
- Stereotyped and hyperactive behavior
- Inappropriate body exposure
- Disturbed behavior

This scale has been extensively validated and clearly distinguishes persons independently classified at different adaptive behavior levels.

ASSESSMENT OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS

Autism is not a single disorder, but a range of closely related disorders evident in the first years of life. Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) include diagnostic categories such as autistic disorder, Asperger's syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder, among others (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Although the level of disability and specific symptoms vary from child to child, what all children with ASDs share in common is a core of difficulties with reciprocal social skills, communication abilities, and flexible behavior. Often, empathy is absent. Affected children may display stereotypic activities, interests, and behaviors. A characteristic vignette of a child with ASD might read as follows:

> Martin is a cute 2-year-old boy who is perplexing and worrisome to his parents. He will only eat crunchy foods and refuses to use utensils. He rarely makes eye contact. When watching TV, he rocks back and forth and flaps his hands. He seldom speaks, although he does verbalize "music" when he wants to hear a favorite CD of children's songs. He becomes enraged if his parents play a different CD. He appears self-absorbed and does not respond affectionately to his parents. For Martin,

taking turns is a foreign concept. He has a very short attention span. Even so, bright metal objects fascinate him.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, about 1 in 88 children manifests an ASD, and these disorders are 5 times more common among boys than girls (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, March 30, 2012). Early diagnosis and intervention are vital because of the improved prognosis (Hollander, Kolevzon, & Coyle, 2011).

The assessment of children for ASDs is a complex endeavor that includes screening tests, behavioral observations, and diagnostic evaluation by specialists in pediatrics, neurology, and psychology. Excessive reliance on checklists or tests is unwise. Even so, appropriate scales can be a useful starting point. We survey a few good measures here.

The Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT; Robins, Fein, & Barton, 1999) is an appealing 23-item checklist that enjoys strong content validity. The M-CHAT is a screening test used with toddlers between 16 and 30 months of age to identify children at risk for ASDs. The authors openly acknowledge that the instrument yields a high false-positive rate. Thus, M-CHAT should be used only in conjunction with further diagnostic evaluation, in the event of a "failing" score. Items on the checklist resemble the following:

Does your child play with other children?	Yes	No
Does your child smile when you smile?	Yes	No
Does your child engage in pretend play?	Yes	No
Does your child enjoy peek-a-boo?	Yes	No
Does your child respond to his/her name?	Yes	No
Does your child sustain eye contact?	Yes	No

Children who fail three or more items (or two or more critical items) should be referred for further evaluation by specialists. The M-CHAT has been translated into more than 30 languages.

Robins (2008) reported a large-scale study of 4,797 children evaluated with M-CHAT during toddler checkups. From this sample, 466 screened positive on the M-CHAT, including 362 families who completed a follow-up interview. From this group, 21 children eventually were diagnosed with ASDs. Remarkably, only *four* of these 21 children were flagged by their pediatrician. In sum, the M-CHAT yields a high false-positive rate, but this is an acceptable price to pay for identifying at-risk children who might otherwise go undetected for additional months or years. In fact, the "cost" of the false-positive identifications usually consisted of a telephone follow-up call or brief in-person interview to determine that further assessment was not warranted.

Another widely used autism checklist is the Baby and Infant Screen for Children with Autism Traits-Part 1, referred to as BISCUIT-Part 1 by the authors (Matson, Boisjoli, & Wilkins, 2007). The instrument consists of 71 items that assess the core symptoms of autism in toddlers 17 to 37 months of age. The items are completed by a parent or caretaker on a 3-point scale that includes 0 (not different, no impairment), 1 (somewhat different, mild impairment), and 2 (very different, severe impairment). Items are brief and resemble the following: *communicates verbally*, *takes turns*, *sustains eye contact*, *responds to name*. An exploratory factor analysis of results for 1,287 children enrolled in an early intervention program yielded a three-factor solution consistent with symptom clusters found in ASD children, supporting the construct validity of the scale (Matson, Boisjoli, Hess, & Wilkins, 2010). The BISCUIT-Part 1 also demonstrated good convergent validity with the M-CHAT, and appropriate divergent validity with measures of adaptive and motor behaviors in a sample of 1,007 toddlers (Matson, Wilkins, & Fodstad, 2011). Over 80 studies have been published on the scale. For a recent review, see Matson and Tureck (2012).

CHAPTER 8

Foundations of Personality Testing

TOPIC 8A Theories of Personality and Projective Techniques

Personality: An Overview
Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality
Type Theories of Personality
Phenomenological Theories of Personality
Behavioral and Social Learning Theories
Trait Conceptions of Personality
The Projective Hypothesis
Association Techniques
Completion Techniques
Construction Techniques
Expression Techniques
Case Exhibit 8.1 Projective Tests as Ancillary to the Interview

In psychological testing a fundamental distinction often is drawn between ability tests and personality tests. Defined in the broadest sense, ability tests include a plethora of instruments for measuring intelligence, achievement, and aptitude. In the preceding seven chapters we have explored the nature, construction, application, reliability, and validity of ability tests. In the next two chapters we shift the emphasis to personality tests and related matters. Personality tests seek to measure one or more of the following: personality traits, dynamic motivation, symptoms of distress, personal strengths, and attitudinal characteristics. Measures of spirituality, creativity, and emotional intelligence also fall within this realm.

Theories of personality provide an underpinning for the multiplicity of instruments available in the field. For this reason, we begin this chapter with a survey of prominent personality theories. The many ways in which theorists conceptualize personality clearly have impacted the design of personality tests and assessments. This is especially evident with projective techniques such as the Rorschach inkblot method, which emanated from psychoanalytic conceptions of personality. Thus, in Topic 8A, Theories of Personality and Projective Techniques, in addition to the survey of personality theories, we have included an introduction to several instruments based on the turn-of-the-twentieth-century psychoanalytic hypothesis

where responses to ambiguous stimuli reveal the innermost, unconscious mental processes of the examinee. The coverage of personality assessment continues in Topic 8B, Self-Report and Behavioral Assessment of Psychopathology, which includes a review of structured tests and procedures, including self-report inventories and behavioral assessment approaches. These time-honored topics of Chapter 8—theories of personality, projective techniques, and structured personality tests—are followed by the relatively new focus of Chapter 9—the Evaluation of Normality and Individual Strengths.

PERSONALITY: AN OVERVIEW

Although personality is difficult to define, we can distinguish two fundamental features of this vague construct. First, each person is consistent to some extent; we have coherent traits and action patterns that arise repeatedly. Second, each person is distinctive to some extent; behavioral differences exist between individuals. Consider the reactions of three graduate students when their midterm examinations were handed back. Although all three students received nearly identical grades (solid B's), personal reactions were quite diverse. The first student walked off sullenly and was later overheard to say that a complaint to the departmental administrator was in order. The second student was pleased, stating out loud that a B was, after all, a respectable grade. The third student was disappointed but stoical. He blamed himself for not studying harder.

How are we to understand the different reactions of these three persons, each of whom was responding to an identical stimulus? Psychologists and laypersons alike invoke the concept of **personality** to make sense out of the behavior and expressed feelings of others. The notion of personality is used to explain behavioral differences between persons (for example, why one complains and another is stoical) and to understand the behavioral consistency within each individual (for example, why the complaining student noted previously was generally sour and dissatisfied).

Why people differ is just one of many key issues in the study of personality. Mayer (2007–8) provides a thoughtful discussion of the big questions in personality psychology, which he defines as "those questions that are simple, important, and central to many people's lives." He identifies 20 big questions, only a few of which can be addressed through testing and assessment. These questions involve existential matters such as the purpose of life, the nature of personhood, and the difficulties encountered in seeking self-knowledge. His captivating article is a reminder that some vital issues can be approached through the empiricism of psychological research and testing, whereas other crucial matters remain elusive and are amenable mainly to philosophical and phenomenological inquiry.

In addition to understanding personality, psychologists also seek to measure it. Literally hundreds of personality tests are available for this purpose; we will review historically prominent instruments and also discuss some promising new approaches. However, in order that the reader can better comprehend the diversity of instruments and approaches, we begin with a more fundamental question: How is personality best conceptualized? As the reader will discover, in order to measure personality we must first envision what it is we seek to measure. The reader will better appreciate the multiplicity of tests and procedures if we also briefly describe the personality theories that comprise the underpinnings for these instruments.

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

Psychoanalysis was the original creation of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). While it is true that many others have revised and adapted his theories, the changes have been slight in comparison to the substantial foundations that can be traced to this singular genius of the Victorian and early-twentieth-century era. Freud was enormously prolific in his writing and theorizing. We restrict our discussion to just those aspects of psychoanalysis that have influenced psychological testing. In particular, the Rorschach, the Thematic Apperception Test, and most of the projective techniques critiqued in the next topic dictate a psychoanalytic framework for interpretation. Readers who wish a more thorough review of Freud's contributions can start with the *New Introductory*

Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Freud, 1933). Reviews and interpretations of Freud's theories can be found in Stafford-Clark (1971) and Fisher and Greenberg (1984).

Origins of Psychoanalytic Theory

Freud began his professional career as a neurologist but was soon specializing in the treatment of hysteria, an emotional disorder characterized by histrionic behavior and physical symptoms of psychic origin such as paralysis, blindness, and loss of sensation. With his colleague Joseph Breuer, Freud postulated that the root cause of hysteria was buried memories of traumatic experiences such as childhood sexual molestation. If these memories could be brought forth under hypnosis, a release of emotion called abreaction would take place and the hysterical symptoms would disappear, at least briefly (*Studies on Hysteria,* Breuer & Freud, 1893–1895).

From these early studies Freud developed a general theory of psychological functioning with the concept of the unconscious as its foundation. He believed that the unconscious was the reservoir of instinctual drives and a storehouse of thoughts and wishes that would be unacceptable to our conscious self. Thus, Freud argued that our most significant personal motivations are largely beyond conscious awareness. The concept of the unconscious was discussed in elaborate detail in his first book (*The Interpretation of Dreams,* Freud, 1900). Freud believed that dreams portray our unconscious motives in a disguised form. Even a seemingly innocuous dream might actually have a hidden sexual or aggressive meaning, if it is interpreted correctly.

Freud's concept of the unconscious penetrated the very underpinnings of psychological testing early in the twentieth century. An entire family of projective techniques emerged, including inkblot tests, word association approaches, sentence completion techniques, and storytelling (apperception) techniques (Frank, 1939, 1948). Each of these methods was predicated on the assumption that unconscious motives could be divined from an examinee's responses to ambiguous and unstructured stimuli. In fact, Rorschach (1921) likened his inkblot test to an X ray of the unconscious mind. Although he patently overstated the power of projective techniques, it is evident from Rorschach's view that the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious had a strong influence on testing practices.

The Structure of the Mind

Freud divided the mind into three structures: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is the obscure and inaccessible part of our personality that Freud likened to "a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement." Because the **id** is entirely unconscious, we must infer its characteristics indirectly by analyzing dreams and symptoms such as anxiety. From such an analysis, Freud concluded that the id is the seat of all instinctual needs such as for food, water, sexual gratification, and avoidance of pain. The id has only one purpose, to obtain immediate satisfaction for these needs in accordance with the pleasure principle. The **pleasure principle** is the impulsion toward immediate satisfaction without regard for values, good or evil, or morality. The id is also incapable of logic and possesses no concept of time. The chaotic mental processes of the id are, therefore, unaltered by the passage of time, and impressions that have been pushed down into the id "are virtually immortal and are preserved for whole decades as though they had only recently occurred" (Freud, 1933).

If our personality consisted only of an id striving to gratify its instincts without regard for reality, we would soon be annihilated by outside forces. Fortunately, soon after birth, part of the id develops into the **ego** or conscious self. The purpose of the ego is to mediate between the id and reality. The ego is part of the id and servant to it, but the ego "interpolates between desire and action the procrastinating factor of thought" (Freud, 1933). Thus, the ego is largely conscious and obeys the **reality principle**; it seeks realistic and safe ways of discharging the instinctual tensions that are constantly pushing forth from the id.

The ego must also contend with the **superego**, the ethical component of personality that starts to emerge in the first five years of life. The superego is roughly synonymous with conscience and comprises the societal standards of right and wrong that are conveyed to us by our parents. The superego is partly conscious, but a large part of it is unconscious, that is, we are not always aware of its existence or

operation. The function of the superego is to restrict the attempts of the id and ego to obtain gratification. Its main weapon is guilt, which it uses to punish the wrongdoings of the ego and id. Thus, it is not enough for the ego to find a safe and realistic way for the gratification of id strivings. The ego must also choose a morally acceptable outlet, or it will suffer punishment from its overseer, the superego. This explains why we may feel guilty for immoral behavior such as theft even when getting caught is impossible. Another part of the superego is the ego ideal, which consists of our aims and aspirations. The ego measures itself against the ego ideal and strives to fulfill its demands for perfection. If the ego falls too far short of meeting the standards of the ego ideal, a feeling of guilt may result. We commonly interpret this feeling as a sense of inferiority (Freud, 1933).

The Role of Defense Mechanisms

The ego certainly has a difficult task, acting as mediator and servant to three tyrants: id, superego, and external reality. It may seem to the reader that the task would be essentially impossible and that the individual would, therefore, be in a constant state of anxiety. Fortunately, the ego has a set of tools at its disposal to help carry out its work, namely, mental strategies collectively labeled **defense mechanisms**.

Defense mechanisms come in many varieties, but they all share three characteristics in common. First, their exclusive purpose is to help the ego reduce anxiety created by the conflicting demands of id, superego, and external reality. In fact, Freud felt that anxiety was a signal telling the ego to invoke one or more defense mechanisms in its own behalf. Defense mechanisms and anxiety are, therefore, complementary concepts in psychoanalytic theory, one existing as a counterforce to the other. The second common feature of defense mechanisms is that they operate unconsciously. Thus, even though defense mechanisms are controlled by the ego, we are not aware of their operation. The third characteristic of defense mechanisms is that they distort inner or outer reality. This property is what makes them capable of reducing anxiety. By allowing the ego to view a challenge from the id, superego, or external reality in a less-threatening manner, defense mechanisms help the ego avoid crippling levels of anxiety. Of course, because they distort reality, the rigid, excessive application of defense mechanisms may create more problems than it solves.

Assessment of Defense Mechanisms and Ego Functions

Although Freud introduced the concept of defense mechanisms, it was left to his followers to elucidate these unconscious mental strategies in more detail (Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997). Vaillant (1971) developed a hierarchy of ego defense mechanisms based on the assumption that some mechanisms are healthier or more adaptive than others. He suggested four broad types, listed here in ascending level of maturity: psychotic, immature, neurotic, mature. Each type includes specific defense mechanisms such as denial, projection, repression, and altruism, described below. Perry and Henry (2004) proposed a similar hierarchy of adaptation in defense mechanisms. They also developed a sophisticated rating scale, which, as we will see, is of value in clinical practice. A hierarchy of types of defense mechanisms (least mature to most mature) is provided in Table 8.1.

Psychotic defense mechanisms are the least healthy because they distort reality to an extreme degree. One example includes gross denial of external reality such as the refusal to acknowledge the death of a loved one. Another example is delusional projection, which consists of frank delusions about external reality, usually of a persecutory nature. The second grouping, Acting Out, comprises several forms of maladaptive action such as passive-aggressive behavior (e.g., intentional lateness to aggravate a partner), impulsive behavior designed to reduce tension, and complaining while simultaneously rejecting help.

Borderline defense mechanisms include patterns of behavior often found in persons with a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The specific mechanisms include splitting, in which the images of others (or self) alternate rapidly from all good to all bad, and projective identification which is the projection of an unwanted, unrecognized trait (like anger) onto others. Neurotic defense mechanisms, the fourth group, are found to some degree

TABLE 8.1 A Hierarchy of Types of Defense Mechanisms (Least Mature to Most Mature)

Type	*Description and Examples*
Psychotic	Gross denial of external reality such as frank delusions; includes denial and distortion
Acting Out	Maladaptive behaviors such as impulsive actions; includes passive-aggressiveness
Borderline	Splitting the image of others into good and bad; includes splitting and schizoid fantasy
Neurotic	Mechanisms that involve minor reality distortion; includes repression and displacement
Obsessive	Somewhat adaptive mechanisms; includes isolation of affect and intellectualization
Mature	Mature forms of defense with minor reality distortion; includes humor and sublimation

Source: Based on Perry and Henry (2004) and Vaillant (1977).

in most persons and include repression (inexplicable memory lapses or failure to acknowledge information, such as "forgetting" a dental appointment) and displacement, which comprises the transfer of feelings from the real object onto someone or something else, such as kicking the dog when angry with the boss.

Obsessive defense mechanisms also are very common and consist of mental patterns like isolation of affect or intellectualization. Isolation of affect involves the superficial acknowledgement of a feeling in the absence of a full emotional experience. In intellectualization, threatening matters are acknowledged but explored in bland terms that are relatively devoid of feelings. For example, Vaillant (1971) describes a physician whose mother had died recently of cancer. The doctor talked at length about the medical characteristics of her illness, thereby easing his sense of loss.

Mature defense mechanisms appear to the beholder as convenient virtues. An example is certain forms of humor that do not distort reality but that can ease the burden of matters "too terrible to be borne" (Vaillant, 1977). Specific kinds of mature mechanisms include:

> *Altruism*: Vicarious but constructive and gratifying service to others.
>
> *Humor*: Playful acknowledgment of ideas and feelings without discomfort and without unpleasant effects on others; does not include sarcasm.
>
> *Suppression*: Conscious or semiconscious decision to postpone paying attention to a conscious conflict or impulse.
>
> *Anticipation*: Realistic anticipation of or planning for future inner discomfort; for example, realistic anticipation of surgery or separation.
>
> *Sublimation*: Indirect expression of instinctual wishes without adverse consequences or loss of pleasure; for example, channeling aggression into sports.

An example of humor as a mature defense mechanism would be former president Ronald Reagan's quip to doctors in 1981 as he entered surgery for a bullet wound from his attempted assassination. He is reported to have said, "I hope you're all Republicans."

Perry and colleagues developed the Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS) as a basis for assessing the level, type, and severity of defense mechanisms encountered in psychotherapy patients (Perry, 1990; Perry & Harris, 2004). The DMRS was devised for rating the presence of 30 discrete defense mechanisms (e.g., acting out, splitting, denial, projection, repression, intellectualization, altruism, etc.) in a 50-minute dynamically oriented interview. In the original scale, a 3-point qualitative rating of absent, probably present, or definitely present was obtained for each defense mechanism identified in a review of a videotaped session.

Subsequently, the test developers adopted a simple quantitative scoring approach in which defense mechanisms were isolated and identified in short, meaningful segments of the taped interview. They found that a typical therapy session includes anywhere from 15 to 75 illustrations of the various

defense mechanisms. Based on prior research, each defense mechanism receives a score from 1 (highly immature and maladaptive) to 7 (highly mature and adaptive). Although the scale offers a number of scoring options, the most useful score is the Overall Defensive Functioning (ODF) score, which is the simple average of the ratings of the observed defense mechanisms. The theoretical range of scores is 1.0 to 7.0, although scores of 3.0 and below are rare. Scores below 5.0 indicate significant personality disorder or severe depression. Scores of 6.0 and higher indicate normal or healthy functioning. Interrater reliabilities from six studies were mostly in the mid- to high-.80s for the ODF scores. The stability coefficient for a small sample of patients over a one-month interval was a respectable .75 (Perry & Harris, 2004).

The ODF scores tend to improve over the course of dynamically oriented therapy, which supports the validity of the construct being measured, maturity of defense mechanisms. In four studies involving one-month to one-year follow-up with small samples, the within-group effect sizes for gains in ODF scores ranged from .02 to 1.05, with most in the range of .41 to .82 (Perry Harris, 2004, Table 9.5). Effect sizes of this magnitude are considered moderate to large, that is, meaningful gains are being accomplished, as registered by the increased maturity of the defense mechanisms emerging in the therapy sessions. The authors observe:

> Defenses can be viewed as both process phenomena (psychological mechanisms in action) and as a measure of adaptive outcome, when aggregated across sessions and time. This gives the study of defenses great potential clinical relevance. To develop and test predictive hypotheses about treatment will make the study of defense very relevant to daily clinical work, and both scientifically promising and exciting (Perry & Harris, 2004, p. 190).

The meaningful assessment of defense mechanisms largely has eluded clinical researchers, but instruments like the DMRS show promise of making key elements of psychoanalytic theory accessible to empirical validation (Perry, Beck, Constantinides, & Foley, 2009). However, this approach does have two drawbacks: The practitioner needs specialized training to identify defense mechanisms, and the process of collecting relevant information from patients is very time-consuming.

TYPE THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

The earliest personality theories attempted to sort individuals into discrete categories or types. For example, the Greek physician Hippocrates (ca. 460–377 B.C.) proposed a humoral theory with four personality types (sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic) that was too simplistic to be useful. In the 1940s, Sheldon and Stevens (1942) proposed a type theory based on the relationship between body build and temperament. Their approach stimulated a flurry of research and then faded into obscurity. Nonetheless, typological theories have continued to capture intermittent interest among personality researchers. We will illustrate type theories by reviewing contemporary research on coronary-prone personality types.

Type A Coronary-Prone Behavior Pattern

Friedman and Rosenman (1974) investigated the psychological variables that put individuals at higher risk of coronary heart disease. They were the first to identify a **Type A coronary-prone behavior pattern**, which they described as "an action–emotion complex that can be observed in any person who is aggressively involved in a chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time, and if required to do so, against the opposing efforts of other things or persons" (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974). At the opposite extreme is the Type B behavior pattern, characterized by an easygoing, noncompetitive, relaxed lifestyle. Of course, people vary along a continuum from "pure" Type A to "pure" Type B.

Friedman and Ulmer (1984) have provided a detailed description of the full-fledged Type A behavior pattern, and it is not an appealing picture. These individuals display a deep insecurity, regardless of their achievements. They desire to dominate others, and typically are indifferent to the feelings of competitors. They exhibit a free-floating hostility,

and easily find things that irritate them. They also suffer from a sense of urgency about getting things done. Type A persons often engage in multitasking, such as reviewing correspondence while making a phone call. Almost beyond belief, one patient confessed to using two electric shavers, one for each hand (Friedman & Ulmer, 1984).

In other studies, researchers have found only a weak relationship—or no relationship at all—between Type A behavior and CHD (e.g., Eaker & Castelli, 1988; Smedslund & Rundmo, 1999). In the most comprehensive review of its kind, Myrtek (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 25 prospective studies of Type A behavior and CHD and concluded flatly that "Type A behavior is not an independent risk factor for CHD." Effect sizes in this review were not just small, they were effectively zero, on the order of .003. It did not matter whether structured interviews or questionnaires were used to assess Type A behavior. Myrtek (2007) also warns that the existence of the concept itself can be dangerous because it provides patients an "external causal attribution" and relieves them of the responsibility for behavior change. The Type A concept also gives false benefit to physicians when they work with CHD patients who lack the usual risk factors (smoking, poor diet, lack of exercise). Blaming Type A behavior is easier than admitting that the causes of CHD sometimes are unknown.

Other researchers have found that CHD is linked not so much with the full-blown Type A behavior pattern as with specific components such as being anger-prone (Dembroski, MacDougall, Williams, & Haney, 1985) or possessing time urgency (Wright, 1988). Wielgosz and Nolan (2000) identified hostility, cynicism, and suppression of anger, as well as stress, depression, and social isolation as significant risk factors in Type A behavior. Certainly there continues to be a need to sort out the specific risk factors in this area of investigation. What we do know with certainty is that the simple equation of Type A behavior causes CHD no longer is convincing.

Type A behavior can be diagnosed from a short interview consisting of questions about habits of working, talking, eating, reading, and thinking (Friedman, 1996). The more flagrant cases of Type A behavior can also be detected by paper-and-pencil tests (Jackson & Gray, 1987). However, the questionnaire approach is limited because it cannot reveal the facial, vocal, and psychomotor indices of hostility and time urgency that are usually evident in interview (Friedman & Ulmer, 1984).

Early studies indicated that persons who exhibited the Type A behavior pattern were at greatly increased risk of coronary disease and heart attack. In one 9-year study of more than 3,000 healthy men, persons with the Type A behavior pattern were 2½ times more likely to suffer heart attacks than those with Type B behavior pattern (Friedman & Ulmer, 1984). In fact, not one of the "pure" Type B's—the extremely relaxed, easygoing, and noncompetitive members of the study—had suffered a heart attack. In the famous Framingham longitudinal study, Type A men ages 55 to 64 were about twice as likely at 10-year follow-up to develop coronary heart disease as Type B men (Haynes, Feinleib, & Eaker, 1983). In this study, the link between Type A behavior and coronary heart disease (CHD) was especially strong for white-collar workers.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

Phenomenological theories of personality emphasize the importance of immediate, personal, subjective experience as a determinant of behavior. Some of the theoretical positions subsumed under this title have been given other labels also, such as humanistic theories, existential theories, construct theories, self-theories, and fulfillment theories (Maddi, 2000). Nonetheless, these approaches share a common focus on the person's subjective experience, personal world view, and self-concept as the major wellsprings of behavior.

Origins of the Phenomenological Approach

The orientation briefly reviewed in this section has numerous sources that reach back to turn-of-the-twentieth-century European philosophy and literature. Nonetheless, two persons, one a philosopher and the other a writer, stand out as seminal

contributors to the modern phenomenological viewpoint. The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) invented a complex philosophy of phenomenology that was concerned with the description of pure mental phenomena. Husserl's approach was heavily introspective and nearly inscrutable. More approachable was the Danish writer Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), well known for his contributions to existentialism. Existentialism is the literary and philosophical movement concerned with the meaning of life and an individual's freedom to choose personal goals. The phenomenology of Husserl and the existentialism of Kierkegaard influenced dozens of prominent philosophers and psychologists. Vestiges of these early viewpoints are evident in virtually every contemporary phenomenological personality theory (Maddi, 2000).

Carl Rogers, Self-Theory, and the Q-Technique

The most influential phenomenological theorist was Carl Rogers (1902–1987). His contributions to personality theory, known as self-theory, are extensive and generally well appreciated by students of psychology (Rogers, 1951, 1961, 1980). But it is also true, albeit little recognized, that Rogers helped shape a small part of psychological testing by popularizing the Q-technique.

The **Q-technique** is a procedure for studying changes in the self-concept, a key element in Rogers's self-theory. The technique was developed by Stephenson (1953) but a series of studies by Rogers and his colleagues served to popularize this measurement approach (Rogers & Dymond, 1954). Also known as a Q-sort, the Q-technique is a generalized procedure that is especially useful for studying changes in self-concept.[1] The Q-sort consists of a large number of cards, each containing a printed statement such as the following:

I am poised
I put on a false front
I make strong demands on myself
I am a submissive person
I am likeable

The examinee is asked to sort a hundred or so statements into nine piles, putting a prescribed number of cards into each, thus forcing a near-normal distribution. The instructions specify that the examinee put the cards most descriptive of him or her at one end, those least descriptive at the opposite end, and those about which he or she is indifferent or undecided around the middle of the distribution. The required distribution might look like this:

	Least Like Me							**Most Like Me**	
Pile No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
No. of cards	1	4	11	21	26	21	11	4	1

The nature of the items is determined by the needs of the researcher or practitioner. Rogers used a set of items devised by Butler and Haigh (Rogers & Dymond, 1954, chap. 4) to tap the self-concept. These statements were taken at random from available therapeutic protocols; their Q-sort items represented actual client statements, reworded for clarity. But a special virtue of the Q-technique is that other researchers or practitioners are free to craft their own items. For example, Marks and Seeman (1963) used a psychodynamic perspective in devising items for the therapist description of patient groups. Examples of their items include the following:

Utilizes acting out as a defense mechanism
Tends to be flippant in both word and gesture
Genotype has paranoid features
Appears to be poised, self-assured, socially at ease
Exhibits depression (manifest sad mood)

Scoring a Q-sort is usually a matter of comparing or correlating the distribution of items against an established norm. For example, well-adjusted

[1]The Q-technique has additional applications as well. Marks and Seeman (1963) employed Q-sorts by therapists to describe patients with specific MMPI profiles. Bem and Funder (1978) recommend a Q-sort to derive a profile of characteristics associated with successful performance of a specific task. Persons whose self-descriptions match the derived profile can be predicted to succeed at the selected task.

persons might be asked to sort the items so as to derive an average pile placement number (ranging from 1 to 9) for each item. An individual examinee would be considered more- or less-adjusted according to the resemblance between his or her sortings and the average sorting for adjusted persons. We will refer the reader to Block (1961, 2008) for details.

Another way to use the Q-sort is to compare an examinee's self-sort with his or her ideal sort. Rogers used the discrepancy between these two sortings as an index of adjustment. His subjects were required to sort the items twice, according to the following instructions:

1. *Self-sort.* Sort these cards to describe yourself as you see yourself today, from those that are least like you to those that are most like you.
2. *Ideal sort.* Now sort these cards to describe your ideal person—the person you would most like within yourself to be (Rogers & Dymond, 1954).

Using the item pile numbers, Rogers then correlated the two sorts for each subject separately. Consider what these data mean: If the self-sort and the ideal sort are highly similar, the correlation of Q-sort data will approach 1.0; if the two sorts are opposite one another, the correlation will approach −1.0. Of course, most sorts will be somewhere in between but typically on the positive side. Butler and Haigh found that psychotherapy clients increased their congruence between self and ideal (Rogers & Dymond, 1954, chap. 4). Even so, adjusted control subjects possessed a greater congruence.

BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL LEARNING THEORIES

Behavioral and social learning theories have their origins in laboratory studies on operant learning and classical conditioning. A fundamental assumption of all behavioral theorists is that many of the behaviors that make up personality are learned. To understand personality, then, we must know about the learning history of the individual. Behavioral theorists also believe that the environment is of supreme importance in shaping and maintaining behavior. Behavioral inquiry, therefore, seeks to identify the specific components of the current environment that are controlling a person's behavior. The behavioral approach to personality has produced a variety of direct assessment methods, which we discuss in the next chapter.

Behavioral theorists disagree mainly on the role that cognitions play in determining behavior. *Cognitions* are inferred mental processes such as problem solving, judging, or reasoning. Radical behaviorists believe that resorting to mentalistic explanations of any kind is futile: "When what a person does is attributed to what is going on inside him, investigation is brought to an end" (Skinner, 1974). By contrast, social learning theorists make cautious reference to cognitions in explaining what it is, specifically, that a person learns. A social learning theorist might argue that we learn expectations or rules about the environment, not just stimulus and response connections.

Modern social learning theory can be viewed as a cognitive variant of the strict behaviorism that was dominant in U.S. psychology early in the twentieth century. Social learning theorists accept the Skinnerian premise that external reinforcement is an important determinant of behavior. But they also maintain that cognitions have a critical influence on our actions as well. For example, Rotter (1972) has popularized the view that our expectations about future outcomes are the primary determinants of behavior. The probability that a person will behave self-assertively, for example, depends on his or her expectations about the likely results of self-assertiveness. If the expected outcome is valued by the person, the behavior is more likely. Of course, expectations are a function of the person's history of reinforcement, so Rotter's social learning perspective is similar to the behavioral viewpoint. But the implication of social learning theory is that behavior is the result of a belief, in particular, a belief that the behavior will result in a desired outcome. Thus, cognitions are assumed to affect actions.

Based on his social learning views, Rotter (1966) developed the Internal-External (I-E) Scale, an interesting measure of internal versus external locus of control. The construct of **locus of control** refers to the perceptions that individuals have about the source of things that happen to them. In particular, the I-E Scale seeks to assess the examinee's generalized expectancies for internal versus

external control of reinforcement. The purpose of the I-E Scale is to determine the extent to which the examinee believes that reinforcement is contingent upon his or her behavior (internal locus of control) as opposed to the outside world (external locus of control). The instrument is a forced-choice self-report inventory. For each item, the examinee chooses the single statement (from a pair) with which he or she more strongly concurs. Items resemble the following:

> In general, most people get the respect they deserve.
>
> OR
>
> In reality, a person's worth often passes unrecognized.

For the preceding item, the first alternative indicates an internal locus of control, whereas the second alternative signifies an external locus of control. The balance of internal to external responses determines the overall score on the scale. The I-E Scale is a reliable and valid instrument that has stimulated a huge body of research on the nature and meaning of locus of control and related variables. Research indicates that locus of control has a strong relationship to occupational success, physical health, academic achievement, and numerous other variables. As the reader might suspect, an internal locus of control generally predicts a more positive outcome than an external locus of control. The interested reader can consult Lefcourt (1991) for further details.

Important contributions to social learning theory have also been made by Albert Bandura. In his early studies, Bandura examined the role of observational learning and vicarious reinforcement in the development of behavior (Bandura, 1965, 1971; Bandura & Walters, 1963). More recently, he has proposed that perceived self-efficacy is a central mechanism in human action (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Taylor, Ewart, Miller, & DeBusk, 1985). **Self-efficacy** is a personal judgment of "how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations" (Bandura, 1982). The concept of self-efficacy is useful in explaining why correct knowledge does not necessarily predict efficient action. For example, two boys may be equally convinced that a garden snake in the bathtub presents no hazard, but one will pick it up while the other runs out the door. These differences in behavior illustrate the role of self-referential thought as a mediator between knowledge and action. The boy who ran out the door did not believe he could deal with the situation effectively. He had little perceived self-efficacy for snake handling. Bandura would argue that the primary determinant of the boy's behavior is a self-judgment about personal capabilities. Cognitions are, therefore, assumed to be a major determinant of behavior.

Bandura (1997, 2006) has developed an appealing approach to the assessment of self-efficacy expectations outlined below. But he warns against the idea that there can be one all-purpose measure of perceived self-efficacy:

> One cannot be all things, which would require mastery of every realm of human life. People differ in the areas in which they cultivate their efficacy and in the levels to which they develop it even within their given pursuits. For example, a business executive may have a high sense of organizational efficacy but low parenting efficacy. Thus, the efficacy belief system is not a global trait but a differentiated set of self-beliefs linked to distinct realms of functioning (Bandura, 2006, p. 307).

As a consequence, scales of self-efficacy need to be adapted to the particular domain of functioning of interest to the practitioner or researcher.

Fortunately, Bandura (2006) has outlined a strategy for developing self-efficacy scales. The starting point is a simple rating format, which resembles the following hypothetical example of a scale that school administrators might use with teachers to gauge classroom self-efficacy:

Classroom Questionnaire: We are interested in the areas of challenge that teachers face in the classroom. Your answers will not be disclosed to others. Please rate your degree of confidence for doing the things below using this scale:

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Can't Do			Mildly Uncertain			Moderately Certain			Completely Certain	

Confidence: (0 to 100)

Maintain control of the classroom when lecturing _____

Keep students on track during hard assignments _____

Deal with individuals who keep talking out of turn _____

Teach students who don't want to be in class _____

Teach students who have no parental support _____

Motivate students who resist doing homework _____

Keep the brightest students interested in class _____

This is a only a preliminary and generic example. A complete scale would be longer and would undergo a few iterative cycles of revision before final draft. In a recent and helpful chapter, Bandura (2006) also gives advice on how to construct the best self-efficacy scales, starting with issues of content validity, response bias, item analysis, and ending with strategies for validation of scales. Yet, regardless of their psychometric excellence, self-efficacy scales need to be practical. They should be judged by the extent to which, ultimately, they enable people to fulfill desired personal and social transformations (Bandura, 2006).

TRAIT CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONALITY

A **trait** is any "relatively enduring way in which one individual differs from another" (Guilford, 1959). Psychologists developed the concept of trait from the ways people describe other people in everyday life. As language evolved, people found words to portray the consistencies and differences they encountered in their daily interactions with others. Thus, when we say one person is sociable and another is shy we are using trait names to describe consistencies within individuals and also differences between them (Goldberg, 1981a; Fiske, 1986).

Trait conceptions of personality have been enormously popular throughout the history of psychological testing, so the coverage here is necessarily selective. We will review two prominent and influential positions from the dozens of trait theories that have been proposed. These approaches differ primarily in terms of whether traits are split off into finely discriminable variants or grouped together into a small number of broad dimensions:

1. Cattell's factor-analytic viewpoint identifies 16 to 20 bipolar trait dimensions.
2. Eysenck's trait-dimensional approach coalesces dozens of traits into two overriding dimensions.
3. Goldberg and others have sought a modern synthesis of all trait approaches by proposing a five-factor model of personality.

For readers who desire a more detailed discussion of this topic, Pervin (1993) and Wiggins (1997) provide an excellent review of trait approaches to personality theory.

Cattell's Factor-Analytic Trait Theory

Cattell (1950, 1973) refined existing methods of factor analysis to help reveal the basic traits of personality. He referred to the more obvious aspects of personality as **surface traits**. These would typically emerge in the first stages of factor analysis when individual test items were correlated with each other. For example, true–false items such as "I enjoy a good prize fight," "Getting stuck behind a slow driver really bothers me," and "It's important to let people know who is in charge" might be answered similarly by subjects, revealing a surface trait of aggressiveness.

But surface traits themselves tended to come in clusters, as revealed by Cattell's more sophisticated application of factor analysis. For Cattell, this was evidence of the existence of **source traits**, the stable and constant sources of behavior. Source traits are, therefore, less visible than surface traits but are more important in accounting for behavior.

Cattell (1950) was unrivaled in his use of factor analysis to discover how traits were organized and how they were related to each other. One approach was to have persons rate others they knew well by checking various adjectives such as *aggressive, thoughtful,* and *dominating* from a list of 171 choices. When the results from 208 subjects were subsequently factor analyzed, about 20 underlying personality factors or traits were tentatively identified. Another approach was to have thousands of

persons answer questions about themselves and then factor-analyze their responses. Sixteen of the original 20 personality traits were independently confirmed by this second approach (Cattell, 1973). These 16 source traits have been incorporated into the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), a trait-based paper-and-pencil test of personality that is discussed in the next chapter.

The Five-Factor Model of Personality

The five-factor model of personality has its origins in a review chapter by Goldberg (1981b). In his analysis of factor-analytic trait research, Goldberg identified several consistencies, which he referred to as the "Big Five" dimensions. Although researchers have used slightly different terms for these factors, the most common labels are

Neuroticism
Extraversion
Openness to Experience
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness

Rearranging the factors yields a simple acronym: OCEAN. The five-factor model is rapidly becoming theconsensus model of personality. Support for the five-factor approach comes from several sources, including factor analysis of trait terms in language and the analysis of personality from an evolutionary perspective. We discuss these perspectives in the following.

The use of trait terms in the analysis of personality is based upon the **fundamental lexical hypothesis**. The essential point of this hypothesis is that trait terms have survived in language because they convey important information about our dealings with others:

> The variety of individual differences is nearly boundless, yet most of these differences are insignificant in people's daily interactions with others and have remained largely unnoticed. Sir Francis Galton may have been among the first scientists to recognize explicitly the fundamental lexical hypothesis—namely that the most important individual differences in human transactions will come to be encoded as single terms in some or all of the world's languages. (Goldberg, 1990)

When trait terms in English are distilled down to a reasonably distinct and nonoverlapping set of adjectives, a few hundred characteristics typically emerge (Allport, 1937). For decades, researchers have been asking individuals to rate themselves or others on these or similar traits. When these ratings are subjected to factor analysis, the "Big Five" dimensions previously listed usually appear in one guise or another. In sum, a mounting body of research indicates that the five-factor model captures a valid and useful representation of the structure of human traits.

The five-factor approach also possesses evolutionary plausibility. Specifically, the five factors of personality previously listed capture individual differences that relate to such basic evolutionary functions as survival and reproductive success (Buss, 1997; Pervin, 1993). Goldberg (1981b) has theorized that people implicitly ask the following questions in their interactions with others:

1. Is X active and dominant or passive and submissive? (Can I bully X or will X try to bully me?)
2. Is X agreeable (warm and pleasant) or disagreeable (cold and distant)?
3. Can I count on X? (Is X responsible and conscientious or undependable and negligent?)
4. Is X crazy (unpredictable) or sane (stable)?
5. Is X smart or dumb? (How easy will it be for me to teach X?)

Directly or indirectly, each of these evaluations has a bearing on survival and reproductive success. For example, point 3 (conscientiousness) involves a trait that might ensure group survival in a hostile world. A person low on this trait (undependable) would be a poor choice for guarding the food supply. The ability to discern conscientiousness in others therefore has adaptive value. Not surprisingly, the five points previously listed correspond to the five-factor personality model.

The five-factor model of personality has inspired several personality scales and other systems for assessment (deRaad & Perugini, 2002). For example, Costa and McCrae have developed

two personality tests based on the five-factor model (Costa, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1987). The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) contains 240 items rated on a five-point scale. In addition to the five major domains of personality, the inventory measures six specific traits (called facets) within each domain. A shortened 60-item version known as the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) also is available. Trull, Widiger, Useda, and others (1998) have published a semistructured interview for the assessment of the five-factor model of personality. These tests are discussed in the next chapter.

Comment on the Trait Concept

All trait approaches to personality share certain problems in common. First, there is disagreement whether traits cause behavior or merely describe behavior (Fiske, 1986). It can be persuasively argued that invoking traits as causes is an empty form of circular reasoning. For example, a person with extremely high standards might be said to possess the trait of perfectionism. But when asked to explain what is meant by perfectionism, we invariably end up referring to a pattern of extremely high standards. Thus, when we assert that someone is perfectionistic, are we really doing anything more than providing a short-hand description of their past behavior? Miller (1991) has voiced this criticism of the five-factor approach, noting that the model merely describes psychopathology but does not explain it.

A second problem with traits is their apparently low predictive validity. Mischel (1968) is credited with the first effective disparagement of the trait concept in his influential book *Personality and Assessment*. He stated that "while trait theory predicts behavioral consistency, it is behavior inconsistency that is typically observed" (Mischel, 1968). In a wide-ranging review of existing research, Mischel noted that trait scales produced validity coefficients with an upper limit of $r = .30$. He coined the term **personality coefficient** to describe these low correlations. Undoubtedly significant for large samples of subjects, correlations of $r = .30$ are of minimal value in the prediction of individual behavior.

Trait researchers responded to Mischel's attack by refining and limiting the trait concept. Researchers sought to identify subgroups of persons whose behavior could be accurately predicted on the basis of trait scores and also attempted to distinguish the kinds of situations in which behavior is largely determined by traits (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002; Wasylkiw & Fekken, 2002). These efforts met with modest success, raising the validity of some trait questionnaires—in some contexts with some persons—substantially beyond the ominous $r = .30$ barrier posited by Mischel (1968). But gone forever are the days of simplistic, generalized assertions such as "trait X predicts behavior Y."

THE PROJECTIVE HYPOTHESIS

Frank (1939, 1948) introduced the term *projective method* to describe a category of tests for studying personality with unstructured stimuli. In a **projective test** the examinee encounters vague, ambiguous stimuli and responds with his or her own constructions. Disciples of projective testing are heavily vested in psychoanalytic theory and its postulation of unconscious aspects of personality. These examiners believe that unstructured, vague, ambiguous stimuli provide the ideal circumstance for revelations about inner aspects of personality. The central assumption of projective testing is that responses to the test represent projections from the innermost unconscious mental processes of the examinee. We introduce this topic with some preliminary concepts and distinctions relevant to projective testing.

The assumption that personal interpretations of ambiguous stimuli must necessarily reflect the unconscious needs, motives, and conflicts of the examinee is known as the **projective hypothesis**. Frank (1939) is generally credited with popularizing the projective hypothesis:

> When we scrutinize the actual procedures that may be called projective methods we find a wide variety of techniques and materials being employed for the same general purpose, to obtain from the subject, "what he cannot or will not say," frequently because he does not know himself and is not aware what he is revealing about himself through his projections.

The challenge of projective testing is to decipher underlying personality processes (needs, motives, and conflicts) based on the individualized,

unique, subjective responses of each examinee. In the sections that follow we will examine how well projective tests have met this portentous assignment.

A Classification of Projective Techniques

Lindzey (1959) has offered a classification of projective techniques that we will follow here. Based on the response required, he divided projectives into five categories:

- Association to inkblots or words
- Construction of stories or sequences
- Completions of sentences or stories
- Arrangement/selection of pictures or verbal choices
- Expression with drawings or play

Association techniques include the widely used Rorschach inkblot test and its psychometrically superior cousin the Holtzman Inkblot Technique, as well as word association tests. Construction techniques include the Thematic Apperception Test and the many variations upon this early instrument. Completion techniques consist mainly of sentence completion tests, discussed later. Arrangement/selection procedures such as the Szondi test (discussed in the first chapter) are currently seldom used. Finally, expression techniques such as the Draw-A-Person or House-Tree-Person test are very popular among clinicians in spite of dubious validity data.

We will review prominent techniques within each category except the antiquated arrangement/selection approaches, which are almost never used. However, the literature on major projective techniques is simply overwhelming, running to perhaps tens of thousands of articles on the Rorschach alone. We can suggest major trends in the research, but the reader will need to consult other sources for comprehensive reviews.

ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES

The Rorschach

The Rorschach consists of 10 inkblots devised by Herman Rorschach (1884–1922) in the early 1900s. He formed the inkblots by dribbling ink on a sheet of paper and folding the paper in half, producing relatively symmetrical bilateral designs. Five

FIGURE 8.1 An Inkblot Similar to Those Found on the Rorschach

of the inkblots are black or shades of gray, while five contain color; each is displayed on a white background. An inkblot of the type employed by Rorschach is shown in Figure 8.1. The Rorschach is suited to persons age 5 and up but is most commonly used with adults.

Regrettably, Rorschach died before he could complete his scoring methods, so the systematization of Rorschach scoring was left to his followers. Five American psychologists produced overlapping but independent approaches to the test—Samuel Beck, Marguerite Hertz, Bruno Klopfer, Zygmunt Piotrowski, and David Rapaport (Erdberg, 1985). Predictably, the nuances of scoring varied from one scoring method to another. Beginning in the 1990s, John Exner and his colleagues began to codify and synthesize the scoring approaches into a single method known as the Rorschach Comprehensive System (Exner, 1991, 1993; Exner & Weiner, 1994). The Comprehensive System (CS) supplanted all previous methods and became the preferred scoring system because it was more clearly grounded in empirical research. Even so, reservations about the Rorschach in general and the CS in particular persisted in the trade (Lilienfield, Wood, & Garb, 2000, 2001).

Beginning in about 2010, a new system for administration, scoring, and interpretation of the Rorschach emerged as the clear choice for practitioners. The Rorschach Performance Assessment System (R-PAS) represents an extension and improvement of the CS (Meyer, Viglione, Mihura, Erard, & Erdberg, 2011). Erard (2012) provides a succinct summary of its appeal:

> Despite its recent formal introduction to the professional assessment community, R-PAS takes advantage of decades of research in peer reviewed publications (including the insights of Rorschach critics) and builds on established validity and general acceptance for most of its procedures and features (p. 122).

In using the R-PAS, the examiner first establishes rapport and then sits to the side of the client or patient to minimize body language communication. For each card, the examiner asks the respondent to look at the stimulus and to answer "What might this be?" Before the test, the examiner asks for "two, maybe three responses" per card. During the test, if only one reply is given, the examiner prompts for additional response(s), and pulls the card after four responses are provided. This is called response optimization, which elicits a typical range of 18 to 28 responses. This technique greatly reduces short and long records (protocols with upwards of 100 responses have been encountered), which affords a better fit with norms. The R-PAS incorporates several laudable improvements (www.r-pas.org):

- Evidence-based selection of scoring variables
- Detailed guidelines for test administration
- Methods to optimize the number of responses
- Guidelines for clarifying coding uncertainties
- Normative reference values for international samples
- Form quality tables for accuracy and conventionality
- Inexpensive scoring with a web-based program
- Easy-to-read graphs with standard scores
- Translations into several languages

Once the test is administered and the responses recorded, scoring begins. This is an intricate process that requires significant training. We can only refer to highlights here. Responses are scored for a number of variables such as location, content, form quality, thought processes, and determinants. Determinants are different aspects of the blot such as color, shading, and form, which appear to have influenced examinee responses (Table 8.2).

Interrater reliability of R-PAS scores is excellent. Using a diverse sample of 50 Rorschach records randomly selected from ongoing research, the median intraclass correlation coefficient (an index of agreement between raters) for 60 variables was .92 (Viglione, Blume-Marcovici, Miller, Giromini, & Meyer, 2012). Another useful feature of this new approach to Rorschach scoring is the availability of an international reference sample for standardization of scoring variables. This sample of 1,396 protocols was obtained from 15 nations, including Australia, Brazil, Japan, Israel, and Spain—just to give a sense of the global distribution.

The validity of the Rorschach as scored with the R-PAS (or any other scoring system) is difficult to summarize in any simple manner. Individual studies indicate good validity for some purposes, but limited validity for other applications. For example, with the R-PAS, Complexity scores were correlated with functional capacity ($r = .30$) and social skills capacity ($r = .34$) in a sample of 72 middle-aged and older outpatients with schizophrenia (Moore, Viglione, Rosenfarb, Patterson, & Mausbach, 2012). Psychological complexity, as measured by the Complexity score, assesses the mental effort, intricacy, and integration evident in responses, with higher scores indicating better coping skills. Thus, it makes theoretical and empirical sense that psychological complexity would show positive correlations with functional and social capacities. These results support the validity of this Rorschach variable.

Once the entire protocol has been coded, the examiner computes a number of summary scores that form the primary basis for hypothesizing about the personality of the examinee. For example, the F+ percent is the proportion of the total responses that uses pure form as a determinant. A voluminous literature exists on the meaning of this index, but it seems safe to hypothesize that when the F+ percentage falls below 70 percent, the examiner should consider the possibility

TABLE 8.2 Summary of Major Rorschach Scoring Criteria

Location: Where on the blot was the percept located?		
W	Whole	Entire inkblot used
D	Common detail	Well-defined part used
Dd	Unusual detail	Unusual part used
White Space: Was white space used in the response?		
SR	Space reversal	White space as the figure
SI	Space integration	White space integrated in percept
Content: What is seen, and is it synthesized or vague?		
H	Human	Percept of a whole human form
Hd	Human detail	Human form incomplete in any way
Ex	Explosion	An actual explosion
Sy	Synthesis	Objects are meaningfully related
Vg	Vagueness	Objects in the percept are vague
2	Pair	Two identical, mirror-image percepts
Form Quality: How well does the percept fit the blot?		
o	Ordinary	Obvious and easily seen
u	Unusual	Unusual but still a good fit
—	Minus	Distorted and unrealistic percept
P	Popular	Designated high frequency percept
Determinants: What feature of the blot determined the response?		
M	Movement	Movement seen or implied in percept
C	Color	Color helped determine the response
F	Form	Form a major determinant of percept
T	Texture	Shading involved in the response
Thought Processes: Are there issues with thought processes or themes?		
DV1	Deviant Verbalization-1	Odd or unusual verbalization
DV2	Deviant Verbalization-2	Clearly bizarre verbalization
MOR	Morbid	Response has a clearly dysphoric tone

Note: This list is incomplete and illustrative only. The full scoring system is complex and allows for blends. For example, the determinant FC means that both form and color were used to determine the percept, but form was more important than color.

Source: Based on Exner (1993) and Meyer et al. (2011).

of severe psychopathology, brain impairment, or intellectual deficit in the examinee (Exner, 1993). The F+ percent is also considered to be an index of ego strength, with higher scores indicating a greater capacity to deal effectively with stress. Meyer and Eblin (2012) discuss R-PAS variables and composites.

Frank (1990) has emphasized that formal scoring of the Rorschach is insufficient for some

purposes such as the diagnosis of schizophrenia. He stresses that an analysis of the patient's thinking for the presence of highly personal, illogical, and bizarre associations to the blots is essential for psychodiagnosis. In his approach, the Rorschach is really an adjunct to the interview, and not a test per se.

Bornstein and Masling (2005) have reminded us that neither the CS nor the R-PAS should be confused with being "the Rorschach." After all, there are many other helpful and validated approaches to scoring the test. Their book, *Scoring the Rorschach: Seven Validated Systems* (2005), is a wonderful compendium of alternative scoring systems that can be used to answer specialized assessment questions. A case in point is the Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale (RPRS; Handler & Clemence, 2005), a promising and validated system for predicting who will be successful in psychotherapy and who will not. Scoring the RPRS is complex and consists of assigning or subtracting points for various categories of clearly defined responses. For example, a positive score is given if a response depicts a human as dancing, running, talking, or pointing, whereas a score of zero is coded if humans are seen as sleeping, lying down, sitting, or balancing. The meaningful use of color in the response also contributes to a positive score, whereas using color to depict explosions or diseases results in points being subtracted. Several categories are scored, yielding a total score that ranges from −12 to +17. The following interpretations are then assigned to different ranges of the RPRS score:

17 to 13:	The person is almost able to help himself. A very promising case that just needs a little help.
12 to 7:	Not quite so capable as the previous case to work out his problems himself but with some help is likely to do pretty well.
6 to 2:	Better than 50–50 chance; any treatment will be of some help.
1 to −2:	50–50 chance.
−3 to −6:	A difficult case that may be helped somewhat but is generally a poor treatment prospect.
−7 to −12:	A hopeless case. (Handler & Clemence, 2005, p. 54)

Meyer and Handler (1997) used meta-analysis to synthesize the results of 18 validity studies of the RPRS, comprising a total sample of 752 participants. Their results translated to a 78 percent success rate in psychotherapy for clients with high scores on the RPRS, but only a 22 percent success rate for clients with low scores on the scale. The RPRS is a promising scale that should receive wider use in clinical practice.

Another useful scoring system for the Rorschach is the Thought Disorder Index (TDI), which assesses formal thought disorder (Holtzman, Levy, & Johnston, 2005). Thought disorder exists on a continuum from mild slippage to bizarre disorganization and is especially characteristic of patients with schizophrenia. Thus, the assessment of thought disorder is pivotal in the diagnosis and treatment of individuals with schizophrenia or other serious mental illness.

The following examples of thought disorder are from Holzman et al. (2005). Mild examples would include clients with peculiar language that employs stilted, inappropriate, or odd expressions. For example, in responding to the Rorschach, a patient with mild thought disorder might use expressions such as "He's organizing in his organs" or "There's a segregation between mouth and nose" or "Red is trouble, and Africa being red symbolizes that maybe the origin of man was in Africa and that's why it looks red." As thought disorder becomes more prominent, Rorschach responses reveal increasingly queer and confused qualities. The patient might describe portions of the blot as being "A foxed comic dog" or "The adhesive adjunctive extensions" or "These are the posterior pronunciations." Extreme examples of thought disorder show an incoherent quality such as "Blood, and break their neck, you know, reject" or the invention of words, for example, "The property is more closely centulated to the trailroads."

The TDI is calculated by scoring each response for the severity level of thought disorder from none to extreme, with possible scores of 0, .25, .50, .75, and 1.0. Then the average score is computed across all responses. This number is multiplied by 100 to yield the final score on a range from 0 to 100. Thus, an overall score of 0 would mean that not one response revealed any thought disorder, whereas a score of 100 would signify that, without exception, every response was highly bizarre and disorganized.

The reliability of the TDI is reasonably good, with split-half correlations around .80 and interrater reliability coefficients of .90 and higher. Validity has been supported from a number of directions, such as huge improvements in scores when patients with schizophrenia are tested before and after comprehensive interventions including drug therapies (Holtzman et al., 2005). Mastering the TDI scoring criteria is far easier than learning the Comprehensive System. Insofar as the TDI provides valuable information about the extent of thought disorder—one of the foremost reasons that practitioners use the Rorschach—we can expect to see increased reliance on this approach to test scoring.

Space does not permit us to summarize validated scoring systems. These scales are derived largely from psychoanalytic theory and include an index of object relations, a measure of oral dependency, barrier and penetration indices based on body image, a measure of primary process thinking, and a scale that assesses primitive psychological defenses (Bornstein & Masling, 2005).

Comment on the Rorschach

The Rorschach has provoked more controversy in the field of assessment than any other personality test or instrument. Opinions tend to be polarized, and both proponents and detractors cite studies and analyses to support their case. For example, critics of the test refer to a fascinating study by Albert, Fox, and Kahn (1980) on the susceptibility of the Rorschach to faking. We remind the reader that literally thousands of Rorschach research studies have been published. In fact, a search of PsychINFO using the key title word Rorschach yielded 5,324 articles dating back to 1925 (the test was published in 1921). The majority of these studies are positive in tone. But the skeptical results reported by Albert, Fox, and Kahn (1980) are not isolated. They submitted the Rorschach protocols of 24 persons to a panel of experts, asking for psychiatric diagnoses of each examinee. The 24 Rorschach protocols consisted of results from four groups of six persons each:

- Mental hospital patients with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia
- Uninformed fakers given instructions to fake the responses of a paranoid schizophrenic
- Informed fakers who listened to a detailed audiotape about paranoid schizophrenia
- Normal controls who took the test under standard instructions

The uninformed fakers, informed fakers, and normal controls were students who had passed an MMPI screening and were judged reasonably normal during interview. Each protocol was rated by six to nine judges, all fellows of the Society for Personality Assessment. The judges were told to provide a psychiatric diagnosis as well as other information not reported here. The judges were not informed as to the purpose of the study but were told to assess whether any profiles appeared to be malingered.

The informed fakers must have done an excellent job, for they were more likely to be diagnosed psychotic than the real patients themselves (72 percent versus 48 percent, respectively). The uninformed fakers were fairly convincing, too, with a 46 percent rate of diagnosed psychosis. The normal controls were diagnosed as psychotic 24 percent of the time. Granted that the diagnostic challenge in this study was immense, it is still disturbing to find that the expert judges rated 24 percent of the normal protocols as psychotic, while correctly identifying psychosis in only 48 percent of the actual psychotic protocols. A more recent study by Netter and Viglione (1994) also concluded that the Rorschach was susceptible to the faking of psychosis.

In general, critics portray the test as possessing low reliability and a general lack of predictive validity (Carlson, Kula, & St. Laurent, 1997; Wood, Nezworski, & Stejskal, 1996; Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000). In their meta-analytic review, Garb, Florio, and Grove (1998) concluded that the Rorschach explained a dismal 8 to 13 percent of the variance in client characteristics, as compared to the MMPI, which explained 23 to 30 percent of the variance.

Supporters of the test cite improvements in scoring offered by the R-PAS approach and are more optimistic in their outlook (Meyer & Eblin, 2012). A recent study by McGrath, Pogge, Stokes, and others (2005) found that the Rorschach could be scored with respectable reliability, even in the less controlled conditions typical of real-world testing. This was an important finding because virtually all prior

studies of reliability have been conducted in research settings. In response to the ongoing controversy, the prestigious *Society for Personality Assessment* requisitioned external reviews by an independent panel of "blue ribbon" experts, who concluded that the Rorschach possesses reliability and validity similar to other accepted tests like the MMPI-2. The trustees of the society assert that the continued use of the Rorschach, therefore, is appropriate and justified (Board of Trustees for the Society for Personality Assessment, 2005).

The controversy over the Rorschach probably will subside for awhile, but it is not likely to disappear entirely. Even if the test continues to prevail because of studies supporting the reliability of scoring and the validity of inferences, there are other concerns seldom mentioned by skeptics. One liability is that learning the scoring system is an arduous and time consuming task that requires dozens of hours of practice and years of supervised experience. Some doctoral programs offer an entire course (or two) on the Rorschach, and this is just the beginning of the training needed. A second problem is that administering and scoring the Rorschach requires a few hours of professional time from a licensed psychologist. This time is a precious and expensive commodity. Someone has to pay for it. These practical issues are daunting. In regard to learning the test in the first place, and devoting the time to administer and score it in the second place, many clinical training directors and practitioners (and not a few insurance companies) are asking "Is it worth it?"

COMPLETION TECHNIQUES

Sentence Completion Tests

In a sentence completion test, the respondent is presented with a series of stems consisting of the first few words of a sentence, and the task is to provide an ending. As with any projective technique, the examiner assumes that the completed sentences reflect the underlying motivations, attitudes, conflicts, and fears of the respondent. Usually, sentence completion tests can be interpreted in two different ways: subjective-intuitive analysis of the underlying motivations projected in the subject's responses, or objective analysis by means of scores assigned to each completed sentence.

An example of a sentence completion test is shown in Figure 8.2. This test is quite similar to existing instruments in that the stems are very short and restricted to a small number of basic themes. The reader will notice that three topics reoccur in this short test (the respondent's self-concept, mother, and father). In this manner the examinee has multiple opportunities to reveal underlying motivations about each topic. Of course, most sentence completion tests are much longer—anywhere from 40 to 100 stems—and contain more themes—anywhere from 4 to 15 topics.

Dozens of sentence completion tests have been developed; most are unpublished and unstandardized instruments produced to meet a specific clinical need. Some representative sentence completion tests in current use are outlined in Table 8.3. Of these

Directions: Finish these sentences to indicate how you feel.

1. My best characteristic is _____
2. My mother _____
3. My father _____
4. My greatest fear is _____
5. The best thing about my mother was _____
6. The best thing about my father was _____
7. I am proudest about _____
8. I only wish my mother had _____
9. I only wish my father had _____

FIGURE 8.2 Example of a Short Sentence Completion Test

TABLE 8.3 Brief Outline of Representative Sentence Completion Tests

Sentence Completion Series Psychological Assessment Resources

The SCS consists of 50 sentence stems designed to aid the clinician in identifying underlying concerns and specific areas of client distress. A unique feature of this instrument is the publication of eight different forms, parallel in content, which allow for repeated testing.

Forer Structured Sentence Completion Test Western Psychological Services

This instrument is available in separate forms for men, women, adolescent boys, and adolescent girls. Each form contains 100 sentence stems designed to cover attitude–value systems, evasiveness, and defense mechanisms.

Geriatric Sentence Completion Form Psychological Assessment Resources

The GSCF is a 30-item form specifically developed for use with older adult clients. The GSCF elicits personal responses to four content domains: physical, psychological, social, and temporal orientation. The test manual includes a number of clinical case illustrations.

Washington University Sentence Completion Test, Privately published by Loevinger

The WUSC uses separate forms for men, women, and younger male and female subjects. This test is highly theory-bound; responses are classified according to seven stages of ego development: presocial and symbiotic, impulsive, self-protective, conformist, conscientious, autonomous, integrated.

instruments, Loevinger's Washington University Sentence Completion Test is the most sophisticated and theory-bound (e.g., Weiss, Zilberg, & Genevro, 1989). However, the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank has the strongest empirical underpinnings and is the most widely used in clinical settings. We examine this instrument in more detail.

Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank

The Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank (RISB) consists of three similar forms—high school, college, and adult—each containing 40 sentence stems written mostly in the first person (Rotter & Rafferty, 1950; Rotter, Lah, & Rafferty, 1992). Although the test can be subjectively interpreted in the usual manner through qualitative analysis of needs projected in the subject's responses, it is the objective and quantitative scoring of the RISB that has drawn the most attention.

In the objective scoring system each completed sentence receives an adjustment score from 0 (good adjustment) to 6 (very poor adjustment). These scores are based initially on the categorizing of each response as follows:

- *Omission*—no response or response too short to be meaningful
- *Conflict response*—indicative of hostility or unhappiness
- *Positive response*—indicative of positive or hopeful attitude
- *Neutral response*—declarative statement with neither positive nor negative affect

Examples of the last three categories include:

I hate . . . the entire world. (conflict response)

The best . . . is yet to come. (positive response)

Most girls . . . are women. (neutral response)

Conflict responses are scored 4, 5, or 6, from lowest to highest degree of the conflict expressed. Positive responses are scored 2, 1, or 0, from least to most positive response. Neutral responses and omissions receive no score. The manual gives examples of each scoring category. The overall adjustment score is obtained by adding the weighted ratings in the conflict and positive categories. The adjustment score can vary from 0 to 240, with higher scores indicating greater maladjustment.

The reliability of the adjustment score is exceptionally good, even when derived by assistants with minimal psychological expertise. Typically, interscorer reliabilities are in the .90s and split-half coefficients are in the .80s (Rotter et al., 1992; Rotter, Rafferty, & Schachtitz, 1965). The validity of this index has been investigated in numerous studies using the RISB as a screening device with a "maladjustment" cutoff score. For example, a cutoff score of 135 has been found to correctly screen delinquent

youths 60 percent of the time while identifying nondelinquent youths correctly 73 percent of the time (Fuller, Parmelee, & Carroll, 1982). The same cutoff identifies heavy drug users 80 to 100 percent of the time (Gardner, 1967). These and similar findings support the construct validity of the adjustment index but also indicate that classification rates are much lower than needed for individual decision making or effective screening. It also appears that the norms for the adjustment index are outdated. Lah and Rotter (1981) found that student scores differ significantly from those obtained in the original study by Rotter and Rafferty (1950). Lah (1989) and Rotter et al. (1992) provide new normative, scoring, and validity data for the RISB.

As discussed by P. Goldberg (1965), the simplicity of the single adjustment score is both the test's strength and weakness. True, the test provides a quick and efficient method for obtaining an overall index of how respondents are functioning on a day-to-day basis. However, a single score cannot possibly capture any nuances of personality functioning. In addition, the RISB is subject to the same types of bias as other self-report measures, namely, the information will reflect mainly what the respondent wants the examiner to know.

CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)

The TAT consists of 30 pictures that portray a variety of subject matters and themes in black-and-white drawings and photographs; one card is blank. Most of the cards depict one or more persons engaged in ambiguous activities. Some cards are used for adult males (M), adult females (F), boys (B), or girls (G), or some combination (e.g., BM). As a consequence, exactly 20 cards are appropriate for every examinee.

A picture similar to those on the TAT is shown in Figure 8.3. In administering the TAT, the examiner requests the examinee to make up a dramatic story for each picture, telling what led up to the current scene, what is happening at the moment, how the characters are thinking and feeling, and what the outcome will be. The examiner writes down the story verbatim for later scoring and analysis.

FIGURE 8.3 **A Picture Similar to Those on the Thematic Apperception Test**

The TAT was developed by Henry Murray and his colleagues at the Harvard Psychological Clinic (Morgan & Murray, 1935; Murray, 1938). The test was originally designed to assess constructs such as needs and press, elements central to Murray's personality theory. According to Murray, needs organize perception, thought, and action and energize behavior in the direction of their satisfaction. Examples of needs include the needs for achievement, affiliation, and dominance. In contrast, press refers to the power of environmental events to influence a person. Alpha press is objective or "real" external forces, whereas beta press concerns the subjective or perceived components of external forces. Murray (1938, 1943) developed an elaborate TAT scoring system for measuring 36 different needs and various aspects of press, as revealed by the examinee's stories.

Almost as soon as Murray released the TAT, other clinicians began to develop alternative scoring systems (e.g.,Dana, 1959; Tomkins, 1947). Literature on the administration, scoring, and interpretation of the TAT burgeoned extensively, as documented by reviews (Aiken, 1989, chap. 12; Groth-Marnat, 1997; Weiner & Kuehnle, 1998). By the 1950s, there was no single preferred mode of administration, no single preferred system of scoring, and no single preferred

method of interpretation, a predicament that still endures today. Clinicians even vary the wording of the instructions and commonly select an individualized subset of TAT cards for each client. Indeed, the absence of standardized procedures is such that we should rightly regard the TAT as a method, not a test.

It is worth mentioning that Murray's instructions included a statement that the TAT was "a test of imagination, one form of intelligence" and further stipulated:

> I am going to show you some pictures, one at a time; and your task will be to make up as dramatic a story as you can for each. Tell what has led up to the event shown in the picture, describe what is happening at the moment, what the characters are feeling and thinking; and then give the outcome. Speak your thoughts as they come to your mind. Do you understand? Since you have fifty minutes for ten pictures, you can devote about five minutes to each story. Here is the first picture. (Murray, 1943)

Currently, clinicians downplay the emphasis on imagination and intelligence when giving instructions. Surely, this omission must influence the quality of the stories produced.

Even though more than a dozen scoring systems have been proposed, interpretation of the TAT is usually based on a clinical-qualitative analysis of the story productions. A central consideration harks back to Murray's "hero" assumption. According to this viewpoint, the hero is the protagonist of the examinee's story. It is assumed that the examinee clearly identifies with this character and projects his or her own needs, strivings, and feelings onto the hero. Conversely, thoughts, feelings, or actions avoided by the hero may represent areas of conflict for the examinee. A specific example will help clarify these points. Consider the response to Card 3BM given by a depressed examinee[2]:

> Looks like . . . I can't tell if it's a girl or boy. Could be either. I guess it doesn't matter. This person just had a hard physical workout. I guess it's a her. She's just tired. No trauma happened or anything. She was sitting around a table with friends and she got real tired. She's not in a health danger or anything. These are her keys. Her friends drag her back to her room and put her to bed. She's O.K. the next day. No trauma. She's tired physically, not mentally. (Ryan, 1987)

What stands out in this response is the repetitive denial of danger or trauma. But later in the testing, the denial of trauma is no longer maintained. Read how the examinee responded to the blank card, relating a story of a young man, traumatized at school, who takes his car down to the river:

> He sees the bridge, he's really down. He remembers that he's heard stories about people jumping off and killing themselves. He could never understand why they did that. Now he understands, he jumps and dies . . . he should have waited 'cause things always get better sometime. But he didn't wait, he died. (Ryan, 1987)

Most clinicians would conclude that the examinee who produced these stories had been traumatized and was defending against self-destructive impulses. Correspondingly, the clinician would be well advised to explore these issues in psychotherapy.

The psychometric adequacy of the TAT is difficult to evaluate because of the abundance of scoring and interpretation methods. Clinicians defend the test on an anecdotal basis, pointing out remarkable and confirmatory findings such as illustrated here. However, data-minded researchers are more cautious. One problem is that formally scored TAT protocols possess very low test–retest reliability, with a reported median value of $r = .28$ (Winter & Stewart, 1977). Furthermore, an astonishing 97 percent of test users employ subjective and "personalized" procedures for interpreting the TAT; that is, only a tiny fraction of clinical practitioners rely on

[2]Card 3BM depicts one person—arguably male or female—kneeling or slumped over on a couch with head bowed on one arm. In the corner is a vaguely drawn object interpreted by some examinees to be a handgun or other weapon.

a standardized scoring system (Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2001). This is troubling because a consistent theme in research on projective testing is that intuitive interpretations are likely to overdiagnose psychological disturbance.

In addition to clinical applications, the TAT has received considerable use for research purposes. For example, Turk, Brown, Symington, and Paul (2010) examined the content of TAT stories from 22 persons with agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC), a congenital brain disorder in which the pathways connecting the two cerebral hemispheres are partially or completely absent. They used the linguistic inquiry software of James Pennebaker (Tauszcik & Pennebaker, 2010) to count words in psychologically meaningful categories. Compared to age- and IQ-matched controls, the ACC individuals used fewer words pertaining to emotionality, cognitive processes, and social processes, indicating that they experienced greater difficulty imagining and inferring the mental and emotional states of others. In this research application, the TAT proved helpful for enhancing our understanding of the unique qualities of persons with ACC.

The Picture Projective Test

The Picture Projective Test (PPT) is an attempt to construct a general-purpose instrument with improved psychometric qualities (Ritzler, Sharkey, & Chudy, 1980; Sharkey & Ritzler, 1985). The developers of the PPT note that the majority of the TAT pictures exert a strong negative stimulus "pull" on storytelling. The TAT cards are cast in dark, shaded tones and most scenes portray persons in low-key or gloomy situations. It is not surprising, then, that projective responses to the TAT are strongly channeled toward negative, melancholic stories (Goldfried & Zax, 1965).

In contrast, the PPT uses a set of pictures taken from the *Family of Man* photo essay published by the Museum of Modern Art (1955). The following criteria were used in selecting 30 pictures:

- The pictures had to show promise of eliciting meaningful projective material.
- Most but not all of the pictures had to include more than one human character.
- About half of the pictures had to depict humans showing positive affective expression (e.g., smiling, embracing, dancing).
- About half of the pictures had to depict humans in active poses, not simply standing, sitting, or lying down.

In an initial pilot study, the authors compared TAT and PPT story productions of eight undergraduates on several variables such as length of stories, emotional tone, and activity level (Ritzler, Sharkey, & Chudy, 1980). Compared to the TAT productions, the PPT stories were of comparable length but were much more positive in thematic content and emotional tone. The PPT stories were also much more active, meaning that the central character had an active, self-determined effect on the situation in the story. Furthermore, the PPT stories placed greater emphasis on interpersonal rather than intrapersonal themes. In other words, the PPT stories placed more emphasis on "healthy," adaptive aspects of personality adjustment than did the TAT productions.

The PPT developers also compared their instrument against the TAT in a diagnostic validity study (Sharkey & Ritzler, 1985). PPT and TAT story productions of 50 subjects were compared: normals, nonhospitalized depressives, hospitalized depressives, hospitalized psychotics with good premorbid histories, and hospitalized psychotics with poor premorbid histories (10 subjects in each group). Although the TAT and PPT were essentially equal in their capacity to discriminate normal from depressed subjects, the PPT was superior in differentiating psychotics from normals and depressives. On the PPT, depressives told stories with gloomier emotional tone and psychotics made more perceptual distortions, and thematic/interpretive deviations. The PPT appears to be a very promising instrument, although it is obvious that further research is needed on its psychometric qualities. One noteworthy feature is that anyone can purchase the PPT stimuli at their local bookstore. The requisite materials are found in the *Family of Man* photo collection (Museum of Modern Art, 1955).

Children's Apperception Test

Designed as a direct extension of the TAT, the Children's Apperception Test (CAT) consists of 10

pictures and is suitable for children 3 to 10 years of age. The preferred version for younger children (CAT-A) depicts animals in unmistakably human social settings (Bellak & Bellak, 1991). The test developers used animal drawings on the assumption that young children would identify better with animals than humans. A human figure version (CAT-H) is available for older children (Bellak & Bellak, 1994). No formal scoring system exists for the CAT and no statistical information is provided on reliability or validity. Instead, the examiner prepares a diagnosis or personality description based on a synthesis of 10 variables recorded for each story: (1) main theme; (2) main hero; (3) main needs and drives of hero; (4) conception of environment (or world); (5) perception of parental, contemporary, and junior figures; (6) conflicts; (7) anxieties; (8) defenses; (9) adequacy of superego; (10) integration of ego (including originality of story and nature of outcome) (Bellak, 1992). The lack of attention to psychometric issues of scoring, reliability, and validity of the CAT is troublesome to most testing specialists.

Other Variations on the TAT

The TAT has inspired a number of similar tests designed for children and older adults (Table 8.4). In addition, modifications and variations of the TAT have been developed for ethnic, racial,

TABLE 8.4 Thematic Apperception Tests for Specific Populations

Family Apperception Test

For children ages 6 and older, the Family Apperception Test consists of 21 cards depicting a family in various situations. For example, one card shows a family sitting around a table with parents talking while the children eat. As with the TAT, the examinee is asked to describe what led up to the scene, what is happening now, what will happen next, and what the main characters are feeling. The test is based on family systems theory. The manual provides a scoring guide for categories such as limit-setting, conflict resolution, boundaries, quality of relationships, and emotional tone (Sotile, Julian, Henry, & Sotile, 1988).

Blacky Pictures

For children ages 5 and older, the Blacky Pictures test was also based on the premise that children identify more readily with animals than humans. The 11 cartoon stimuli depict the adventures of the dog Blacky and his family (Mama, Papa, and sibling Tippy). In addition to requesting a story for each card, the examiner also presents multiple-choice questions based on stages of psychosexual development derived from psychoanalytic theory (Blum, 1950). Although the test was originally developed with adults, children enjoy taking the Blacky and are quite responsive to the pictures. Problems with this test include the absence of norms, especially for children, and poor stability of scores (LaVoie, 1987).

Michigan Picture Test-Revised

For older children ages 8 to 14 years, the MPT-R consists of 15 pictures and a blank card. Responses are scored for Tension Index (e.g., portrayal of personal adequacy), Direction of Force (whether the central figure acts or is acted upon), and Verb Tense (e.g., past, present, future). These three scores can be combined to yield a Maladjustment Index. Reliability and norms are adequate, although evidence of validity is unsatisfactory. A major problem with this test is that the cards portray interpersonal relationships so vividly that little is left to the child's imagination (Aiken, 1989).

Senior Apperception Test (SAT)

Although the 16 situations depicted on the SAT cards include some positive circumstances, the majority of pictures were designed to reflect themes of helplessness, abandonment, disability, family problems, loneliness, dependence, and low self-esteem (Bellak, 1992). Critics complain that the SAT stereotypes the elderly and therefore discourages active responding (Schaie, 1978).

and linguistic minorities. One of the first was the Thompson TAT (T-TAT) in which 21 of the original TAT pictures were redrawn with African American figures (Thompson, 1949). This TAT modification incorporated certain unintended changes—for example, in facial expressions and the situations portrayed. As a result, the T-TAT should be considered a new test and not just a TAT translation suited to African American individuals (Aiken, 1989).

Another specialized TAT-like test is the TEMAS, which consists of 23 colorful drawings that depict Hispanic persons interacting in contemporary, inner-city settings (Aiken, 1989; Constantino, Malgady, & Rogler, 1988). TEMAS is Spanish for *themes* and an acronym for "tell me a story." The thematic content of TEMAS stories is scored for 18 cognitive functions, 9 personality (ego) functions, and 7 affective functions. The test can also be scored for various objective indices such as reaction time, fluency, unanswered inquiries, and stimulus transformations (e.g., a letter is transformed into a bomb). Hispanic children respond well to the TEMAS, even though they may be inarticulate in response to traditional projective tests.

The inconsistent reliability of the TEMAS is a source of concern, because reliability constrains validity. The manual reports that Cronbach's alpha for the 34 scoring functions ranged from .31 to .98 with half below .70. Test–retest reliabilities were even lower; the highest correlation was $r = .53$ and for 26 of the 34 functions the correlations were near zero! In spite of the questionable reliability of the instrument, several studies provide support for its concurrent and predictive validity. For example, in a clinical sample of 210 Puerto Rican children, TEMAS scale scores predicted independent criteria of ego development, trait anxiety, and adaptive behavior reasonably well, with correlations ranging from .27 to .51 (Malgady, Constantino, & Rogler, 1984). A steady stream of research has continued to bolster the utility of this instrument, as surveyed by Constantino & Malgady (1996). Flanagan and di Guiseppe (1999) provide a critical review of the TEMAS; Constantino and Malgady (2000) describe recent developments with the test.

EXPRESSION TECHNIQUES

The Draw-A-Person Test

As the reader will recall from an earlier chapter, Goodenough (1926) used the Draw-A-Man task as a basis for estimating intelligence. Subsequently, psychodynamically minded psychologists adapted the procedure to the projective assessment of personality. Karen Machover (1949, 1951) was the pioneer in this new field. Her procedure became known as the Draw-A-Person Test (DAP). Her test enjoyed early popularity and is still widely used as a clinical assessment tool. Watkins, Campbell, Nieberding, and Hallmark (1995) report that projective drawings such as the DAP rank eighth in popularity among clinicians in the United States.

The DAP is administered by presenting the examinee with a blank sheet of paper and a pencil with eraser, then asking the examinee to "draw a person." When the drawing is completed the examinee usually is directed to draw another person of the sex opposite that of the first figure. Finally, the examinee is asked to "make up a story about this person as if he [or she] were a character in a novel or a play" (Machover, 1949).

Interpretation of the DAP proceeds in an entirely clinical-intuitive manner, guided by a number of tentative psychodynamically based hypotheses (Machover, 1949, 1951). For example, Machover maintained that examinees were likely to project acceptable impulses onto the same-sex figure and unacceptable impulses onto the opposite-sex figure. She also believed that the relative sizes of the male and female figures revealed clues about the sexual identification of the examinee. For example, drawing a man with large eyes and lashes was thought to indicate a homosexually inclined male.

These interpretive premises are colorful, interesting, and plausible. However, they are based entirely on psychodynamic theory and anecdotal observations. Machover made little effort to validate the interpretations. The empirical support for her hypotheses is somewhere between meager and nonexistent (Swensen, 1968). In favor of the DAP, the overall quality of drawings does weakly predict psychological adjustment (Lewinsohn, 1965; Yama,

1990). However, judged by contemporary standards of evidence, the sweeping and cavalier assessments of personality so often derived from the DAP are embarrassing. Some reviewers have concluded that the DAP is an unworthy test that should no longer be used (Gresham, 1993; Motta, Little, & Tobin, 1993).

Rather than using the DAP to infer nuances of personality, a more appropriate application of this test is in the screening of children suspected of behavior disorder and emotional disturbance. For this purpose, Naglieri, McNeish, and Bardos (1991) developed the Draw A Person: Screening Procedure for Emotional Disturbance (DAP:SPED). In one study, diagnostic accuracy of problem children was significantly improved by application of the DAP:SPED scoring approach (Naglieri & Pfeiffer, 1992).

The House-Tree-Person Test (H-T-P)

The H-T-P is a projective test that uses freehand drawings of a house, tree, and person (Buck, 1948, 1981). The examinee is given almost complete freedom in sketching the three objects; separate pencil and crayon drawings are requested. Although the examiner can improvise an H-T-P Test with mere blank pieces of paper, Buck (1981) recommends the use of a four-page drawing form with identification information on the first page. Pages two, three, and four are titled House, Tree, and Person. Two drawing forms are needed for each examinee, one for pencil drawings and the other for crayon drawings. Buck (1981) also provides a separate four-page form for a postdrawing interrogation phase, which consists of 60 questions designed to elicit the examinee's opinions about elements of the drawings. Many practitioners feel the postdrawing interrogation phase is not worth the extended effort. Also, the value of separate crayon drawings is questioned (Killian, 1987).

The House-Tree-Person Test has much the same familial lineage as the Draw-A-Person Test. Like the DAP Test, the H-T-P Test was originally conceived as a measure of intelligence, complete with a quantitative scoring system to appraise an approximate level of ability (Buck, 1948). However, clinicians soon abandoned the use of the H-T-P as a measure of intelligence, and it is now used almost exclusively as a projective measure of personality.

Although we will not delve into any details here, the interpretation of the H-T-P rests on three general assumptions: the House drawing mirrors the examinee's home life and intrafamilial relationships; the Tree drawing reflects the manner in which the examinee experiences the environment; and the Person drawing echoes the examinee's interpersonal relationships. Buck (1981) provides numerous interpretive hypotheses for both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the three drawings.

The H-T-P is an alluring test that has fascinated clinicians for more than 40 years. Unfortunately, Buck (1948, 1981) has never provided any evidence to support the reliability or validity of this instrument. Indeed, he is perhaps his own worst critic. At one point in his test manual, he even asserts that validational research is not possible with the H-T-P (Buck, 1981, p. 164).

In general, attempts to validate the H-T-P as a personality measure have failed miserably (for reviews see Krugman, 1970; Killian, 1987). Thoughtful reviewers have repeatedly recommended the abandonment of the H-T-P and similar figure-drawing approaches to personality assessment. The popularity of the H-T-P has dropped off in recent years. A search of PsychINFO revealed only nine articles on the test since 2000, including four dissertations.

Many clinicians do not use projective methods as tests at all but as auxiliary approaches to the clinical interview. These practitioners use projective techniques as clinical tools to derive tentative hypotheses about the examinee. Most of these hypotheses will turn out to be false when examined more closely. However, the few that are confirmed may have important implications for the clinical management of the examinee. Furthermore, we suspect that these fruitful hypotheses might not emerge—or might emerge more slowly—if the practitioner relied entirely on the interview or used only formal tests with established reliability and validity (Case Exhibit 8.1). However, this assertion is difficult to test empirically.

CASE EXHIBIT 8.1

Projective Tests as Ancillary to the Interview

A specific example may help to clarify the role of projective techniques as ancillary to the clinical interview. During the Vietnam War, a Veteran's Administration psychologist tested a young soldier who had accidentally shot himself in the leg with a 45-caliber pistol while practicing quick draw in the jungle. Surgeons found it necessary to amputate the soldier's leg from the knee down. He was quite depressed, and everyone assumed that he suffered from grief and guilt over his great personal tragedy. He was virtually mute and nearly untestable. However, he was persuaded to complete a series of figure drawings. In one drawing he depicted himself as a helicopter gunner, spraying bullets indiscriminantly into the jungle below. When questioned about this drawing, he became quite animated and confessed that he relished combat. Guided by the possible implications of the morbid drawing, the psychologist sought to learn more about the veteran's attitudes toward combat. In the course of several interviews, the veteran revealed that he particularly enjoyed firing on moving objects—animals, soldiers, civilians—it made no difference to him. Gradually, it became clear that the young veteran was an incipient war criminal who was depressed because his injury would prevent him from returning to the front lines. Needless to say, this information had quite an impact on the tenor of the psychological report.

TOPIC 8B Self-Report and Behavioral Assessment of Psychopathology

Theory-Guided Inventories
Factor-Analytically Derived Inventories
Criterion-Keyed Inventories
Behavioral Assessment
Behavior Therapy and Behavioral Assessment
Structured Interview Schedules
Assessment by Systematic Direct Observation
Analogue Behavioral Assessment
Ecological Momentary Assessment

Although there are many methods for the assessment of personality and related qualities, broadly speaking two approaches have dominated the field: unstructured and structured. Unstructured methods such as the Rorschach, TAT, and sentence completion blanks permit broad latitude in the responses of the examinee. These approaches dominated personality testing in the early twentieth century but then slowly faded in standing. In contrast, structured approaches such as self-report inventories and behavior rating scales gained prominence in the mid-twentieth century and have continued to expand in popularity to the present time. Whereas only a handful of unstructured techniques has ever risen to distinction, the number of structured instruments for assessment has grown almost exponentially.

In the previous topic we introduced the reader to the many varieties of unstructured tests such as inkblots, stimulus cards, and sentence completion blanks. These methods are resplendent in the richness of the hypotheses they yield; however, projective techniques largely lack the approval of psychometrically oriented clinicians. In this topic, we focus on the more structured, objective methods for personality assessment favored by measurement-minded psychologists. We review a wide variety of true–false, rating scale, and forced-choice instruments for assessing personality and other qualities. This review takes in a variety of personality tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2, arguably the most famous personality test ever published. We also examine contemporary approaches that rely upon structured interview, behavioral observation, and ratings.

The self-report approaches to testing discussed in the following sections are steeped in the details of psychometric methodology. These tests feature prominent references to reliability indices, criterion keying, factor analysis, construct validation, and other forms of technical craftsmanship. For this reason, the approaches discussed here often are considered objective—as contrasted with projective. However, whether they are objective in any meaningful sense is really an empirical question that must be answered on the basis of research. Perhaps it is more accurate to call these methods *structured*. They are structured in the sense that highly specific rules are followed in the administration, scoring, interpretation, and narrative reporting of results. In fact, some of the approaches are so completely structured that an examinee can answer questions presented on a computer screen and observe a computer-generated narrative report spewed forth from the printer, literally seconds later.[3]

We begin our discussion of structured assessment by reviewing several prominent personality tests. Contemporary psychometricians have relied mainly

[3]Computerized narrative reports may not be altogether a positive development. We discuss the benefits and pitfalls of computer-generated reports in the next chapter.

upon three tactics for personality test development: theory-bounded approaches, factor-analytic approaches, and criterion-key methods. We will organize the discussion of personality inventories around these three categories. Of course, the boundaries are somewhat artificial and many test developers use a combination of methods.

THEORY-GUIDED INVENTORIES

The construction of several self-report inventories was guided closely by formal or informal theories of personality. In these cases, the test developer designed the instrument around a preexisting theory. Theory-guided inventories stand in contrast to factor-analytic approaches that often produce a retrospective theory based upon initial test findings. Theory-guided inventories also differ from the stark atheoretical empiricism found in criterion-key instruments such as the MMPI and MMPI-2. An example of a theory-guided inventory is the Personality Research Form (PRF), based on Murray's (1938) need-press theory of personality. Some theory-guided inventories such as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) attempt to measure very specific components of personality. We review these tests in more detail in the following.

Personality Research Form

The Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1999) is a true–false inventory based loosely on Murray's (1938) theory of manifest needs. The reader will recall from an earlier discussion that Murray posited 15 needs and developed a projective test, the Thematic Apperception Test, to tap those needs. Based on factor-analytic approaches, Jackson expanded the number of needs and produced several forms for assessment. The forms differ in the number of scales and number of items per scale. In addition to parallel short tests (forms A and B), the Personality Research Form (PRF) also exists as parallel long forms (forms AA and BB). These forms, used primarily with college students, consist of 440 true–false items. The long forms yield 20 personality-scale scores and two validity scores, Infrequency and Desirability (Table 8.5). The most popular version of the PRF is form E, which consists of all 22 scales in a modified 352-item test.

In constructing the PRF form E, Jackson first formulated rigorous and theoretically based definitions of the traits to be measured, following Murray's (1938) system for personality description. Next, for each scale over 100 items were written to tape the traits underlying the hypothesized needs. After editorial review, these items were administered to large samples of college students. Item selection was based on simplicity of wording, high biserial correlations with total scale scores, low correlations with other scales (maximizing scale independence), and low correlations with the Desirability scale (minimizing social desirability bias). Convergent and discriminant validity was considered throughout. For the original long forms AA and BB, 20 items were selected for each scale, resulting in 20×22 or 440 items. For the PRF form E, about four items were dropped from each scale, yielding a 352-item test.

Unlike many other personality inventories, the PRF scales have no item overlap. As a result, the scales are unusually independent, with most intercorrelation coefficients in the vicinity of $\pm .30$ (Gynther & Gynther, 1976). Furthermore, the rigorous scale construction procedures employed by Jackson (1970) yielded scales with good internal consistency, with a median coefficient alpha of .70. Test–retest reliabilities are exceptionally strong, ranging from .80 to .96 for a two-week interval, with a median of .91 (Jackson, 1999). Norms are based on thousands of college students from North America, and also include subgroup norms for psychiatric inpatients and criminal offenders. A desirable feature of the PRF is its readability: The test requires only a fifth- or sixth-grade reading level (Reddon & Jackson, 1989).

The validity of the PRF rests upon a substantial body of research over many decades. A lengthy bibliography citing more than 300 articles about the test can be found at www.sigmaassessmentsystems.com. For example, correlations between self and roommate ratings on the PRF constructs are reported to range from .27 to .74, with a median of .53.

The construct validity of the PRF rests especially upon confirmatory factor analyses

TABLE 8.5 Personality Research Form Scales

Scale	*Interpretation of High Score*
Abasement	Self-effacing, humble, blame-accepting
Achievement	Goal striving, competitive
Affiliation	Friendly, accepting, sociable
Aggression	Argues, combative, easily annoyed
Autonomy	Independent, avoids restrictions
Change	Avoids routine, seeks change
Cognitive Structure	Prefers certainty, dislikes ambiguity
Defendence	On guard, takes offense easily
Dominance	Influential, enjoys leading
Endurance	Persevering, hard-working
Exhibition	Dramatic, enjoys attention
Harm Avoidance	Avoids risk and excitement
Impulsivity	Impulsive, speaks freely
Nurturance	Caring, sympathetic, comforting
Order	Organized, dislikes confusion
Play	Playful, light-hearted, enjoys jokes
Sentience	Notices, remembers sensations
Social Recognition	Concern for reputation and approval
Succorance	Insecure, seeks reassurance
Understanding	Values logical thought
Desirability	Validity Scale: favorable presentation
Infrequency	Validity Scale: infrequent responses

Source: Based on Personality Research Form Scales and Descriptions from Jackson, D. N. (1989). *Personality research form manual* (3rd ed.). Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment Systems, Inc., Research Psychologists Press division. (800) 265-1285.

corroborating the grouping of the items into 20 scales (Jackson, 1970, 1984b). In addition, research indicates positive correlations with comparable scales on other inventories (Mungas, Trontel, & Weingardner, 1981). For example, Edwards and Abbott (1973) found exceptionally strong and confirmatory correlations between similar scales on the PRF and the Edwards Personality Inventory (EPI; Edwards, 1967). The EPI is a respected but little-used test consisting of 1,200(!) true–false questions. Some of the confirmatory correlations between PRF and EPI scales for 218 male and female college students are reported as follows:

Achievement (PRF) × Is a Hard Worker (EPI).	74
Change (PRF) × Likes a Set Routine (EPI)	−.54
Nurturance (PRF) × Helps Others (EPI)	.64
Succorance (PRF) × Dependent (EPI)	.73

Because these instruments were developed independently according to different test construction

philosophies, the findings bolster the validity of both tests. Several recent empirical comparisons also support the validity and utility of the PRF. For example, Goffin, Rothstein, and Johnston (2000) proved that the PRF outperformed the more widely used Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF, discussed later in this section) in predicting the job performance of 487 candidates for managerial positions. Vernon (2000) also reports favorably on the validity of the PRF in his review of recent studies.

State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is a popular self-report measure of anxiety, used in research and clinical settings (Spielberger, 1983, 1989). The current version is called Form Y, a minor revision of the original Form X (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). A similar scale for children also is available (Spielberger, 1973). The test has been translated into more than 40 languages. We limit our discussion here to the adult version.

The purpose of the STAI is to differentiate between the temporary condition of state anxiety and the more long-standing quality of trait anxiety. **State anxiety** is defined as a "transitory emotional state or condition characterized by subjective feelings of tension and apprehension, and by activation of the autonomic nervous system." **Trait anxiety** refers to "relatively stable individual differences in anxiety proneness" (Gaudry, Vagg, & Spielberger, 1975, p. 331).

The state scale (A-State scale) consists of 20 items that evaluate how the respondent feels "right now, at this moment." Items are similar to *I feel at peace* and *I am distressed*. Responses are on a 4-point scale (Not At All, Somewhat, Moderately So, and Very Much So). The trait scale (A-Trait scale) consists of 20 items that assess how the respondent feels "generally." Items are similar to *I am a stable person* and *I lack confidence*. Reponses are on a 4-point scale (Almost Never, Sometimes, Often, and Almost Always). Of course, scoring is reversed for positively stated items. The range of scores for each scale is 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. Extensive normative data are available, stratified by age and subdivided by setting (employed adults, college students, high school students, military recruits). The STAI has received extensive service in research, and also is used in health-related clinical applications such as gauging anxiety in pregnant women (Gunning, Denison, Stockley, and others, 2010), monitoring improvement in psychotherapy patients (Vautier & Pohl, 2009), and detecting mental disorder in elderly patients (Kvaal, Ulstein, Nordhus, & Engedal, 2005).

State anxiety fluctuates in response to environmental circumstances and may change even from hour to hour. Therefore, we can expect that test–retest reliability will be lower for state anxiety than for trait anxiety. This is precisely what researchers find, with short-range reliability in the .40s and .50s for the A-State scale and in the high .80s for the A-Trait scale (Rule & Traver, 1983; Spielberger et al., 1970). Internal consistency of the scale is excellent, with Cronbach's alpha of .86 for the total score in a sample of medical patients (Quek, Low, Razack, Loh, & Chua, 2004). Individual alpha values for A-State and A-Trait are robust as well, with results of .95 and .93, respectively, in a sample of 567 patients treated at an anxiety disorders clinic (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007).

The validity of the STAI is well established from dozens of studies demonstrating content validity, convergent/discriminant validity, and construct validity (Spielberger, 1989). In a factor-analytic study of scores for 205 patients with panic disorder, Oei, Evans, and Crook (1990) found that a two-factor oblique solution was the best fit, accounting for 41 percent of the variance. Notably, 18 of the A-State items revealed salient loadings on factor 1 (state anxiety) and all 20 of the A-Trait items showed prominent loadings on factor 2 (trait anxiety). In sum, the STAI is a brief, reliable, and valid measure of state and trait anxiety. The measure is a mainstay for clinicians and researchers.

FACTOR-ANALYTICALLY DERIVED INVENTORIES

Eysenck Personality Questionnaire

The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) was designed to measure the major dimensions of normal and abnormal personality (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Based on a lifelong program of factor-analytic

questionnaire research and laboratory experiments on learning and conditioning, Eysenck isolated three major dimensions of personality: Psychoticism (P), Extraversion (E), and Neuroticism (N). The EPQ consists of scales to measure these dimensions and also incorporates a Lie (L) scale to assess the validity of an examinee's responses. The EPQ contains 90 statements answered "yes" or "no" and is designed for persons aged 16 and older. A Junior EPQ containing 81 statements is suitable for children ages 7 to 15.

Items on the P scale resemble the following:

Do you often break the rules? (T)
Would you worry if you were in debt? (F)
Do you take risks just for fun? (T)

High scores on the P scale indicate aggressive and hostile traits, impulsivity, a preference for liking odd or unusual things, and empathy defects. Antisocial and schizoid patients often obtain high scores on this dimension. In contrast, low scores on P foretell more desirable characteristics such as empathy and interpersonal sensitivity. Items on the E scale resemble the following:

Do you like to meet new people? (T)
Are you quiet when with others? (F)
Do you like lots of excitement? (T)

High scores on the E scale indicate a loud, gregarious, outgoing, fun-loving person. Low scores on the E scale indicate introverted traits such as a preference for solitude and quiet activities. Items on the N scale resemble the following:

Are you a moody person? (T)
Do you feel that life is dull? (T)
Are your feelings easily hurt? (T)

The N scale reflects a dimension of emotionality that ranges from nervous, maladjusted, and overemotional (high scores) to stable and confident (low scores).

The reliability of the EPQ is excellent. For example, the one-month test–retest correlations were .78 (P), .89 (E), .86 (N), and .84 (L). Internal consistencies were in the .70s for P and the .80s for the other three scales. The construct validity of the EPQ is also well established through dozens of studies using behavioral, emotional, learning, attentional, and therapeutic criteria (reviewed in Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Friedman (1987) provides a short but thorough introduction to other sources on the EPQ.

A major focus of research with the EPQ has been on the empirical correlates of **extraversion** and its polar opposite, **introversion**. Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) describe the typical extravert as follows:

> The typical extravert is sociable, likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and does not like reading or studying by himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is generally an impulsive individual.

They describe the typical introvert as follows:

> The typical introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of person, introspective, fond of books rather than people; he is reserved and distant except to intimate friends. He tends to plan ahead, "looks before he leaps," and mistrusts the impulse of the moment.

Eysenck and his followers have linked a number of perceptual and physiological factors to the extraversion/introversion dimension. Because of space limitations, we can only list representative findings here:

- Introverts are more vigilant in watchkeeping.
- Introverts do better at signal-detection tasks.
- Introverts are less tolerant of pain but more tolerant of sensory deprivation.
- Extraverts are more easily conditioned to stimuli associated with sexual arousal.
- Extraverts have a greater need for external stimulation.

Aiken (1989) summarizes additional research on the real-world correlates of the EPQ extraversion/introversion dimension.

In general, the technical characteristics of the EPQ are very strong, certainly stronger than found

in most self-report inventories. The practical utility of the instrument is supported by voluminous research literature. Nonetheless, the EPQ has never caught on among American psychologists, who seem enamored of multiphasic instruments that produce 10, 20, or 30 scores, not a simple trio of basic dimensions.

Comrey Personality Scales

For practitioners who desire a short self-report inventory suitable for college students and other adults, the Comrey Personality Scales (Comrey, 1970, 1980, 2008) would be a good choice. As a protégé of Guilford, Comrey pursued a factor-analytic strategy in developing his 180-item test. Comrey relied exclusively upon college students in the development and standardization of his test, so the CPS is well suited to assessment of personality in this subpopulation.

A special virtue of the CPS is its brevity. Consisting of 180 statements, the test is only one-third as long as competing instruments such as the MMPI-2. The eight CPS personality scales consist of 20 items each, divided equally between positively and negatively worded statements. Another 20 items are devoted to a validity check and the assessment of social desirability response bias.

The following description of CPS scales is based upon Merenda (1985) and Comrey (1995, 2008):

(V) *Validity Check.* A score of 8 is the expected raw score. Any score on the V scale that gives a *T*-score equivalent below 70 is still within the normal range, however. Higher scores are suggestive of an invalid record.

(R) *Response Bias.* High scores indicate a tendency to answer questions in a socially desirable way, making the respondent look like a "nice" person.

(T) *Trust versus Defensiveness.* High scores indicate a belief in the basic honesty, trustworthiness, and good intentions of other people.

(O) *Orderliness versus Lack of Compulsion.* High scores are characteristic of careful, meticulous, orderly, and highly organized individuals.

(C) *Social Conformity versus Rebelliousness.* Individuals with high scores accept society as it is, resent nonconformity in others, seek the approval of society, and respect the law.

(A) *Activity versus Lack of Energy.* High-scoring individuals have a great deal of energy and endurance, work hard, and strive to excel.

(S) *Emotional Stability versus Neuroticism.* High-scoring persons are free from depression, optimistic, relaxed, stable in mood, and confident.

(E) *Extraversion versus Introversion.* High-scoring individuals meet people easily, seek new friends, feel comfortable with strangers, and do not suffer from stage fright.

(M) *Mental Toughness versus Sensitivity.* High-scoring individuals tend to be rather tough-minded people who are not bothered by blood, crawling creatures, vulgarity, and who do not cry easily or show much interest in love stories.

(P) *Empathy versus Egocentrism.* High-scoring individuals describe themselves as helpful, generous, sympathetic people who are interested in devoting their lives to the service of others.

Reflecting its careful factor-analytic derivation, the CPS scales possess exceptional internal consistencies, which range from .91 to .96. These findings indicate that the CPS is most likely a reliable test, but traditional test–retest data are scant. Cross-cultural studies with the CPS are highly supportive of its validity. Brief and Comrey (1993) report that the eight-factor solution to CPS item responses is found in factor analyses with Russian, U.S., Brazilian, Israeli, Italian, and New Zealand samples. Other validational studies with the CPS are not straightforward in their interpretation. On the one hand, the correlations between CPS scale scores and personality-relevant biographical data are very small (Comrey & Backer, 1970; Comrey & Schiebel, 1983). On the other hand, extreme scores on the CPS scales are strongly associated with psychological disturbance (Comrey & Schiebel, 1985). This is particularly true for low scores on Trust versus Defensiveness, Activity versus Lack of Energy, Emotional Stability versus Neuroticism,

Extraversion versus Introversion, and high scores on Orderliness versus Lack of Compulsion. Shen and Comrey (1997) describe the utility of the CPS with medical students, showing that the test is a reasonable predictor of clinical performance and personal suitability. In general, reviewers conclude that the CPS is a promising test that needs updated standardization and additional documentation on its technical qualities. Comrey (1995) summarizes validity studies of his test.

CRITERION-KEYED INVENTORIES

The final self-report inventories that we will review embody a criterion-keyed test development strategy. In a criterion-keyed approach, test items are assigned to a particular scale if, and only if, they discriminate between a well-defined criterion group and a relevant control group. For example, in devising a self-report scale for depression, items endorsed by depressed persons significantly more (or less) frequently than by normal controls would be assigned to the depression scale, keyed in the appropriate direction. A similar approach might be used to develop scales for other constructs of interest to clinicians such as schizophrenia, anxiety reaction, and the like. Notice that the test developer does not consult any theory of schizophrenia, depression, or anxiety reaction to determine which items belong on the respective scales. The essence of the criterion-keyed procedure is, so to speak, to let the items fall where they may.[4]

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2)

First published in 1943, the MMPI was a 566-item true–false personality inventory designed originally as an aid in psychiatric diagnosis (Hathaway & McKinley, 1940, 1943; McKinley & Hathaway, 1940, 1944; McKinley, Hathaway, & Meehl, 1948). The test authors followed a strict empirical keying approach in the construction of the MMPI scales. The clinical scales were developed by contrasting item responses of carefully defined psychiatric patient groups (average *N* of about 50) with item responses of 724 control subjects. The result was a remarkable test useful both in psychiatric assessment and the description of normal personality. Within a few years, the MMPI became the most widely used personality test in the United States.

At first the MMPI aged gracefully; what appeared to be minor flaws were tolerated by practitioners. But as the MMPI reached middle age, the need for rejuvenation became increasingly obvious. The most serious problem was the original control group, which consisted primarily of relatives and visitors of medical patients at the University of Minnesota Hospital. The narrow choice of control subjects, tested mainly in the 1930s, proved to be a persistent source of criticism for the MMPI. All of the control subjects were white, and most were young (average age about 35), married, and from a small town or rural area. This was a sample of convenience that was significantly unrepresentative of the population at large.

The item content of the MMPI also raised concerns (Graham, 1993). Several items used archaic and obsolete terminology, referring to "drop the handkerchief" (a parlor game from the 1930s), sleeping powders (sleeping pills), and streetcars (electric-powered buses). Other items used sexist language. Examinees found some items objectionable, especially those dealing with Christian religious beliefs. These items were the source of occasional lawsuits alleging invasion of privacy. Finally, a few items dealing with bowel functions and sexual behavior were just downright offensive.

From the standpoint of measurement, a more serious problem with item content was that of omission. The MMPI item pool was not broad enough to assess many important characteristics, including suicidal tendencies, drug abuse, and treatment-related behaviors. An additional motive for MMPI revision was to extend the range of item coverage.

The MMPI-2 was released in 1989 after nearly a decade of revision and restandardization. The new,

[4]We are glossing over certain complexities here. Some items reflecting general psychopathology might discriminate *all* the contrast groups from the control group. The test developer might discard these in favor of items that are *differentially* discriminating for just one contrast group but not the others.

improved MMPI-2 incorporates a contemporary normative sample of 2,600 individuals who are loosely representative of the general population on major demographic variables (geographic location, race, age, occupational level, and income). Although higher educational levels are overrepresented, the MMPI-2 normative sample is still a vast improvement over the MMPI normative sample. The item pool has been significantly improved by revision of obsolete items, deletion of offensive items, and addition of new items to extend content coverage.

The MMPI-2 is a significant improvement upon the MMPI, but maintains substantial continuity with its esteemed predecessor. The test developers retained the same titles and measurement objectives for the traditional validity and clinical scales. The restandardization provides a better calibration for scale elevations, a much-needed improvement (Tellegen & Ben-Porath, 1992). Although dozens of items were rewritten, most of these revisions are cosmetic and do not affect the psychometric characteristics of the test (Ben-Porath & Butcher, 1989). In fact, when large samples of subjects complete the MMPI and the MMPI-2, scores on the individual validity and clinical scales typically correlate near .99.

The MMPI-2 consists of 567 items carefully designed to assess a wide range of concerns. The examinee is asked to mark "true" or "false" for each statement as it applies to himself or herself. Most of the items are self-referential. The items encompass a wide variety of mainly pathological themes (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972; Graham, 1993).

The MMPI requires a sixth-grade reading level and is completed by most persons in 1 to 1½ hours.

The original MMPI scales were developed by contrasting item responses of carefully defined psychiatric patient groups (average *N* of about 50) with item responses of about 700 controls. The psychiatric patient groups included the following diagnostic categories: hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, psychopathy, male homosexuality, paranoia, psychasthenia,[5] schizophrenia, and the early phase of mania (hypomania). In addition, samples of socially introverted and socially extraverted college students were used to construct a scale for social introversion. The MMPI-2 retains the basic clinical scales with only minor item deletions and revisions. Ben-Porath and Butcher (1989) investigated the characteristics of the rewritten items on the MMPI-2 and discovered that they are psychometrically equivalent to the original items.

The MMPI-2 can be scored for four validity scales, 10 standard clinical scales, and dozens of supplementary scales. In practice, clinicians place the greatest emphasis upon the validity and standard clinical scales. The supplementary scales are just that—supplementary. They provide information helpful in fine-tuning the interpretation of the traditional validity and clinical scales. MMPI-2 scale raw scores are converted to *T* scores, with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Scores that exceed *T* of 65 merit special consideration. These elevated scores are statistically uncommon in the general population and may signify the presence of psychiatric symptomatology. We will concentrate upon the traditional scales here, beginning with a review of the four validity scales, known as Cannot Say (or ?), L, F, and K.

The Cannot Say score is simply the total number of items omitted or double-marked in completion of the answer sheet. The instructions for the test encourage examinees to mark all items, but omissions or double-marked items will occur. However, this is rare—the modal number of items omitted is zero (Tamkin & Scherer, 1957). Omission of up to 10 items appears to have little effect on the overall test results—one of the benefits of having a huge pool of statements in the MMPI-2. A very high score on this scale may indicate a reading problem, opposition to authority, defensiveness, or indecisiveness caused by depression.

The L Scale is composed of 15 items all scored in the false direction. By answering "false" to L Scale items, the examinee asserts that he or she possesses a degree of personal virtue that is rarely observed in our culture (e.g., never gets angry, likes everyone, never lies, reads every newspaper editorial, and would rather lose than win). The L Scale was

[5]This outdated diagnostic term is quite similar to what would now be labeled obsessive-compulsive disorder.

designed to identify a general, deliberate, evasive test-taking attitude. A high score on the L Scale indicates that the examinee is not only defensive, but naively so. Persons with any degree of psychological sophistication can adopt a defensive test-taking attitude and still score in the normal range on the L Scale.

The F Scale consists of 60 items answered by normal subjects in the scored direction no more than 10 percent of the time. These items reflect a broad spectrum of serious maladjustment, including peculiar thoughts, apathy, and social alienation. Even though F Scale items seem to indicate psychiatric pathology, they are seldom endorsed by patients. Fewer than 50 percent of these items appear on the clinical scales. Many persons with significant psychiatric disturbance do produce elevated scores in the range of $T = 70$ or 80 on the F Scale. On the other hand, exceptionally high scores suggest additional hypotheses: insufficient reading ability, random or uncooperative responding, a motivated attempt to "fake bad" on the test, or an exaggerated "cry for help" in a distressed client.

The K Scale was designed to help detect a subtle form of defensiveness. The 30-item scale is composed, in part, of 22 items that differentiated normal profiles produced by defensive hospitalized psychiatric patients from those produced by normal controls. Additionally, eight items that improved discrimination of depressive and schizophrenic symptoms were added (McKinley, Hathaway & Meehl, 1948). An elevated score on the K Scale may indicate a defensive test-taking attitude. Normal range elevations on the K Scale suggest good ego strength—the presence of useful psychological defenses that allow the person to function well in spite of internal conflict.

The combined use of F and K may be useful in the detection of MMPI-2 profiles that have been faked or malingered. In one study, 81 percent of fake-good profiles were identified by a simple decision rule (using raw scores) of $F-K < -12$, whereas 87 percent of fake-bad profiles were identified by a simple decision rule (using raw scores) of $F-K > 7$ (Bagby, Rogers, Buis, & Kalemba, 1994).

Several clinical scales are "K-corrected" to improve their discriminatory power. The rationale for this practice is that elevations on K betoken an artificial reduction of scores on these clinical scales. Portions of the raw score on K are thus added to these clinical scale scores prior to computation of the *T* scores. The K-corrected scales, discussed later, include Hypochondriasis, Psychopathic Deviate, Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia, and Hypomania. Whether K correction actually improves the MMPI-2 is debatable, but the test publishers continued the tradition from the MMPI for the sake of continuity. Separate norms for non-K-corrected scale score transformations are also available.

In addition to the validity scales, the MMPI-2 is always scored for 10 clinical scales. With the exception of Social Introversion, these clinical scales were constructed in the usual criterion-keyed manner by contrasting responses of clinical subjects and normal controls. As noted previously, Social Introversion was developed by contrasting the responses of college students high and low in social introversion. The 10 clinical scales and common interpretations of elevated scores are outlined in Table 8.6.

Dozens of supplementary scales can also be scored on the MMPI-2. Some of the supplementary scales are based upon rational identification of symptom clusters and subsequent scale purification by empirical means. Fifteen useful MMPI-2 Content Scales were developed in this manner (Butcher, Graham, Williams, & Ben-Porath, 1990). Many of the supplementary scales were developed by independent investigators; these scales vary widely in quality. In practice, only about 30 of the additional scales are routinely scored. Examples of the supplementary scales include Anxiety, Repression, Ego Strength, and the MacAndrew Alcoholism Scale-Revised. Anxiety (A) and Repression (R) are the first two major factors that always emerge from factor analysis of MMPI-2 responses. An interesting supplementary scale is Barron's (1953) Ego Strength (Es) Scale, which purports to predict positive response to psychotherapy. However, not all studies confirm this use of the scale (Graham, 1987). The MacAndrew Alcoholism Scale-Revised (MAC-R; MacAndrew, 1965) is a useful index of alcohol or other substance abuse. The MAC-R is not only useful

TABLE 8.6 The 10 Clinical Scales from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2

Scale No. and Abbreviation	*Scale Name*	*K Correction*	*Typical Interpretation of Elevation*
1 Hs	Hypochondriasis	.5K	Excessive physical preoccupation
2 D	Depression		Sad feelings, hopelessness
3 Hy	Hysteria		Immaturity, use of repression, denial
4 Pd	Psychopathic deviate	.4K	Authority conflict, impulsivity
5 Mf	Masculinity-femininity		Masculine interests [women], feminine interests [men]
6 Pa	Paranoia		Suspiciousness, hostility
7 Pt	Psychasthenia	1K	Anxiety and obsessive thinking
8 Sc	Schizophrenia	1K	Alienation, unusual thought processes
9 Ma	Hypomania	.2K	High energy, possible agitation
0 Si	Social introversion		Shyness and introversion

in assessment of alcoholism but is also helpful in the identification of heavy drinkers and drug-dependent individuals (Wolf, Schubert, Patterson, Grande, & Pendleton, 1990). We cannot possibly review all the useful supplementary scales here. The interested reader should consult Butcher and Williams (1992) and Graham (1993).

MMPI-2 Interpretation

The interpretation of an MMPI-2 profile can proceed along two different paths: scale by scale or configural. In the simplest possible approach, scale by scale, the examiner determines the validity of the test, as discussed previously, by inspecting the four validity scales. If the test appears reasonably valid by these criteria, the examiner consults a relevant resource book and proceeds scale by scale to produce a series of hypotheses. For example, Lachar (1974) has distilled the meaning of various elevations on the Pa or Paranoia scale as follows:

> *T* = 27–44 examinee may be stubborn, touchy, or difficult
>
> *T* = 45–59 no undue sensitivity and adequate regard for others
>
> *T* = 60–69 increasing probability of rigidity and oversensitivity
>
> *T* = 70–79 rigid, touchy, projects blame and hostility
>
> *T* = 79–100 frankly delusional paranoid features may be present

The configural approach to MMPI-2 interpretation is somewhat more complicated and consists of classifying the profile as belonging to one or another loosely defined code type that has been studied extensively. Code types are usually defined

by a combination of elevation (two or more clinical scales elevated beyond a certain criterion) and definition (two or more clinical scales clearly standing out from the others). For example, in its full-blown manifestation, the 4–9 code type can be defined by a valid profile in which scale 4 (Psychopathic Deviate) and scale 9 (Hypomania) are the high-point elevations, both exceed *T* of 65 (elevation), and both exceed the next highest clinical scale by at least 5 *T*-score points (definition). Here is how Graham (1993) describes persons who fit this code type:

> The most salient characteristics of 49/94 individuals is a marked disregard for social standards and values. They frequently get in trouble with the authorities because of antisocial behavior. They have a poorly developed conscience, easy morals, and fluctuating ethical values. Alcoholism, fighting, marital problems, sexual acting out, and a wide array of delinquent acts are among the difficulties in which they may be involved. This is a common code type among persons who abuse alcohol and other substances.

The most likely diagnosis for such individuals is antisocial personality disorder.

We should mention briefly that several computerized interpretation systems are available for the MMPI and the MMPI-2 (Fowler, 1985; Butcher, 1987). The Minnesota Report™ (Butcher, 1993) is the best. This system generates a very cautious and methodical 16-page report that includes discussion of profile validity, symptomatic patterns, interpersonal relations, diagnostic considerations, and treatment considerations. The Minnesota Report™ also provides a variety of figures and tables to illustrate test results.

The adequacy of computerized MMPI-2 narrative reports is generally good, but the reader should realize that computer programs are written by fallible human beings. There is a danger that computer-generated test reports will be erroneous. Furthermore, some less-reputable interpretive systems can be purchased on microcomputer diskette for a few hundred dollars. This increases the risk that computer-based test interpretations will be misused by unqualified persons. We discuss the pitfalls of computerized test interpretation in the final chapter of the book.

Technical Properties of the MMPI-2

From the standpoint of traditional psychometric criteria, the MMPI-2 presents a mixed picture. Reliability data are generally positive, with median internal consistency coefficients (alpha) typically in the .70s and .80s, but as low as the .30s for some scales in some samples. One-week test–retest coefficients range from the high .50s to the low .90s, with a median in the .80s (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). These are good figures considering that some attributes—such as those measured by the Depression scale—change so quickly that the test–retest methodology is of questionable suitability.

A shortcoming of the MMPI-2 is that intercorrelations among the clinical scales are extremely high. For example, in the case of scales 7 and 8, the Psychasthenia and Schizophrenia scales, the correlation is commonly in the .70s. In part, this reflects the item overlap between MMPI scales—scales 7 and 8 share 17 items in common. But it is also true that the criterion-keyed approach is not well suited to the development of independent measures. A high intercorrelation of basic scales is one price to be paid for using this test development strategy.

The validity of the MMPI-2 is difficult to summarize, owing to the sheer volume of research on this instrument and its predecessor, the MMPI. As of 1975, over 6,000 studies employing the MMPI had been completed (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). Of course, thousands of additional studies have been published since then. Graham (1993) provides a brief but excellent review of validity studies on the MMPI/MMPI-2. He notes that the average validity coefficient for MMPI studies conducted between 1970 and 1981 was a healthy .46. He also points out the confirming pattern of extratest correlates in dozens of studies of identified patient groups. Research also indicates that the MMPI-2 is highly comparable to the MMPI, for which a substantial body of validity data has been compiled (Hargrave, Hiatt, Ogard, & Karr, 1994). Finally, bias studies comparing MMPI-2 results for Caucasian

and African American clients indicate that slight racial differences do exist in average profiles. However, these differences validly reflect emotional functioning; that is, the MMPI-2 is not racially biased (McNulty, Graham, Ben-Porath, & Stein, 1997). The MMPI-2 likely will maintain its status as the premiere instrument for assessment of psychopathology in adulthood for many years to come.

In 2008, a new version of the MMPI-2 with reduced length and restructured scales was released (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008; Tellegen & Ben-Porath, 2008). Because it embodies a restructured format (RF), the recent entry is called the MMPI-2-RF. This innovative test comprises 338 items carefully selected from the original 567 items of the MMPI-2, using modern psychometric methods for scale construction. Certainly the reduced length is a potential advantage. Patients often tire when completing the MMPI-2, and some find the experience tedious and onerous. Even so, the MMPI-2-RF constitutes a dramatic departure from the parent instrument and is therefore really a new test (Butcher, 2011). The utility of the MMPI-2-RF will rest upon accumulated research in the coming years.

Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III)

The MCMI-III is a personality inventory designed for the same purposes as the MMPI-2, namely, to provide useful information for psychiatric diagnosis (Millon, 1983, 1987, 1994). The MCMI-III has two advantages over the MMPI-2. First, it is much shorter (175 true–false items) and, therefore, more palatable to clinical referrals; second, it is planned and organized to identify clinical patterns in a manner that is compatible with the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (*DSM-IV*) of the American Psychiatric Association.

The MCMI-III is a highly theory-driven test, incorporating Millon's elaborate theoretical formulations on the nature of psychopathology and personality disorder (Millon, 1969, 1981, 1986; Millon & Davis, 1996). The test includes 27 scales, listed in Table 8.7. The first 11 scales measure personality

TABLE 8.7 Scales of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III

Clinical Personality Patterns		**Clinical Syndromes**	
1	Schizoid	A	Anxiety
2A	Avoidant	H	Somatoform
2B	Depressive	N	Bipolar: Manic
3	Dependent	D	Dysthymia
4	Histrionic	B	Alcohol Dependence
5	Narcissistic	R	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
6A	Antisocial		
6B	Aggressive (Sadistic)	**Severe Syndromes**	
7	Compulsive	SS	Thought Disorder
8A	Passive-Aggressive (Negativistic)	CC	Major Depression
8B	Self-Defeating	PP	Delusional Disorder
Severe Personality Pathology		**Validity (Modifying) Indices**	
S	Schizotypal	X	Disclosure
C	Borderline	Y	Desirability
P	Paranoid	Z	Debasement

styles or traits such as narcissism and antisocial tendencies; the next three assess more severe personality pathology (schizotypal, borderline, and paranoid disorders); the following seven scales assess clinical syndromes such as anxiety and depression; the next three scales assess severe clinical syndromes such as thought disorder; the last three scales are validity (response style) indices. Scores on these scales (Disclosure, Desirability, and Debasement) are used to adjust the other scale scores upward or downward, based on defensiveness or exaggeration of symptoms, respectively.

Scale development for the MCMI-III and its precursors was careful and methodical. We can only portray the broad outline here, in which 3,500 initial items were culled to 175 statements in three stages of test development: a theoretical-substantive stage (theory-guided item writing), an internal-structural stage (item-scale correlations), and an external-criterion stage (contrast of diagnostic groups with the reference group). A special feature of the last stage was Millon's use of general psychiatric patients instead of normal controls as the reference group. The purpose of this strategy was to enhance the capacity of MCMI scales to differentiate specific diagnostic groups from one another. Unfortunately, one side effect of this particular criterion-keyed approach was a rather substantial degree of item overlap for the clinical scales. Millon planned for and expected the item overlap but probably did not anticipate that some pairs of scales on the MCMI would share the majority of their items in common. Some of this overlap was eliminated with the further refinement of the test for the second and third editions. The revised instrument also incorporates an item-weighting procedure. In this approach, individual questions are weighted 2 or 1 to reflect their importance in discriminating the prototype for each scale. The item-weighting approach has been criticized as unnecessary and unwieldy (Streiner, Goldberg, & Miller, 1993).

The normative sample for the MCMI-III consisted of about a thousand men and women patients from across the United States. This is an unusual and controversial approach to the collection of a normative sample. More typically, population-proportionate sampling of reasonably normal individuals is used. Millon offers the arguable justification that a patient sample is adequate for the normative sample because the base rates (in the general population) for specific personality and clinical disorders were consulted to calibrate the cutting points on the individual scales (Millon & Davis, 1996). But this approach is complex, experimental, and difficult to understand. The reliability of the individual scales is good: Internal consistency coefficients average .82 to .90, and test–retest coefficients for one week range from .81 to .87. Support for the validity of the MCMI-III is mixed (Haladyna, 1992; Piersma & Boes, 1997). Craig (1993) has assembled a series of articles that are largely supportive of the MCMI. Jankowski (2002) provides a beginner's guide to the test.

Personality Inventory for Children-2 (PIC-2)

The PIC-2 (Lachar & Gruber, 2001) is a substantial revision of the PIC-R, a popular instrument that dates back to the late 1950s (Wirt & Broen, 1958; Wirt, Lachar, Klinedinst, & Seat, 1984). The current version, suitable for children 5 through 19 years of age, consists of 275 true–false statements that are completed by a parent or parental surrogate. The PIC-2 is one corner of a triad of instruments developed by David Lachar and colleagues to provide a comprehensive, multiview perspective on children's emotional and behavioral adjustment in the home, school, and community. The complementary instruments are the Personality Inventory for Youth (PIY), which is filled out by the child, and the Student Behavior Survey (SBS), which is filled out by the teacher. We discuss only the PIC-2 here. Items on the PIC-2 resemble the following:

> My child finds it difficult to fall asleep.
>
> My child is a finicky eater.
>
> My child has threatened to kill himself (herself).
>
> Sometimes my child swears at other adults.
>
> Our marriage has been full of turmoil.

The instrument also provides a shorter 96-item version known as the Behavioral Summary, suitable for screening and research purposes.

The test developers of the PIC-2 followed a complex multistage methodology to assign individual items to scales and subscales. The goal was to minimize content overlap between scales and subscales by examining preliminary item × subscale correlations and then retaining only those items for each specific subscale that showed high correlations. As a consequence of this test development strategy, each subscale possesses homogeneous content and the individual statements correlate substantially with one another. The resulting instrument consists of three response validity scales (Inconsistency, Dissimulation, Defensiveness) and nine adjustment scales. Each of the adjustment scales includes two or three subscales (Table 8.8).

Scale raw scores are converted to *T* scores with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10. Higher *T* scores indicated increased probability of psychopathology or deficit. Norms for children ages 5 through 19 years of age are based on a nationally representative sample of 2,306 parents of boys and girls in kindergarten through 12th grade.

With the possible exception of the three validity scales (Inconsistency, Dissimulation, and Defensiveness), the PIC-2 scale and subscale names are self-explanatory. The validity scales are (1) Inconsistency, which includes 35 similar pairs of items to determine consistency of responding; (2) Dissimulation, a 35-item scale designed to identify deliberate exaggeration (fake bad) about symptoms or random responding; and (3) Defensiveness, a 24-item scale consisting of improbable virtues (e.g., "my child never has any problems") and therefore an index of naive defensiveness.

The reliability of PIC-2 scales and subscales is good, with test–retest values in the range of .82 to .92 and internal consistency coefficients in the range of .81 to .92. The test manual (Lachar & Gruber, 2001) summarizes a huge body of criterion-related validity studies such as correlations with independent ratings from clinicians. These correlations are very strong for similar behavioral dimensions (and weak for dissimilar behavioral dimensions), thus supporting the validity of individual scales and subscales. In like manner, PIC-2 subscale scores show theory-consistent relationships with the *DSM-IV* diagnostic categories of clinic-referred children. For example, 63 children independently diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder showed highly elevated scores (average *T* scores of 75 to 80) on the following PIC-2 subscales: Disruptive Behavior, Fearlessness, Dyscontrol, and Noncompliance. This is a perfect match to the major clinical features of this *DSM-IV* diagnostic category. Overall, the test developers have cited an impressive body of research that supports the reliability and validity of their instrument. Although independent studies of this test are yet to be published, it seems clear that the PIC-2 will earn wide usage in the behavioral and emotional assessment of school-aged children.

TABLE 8.8 Adjustment Scales and Subscales of the Personality Inventory for Children-2

Adjustment Scales	*Subscales*
Cognitive Impairment	Inadequate Abilities
	Poor Achievement
	Developmental Delay
Impulsivity and Distractibility	Disruptive Behavior
	Fearlessness
Delinquency	Antisocial Behavior
	Dyscontrol
	Noncompliance
Family Dysfunction	Conflict among Members
	Parent Maladjustment
Reality Distortion	Developmental Deviation
	Hallucinations and Delusions
Somatic Concern	Psychosomatic Preoccupation
	Muscular Tension and Anxiety
Psychological Discomfort	Fear and Worry
	Depression
	Sleep Disturbance/Death Preoccupation
Social Withdrawal	Social Introversion
	Isolation
Social Skills Deficits	Limited Peer Status
	Conflict with Peers

BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT

Behavioral assessment concentrates on behavior itself rather than on underlying traits, hypothetical causes, or presumed dimensions of personality. The many methods of behavioral assessment offer a practical alternative to projective tests, self-report inventories, and other unwieldy techniques aimed at global personality assessment.

Typically, behavioral assessment is designed to meet the needs of therapists and their clients in a quick and uncomplicated manner. But behavioral assessment differs from traditional assessment in more than its simplicity. The basic assumptions, practical aspects, and essential goals of behavioral and traditional approaches are as different as night and day. Traditional assessment strategies tend to be complex, indirect, psychodynamic, and often extraneous to treatment. In contrast, behavioral assessment strategies tend to be simple, direct, behavior-analytic, and continuous with treatment.

Behavior therapists use a wide range of modalities to evaluate their clients, patients, and subjects. The methods of behavioral assessment include, but are not limited to, behavioral observations, self-reports, parent ratings, staff ratings, sibling ratings, judges' ratings, teacher ratings, therapist ratings, nurses' ratings, physiological assessment, biochemical assessment, biological assessment, structured interviews, semistructured interviews, and analogue tests. In their *Dictionary of Behavioral Assessment Techniques,* Hersen and Bellack (1988) list 286 behavioral tests used in widely diverse problems and disorders in children, adolescents, adults, and the geriatric population. Dozens more are referenced in a more recent compendium (Hersen & Bellack, 1998). So that the reader can appreciate the diversity of techniques available, we provide a sampling of these tests in Table 8.9.

In recent years, a new form of behavioral assessment known as ecological momentary assessment has become increasingly popular. In ecological momentary assessment, the client carries a wireless handheld device similar to a personal digital assistant and responds in real time to preplanned inquiries from the researcher. This approach is designed to circumvent a number of limitations of traditional self-report techniques. We discuss ecological momentary assessment in more detail at the end of this chapter.

TABLE 8.9 A Sampling of Behavioral Assessment Tests and Techniques

Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale
Alcohol Dependence Scale
Assertiveness Self-Statement Test
Automatic Thoughts Scale
Behavioral Assessment of Satiety
Behavioral Pain Scale
Blood Alcohol Level
Body Sensation Questionnaire
Compulsive Activity Checklist
Conversational Skills Rating Scale
Current Dieting Questionnaire
Dementia Behavioral Assessment Test
Drinking Context Scale
Gifted Behaviors Rating Scale
Goal Attainment Scaling
Health Risk Attitude Scale
Irrational Beliefs Inventory
McGill Pain Questionnaire
Physical Activity and TV Viewing
Physical Fighting—Youth Risk Survey
Pittsburgh Insomnia Rating Scale
Prosocial Behaviors of Children
Rape Trauma Symptom Rating Scale
Scale for the Assessment and Rating of Ataxia
Scale of Sexual Experience
Six Minute Walk Test
Sleep Assessment Scale
Victimization in Dating Relationships

Behavioral assessment is often—but not always—an integral part of **behavior therapy** designed to change the duration, frequency, or intensity of a well-defined target behavior. For example, one therapy goal for a shy college student might be that she initiate a minimum of five conversations

lasting two minutes or more each day. The therapist might recommend that she approach this goal incrementally, beginning with a few brief social exchanges before proceeding to lengthier conversations with strangers. In this example, behavioral assessment might take the form of self-monitoring in which the student uses a wristwatch for timing and a diary for keeping track of conversations.

As noted, behavioral assessment often exists in service of behavior therapy. In many cases, the nature of behavioral assessment is dictated by the procedures and goals of behavior therapy. For this reason, the reader will better appreciate behavioral assessment tools if we interweave this topic with a discussion of behavior therapy methods.

Behavior therapy, also called behavior modification, is the application of the methods and findings of experimental psychology to the modification of maladaptive behavior (Plaud & Eifert, 1998). The roots of behavior therapy can be traced to Skinner's (1953) seminal book, *Science and Human Behavior,* which detailed the application of operant conditioning to the problems of human behavior. Skinner shunned any reference to private, nonobservable events such as thoughts or feelings; he emphasized the importance of identifying observable behaviors and methodically altering the environmental consequences of those behaviors.

Research by Wolpe (1958) on the systematic behavioral treatment of phobias also was influential in founding the methods of behavior therapy. Wolpe's clinical procedures were derived from his laboratory work on the conditioning and counterconditioning of fear in cats. Like Skinner, Wolpe deemphasized the significance of thoughts and beliefs. He viewed fear as a learned phenomenon that could be unlearned by following a strict protocol of graduated exposure to the feared object or situation.

After Skinner, Bandura (1977), Mahoney and Arnkoff (1978), and Meichenbaum (1977) reintroduced cognitive factors into the ever-changing behavioral framework. For example, Bandura (1977) demonstrated that persons are perfectly capable of cognitively based learning. In particular, he showed that individuals can learn from mere observation of the response contingencies experienced by models. Since this learning occurs in the absence of personal consequences, it must be cognitively mediated. As a consequence of this paradigm shift, practically all modern-day behavior therapists concern themselves—at least to some extent—with the thoughts and beliefs of their clients. This new emphasis is reflected in a family of very popular treatment procedures known collectively as cognitive behavior therapy (Hofmann & Reinecke, 2010).

BEHAVIOR THERAPY AND BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT

At present, the specific techniques of behavior therapy can be classified into four overlapping categories (Johnston, 1986): exposure-based methods, cognitive behavior therapies, self-control procedures, and social skills training. Behavioral assessment is used in all of these approaches, as reviewed in the following sections. However, there are relatively few behaviorally based tools for the evaluation of social skills, so this category is not discussed. Readers who desire limited coverage of instruments for the behavioral evaluation of social skills training (including assertiveness) should consult Meier and Hope (1998).

Exposure-Based Methods

Exposure-based methods of behavioral therapy are well suited to the treatment of phobias, which include intense and unreasonable fears (e.g., of spiders, blood, public speaking). One approach to phobic avoidance is systematic exposure of the client to the feared situation or object. Wolpe (1973) favored gradual exposure with minimal anxiety in a procedure known as systematic desensitization. In this therapeutic approach, the client first learns total relaxation and then proceeds from imagined exposure to actual or in vivo exposure to the feared stimulus. Another exposure-based method is flooding or implosion in which the client is immediately and totally immersed in the anxiety-inducing situation.

The therapist needs some type of behavioral assessment to gauge the continuing progress of a client undergoing an exposure-based treatment for a phobia. In the simplest possible assessment approach, known as a **behavioral avoidance test** (BAT), the therapist measures how long the client

can tolerate the anxiety-inducing stimulus. Here is one classic example of a standardized BAT used to evaluate patients with agoraphobia, a disabling fear of open spaces often accompanied by panic attacks:

> The standardized Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) was conducted a week after intake. All anxiolytics, antidepressants, or other psychotropic medication had been taken away at least 4 days before the test. The test was administered by the first author, who was blind to the patients' diagnoses [and] not involved in the treatment. The patients were asked to walk alone as far as they could from the hospital along a mildly trafficated road that was 2 km long. The route was divided into eight intervals of equal length, and the patients rated their anxiety level on a 0–10 scale at the end of each interval. Uncompleted intervals were given a score of 10. An avoidance-anxiety score was computed by summing the anxiety scores for all intervals. (Hoffart, Friis, Strand, & Olsen, 1994)

The researchers discovered that the avoidance-anxiety score from the BAT technique was strongly related to self-reports of catastrophic thoughts (e.g., choking to death, having a heart attack, acting foolish, becoming helpless). This finding illustrates that behavioral assessment approaches often encompass a cognitive component as well. Notice, too, the direct relationship between the goal of therapy and the behavioral avoidance test. In agoraphobia, the primary treatment goal is to reduce patients' anxiety about walking alone in open spaces—which is exactly what the BAT measures.

The BAT approach is predicated on the reasonable assumption that the client's fear is the main determinant of behavior in the testing situation. Unfortunately, demand characteristics for desirable behavior may exert a strong influence on the client's behavior. The client's tolerance of the anxiety-inducing stimulus will bear some relationship to experienced fear but also has much to do with the situational context of assessment (McGlynn & Rose, 1998). The results of BAT assessments may not generalize, and the therapist must be wary of foreclosing treatment too soon.

A **fear survey schedule** is another type of behavioral assessment useful in the identification and quantification of fears. Fear survey schedules are face valid devices that require respondents to indicate the presence and intensity of their fears in relation to various stimuli, typically on a 5- or 7-point Likert scale. Dozens of these instruments have been published, including versions by Wolpe (1973), Ollendick (1983), and Cautela (1977). Tasto, Hickson, and Rubin (1971) used factor analysis to develop a 40-item survey that yields a profile of fear scores in five categories. A generic fear survey schedule is shown in Table 8.10. Fear survey schedules are often used in research projects to screen large samples of persons in search of subjects who share a common fear. Another use of these schedules is to monitor changes in fears, including those that have been targeted for clinical intervention.

Klieger and Franklin (1993) have raised a number of cautions about the use of fear survey schedules in clinical research. These authors note that reliability data for fear surveys are almost nonexistent. A more serious problem has to do with the validity of these instruments. Using the Wolpe and Lang (1977) Fear Survey Schedule-III (FSS-III), a highly respected and widely used schedule, Klieger and Franklin (1993) found no relationship between reported fears on the FSS-III and BAT measures of the same fears. For example, subjects who reported a high fear of blood on the FSS-III were just as likely to approach a bloody white towel and touch it as were subjects who reported no fear of blood. Similar results were found for subjects who feared snakes, spiders, and fire. The researchers concluded that the FSS-III and similar instruments are a poor choice for identifying experimental groups and a poor basis for measuring the outcome of therapeutic interventions. The essential downfall seems to be that fear survey schedules possess such "obvious" validity that few researchers have bothered to evaluate the traditional psychometric characteristics of reliability and validity. Fear survey schedules should be used with caution.

Cognitive Behavior Therapies

The one factor common to all cognitive behavior therapies is an emphasis on changing the belief

TABLE 8.10 Example of a Fear Survey Schedule

Please check the column that best describes your current response to these situations or objects.

	Degree to which you would be disturbed				
	Not at All	Just a Little	Moderate Amount	Very Much	Extremely Bothered
Being in a strange place					
Speaking in public					
Walking into a party					
Getting an injection					
People watching me work					
Large open spaces					
Being fat					
Spider on the wall					
Cat in the room					
Reprimand from the boss					

Note: Most fear survey schedules consist of several dozen items.

structure of the client. The three best-known variants of **cognitive behavior therapy** are Ellis's (1962) rational emotive therapy (RET), Meichenbaum's (1977) self-instructional training, and Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy. Ellis postulates that most disturbed behavior is caused by irrational beliefs, such as the widespread belief that one must have the love and approval of all significant persons at all times. Ellis attempts to alter such core irrational beliefs, primarily by logical argument and forceful exhortation. Meichenbaum's self-instructional technique consists of teaching the client to use coping self-statements to combat stressful situations. For example, a college student suffering from intense test-taking anxiety might be taught to use the following self-talk during examinations: "You have a strategy this time. . . . Take a deep breath and relax. . . . Just answer one question at a time. . . ." Beck's cognitive therapy concentrates mainly on the role of cognitive distortions in the maintenance of depression and other emotional disturbances. Beck (1983) regards depression as primarily a cognitive disorder characterized by the negative cognitive triad: a pessimistic view of the world, a pessimistic self-concept, and a pessimistic view of the future. In therapy, he uses a gentle form of cognitive restructuring to help the client perceive his or her problems in alternative, solvable terms.

Cognitive behavior therapists need not use formal assessment tools in their clinical practice. Typically, these therapists monitor the belief structure of their clients on an informal session-to-session basis. Irrational and distorted thoughts are challenged as they arise during therapy. In the end, the client's self-report of improvement may constitute the main index of therapeutic success. Nonetheless, several straightforward measures of cognitive distortion are available. We have outlined a few prominent instruments in Table 8.11. These instruments are mainly research questionnaires suitable to the testing of group differences, but not sufficiently validated for individual assessment. Clark (1988) faults the developers of cognitive distortion questionnaires for premature release of their instruments. In particular, he notes the absence of research on the concurrent and discriminant validity of most self-statement measures. Another problem is that existing questionnaires were designed to validate constructs in research and consequently do not work well in clinical practice.

TABLE 8.11 Questionnaire Measures of Cognitive Distortion

Anxious Self-Statements Questionnaire (ASSQ)
(Kendall & Hollon, 1989)

Examinee rates how often specific anxious thoughts occurred over the last week. Items are of the form:

I can't stand it anymore.
What's going to happen to me now?
I'm not going to make it.

A psychometrically sound instrument, the ASSQ can be used to assess changes in the frequency of anxious self-talk.

Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ)
(Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Kazdin, 1990)

The ATQ is a frequency measure of depression-related cognitions that assesses personal maladjustment, negative self-concept and expectations, low self-esteem, and giving up/helplessness. The 30-item ATQ correlates very well with the MMPI Depression scale and the Beck Depression Inventory (Ross, Gottfredson, Christensen, & Weaver, 1986).

Cognitive Errors Questionnaire (CEQ)
(Lefebvre, 1981)

The CEQ assesses the degree of maladaptive thinking in general situations and also situations related to chronic low back pain. Discrete vignettes concerning chronic back pain and general scenes are each followed by an illogical dysphoric cognition. The respodent indicates on a 5-point scale how similar the cognition is to the thought he or she would have in the same situation. For example: "You just finished spending three hours cleaning the basement. Your spouse, however, doesn't say anything about it. You think to yourself, 'S(he) must think I did a poor job.'" Smith, Follick, Ahern, and Adams (1986) found that overgeneralization was the specific CEQ cognitive error most consistently correlated with chronic low back pain disability.

Attribution Styles Questionnaire (ASQ)
(Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Von Baeyer, 1979)

The ASQ measures three attributional dimensions relevant to Seligman's learned helplessness model of depression: internal-external, stable-unstable, and global-specific. Depressed persons attribute bad outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes; they attribute good outcomes to external, unstable causes. The questionnaire consists of 12 hypothetical situations, 6 describing good outcomes, 6 describing bad outcomes (e.g., "You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time"). The respondents rate each vignette on a 7-point scale for degree of internality, stability, and globality.

Hopelessness Scale (HS)
(Beck, 1987; Dyce, 1996)

A 20-item true/false scale, the HS is designed to quantify hopelessness, one component of the negative cognitive triad found in depressed persons. (The triad consists of negative views of self, world, and future.) The scale is sensitive to changes in the patient's state of depression. In a validational study, Beck, Riskind, Brown, and Steer (1988) found that HS scores had a negligible relationship to anxiety or general psychopathology when the influence of coexisting depression was partialed out. Thus, the HS appears to measure a specific attribute of depression rather than general psychopathology.

An exceptional and well-validated measure not listed in Table 8.11 is the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI is a short, simple, self-report questionnaire that focuses, in part, on the cognitive distortions that underlie depression (Beck & Steer, 1987; Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). One reason for its popularity is that most patients can complete the 21 items on the BDI in 10 minutes or less. The test has been widely used: More than 1,900 articles using the BDI have been published (Conoley, 1992). A second edition of the inventory was released in 1996 (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). On the BDI-II, several items were revised so as to bring the inventory into closer conformity with prevailing diagnostic criteria for depression. The 21 items are of the following form:

Check the statement from this group that you feel is most true about you:

0 I am upbeat about the future.
1 I feel slightly discouraged about the future.
2 I feel the future has little to offer for me.
3 I feel that the future is utterly hopeless.

Thirteen items cover cognitive and affective components of depression such as pessimism, guilt, crying, indecision, and self-accusations; eight items assess somatic and performance variables such as sleep problems, body image, work difficulties, and loss of interest in sex. The examinee receives a score of 0 to 3 for each item; the total raw score is the sum of the endorsements for the 21 items; the highest possible score is 63.

In a meta-analysis of BDI research studies, the internal consistency of the scale (coefficient alpha) ranged from .73 to .95, with a mean of .86 in nine psychiatric populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). The BDI-II possesses excellent internal consistency with a coefficient alpha of .92 (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Test–retest reliability of the BDI is modest, with a range of .60 to .83 in nonpsychiatric samples and .48 to .86 in psychiatric samples. However, the test–retest methodology is not well suited to phenomena such as depression that are naturally unstable. Subjective depression fluctuates dramatically from week to week, day to day, even hour to hour. A lackluster value for test–retest reliability might signify valid change in the construct being measured rather than unwanted measurement error.

A variety of normative results are available, with BDI data for samples of patients with major depression, dysthymia, alcoholism, heroin addiction, and mixed problems. The manual also provides guidelines for degree of depression based upon BDI score (0 to 9, normal; 10 to 19, mild to moderate; 20 to 29, moderate to severe; 30 and above, extremely severe). These ratings are based upon clinical evaluations of patients.

The BDI has been extensively validated against other measures of depression and independent criteria of depression. For example, correlations with clinical ratings and scales of depression such as from the MMPI are typically in the range of .60 to .76 (Conoley, 1992). Sex differences are minimal, although there may be slight differences in the expression of depression between men and women (Steer, Beck, & Brown, 1989). Large college student samples of Whites (N = 838) and Blacks (N = 139), the BDI-II was found to be free of racial bias (Sashidharan, Pawlow, & Pettibone, 2012). Yet, in a comparison of 218 older patients (M = 69.4 years of age) versus 613 younger patients (M = 37.9 years of age), Kim, Pilkonis, Frank, Thase, and Reynolds (2002) found strong evidence of differential item functioning. Specifically, older patients tended to report fewer cognitive symptoms, especially for low to average levels of depression, and tended to report more somatic symptoms, especially for high levels of depression. The authors propose revised cut-off scores for the various levels of depression (mild, moderate, and severe) in older patients.

The BDI-II is particularly useful in primary care medical settings, where the presence of significant depression can be overlooked. Many patients are not aware of their illness, and some physicians may not be trained to examine for it. In a sample of 340 medical outpatients, Arnau, Meagher, Norris, and Bramson (2001) found that 23 percent of the group scored in the range indicative of mild, moderate, or severe depression on the test. The instrument proved helpful in identifying patients with depression who might otherwise be overlooked. Overall, the BDI-II was 92 percent accurate in identifying patients meeting the formal criteria for Major Depressive Disorder.

The only shortcoming of the BDI-II is its transparency. Patients who wish to hide their

despair or exaggerate their depression can do so easily. However, for patients who are motivated to accurately report their cognitive and emotional status, the BDI-II ranks among the best instruments for indexing the presence and degree of depression. Some clinicians ask patients to complete the BDI-II after each therapy session; they use the BDI much as a physician might use a thermometer.

Self-Monitoring Procedures

A common misconception about behavior therapy is that it consists of authoritarian therapists applying powerful rewards and punishments to passive clients. Although this stereotypical model may be true for some impaired clients with limited behavioral repertoires, for the most part behavior therapy consists of humane practitioners teaching their clients methods of self-control. An emphasis upon self-monitoring is fundamental to all forms of behavior therapy. In **self-monitoring**, the client chooses the goals and actively participates in supervising, charting, and recording progress toward the end point(s) of therapy. According to this model, the therapist is relegated to the status of expert consultant.

Self-monitoring procedures are especially useful in the treatment of depression, a prevalent behavior disorder consisting of sad mood, low activity level, feelings of worthlessness, concentration problems, and physical symptoms (sleep loss, appetite disturbance, reduced interest in sex). Several self-monitoring programs for depression have been reported (Lewinsohn & Talkington, 1979; Rehm, Kornblith, O'Hara, & others, 1981). In order to illustrate the self-monitoring approach to the control of depression, we will summarize one small corner of the program advocated by Lewinsohn and his colleagues (Lewinsohn, Munoz, Youngren, & Zeiss, 1986).

Lewinsohn observed that depression goes hand in hand with a marked reduction in the experiencing of pleasant events. Depressed persons retreat from engaging in pleasant activities; the behavioral withdrawal only contributes further to their depression, inciting a continuous downward spiral. Fortunately, it is possible to replace the downward spiral with an upward one. To help reverse the downward spiral of depression, Lewinsohn and his colleagues devised the Pleasant Events Schedule (PES; MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1982). The purpose of the PES is twofold. First, in the baseline assessment phase, the PES is used to self-monitor the frequency (*F*) and pleasantness (*P*) of 320 largely ordinary, everyday events. Examples of the kinds of events listed on the PES include the following:

reading magazines
going for a walk
being with pets
playing a musical instrument
making food for charity
listening to the radio
reading poetry
attending a church service
watching a sports event
playing catch with a friend
working on my job

The frequency and pleasantness of these everyday events are both rated 0 to 2.[6] The mean rate of pleasant activities is then calculated from the sum of the $F \times P$ scores; that is, mean rate = $F \times P/320$. Normative findings for mean *F,* mean *P,* and mean $F \times P$ are reported in Lewinsohn, Munoz, Youngren,

[6]The Frequency Scale is calibrated as follows:
0—This has *not* happened in the past 30 days.
1—This has happened a *few times* (1 to 6 times) in the past 30 days.
2—This has happened *often* (7 times or more) in the past 30 days.

The Pleasantness Scale is calibrated as follows:

0—This was *not* pleasant.
1—This was *somewhat* pleasant.
2—This was *very* pleasant.

and Zeiss (1986) and serve as a basis for treatment planning. Participants in the Lewinsohn program also monitor their daily mood on a simple 1 (worst) to 9 (best) basis.

The second use of the PES is to self-monitor therapeutic progress. Based on the initial PES results, clients identify 100 or so potentially pleasant events and strive to increase the frequency of these events, monitoring daily mood along the way. Clients who increase the frequency of pleasant events generally show an improvement in mood and other depressive symptoms.

The PES is a highly useful tool for clinicians who wish to implement a self-monitoring approach to the assessment and treatment of depression. MacPhillamy and Lewinsohn (1982) report favorably on the technical qualities of the PES and discuss a variety of rational, factorial, and empirical subscales, which we cannot review here. The instrument has fair to good test–retest reliability (one-month correlations in the range of .69 to .86), excellent concurrent validity with trained observers, and promising construct validity. In general, the subscales behave as one would predict on the basis of the constructs they purport to measure—we refer the reader to MacPhillamy and Lewinsohn (1982) for details.

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

An important responsibility for many mental health practitioners is to determine a proper psychiatric diagnosis for their patients, within prevailing guidelines. Almost without exception, practitioners utilize the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* now in its fourth edition (*DSM-IV;* APA, 2000). The latest version includes a "Text Revision" and for this reason is known technically as *DSM-IV-TR.* Here we use the less cumbersome acronym *DSM-IV*. *DSM-V* is scheduled for release in 2013.

Five axes are included in the *DSM-IV* classification. Axis I concerns clinical disorders such as Alcohol Use Disorder, Panic Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, or Schizophrenia. Axis II pertains to personality disorders such as Borderline Personality Disorder, Avoidant Personality Disorder, or Dependent Personality Disorder. Axis III is employed to identify general medical conditions (e.g., hypothyroidism, heart disease) that may bear upon psychological adjustment. Axis IV is for reporting psychosocial and environmental problems (e.g., loss of friends, unemployment, litigation, no health insurance) that may impact personal functioning. Axis V consists of an anchored rating scale, the Global Assessment of Function (GAF) Scale, used to assign a summary score of functioning from 1 (e.g., immobilized, suicidal) to 100 (e.g., thriving, sought out). Of course, intermediate scores are available and clearly operationalized. For example, a GAF score of 70 indicates some mild symptoms but generally good psychological functioning.

Diagnosis is construed by some people as a form of pointless, overconfident, pigeonholing. In truth, it serves a number of indispensable functions. As outlined by Andreasen and Black (1995), these key purposes include:

- Reducing the complexity of clinical phenomena
- Facilitating communication between clinicians
- Predicting the outcome of the disorder
- Deciding on an appropriate treatment
- Assisting in the search for etiology
- Determining the prevalence of diseases worldwide
- Making decisions about insurance coverage

Yet, for all of its advantages, there are also problems with *DSM-IV*. One problem is the sheer amount of time it can take to determine a multiaxial diagnosis. A second and related difficulty is that, although the *DSM-IV* textbook describes the diagnostic categories and alternatives with great precision, it does not specify a coherent method for arriving at the diagnosis. A third problem flows from the previous two, namely, psychiatric diagnosis is mixed in its reliability (Andreasen & Black, 1995). Interrater agreement for some diagnoses is very high (e.g., Alcohol Use Disorder) but for other diagnoses it is only moderate to low (e.g., Borderline Personality Disorder).

Several interview schedules have been developed to reduce the time needed for diagnosis and also to improve the reliability of the enterprise by standardizing the procedures. Broadly speaking, these instruments are of two types: semistructured approaches that allow for some clinician leeway in follow-up questioning, and structured approaches

that mandate a completely scripted approach. Here we will describe two prominent schedules to illustrate this important form of psychological assessment.

The Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS; Spitzer & Endicott, 1978) is a highly respected diagnostic interview for evaluating Axis I mood and psychotic disorders. The SADS is a semistructured inquiry that includes standard questions asked of all patients and optional probes used to clarify patient responses (Rogers, Jackson, & Cashel, 2004). Additional unstructured questions can be asked to augment the optional probes. Part I of the SADS methodically examines Axis I symptoms for the current episode, including the worst period and the current week, whereas Part II provides a survey of past episodes. Through a progression of questions and criteria, the interviewer solicits sufficient information to assess the severity of disturbance and also to elucidate the diagnosis. For example, one item on the SADS addresses prominent signs of depression: pessimism and hopelessness. A standard inquiry for this item might be: "Have you felt discouraged?" An affirmative answer would trigger optional probes such as "How do you see things working out?"

Rogers (2001) has reviewed the voluminous research on reliability and validity of the SADS and offers an encouraging endorsement of the instrument. For example, the consensus from over 21 studies is that the interrater reliability for specific diagnoses is typically strong, with median kappa coefficients of greater than .85. **Kappa** is the index of interrater agreement, corrected for chance (Cohen, 1960). Validity for the SADS also is robust with moderate predictive validity (e.g., results moderately predict the course and outcome of mood disorders) and strong concurrent validity (e.g., results correlate with other similar schedules). A child's version of the schedule, known as the "kiddie" SADS or K-SADS, also is available (Ambrosini, 2000).

Finally, we would be remiss not to mention a family of instruments known as SCID, the Structured Clinical Interview for *DSM-IV* (First & Gibbon, 2004). SCID comes in numerous editions and variations, including SCID-I for Axis I diagnoses, SCID-II for Axis II diagnoses, SCID-P for determining the differential diagnosis of psychotic symptoms, and SCID-NP for nonpatient settings in which a current psychiatric disorder is unlikely. All of the forms follow the same format in which the interviewer reads the SCID questions to the client in sequence, the objective being to elicit sufficient information to determine whether individual *DSM-IV* criteria are met. The interviewer has the leeway to ask for specific examples of affirmative answers. Thus, SCID is a semistructured interview. A logical flow sheet is followed to determine the appropriate diagnosis. The SCID reveals generally good interrater agreement for *DSM-IV* diagnosis, but this is variable from one diagnosis to the other. In Table 8.12, we have summarized the average kappas from multiple studies of SCID reliability. Kappa values above .70 are considered good agreement, values from .50 to .69 are deemed fair, and values below .50 indicate poor agreement.

ASSESSMENT BY SYSTEMATIC DIRECT OBSERVATION

Although not a prominent approach with adults, systematic and direct observation is widely used in the evaluation of children, especially by psychologists who work in school systems. In fact, Wilson and Reschly (1996) determined that systematic observation is the single most commonly used assessment method among school-based practitioners, who reported an average of more than *15* student behavioral observations per month.

It is essential to distinguish systematic, direct observation from more casual approaches such as naturalistic observation. Anyone can engage in the informal and anecdotal methods that characterize naturalistic observation—and most people do so every day. These methods typically culminate in formless conclusions such as "Johnny seems to be out of his seat a lot during the school day." In contrast, systematic and direct observation is highly structured and set apart by five characteristics (Hintze, Volpe, & Shapiro, 2002; Salvia & Ysseldyke, 2001):

1. The goal of observation is to measure specific behaviors.
2. The target behaviors have been operationally defined beforehand.
3. Observations are conducted under objective, standardized procedures.

TABLE 8.12 Average SCID Interrater Agreement for Psychiatric Diagnosis

Axis I Diagnoses	*Weighted Kappa*
Major Depressive Disorder	79
Dysthymic Disorder	63
Bipolar Disorder	77
Schizophrenia	80
Alcohol Dependence/Abuse	90
Other Substance Dependence/Abuse	86
Panic Disorder	75
Social Phobia	63
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder	53
Generalized Anxiety Disorder	66
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder	89
Somatoform Disorder	41
Eating Disorder	71
Axis II Personality Disorders	
Avoidant	64
Dependent	66
Obsessive Compulsive	56
Passive-Aggressive	67
Self-Defeating	62
Depressive	65
Paranoid	68
Schizotypal	70
Schizoid	76
Histrionic	64
Narcissistic	74
Borderline	62
Antisocial	72

Note: Decimals omitted.
Source: Average results for multiple studies reported on the SCID website (www.scid4.org).

4. The times and places for observation are carefully specified.
5. Scoring is standardized and does not vary from one observer to another.

This form of assessment is appealing because of its direct link to intervention. In fact, it is common to employ observational assessment before, during, and after an intervention to determine the impact on the individual student.

Commonly, systematic and direct observation is executed by means of an objective, structured coding system. Many different styles of coding systems have been proposed; we have space here only to illustrate a few popular methods. Sattler (2002) provides an extensive review, devoting two chapters to this topic. One straightforward approach is simple frequency counting of target behaviors. Typically, the target behaviors are undesirable behaviors such as a student leaving his or her seat, calling out, or being off task. Of course, the characteristics of these behaviors would be carefully specified in advance. Then an observer sits off to the side and unobtrusively records the frequency of each behavior within discrete time periods. The purpose of this kind of assessment is to objectify the extent of troublesome actions. This information serves as a baseline for later comparison to determine the effectiveness of any interventions. See Figure 8.4 for an example. In this hypothetical example, it is evident that the student "Sammy" is more out of control in the afternoon than the morning, which may be valuable information when it comes to remediation planning.

Another approach to systematic, direct observation is to record the duration of target behaviors. Typically, target behaviors are undesirable actions such as temper tantrums, social isolation, or aggressive outbursts, but the focus of assessment also may include desirable behaviors such as staying on task during a designated reading period or vigilantly working on a homework assignment (Hintze, Volpe, & Shapiro, 2002). For some behaviors, duration may be more important than frequency. Consider out-of-seat behavior as an example. A third grader who is out of his seat in a morning for six brief episodes of a few seconds each is far, far less problematic—both to self and others—than a student who leaves his seat once for 10 minutes. See Figure 8.5 for an example of a duration recording sheet. In this hypothetical example, it is evident that "Susan" exhibits a high level of undesirable behavior. The goal of intervention might be to reduce both the frequency and the average duration of her tantrum behaviors.

Date: November 10, 2005 Observer: Judy Jones
Student: Sammy Smith Age: 8-5 Grade: 3

	Target Behaviors		
Time Period	*Calling Out*	*Leaving Seat*	*Off Task*
9:00–9:15	××××	××	××××
9:15–9:30	×××	×××	××
9:30–9:45	×××	×××	××
9:45–10:00	×	××	××
2:00–2:15	×××××	×××××	××
2:15–2:30	××××××	××××	×××××××
2:30–2:45	×××××	×××	×××××××
2:45–3:00	××××	××××	×××××××

Calling Out: Specific episodes of interrupting teacher, calling to classmates, making noise, yelling
Leaving Seat: Separate event such as standing without permission, leaving the seat, knees on seat
Off Task: Not doing assigned work (e.g., daydreaming, playing with objects, doing other work)

FIGURE 8.4 Example of a Frequency Recording Sheet

Date: November 10, 2005 Observer: Judy Jones
Student: Susan Brown Age: 8-5 Grade: 3

Time Start: 9:00 Time Stop: 12:00

Tantrum Behavior Separate Incidents	*Elapsed Time in Minutes and Seconds*
1	3 min 00 s
2	2 min 30 s
3	1 min 15 s
4	4 min 30 s
5	2 min 45 s
Total:	14 min 00 s
Average Episode	2 min 48 s

FIGURE 8.5 Example of a Duration Recording Sheet

In addition to the individualized forms of direct observation that we have illustrated here, dozens of published forms also are available (e.g., Sattler, 2002, Chapters 4 and 5). For these instruments, the categories of observation and the operational definitions are prespecified, which saves time for the practitioner. For example, Shapiro (1996) has issued the Behavior Observation of Students in Schools (BOSS), a straightforward form that consists of six categories of classroom behavior—five designed for students and one for the teacher. The BOSS classifies behaviors as active engagement, passive engagement, off-task motor, off-task verbal, and off-task passive. Of course, these categories are thoroughly defined in operational terms. Direct instruction by the teacher also is recorded. The BOSS is rated in 15-second intervals for a 15-minute interval. The instrument also allows for the collection of behavioral norms for classmates to determine normative patterns in each category.

Although direct observations offer the utmost simplicity in format, it is important to recognize a number of threats to reliability and validity for this genre of assessment (Baer, Harrison, Fradenburg, Petersen, & Milla, 2005). Sattler (2002) has catalogued the sources of unreliability, which include personal qualities of the observer, poor design of instruments, and problems in obtaining a representative sample of behavior. For example, **observer drift** occurs when an observer becomes fatigued and less vigilant over time, thus failing to notice target behaviors when they occur. Expectations also can influence ratings such as when the observer has been told that a child is aggressive—and then records questionably aggressive acts as aggressive. The primary antidote to observer inaccuracy is careful training and cross-checking of one observer against another to demonstrate a high level of interrater agreement. With regard to poor design of instruments, the most common error is **coding complexity**, in which there are too many categories or ill-defined categories. Attention to design of rating scales and pretesting of instruments will avert this problem. Problems also can arise in the suitable sampling of behavior. For example, if a child's attentional difficulties mainly arise in the afternoon, clearly it is pointless to collect data only in the morning. Ratings

should be collected throughout the day or, if this is not possible, during the most salient time periods.

ANALOGUE BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT

The methods of analogue behavioral assessment are closely related to the methods of systematic, direct observation. The main difference has to do with the settings in which the observations occur. In systematic, direct observation, the assessment of clients takes place in a natural setting such as a classroom. In **analogue behavioral assessment**, clients are observed in a contrived but plausible setting and also are instructed to engage in relevant tasks designed to elicit behaviors of interest (Haynes, 2001). The goal is to create a state of affairs analogous to pivotal situations in real life—hence, the use of the word *analogue* in describing this form of observational assessment.

Perhaps some examples will help clarify the nature and scope of this approach. One application of analogue behavioral assessment is the evaluation of children referred for assessment of behavior or school problems (Mori & Armendariz, 2001). A specialist who works with these children could dedicate a separate room in his or her clinic to analogue behavioral assessment. The room might resemble a small classroom, complete with blackboard, a few student desks, and bookcases. The referred child would be given a realistic homework assignment and told to work on it for 30 minutes while waiting for the interview. The psychologist then observes through a one-way window and records relevant behaviors using a suitable rating scale.

Analogue behavioral assessment also can be used to evaluate parent–child interactions. For example, in evaluating a 3-year-old referred for behavior problems, the clinician might place the parent and child in a room full of toys with instructions to play for 10 minutes. The psychologist then instructs the parent to tell the child, "Okay, it's time to go. You have to pick up the toys just like you do at home." The clinician observes through a one-way window and codes both the parental management style and the nature and degree of child compliance.

In like manner, analogue behavioral assessment has been used in the assessment of adult couples, including husbands and wives seeking marital therapy (Heyman, 2001). In a standard paradigm, the clinician asks the couple to discuss two conflict areas for 5 to 7 minutes each. The clinician sits to the side observing the interactions and recording communication patterns with a standard form such as the Rapid Couples Interaction Scoring System (RCISS; Krokoff, Gottman, & Hass, 1989). The RCISS consists of 22 codes that address speaker and listener behaviors, both verbal and nonverbal, in such categories as criticism, disagreement, compromise, positive solution, questioning, humor, and smiling. Instruments of this genre typically do not reveal strong interrater agreement for specific constructs (e.g., put-downs), but the more inclusive constructs such as positive affect versus negative affect fare better and provide information that is helpful in characterizing communication patterns (Heyman, 2001). There are little or no data on the test–retest reliability of the RCISS or similar instruments, and some researchers advise caution in their use. For example, King (2001) faults the RCISS because it does not deal adequately with issues of subtext or "reading between the lines" in couples' communication.

ECOLOGICAL MOMENTARY ASSESSMENT

Recent advances in wireless connectivity have spawned an entirely new approach to assessment known as ecological momentary assessment (EMA). **Ecological momentary assessment** is defined as the "real-time measurement of patient experience in the real world, at the point of experience" (Shiffman, Hufford, & Paty, 2001). Consider the research problem of determining whether a new drug treatment is effective in ameliorating the severe pain of migraine headaches. Whereas previous research methods relied upon retrospective questionnaire reports of patients receiving a new drug treatment, an EMA approach instead would consist of patients reporting their instantaneous experiences on a handheld device, with responses immediately transmitted (via the same wireless technology used by cell phones) to a central computer for ultimate analysis with sophisticated software. For example, the handheld device might "beep" to signal that the patient should immediately respond (on a touch-sensitive

screen) to a series of rating scales for pain, mood, fatigue, and other relevant dimensions. The entire self-rating procedure might take less than a minute. The ratings would be requested several times a day on a randomized schedule.

Because EMA responses of clients are immediate and based on a schedule determined by the researcher, several biases of human recall are avoided. For example, consider the biasing effects of saliency, in which emotionally charged events dominate recall. For instance, a very brief episode of severe migraine pain may be recalled as lasting much longer than the actual experience because of the emotional valence of the incident. Whereas a retrospective questionnaire report of this pain would be affected by the salience of the event, an EMA analysis, with periodic real-time sampling of the actual pain experiences, would provide a more accurate portrayal of the episode. Recency is another recall bias that is circumvented by EMA. The recency bias refers to the fact that people are more likely to recall recent events than remote events. Potentially, this could lead to underestimation of the therapeutic effects of a drug if retrospective recall coincided with the onset of symptoms. In contrast, with an EMA analysis, client reporting consists of periodic and instantaneous time samples; the results are relatively unaffected by the recency bias.

In general, EMA provides a more accurate and reliable approach to the assessment of patient experience than traditional approaches such as retrospective questionnaires. One advantage is that compliance cannot be faked (as when patients fill out a week's worth of daily questionnaires minutes before handing them in to the researcher). In fact, because EMA approaches are highly user-friendly, researchers report an astonishing overall compliance of 93 to 99 percent averaged across many studies (Shiffman et al., 2001). EMA has been used in research into treatments for acute pain, alcoholism, arthritis, asthma, depression, eating disorders, headaches, hypertension, gastrointestinal disorders, schizophrenia, smoking, and urinary incontinence (Shiffman & Hufford, 2001; Shiffman, Hufford, Hickcox, and others, 1997; Smyth, Wonderlich, Crosby, and others, 2001). As EMA technology becomes streamlined and more affordable, we can expect this new technique to become commonplace in psychological outcome studies with clients.

In addition to practical applications in health care research, the EMA methodology also can be used to test psychological theories, as illustrated by a recent study of emotions. Tong, Bishop, Enkelmann, and others (2005) enlisted the cooperation of 118 police officers in Singapore to wear an ambulatory blood pressure monitor during their work day. This device also beeped at random about every 30 minutes, a signal that the officer should fill out a simple 12-item questionnaire in a palmtop as soon as possible. The items, rated on 5-point scales, included topics such as:

- How pleasant is this event?
- To what extent are you getting what you expected?
- How much personal effort is needed to deal with it?
- How much control do you have over the event?

With practice, it would take less than a minute to fill out a questionnaire of this nature. Of course, the added advantage of the EMA approach is that data are collected in naturalistic settings in real time, and, therefore, not prone to biases in recall.

In some cases, EMA provides for insights that would be difficult to achieve with any other research methodology. Consider the common belief that binge eating is maintained because it reduces negative affect, which is known as the affect regulation model (Polivy & Herman, 1993). Put simply, this is the view that people binge on food because they feel bad, and bingeing helps them feel better, at least in the short run. Because retrospective reports are notoriously untrustworthy, researchers prefer more immediate access to personal experiences in real time. Fortunately, when EMA is used with large samples of binge eaters, it is inevitable that some of the randomly requested mood reports will occur just before and just after episodes of binge eating. In a meta-analysis of 36 EMA studies including 968 participants, Haedt-Matt and Keel (2011) found that negative affect increased prior to episodes of binge eating. But they also discovered that negative affect continues to increase afterward, which fails to support a key prediction of the affect regulation model.

CHAPTER 9

Evaluation of Normality and Individual Strengths

TOPIC 9A Assessment Within the Normal Spectrum

Broad Band Tests of Normal Personality
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
California Psychological Inventory (CPI)
NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R)
Stability and Change in Personality
Assessment of Moral Judgment
Assessment of Spiritual and Religious Concepts

In the previous chapter we surveyed tests used by psychologists to evaluate clients for a range of symptoms and life difficulties. These instruments included the mainstays of the profession such as the MMPI-2, MCMI-III, Rorschach, and TAT. Such tests might be referred to as "clinical" in nature, because they are well suited to the needs of clinical practice. But what are practitioners to do if they want to evaluate someone who is reasonably normal? In other words, assessment does not always entail delving into symptoms, distress level, defense mechanisms, diagnosis, and the like. One example might be a young executive who wants to know about "growth edges" in regard to leadership positions. Another example might be a college student who desires self-knowledge as part of vocational explorations.

Even though clinical tests such as those surveyed in the previous chapter can be employed within the normal spectrum, they do not excel in this application. In fact, the evaluation of normal personality was not the original purpose of tests such as the MMPI or the Rorschach. For example, the initial objective of the MMPI-2 was the diagnosis of psychopathology, which remains the most dominant and effective application of the instrument. Historically, the purpose of the Rorschach has been described by Frank (1939) and others as providing an "X-ray of the mind" to identify themes hidden away from ordinary observation. Currently, the most common application of the test is with clients who display complex psychological symptoms that do not fit neatly into the categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).

When a practitioner wants to assess personality within the normal spectrum, tests designed expressly for that purpose typically provide a more helpful perspective than instruments developed from the standpoint of psychopathology. Instead of measuring concepts such

as depression, paranoia, anxiety, narcissism, or suicide potential, the focus in these alternative instruments is on qualities pertinent to the normal range of human functioning. We are referring here to features like responsibility, social presence, intuition, locus of control, attachment style, or faith maturity. This chapter investigates an assortment of instruments suitable for assessment within the normal continuum and beyond.

Normality differs from abnormality by shades of gray rather than revealing a sharp demarcation (Offer & Sabshin, 1966). Understanding the various definitions of normality would involve a lengthy detour; we do not pursue the topic here. In their comprehensive textbook of psychiatry, Sadock and Sadock (2004) provide an excellent overview. Our goal here is to focus on useful tests and measures, including some that have been neglected because of the emphasis on psychopathology within the field of clinical psychology.

In Topic 9A, Assessment Within the Normal Spectrum, we explore the qualities of several tests and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. We feature a few widely used scales in this topic, including the venerable Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), one of the most widely employed personality tests of all time, and the California Psychological Inventory (Gough & Bradley, 1996), a measure with strong empirical roots.

In addition to their value in the assessment of client personality, tests also contribute to our understanding of both typical and atypical trajectories of personality across the life span. For this reason, we follow a key research issue in personality psychology, namely, whether personality remains stable or tends to shift in specific directions with age. We close the topic with an evaluation of tools for assessing spiritual and religious constructs.

Other forms of assessment pertinent to the normal spectrum of adult functioning also are covered in Topic 9A. We are referring here to the evaluation of spiritual, religious, and moral constructs. These specialized forms of assessment have received an increasing amount of attention in recent years.

In Topic 9B, Positive Psychological Assessment, we examine a number of relatively new scales that have emerged in response to a reawakening of interest in human potential, an interest that has remained largely dormant in psychology since the early 1900s (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). A special focus in this topic is the assessment of creativity.

BROAD BAND TESTS OF NORMAL PERSONALITY

A broad band test is one that measures the full range of functioning, as opposed to limited aspects. Beginning in the 1940s, researchers sought to capture the nuances of normal personality by developing broad-band self-report instruments. The sheer variety of approaches to this task is a testament to the complexity of human functioning. An enduring question, related to the previous topic on theories of personality, is how best to conceptualize the multifaceted notion of personality. For example, is personality best construed as a limited number of types, with most people resembling one type or another with reasonable precision? Or, is personality best interpreted as several dimensions, with each unique individual revealing a specific level of each dimension? If a dimensional approach is preferred, how many dimensions are needed to describe the array of human responses: 5, 16, 20—or more?

There are no definitive answers to these questions, although dimensional approaches generally have prevailed over typological methods in the history of test development. Even so, useful and popular typological approaches do exist. In fact, we begin the discussion of broad-band tests with an instrument that flexibly permits both a typological and a dimensional approach to the understanding of normal personality.

MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR (MBTI)

Originally published in 1962, the MBTI is a forced-choice, self-report inventory that attempts to classify persons according to an adaptation of Carl Jung's theory of personality types (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Tzeng, Ware, & Chen, 1989). As discussed below, recent adaptations of the test also provide dimensional scores in addition to the well-known four-letter typological codes.

According to the publisher, the MBTI is the most widely used individual test in history, taken by approximately 2 million people a year. Proponents of the instrument deem it valuable in vocational guidance and organizational consulting. It comes in a number of versions, including Form M, a 93-item test which can be purchased by qualified psychologists in a self-scoring paper-and-pencil format, or administered on-line. Other forms such as the 126-item Form G and the 144-item Form Q are available on-line and must be authorized by a psychologist who has agreed to a licensing arrangement with the publisher, Consulting Psychologists Press (www.cpp.com).

Regardless of the version employed, the MBTI is scored on four theoretically independent polarities: Extraversion–Introversion, Sensing–iNtuition, Thinking–Feeling, and Judging–Perceiving. The test-taker is categorized on one side or the other of each polarity, which results in a four-letter code such as ENTJ (Extraversion, iNtuition, Thinking, Judging). Because there are two poles to each of the four dimensions, this allows for 2^4 or 16 different personality types. Each of the 16 types has been studied extensively over the years.

The four polarities (E-I, S-N, T-F, J-P) do not necessarily correspond to common understandings of the anchor terms and hence require some explanation. It is also important to note that the concepts are intended to be value-neutral and merely descriptive. Thus, it is neither better nor worse to manifest Extraversion or Introversion. Likewise, Thinking and Feeling are simply different modalities and one is not better than the other, and so forth. The opposite ends of each polarity are simply different modes of being that may have a variety of implications for relationships, vocation, leadership, and personal functioning. Possessing the qualities of one polarity or the other may be advantageous (or not) in different situations.

Extraversion–Introversion is probably the easiest to describe. An extravert (E) directs energy outward to people and conversations, whereas an introvert (I) directs energy inward to his or her inner world. A note of clarification: The MBTI retains the original spelling of Extraversion, preferred by Jung, instead of using the synonymous concept of Extroversion, preferred by contemporary psychologists. Sensing–iNtuition involves two opposite ways of perceiving. Those who prefer sensing (S) rely on the immediate senses, whereas those who prefer intuition (N) rely upon "relationships and/or possibilities that have been worked out beyond the reach of the conscious mind" (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Of course, the letter N is used to designate intuition because the letter I already is taken to label Introversion. Thinking–Feeling refers to basing conclusions on thinking (T), that is, logic and objectivity, as opposed to feeling (F), which involves a reliance on personal values and social harmony. Finally, Judging–Perceiving indicates a preference for decisiveness and closure (J) or an open-ended flexibility and spontaneity (P). Whereas in common parlance the notion of "judging" often has a negative connotation, this is not the case when the term is applied to this polarity of the MBTI.

The 16 possible four-letter types are not equally represented in the general population, and some types are more common in specific occupational groups. For example, in a sample of 231 education graduate students from a Midwestern university, the ENFP type was by far the most common ($N = 43$), followed by ENFJ ($N = 28$) in frequency. Codes beginning with the letter E (Extraversion) constituted nearly two-thirds of this sample, which highlights the importance of Extraversion in the field of education. Paraphrasing from Myers and McCaulley (1985, p. 78), the work expectations for someone who embodies the ENFP type are as follows:

- prefers to work interactively with a succession of people away from the desk
- likes to work with a succession of new problems to be solved
- prefers to provide service that is appreciated
- likes to work in changing situations that require adaptation

These qualities align well with the role expectations for people heading into the field of education.

Standardization data for the MBTI is extensive and based on large samples collected over many decades (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). One particularly useful table is a list of occupations empirically attractive to the sixteen types. For example, 18 percent of attorneys are INTJ in type, whereas only 2 percent of elementary school teachers fit this

code. This is useful information for clients who take the test in search of personal or career guidance. Split-half reliabilities for the four scales are in the .80s for the combined subject pool of nearly 56,000 participants. Test–retest reliabilities for the four scales are somewhat lower and depend on the interval between tests. When the interval is short, on the order of a few weeks, results are strong, with coefficients mainly in the .70s and higher. Yet, when the interval is longer, on the order of several years, the coefficients are predictably lower, in the .40s and .50s. With regard to reliability, an important question with the MBTI is the stability of the four letter code from test to retest. The test manual reports on a dozen studies of code type stability, with retest intervals ranging from 5 weeks to 5 years (most intervals a year or two). On average, about 41 percent of examinees retained their identical code type, that is, all four letters of the code remained the same from test to retest. About 38 percent of examinees remained stable on three of the four letters, that is, one letter changed for them. About 17 percent of examinees retained two of their four letters, but switched on the other two. And, 3 percent retained only one letter, switching on the other three. Overall, these are impressive results as to the long-term stability of the MBTI code types.

In a review of 17 studies reporting reliability coefficients, Capraro and Capraro (2002) found respectably strong reliability coefficients of .84 (E-I), .84 (S-N), .67 (T-F), and .82 (J-P). Salter, Forney, and Evans (2005) conducted an especially rigorous evaluation of MBTI reliability, looking at the stability of MBTI categories across three administrations with 231 graduate students in education. The three administrations were at the beginning of the first year, beginning of the second year, and end of the second year. Their report included extensive analyses, but of interest here is the percentage of respondents who received the same classification (e.g., Extraversion or Introversion) on all three occasions. The percentage who displayed complete consistency for each dimension was as follows:

- E-I 67%
- S-N 66%
- T-F 69%
- J-P 71%

Given the stringency of the reliability approach (agreement across three administrations), these are respectable findings.

More than 400 references citing the MBTI were found in PsychINFO from 2000 to 2009, many pertaining to the validity of the instrument. For example, in a study of 177 managers, Higgs (2001) reported a significant relationship between emotional intelligence and the dominant MBTI function of iNtuition. Emotional intelligence is monitoring emotions of self and others and using this information to guide thinking and actions (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). A positive relationship with MBTI iNtuition is strong support for the validity of this dimension.

Another recent study also provides support for the validity of the polarities assessed by the MBTI. Furnham, Moutafi, and Crump (2003) tested 900 adults with two instruments: the MBTI and the Revised NEO-Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992). The NEO-PI-R is a well validated measure of personality that evaluates five factors of personality known as the "big five." These factors are Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness (to experience), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. As predicted by the authors, the MBTI dimensions revealed healthy and appropriate correlations with corresponding factors from the NEO-PI-R. Specifically, the following averaged concurrent validity correlations were found between the MBTI dimensions and the NEO-PI-R scales: E-I correlated .71 with Extraversion; S-N correlated –.65 with Openness; T-F correlated –.35 with Agreeableness; and, J-P correlated .46 with Conscientiousness. The negative correlations indicate an inverse relationship, that is, those categorized as S (Sensing) on the MBTI obtained low scores on Openness, whereas those categorized as N (iNtuition) obtained high scores on Openness. In like manner a T or Thinking type tended to obtain low scores on Agreeableness whereas an F or Feeling type tended to obtain high scores. All of these correlations are consistent with theoretical understandings of the MBTI and hence buttress the validity of the instrument.

As mentioned, recent versions of the MBTI yield additional information beyond the four-letter typological classification. For example, the 144-item form Q, available on-line, provides a highly detailed and sophisticated summary report that partitions

each of the four polarities into five facet scores. Hence the report includes a total of 20 facet scores in addition to the four-letter code. For example, the Thinking-Feeling dimension includes bipolar facets such as Logical-Empathetic, Reasonable-Compassionate, and Tough-Tender. The dimensions and facets of this version of the MBTI are displayed in Table 9.1. The report includes not only the typological classifications (e.g., T or F) but also a rating for each bipolar facet on an 11-point continuum. This kind of nuanced dimensional information appeals to many users.

TABLE 9.1 Dimensions and Facets of the MBTI, Form Q

Extraversion (E)	**(I) Introversion**
Initiating	Receiving
Expressive	Contained
Gregarious	Intimate
Active	Reflective
Enthusiastic	Quiet
Sensing (S)	**(N) Intuition**
Concrete	Abstract
Realistic	Imaginative
Practical	Conceptual
Experiential	Theoretical
Traditional	Original
Thinking (T)	**(F) Feeling**
Logical	Empathetic
Reasonable	Compassionate
Questioning	Accommodating
Critical	Accepting
Tough	Tender
Judging (J)	**(P) Perceiving**
Systematic	Casual
Planful	Open-Ended
Early Starting	Pressure-Prompted
Scheduled	Spontaneous
Methodical	Emergent

One concern about the MBTI is that the increasing cost of administering the instrument—in the range of $10 to $30 per individual—provides a disincentive for outside researchers who want to conduct reliability or validity studies. This is an issue not only for the MBTI but also for the most widely used contemporary tests. Understandably, test publishers want to profit from their massive and expensive efforts at test development. But the downside is that scholarly researchers need substantial funding if they desire to administer newer versions of the MBTI to large samples of examinees. Partly in reaction to the paucity of independent research on newer versions of this test, reviewers continue to suggest caution in its use, especially when making simplistic inferences from the four-letter type formulas (Pittenger, 2005).

CALIFORNIA PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY (CPI)

Originally published in 1957, the CPI is a true–false test designed expressly to measure the dimensions of normal personality (Gough & Bradley, 1996; McAllister, 1988). The instrument is available in two forms, the CPI-434 (Gough, 1995) and the CPI-260 (www.skillsone.com), which is available only online. The component scales and the interpretive strategies are nearly identical for the two versions, which differ mainly in the number of items—434 versus 260. Psychometric properties of both versions are similar and strong. Because of its ease of administration and the immediacy with which the practitioner receives an extensive computer-generated report, the CPI-260 rapidly is gaining favor among psychological practitioners.

The CPI-260 is scored for 20 folk measures of personality, 7 work-related scales, and 3 broad vectors. The purpose of the test is to provide a clear picture of the examinee by using descriptors based on the ordinary language of everyday life (Gough & Bradley, 1996). Three of the basic personality scales also provide information on test-taking attitudes and therefore function as validity scales. These scales are Good Impression (Gi), which assesses the extent to which the individual presents a favorable image to others; Communality (Cm), which

measures unusual responses that might arise from carelessness or faking bad; and Well-being (Wb), which gauges the portrayal of serious emotional problems.

The 20 folk measures and 7 work-related scales are listed and briefly described in Table 9.2. These scales are reported as *T*-scores normed to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 in the

TABLE 9.2 Brief Description of Standard and Work-Related CPI-260 Scales

	Standard Scales	*Common Interpretation of High Score*
Do	Dominance	dominant, persistent, good leadership ability
Cs	Capacity for Status	personal qualities that underlie and lead to status
Sy	Sociability	outgoing, sociable, participative temperament
Sp	Social Presence	poise, spontaneity, and self-confidence in social situations
Sa	Self-acceptance	self-acceptance and sense of personal worth
In	Independence	high sense of personal independence, not easily influenced
Em	Empathy	good capacity to empathize with other persons
Re	Responsibility	conscientious, responsible, and dependable
So	Social Conformity	strong social maturity and high integrity
Sc	Self-control	good self-control, freedom from impulsivity and self-centeredness
Gi	Good Impression	concerned about creating a good impression
Cm	Communality	valid and thoughtful response pattern
Wb	Sense of Well-being	not worrying or complaining, free from self doubt
To	Tolerance	permissive, accepting, and nonjudgmental social beliefs
Ac	Achievement via Conformance	achieves well in settings where conformance is necessary
Ai	Achievement via Independence	achieves well in settings where independence is necessary
Cf	Conceptual fluency	high degree of personal and intellectual efficiency
Is	Insightfulness	interested in and responsive to the inner needs, motives, and experiences of others
Fx	Flexibility	flexible and adaptable in thought and social behavior
Sn	Sensitivity	sensitive to others' feelings, personally vulnerable
	Work-Related Scales	*Common Interpretation of High Score*
Mp	Managerial Potential	good judgment, effective at dealing with people
Wo	Work Orientation	strong work ethic, rarely complains about work
Ct	Creative Temperament	creative thinker who prefers what is new or different
Lp	Leadership	strong leadership skills, deals well with stress
Ami	Amicability	collegial and cooperative, a good team player
Leo	Law Enforcement Orientation	practical, well suited to work in law enforcement

Source: Based on Gough, H. G. and Bradley, P. (1996). *CPI manual* (3rd ed.). Mountain View, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Also, Megargee, E. (1972). *The California Psychological Inventory handbook*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; and McAllister, L. (1988). *A practical guide to CPI interpretation*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

general population. The test developers used an empirical methodology of criterion-keying to develop the majority of the scales. Specifically, extreme groups of participants (mainly college students) were formed on such scale-relevant criteria as school grades, sociability, and participation in curricular activities. Item-endorsement frequencies were then contrasted to ferret out the best statements for each scale. For example, the Sociability (Sy) scale was constructed by contrasting item-endorsement rates for persons reporting a large number of social activities versus those reporting few or no social activities. In constructing four of the folk scales, the authors used a rational basis backed up by indices of internal consistency.

Reflecting the care with which the scales were constructed, reliability data for the CPI are respectable. Most alpha coefficients are in the .70s and .80s, with a median value of .76. The test–retest reliability coefficients tend to be somewhat lower, with a median retest correlation of .68. The authors provide a wealth of normative data, including average test scores for 52 samples of males and 42 samples of females, subdivided by education, occupation, college major, gender, and other variables. The basic normative sample consists of 3,000 males and 3,000 females of varying age, social class, and geographic region (Gough & Bradley, 1996).

In addition to the wealth of information provided by the individual scale scores, the CPI also is scored on three broad dimensions or vectors derived from decades of factor-analytic studies with the instrument. The three vectors include two basic orientations and a third theme reflecting ego integration. The first basic orientation called vector 1 or v.1 has two polarities: toward people or toward one's inner life. This vector is similar to the extraversion–introversion dimension found in nearly every personality theory ever proposed. The second basic orientation or v.2 also has two polarities: rule-favoring or rule-questioning. This vector reflects a conventional–unconventional dimension also found in many studies. These first two bipolar orientations, v.1 and v.2, provide a 2×2 typology of four lifestyles termed the Implementer, Supporter, Innovator, and Visualizer lifestyles, described below. The third vector or v.3 assesses a 7-point continuum variously referred to as self-realization, psychological competence, or ego integration. In the client feedback report provided by the publisher, v.3 is referred to as Level of Satisfaction and scored 1 (low) to 7 (high). This vector acts as a moderator for each of the lifestyles, with high scores on v.3 leading to a positive expression and low scores leading to a negative expression.

Results from several correlational studies confirm distinctive psychological portraits for the four lifestyles mentioned above (Gough & Bradley, 1996). Briefly, the four life styles are as follows:

- Implementers (extroverted and rule-favoring) tend to do well in managerial and leadership roles.
- Supporters (introverted and rule-favoring) function well in supportive or ancillary positions.
- Innovators (extroverted and rule-questioning) are adept at creating change.
- Visualizers (introverted and rule-questioning) work best alone in fields such as art or literature.

The CPI Manual provides a wealth of information about each lifestyle, including adjective correlates obtained from spouses, peers, and professional evaluators. From these empirical sources, a clear portrait of each lifestyle emerges. For example, the summary statement for Innovators is as follows:

> Gammas attend to and seek the monetary, prestige, and other rewards offered by society, but are often at odds with the culture concerning the criteria by which these rewards are apportioned. Their values are personal and individual, not traditional or conventional. Gammas [Innovators] are the doubters, the skeptics, those who see and resist the arbitrary and unjustified features of the status quo. At their best, they are innovative and insightful creators of new ideas, new products, and new social forms. At their worst, they are rebellious, intolerant, self-indulgent, and disruptive; and at low levels on the v.3 scale, they often behave in wayward, rule-violating, and narcissistic ways. (Gough & Bradley, 1996, p. 50)

The reader will notice that the third vector, v.3, moderates the expression of the Implementer lifestyle, for better or for worse. When v.3 is high, the Implementer is innovative and insightful. When v.3 is low, the Implementer is wayward and narcissistic. A similar pattern holds true for the other three lifestyles—each can have a positive or negative expression, depending on the level of personal integration reflected on the v.3 scale.

The CPI is heir to a long history of empirical research that substantiates a number of real-world correlates for distinctive test profiles. Due to space limitations, we can only list several prominent areas in which the value of the test has been empirically confirmed. The CPI is useful for helping predict the following:

- Psychological and physical health
- High school and college achievement
- Effectiveness of student-teachers
- Effectiveness of police and military personnel
- Leadership and management success

The CPI is particularly effective at identifying adolescents or adults who follow a delinquent or criminal lifestyle. For example, Gough and Bradley (1992) studied a sample of 672 delinquent or criminal men and women, contrasting their CPI scale scores with a large sample of controls. Of the 27 scales evaluated, they found significant mean differences on 25 for men and 26 for women. The most discriminating scale was Social Conformity (So), which revealed healthy point-biserial correlations of .54 for men and .58 for women. They also found that low scores on v.3 (a measure of ego integration) were associated with greater incidence of delinquency. The reader can find further details on the real-world empirical correlates of CPI profiles in Groth-Marnat (2003) and Hargrave and Hiatt (1989).

NEO PERSONALITY INVENTORY-REVISED (NEO PI-R)

The NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO PIR) embodies decades of factor-analytic research with clinical and normal adult populations (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The test is based upon the five-factor model of personality described in the previous chapter. It is available in two parallel forms consisting of 240 items rated on a five-point dimension. An additional three items are used to check validity. A shorter version, the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) is also available (Costa & McCrae, 1989). We limit our discussion to the NEO PI-R. Form S is for self-reports whereas Form R is for outside observers (e.g., the spouse of a client). The item format consists of five-point ratings: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree. The items assess emotional, interpersonal, experiential, attitudinal, and motivational variables.

The five domain scales of the NEO PI-R are each based upon six facet (trait) scales (Table 9.3). The internal consistency of the scales is superb: .86 to .95 for the domain scales, and .56 to .90 for the facet scales. Stability coefficients range from .51 to .83 in three- to seven-year longitudinal studies. Validity evidence for the NEO PI-R is substantial, based on the correspondence of ratings between self and spouse, correlations with other tests and checklists, and the construct validity of the five-factor model itself (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Piedmont & Weinstein, 1993; Trull, Useda, Costa, & McCrae, 1995).

The NEO PI-R is an excellent measure of personality that is especially useful in research. Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, and Ones (2000) describe a particularly fascinating research project with the test in which all U.S. presidents were evaluated by 115 highly informed, expert presidential biographers who filled out the NEO PI-R on behalf of the presidents, from George Washington through George H. W. Bush. The authors developed a typology of presidents from the data and related facets of the test to presidential success (i.e., historical greatness). They also published individual presidential profiles, such as the following results for George Washington (50 is average in the general population):

Neuroticism	47
Extraversion	44
Openness	39
Agreeableness	40
Conscientiousness	72

The portrait that emerges is of a leader who is well-adjusted, slightly introverted, not particularly open to experience, markedly disagreeable, and

TABLE 9.3 Domain and Facet (Trait) Scales of the NEO PI-R

Domains	*Facets*	
Neuroticism	Anxiety	Self-Consciousness
	Angry Hostility	Impulsiveness
	Depression	Vulnerability
Extraversion	Warmth	Activity
	Gregariousness	Excitement Seeking
	Assertiveness	Positive Emotions
Openness to Experience	Fantasy	Actions
	Aesthetics	Ideas
	Feelings	Values
Agreeableness	Trust	Compliance
	Straightforwardness	Modesty
	Altruism	Tender-Mindednesss
Conscientiousness	Competence	Achievement Striving
	Order	Self-Discipline
	Dutifulness	Deliberation

extremely conscientious. After reviewing the specific facet scores (see Table 9.3), the authors concluded that Washington "falls quite short of the modern political commodities of warmth, empathy, and open-mindedness."

The test also shows promise as a measure of clinical psychopathology. For example, Clarkin, Hull, Cantor, and Sanderson (1993) found that patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder scored very high on Neuroticism and very low on Agreeableness, which resonates strongly with every clinician's response to these challenging patients. Ranseen, Campbell, and Baer (1998) determined that 25 adults with attention deficit disorder scored significantly higher than controls in the Neuroticism domain and significantly lower in the Conscientiousness domain, demonstrating the usefulness of the NEO PI-R in understanding attention deficit disorders in adulthood. One minor concern about the instrument is that it lacks substantial validity scales—only three items assess validity. The administration of the NEO PI-R assumes that subjects are cooperative and reasonably honest. This is usually a safe assumption in research settings but may not hold true in forensic, personnel, or psychiatric settings.

For purposes of education and research, several psychometricians have constructed websites where it is possible to self-administer an equivalent version of the NEO PI-R. Although not identical to the commercial version of the test (Costa & McCrae, 1992), these parallel adaptations do provide estimates of examinee standing on the five broad domains and 30 subdomains of personality tested by the NEO PI-R and also provide useful narrative reports. One such site can be found at www.personalitytest.com. Another useful site is available at http://ipip.ori.org. This location hosts the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), advertised as a "scientific collaboratory for the development of advanced measures of personality and other individual differences." The term **collaboratory** was coined by Finholt and Olson (1997) to describe Internet-based arrangements that facilitate the collaboration of test specialists, regardless of geographical location. For example, the specific mission of IPIP is to bring test

development into the public domain and serve as a forum for the dissemination of research findings and psychometric developments.

Recently, the developers of the NEO-PI-R produced a new version that is more readable and therefore better suited to students as young as 12 years of age. The NEO-PI-3 is a careful and modest revision of the original instrument that addresses a number of problematic items difficult for adolescents and young adults to comprehend (McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005). As noted above, the NEO-PI-R consists of 240 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Agree* to *Strongly Disagree*. The authors identified 30 items using words on a par with *laissez-faire, fastidious,* and *adhere* that even adults might find challenging. The authors rewrote these items for transparency and carefully tested them for equivalence in a new sample of 500 respondents. Three illustrations of old items and replacement items (in boldface) are shown below. These are representative only, not the actual items and revisions:

1. I feel angst about the future.
1. **I feel nervous about the future.**
2. I think of myself as laissez-faire.
2. **I think of myself as easy-going.**
3. I enjoy situations of raucous hilarity.
4. **I like to laugh.**

An additional 18 items were rewritten because they revealed low item-total correlations with the facet (trait) scale to which they belonged. The resulting instruments, the NEO-PI-3, retained the original five-factor structure and revealed better internal consistency and readability than the previous version. In sum, the authors improved their test, especially for applications with adolescent and college-aged clients (Costa, McCrae, & Martin, 2008).

STABILITY AND CHANGE IN PERSONALITY

Most of us have heard adages like "People don't change" or "Personality traits become exaggerated with age" or "You have to hit bottom before change is possible." Opinions abound on the stability or malleability of personality. What the lay public seldom recognizes, however, is that issues of stability and change in personality can be approached with empiricism through psychological assessment. As we will see, a few tests figure prominently in lifespan developmental research, especially instruments that embody the five-factor approach (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

One question central to the field of personality psychology is whether personality remains stable throughout life, or reveals predictable shifts in certain qualities as we age. On the surface this question appears amenable to straightforward longitudinal research. Simply administer a suitable instrument to a large sample of the general population, and retest every five years or so. Then, chart the trends in dimensions of personality over the life span. But this is not as simple as it seems. One problem is **selective attrition**, in which less healthy individuals tend to drop out, disappear, or discontinue the project for reasons known and unknown (Barry, 2005). Although there are methodological adjustments for minimizing the impact, selective attrition nonetheless may skew results toward an unrealistically optimistic picture of trends in aging. Another problem with longitudinal research is that decades of time are needed to follow individuals over the life span. Long-term developmental research is difficult and expensive.

An alternative strategy is cross-sectional research in which a large sample of individuals of all ages (from teenagers to persons in their 90s) is tested at one point in time, allowing for immediate age comparisons in personality characteristics. This is an appealing technique but also fraught with methodological concerns. In particular, the cross-sectional strategy is vulnerable to a research problem known as cohort effects (Schaie, 2011). A cohort is a group of individuals born at roughly the same time who therefore share particular life experiences and historical influences. A **cohort effect** is the inference that differences between age groups (cohorts) are due to disparities in the nature and quality of early developmental or historical experiences rather than caused by the impact of aging. A hypothetical example will serve to illustrate. Suppose we observe in a cross-sectional study of neuroticism

(anxiety-proneness) that persons in their 70s score higher than those in their 50s. We might be tempted to attribute the apparent increase in neuroticism to the impact of aging and its attendant concerns. But that inference overlooks the possibility that the older participants in our study were *always* higher in neuroticism than the younger members, perhaps because their early formative years occurred during the frantic uncertainty of World War II, or for other unknown reasons. In this hypothetical example, the higher level of neuroticism would not be a general trend or result of traversing into old age, but a specific quirk of the older cohort. Again, this is an hypothetical example. Real age trends in neuroticism are reviewed below.

Yet, the proposal that historical forces can shape the personality of an entire cohort is accurate. Elder (1974) has documented historical impacts on personality in a path-breaking longitudinal study of children raised during the Great Depression (1929–1941). Among other findings, these children grew into adults who responded with habits of greater frugality than preceding or subsequent cohorts.

In studying age trends in personality, a certain degree of tentativeness is warranted, because no single study or method is conclusive. Some researchers combine longitudinal and cross-sectional methods in what is known as the cross-sequential approach (Nestor & Schutt, 2012). This method involves the longitudinal retesting of cross-sectional study participants on at least one additional occasion. The beauty of the cross-sequential method is that cohort effects can be distinguished from genuine longitudinal trends. This allows researchers to identify typical changes resulting from intrinsic maturation.

It is important to mention that core issues of personality change may not be wholly amenable to traditional methods of measurement. Consider the case study of Ann, interviewed on videotape five times over a span of 40 years, from age 21 to age 61 (Mitchell, 2007). She was one of more than 100 participants in the monumental Mills Longitudinal Study, conducted by Ravenna Helson (Helson & Soto, 2005). Mitchell (2007) analyzed the videotaped interviews of Ann through the lens of attachment theory, which we summarize briefly before returning to her story.

Attachment theory (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1965) broadly distinguishes secure attachment from insecure attachment. In secure attachment, distressed infants seek proximity to caregivers and receive nurturance from them without pause or ambivalence. In insecure attachment, distressed infants are unable to receive a sense of security from caregivers who are themselves limited or erratic (George & Solomon, 1999). Insecure attachment is further subdivided into three types: avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized (Main & Hesse, 1990). Volumes have been written about these styles; we can provide only the barest of outlines here. In the avoidant style, the distressed infant appears emotionally distant and the caregiver is disengaged. In the ambivalent style, the distressed infant becomes anxious, insecure, and angry, and the caregiver is inconsistent. In the disorganized style, the distressed infant seems depressed, angry, and passive, and the caregiver is extremely erratic.

Attachment theory is relevant to adult personality development because, in the words of Mitchell (2007), "Attachment status becomes personality style" (p. 97). Corresponding to the four styles of infant attachment mentioned above (secure, avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized), the linked attachment styles in adulthood are described as secure, dismissing of attachment, preoccupied with attachment, and disorganized-fearful (Main & Solomon, 1986). Questionnaires have been developed to assess attachment style in adulthood (e.g., Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992), but they are limited and drab in comparison to qualitative analysis of interview materials.

In the case study of Ann, Mitchell (2007) determined that Ann started her journey into adulthood (age 21) with a distinctly insecure attachment of the avoidant style. In narrative statements, Ann described a frightening childhood in which her mother died a prolonged death from cancer. This was bad enough, but compounding the trauma was that her father, previously a source of security, proved incapable of breaking the painful news to Ann, leaving it to her grandfather instead. Then, her father withdrew and became distant, which Ann experienced as even more devastating than the death of her mother. Ann developed an avoidant

attachment style. She feared abandonment for most of her life:

> This narrative presents a set of rich characters in a plot that devolves from intimate tenderness to death, abandonment, and benign neglect. The strong-minded girl escaped, but in the process a door was closed that would not open again for nearly 40 years. (Mitchell, 2007, p. 100)

The door opened gradually after the birth of an adored daughter, four years of therapy to deal with attachment concerns, divorce, falling in love again, remarriage, return to school, and a new career. When last interviewed, Ann revealed an amazing shift to a secure attachment style:

At 61, Ann was phasing in retirement and was "much less stressed, much more easy going." She was learning foreign languages, doing photography, involved in local politics, and often with her partner, family, and friends (p. 113).

The analysis provided by Mitchell (2007) is full of rich detail that we cannot recount here. The point of this somewhat lengthy digression into the case of Ann is that analyses based on average test scores from large groups of research participants, whether longitudinal or cross-sectional, will not capture the depth and vibrancy available from the qualitative study of individual lives in transition. Even so, empirical analyses provide a general framework for understanding stability and change in personality. Thus, we review key studies and conclusions below.

Personality Stability and Change in Middle and Late Life

Do people change in personality traits across the life course? Several researchers have sought to identify mean-level changes or **normative changes** that are generalizable patterns of development found in most people (Caspi & Roberts, 1999). Most commonly, investigators use the Big Five model of personality as their measurement perspective (Goldberg, 1981b). As the reader will recall, this is the view that personality is best conceived as five factors labeled neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.

Individual reports of developmental trends in the Big Five factors over the life course often seem inconclusive or contradictory. In a study of 2,274 participants in their forties retested after 6 to 9 years, Costa, Herbst, McCrae, and Siegler (2000) found minimal or no change in mean level of the Big Five factors, even though popular accounts indicate that midlife is a time of crisis and turmoil. In contrast, others report that personality traits continue to transform in middle and old age, with increases in conscientiousness and agreeableness, and decreases in some elements of extraversion (Helson, Kawn, John, & Jones, 2002).

How can we reconcile these contradictory reports? Perhaps the best approach to this dilemma is a comprehensive synthesis of all relevant studies by means of meta-analysis. **Meta-analysis** is a sophisticated statistical procedure for combining data from multiple studies. In this method, results from studies using different measurement techniques can be transformed to a common metric, the effect size, and then combined for powerful statistical analyses (Cohen, 1988). One type of **effect size** is Cohen's *d*, which is the mean difference on a variable between two comparison groups divided by the standard deviation of the pooled groups on that variable, or $d = (M_1 - M_2)/s_p$. While effect sizes exist theoretically on an infinite range in positive and negative directions, it is rare in everyday research that they exceed the bounds of +3.0 to −3.0, a value of 0 indicating no difference between groups. The beauty of meta-analysis is that studies using diverse tests, measuring slightly different constructs, based on varying scales of measurement, nonetheless can be transformed to the common metric of effect size and then combined for comprehensive analysis.

In regard to shifts in Big Five personality factors over the life course, Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006) completed a meta-analysis of 92 longitudinal samples to determine the patterns of normative change. Their findings constitute an authoritative synthesis of research in the field. They sorted the various personality test results into six categories closely resembling the Big Five taxonomy of personality traits. Their categories are effectively identical to the Big Five, except they split extraversion into two subcategories of social dominance and social

vitality. The six categories they investigated were emotional stability, conscientiousness, agreeableness, social dominance, social vitality, and openness to experience. They summarize their findings as follows:

> This study demonstrates that personality traits show a clear pattern of normative change across the life course. People become more socially dominant, conscientious, and emotionally stable mostly in young adulthood, but in several cases also in middle and old age. We found that individuals demonstrated gains in social vitality and openness to experience early in life and then decreases in these two trait domains in old age (Roberts et al., 2006, p. 14).

Further, they note that contrary to popular views about personality development, the biggest shifts occur not in adolescence, but in young adulthood when social role expectations are more taxing. Young adulthood is when most persons leave home, find a career, and integrate with the community. The authors caution that their findings are based entirely on Western samples and generalization to non-Western cultures therefore is unknown.

Soto, John, Gosling, and Potter (2011) pursued the question of age differences in personality traits with an intriguing and massive cross-sectional research project. Their sample consisted of an astonishing 1,267,218 individuals (age 10 to 65) who responded to a Web-based questionnaire on Big Five personality traits. Their assessment instrument was the Big Five Inventory (BFI), a simple 44-item measure with excellent psychometric qualities (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). The BFI is freely available to researchers for noncommercial purposes. The format of the instrument is depicted in Table 9.4. The test developers isolated two distinctive subscales, called Facet scales, for each of the Big Five domains.

TABLE 9.4 The BFI Facet Scales: Names and Example Items

BFI Facet Scale	*Example Items*
Extraversion	
Assertiveness	1. Has an assertive personality. 2. Is sometimes shy, inhibited. (R)
Activity	3. Is full of energy. 4. Generates a lot of enthusiasm.
Agreeableness	
Altruism	1. Is helpful and unselfish with others. 2. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone.
Compliance	3. Has a forgiving nature. 4. Starts quarrels with others. (R)
Conscientiousness	
Order	1. Tends to be disorganized. (R) 2. Can be somewhat careless. (R)
Self-Discipline	3. Perseveres until the task is finished. 4. Is easily distracted. (R)
Neuroticism	
Anxiety	1. Worries a lot. 2. Remains calm in tense situations. (R)
Depression	3. Is depressed, blue. 4. Can be moody.
Openness to Experience	
Openness to Aesthetics	1. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences. 2. Has few artistic interests. (R)
Openness to Ideas	3. Likes to reflect, play with ideas. 4. Is curious about many things.

Note: Reverse-keyed items are denoted by (R). The common stem for all BFI items is "I see myself as someone who . . . " BFI _ Big Five Inventory.

Source: Reprinted with permission from Soto, C. J., John, O. P., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2011). Age differences in personality traits from 10 to 65: Big Five domains and facets in a large cross-sectional sample. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *100*, 330–348.

Their assessment tool, the BFI, is appropriate for children and adults of any age with a fifth-grade reading level. However, for participants younger than 10 and older than 65, sample sizes were too small to provide highly reliable estimates. The minimum sample size for each year of age was 922, and at least 422 persons of each gender were included. Their study is vast and comprehensive in its conclusions. We need to keep in mind that cross-sectional age differences may not mirror longitudinal age trends. As discussed above, cohort effects always could be at play. However, Soto et al. (2011) collected their cross-sectional data over a period of 7 years, and thus were able to examine for cohort effects, which they did not find. We summarize here a few essential and remarkable findings:

- Scores for Agreeableness and Conscientiousness take a nosedive after age 10, reaching their lowest levels by far in the entire life span at age 13 and then climbing sharply into young adulthood at age 20. The popular stereotype that young teenagers are disagreeable and lacking in self-discipline rings true in this study.
- Scores on Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience all climb gradually or moderately throughout the entire span of adulthood, from age 20 to 65. Some qualities do appear to improve indefinitely with age (at least to age 65).
- Scores on Extraversion are at their highest level at age 10, drop sharply until age 15, and then remain level across the life span. The contribution of the Activity component (e.g., "Is full of energy") appears to explain the very high scores on Extraversion at age 10. After age 15 there is essentially no change in Extraversion scores.
- Scores on Neuroticism reveal abrupt gender differences. Women outscore men, sometimes dramatically so, at all age levels. For women, scores rise sharply to their highest levels at age 15–16 and then decline at a moderate pace for the remainder of the life span. It appears that the mid-teen years are especially difficult for girls. For men, scores on Neuroticism decline moderately from age 10 to 20, remain level from age 20 to age 50, and then decline moderately to age 65. The higher scores for women compared to men document an established epidemiological trend in which women are more likely to manifest anxiety and depression than men (McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011).
- Women score higher than men at all ages for Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion. Gender differences on Openness to Experience are complex, but at all ages men score higher than women on the Ideas facet. The interpretation of these gender differences is unclear.

The literature on age differences and longitudinal trends in Big Five personality domains is vast. We refer the reader to Helson and Soto (2005), Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, and Nagy (2011), Specht et al. (2011), and Wortman, Lucas, and Donnellan (2012).

THE ASSESSMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT

The Moral Judgment Scale

Kohlberg has proposed one of the few theories of moral development that is both comprehensive and empirically based (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1958, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Although he was more concerned with theory-based problems of moral development than with the nuances of standardized measurement, Kohlberg did generate a method of assessment that is widely used and intensely debated. We will review the underlying rationale for his measurement tool and discuss the psychometric properties of the instrument as well. In addition, we will take a brief look at a more objectively based adaptation of Kohlberg's approach known as the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979; Rest & Thoma, 1985).

Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory grew out of Piaget's (1932) stage theory of moral development in childhood. Kohlberg extended the stages into adolescence and adulthood. In order to explore reasoning about difficult moral

issues, he devised a series of **moral dilemmas**. One of the most famous is the dilemma of Heinz and the druggist:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. (Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 1975)

After reading or hearing this story, the respondent is asked a series of probing questions. The questions might be as follows: Should Heinz have stolen the drug? What if Heinz didn't love his wife? Would that change anything? What if the person dying was a stranger? Should Heinz steal the drug anyway? Based on answers to this and other dilemmas, Kohlberg concluded that there are three main levels of moral reasoning, with two substages within each level (Table 9.5). One use of his measurement instrument, the Moral Judgment Scale, is to determine a respondent's stage of moral reasoning.[1]

The Moral Judgment Scale consists of several hypothetical dilemmas such as Heinz and the druggist, presented one at a time (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & others, 1978). In its latest revision, the scale comes in three versions called Forms A, B, and C. Scoring is quite complex, based on the examiner's judgment of responses in relation to extensive criteria outlined in a detailed scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Although there are several different dimensions to scoring, the one element most frequently cited in research studies is the overall stage of moral reasoning that characterizes a respondent.

TABLE 9.5 Kohlberg's Levels and Stages of Moral Development

Level 1:	**Preconventional**
Stage 1.	Punishment and obedience orientation: The physical consequences determine what is good or bad.
Stage 2.	Instrumental relativism orientation: What satisfies one's own needs is good.
Level 2:	**Conventional**
Stage 3.	Interpersonal concordance orientation: What pleases or helps others is good.
Stage 4.	"Law-and-order" orientation: Maintaining the social order and doing one's duty is good.
Level 3:	**Postconventional or Principled**
Stage 5.	Social contract-legalistic orientation: Values agreed upon by society determine what is good.
Stage 6.	Universal ethical-principle orientation: What is right is a matter of conscience derived from universal principles.

Source: Based on Kohlberg (1984).

Critique of the Moral Judgment Scale

Early versions of the Moral Judgment Scale suffered serious shortcomings of scoring and interpretation. For example, in his doctoral dissertation, Kohlberg (1958) proposed two scoring systems: one using the sentence or completed thought as the unit of scoring, the other relying upon a global rating of all the subject's utterances as the unit of analysis. Neither approach was fully satisfactory, and early reviews of the scale were justifiably critical of its reliability and validity (Kurtines & Greif, 1974).

In response to these criticisms, Kohlberg and his associates developed a scoring system that is

[1]Even though the Moral Judgment Scale has been widely used for empirical research, Kohlberg (1981, 1984) suggests that its most valuable application is for the promotion of self-understanding and the development of moral reasoning in the individual respondent.

unparalleled in its clarity, detail, and sophistication (Rest, 1986). Fortuitously, since the moral dilemmas of the Moral Judgment Scale have remained constant over the years, it is possible to apply the new scoring system to old data. The capacity to reanalyze old data and compare them with new data is invaluable in determining the reliability and validity of an existing scale. A most important study in this regard has been published by Kohlberg and associates (Colby et al., 1983).

This investigation reports the results of using the new scoring system in a longitudinal study spanning more than 20 years. The results are impressive and offer strong support for the reliability and validity of the instrument. Test–retest correlations for the three forms were in the high .90s, as were interrater correlations. Longitudinal scores of subjects tested at three- to four-year intervals over 20 years revealed theory-consistent trends. Fifty-six of 58 subjects showed upward change, with no subjects skipping any stages. Furthermore, only 6 percent of the 195 comparisons showed backward shifts between two testing sessions. The internal consistency of scores was also excellent: about 70 percent of the scores were at one stage, and only 2 percent of the scores were spread further than two adjacent stages. Cronbach's alpha was in the mid-.90s for the three forms. These findings have been corroborated by Nisan and Kohlberg (1982). Heilbrun and Georges (1990) also report favorably upon the validity of the Moral Judgment Scale, insofar as postconventional development is correlated with higher levels of self-control, as would be predicted from the fact that morally mature persons often oppose social pressure or legal constraints. In sum, the Moral Judgment Scale is reliable, internally consistent, and possesses a theory-confirming developmental coherence.

The Defining Issues Test

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is similar to the Moral Judgment Scale but incorporates a much simpler and completely objective scoring format (Rest, 1979, 1986). The examinee reads a series of moral dilemmas similar to those designed by Kohlberg and then chooses a proper action for each. For example, one dilemma involves a patient dying a painful death from cancer. In her lucid moments, she requests an overdose of morphine to hasten her death. What should the doctor do? Three options of the following kind are listed:

_____He should give the woman a fatal overdose

_____Should not give the overdose

_____Can't decide

The examinee's choice does not enter directly into the determination of the moral judgment score. The real purpose in forcing a choice is to cause the examinee to think about the importance of various factors in making the decision. Following the choice of proper action, the examinee rates the importance of several factors on a five-point Likert scale: great, much, some, little, or no importance. The factors are distinct for each dilemma. The factors differ in the level of moral judgment they signify, ranging from Kohlberg's stage 1 through stage 6. In the case of the preceding dilemma, the factors include such matters as follows:

_____Whether the doctor can make it look like an accident

_____Can society afford to let people end their lives when they want to

_____Whether the woman's family favors giving the overdose or not

These ratings form the basis for generating several quantitative scores that pertain to the moral judgment of the examinee. The most widely used score is the *P* score, which is a percentage of principled thinking. Reliability of the *P* score ranges from .71 to .82 in test–retest studies (Rest, 1979, 1986). Validity has been studied by contrasting groups known to differ on principled thinking. For example, graduate students in moral philosophy and political science, general college students, high school seniors, and ninth-grade students were found to differ appropriately and systematically on the *P* score. In longitudinal studies, significant upward trends were found over six years and four testings. Recently, Rest has recommended a new measure of moral judgment, the N2 index, calculated on the basis of several complex formulas that use both ranking and rating data. The two indices are highly correlated in the .90s. Nonetheless, in a retrospective analysis of previous studies, the N2 index outperformed the *P* index by a substantial margin (Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997).

Over 600 articles have been published on the Defining Issues Test (McCrae, 1985). In general, the instrument is considered a useful alternative to Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, particularly for research on group differences in moral reasoning. However, reviewers do note several cautions about the DIT (Westbrook & Bane, 1992). First, the test uses two moral dilemmas from the Vietnam War and is, therefore, somewhat dated. Many young examinees have little knowledge of (and perhaps no interest in) this topic and may find it difficult to identify with these questions. Another dilemma—the classic case of whether Heinz should steal a drug to save his wife's life—is also of dubious value since it has been widely publicized and reprinted in college textbooks. A significant proportion of prospective examinees are no longer naive about this moral dilemma.

Richards and Davison (1992) have pressed the point that the DIT is biased against conservatively religious individuals. Certainly, it is well established that conservative or fundamentalist religious people tend to score lower than average on the *P* score of the Defining Issues Test (Getz, 1984; Richards, 1991). According to Richards and Davison (1992), the reason for this is that stage 3 and stage 4 items (unintentionally) possess strong theological implications that cause fundamentalist individuals to endorse the items, thereby lowering their score on the test. Consider items that tap stage 4 reasoning, which is the "law and order" orientation that equates "moral" with doing one's duty and maintaining the social order. Whereas nonreligious persons might support the laws of the land (and endorse stage 4 items) because they believe that legal authorities define what is right and moral, religious minorities such as Mormons believe that supporting the laws of the land is a theological and religious obligation that flows directly from articles of faith in their religion:

> While Mormons place a high value on obeying the law and supporting legal authorities, this value is due to their theological belief that God has commanded them to do so, and not because they believe, as do true Stage 4 thinkers, that the laws of the land or legal authorities *define* what is right or moral. (Richards & Davison, 1992, p. 470)

These researchers demonstrate empirically that certain DIT items measure a different construct for conservative religious persons than for the general population. As a consequence, the validity of the test in these groups is open to question.

Relatively few studies have investigated the relationship between level of moral development on the DIT and moral behavior. This is understandable, given that the purpose of the DIT is not directly to predict behavior but to evaluate moral development. Still, it is a reasonable assumption that individuals who receive higher *P* scores on the DIT should also refrain from moral transgressions such as cheating on tests. A study by Cummings, Maddux, Harlow, and Dyas (2002) investigated this particular relationship by asking 145 college students majoring in education to anonymously fill out both the DIT and the Assessment of Academic Misconduct (AAM). The AAM is a 41-item measure of misbehaviors such as copying test answers, downloading term papers, retrospectively changing test answers, and so forth. Although these individuals reported an average (but prolific!) level of academic misconduct for college students—fully three-fourths admitted to one or more transgressions—there was absolutely no relationship between scores on the DIT and scores the AAM. Certainly, more research is needed on the connection (or disconnection) between moral reasoning and moral action.

Another concern about the DIT is the dearth of norms pertinent to minority groups. Finally, Westbrook and Bane (1992) argue that the technical manual for the DIT lacks essential details needed to evaluate the adequacy of the test. In spite of the concerns listed here, the DIT is a widely respected test, particularly for research on moral reasoning. Thoma (2006) provides a thorough review of research on the DIT.

THE ASSESSMENT OF SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS

Within the field of psychology, transcendent topics such as spiritual well-being or faith maturity never have received mainstream attention. Many years

ago, Gordon Allport (1950) lamented that the subject of religion "seems to have gone into hiding" among intellectuals and academic researchers:

> Whatever the reason may be, the persistence of religion in the modern world appears as an embarrassment to the scholars of today. Even psychologists, to whom presumably nothing of human concern is alien, are likely to retire into themselves when the subject is broached. (p. 1)

The situation is little improved in contemporary times. For example, except for a few specialty journals, spiritual and religious topics are virtually absent from the psychological literature.

Yet researchers have no right to retire from the field, given its significance to the average person. Consider these statistics on religious belief in the United States, stable since 1944 when national polls first came into use (Hoge, 1996):

- Belief in God has remained constant at about 92 to 95 percent of the population.
- Belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ has been endorsed by 75 to 80 percent of adults.
- Belief in an afterlife has remained at about 75 percent of the population.

Comparable statistics are not available worldwide, but it seems likely that the percentage of believing individuals (whether Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, or other) is very high. Most people embrace a spiritual perspective in life, and surely this must have some bearing on their adjustment, behavior, and outlook.

Unfortunately, the field of psychology, including the specialty area of testing, largely has maintained an indifference to this important aspect of human experience. Worse yet, in many intellectual circles the endorsement of spiritual or religious sentiments is seen as evidence of psychopathology. Among others, Sigmund Freud endorsed a cynical view of religion in his aptly titled essay, *The Future of an Illusion* (1927/1961). Yet for many persons, a connection with the transcendent is essential to meaning in life. This is especially so in times of extreme duress, as when personal annihilation knocks at the front door. Consider the experience of Viktor Frankl (1963), a Nazi death camp survivor and founding figure of existential psychology. At one point during World War II he had to surrender his coat with a cherished manuscript in the pockets in exchange for the worn-out rags of an inmate sent to the gas chamber:

> Instead of the many pages of my manuscript, I found in a pocket of the newly acquired coat a single page torn out of a Hebrew prayer book, which contained the main Jewish prayer, *Shema Yisrael.* How should I have interpreted such a "coincidence" other than as a challenge to live my thoughts instead of merely putting them on paper?

In the remainder of this topic, we take the view that spiritual and religious dimensions to life often serve constructive purposes and that assessment within these domains is worthy of additional study.

Challenges and Purposes of Religious and Spiritual Assessment

Other than personal or scholarly curiosity about religious and spiritual matters, what might be the motivation for religious and spiritual assessment? Further, what is spirituality, and how is it distinguished from religiousness? It appears evident that some people can be religious without being spiritual, ghost walking through religious traditions with no involvement of heart. But is it possible to be spiritual without being religious? Before we review specific assessment tools, it will prove helpful to examine the distinction between spirituality and religiousness, and to discuss the reasons for assessment in the first place.

According to the *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches* (2012), total church membership has declined steadily for many years, even though some denominations have increased in popularity. Alongside this general decline in traditional forms of worship, spiritual practices have expanded in popularity, as witnessed by the proliferation of meditation, 12-step, Eastern, yoga, and other broadly spiritual practices. For example, mindfulness meditation, with roots in Buddhism, is more

popular than ever (Williams & Penman, 2011). It is recommended for problems with anxiety, depression, pain, hyperactivity, sleep, parenting, stress, tinnitus, psoriasis, Parkinson's disease—the list goes on and on. Those who practice mindfulness, for whatever initial purpose, often embrace it as a way of being in the world, a spiritual discipline.

But what is spirituality, and how is it distinguished from religiousness? Certainly the two share broad overlap in many cases, but each must possess unique qualities if assessment is to succeed. Kapuscinski and Masters (2010) review the vexing problem of definition and conclude that the terms continue to be used separately but with little agreement on meaning. Others think we are beginning to see a consensus in the field:

> Despite definitional difficulties, there is agreement among researchers that individuals have the capacity to experience spirituality outside the context of religious institutions. Religion is frequently defined by institutional affiliation, whereas spirituality is not. Religion is also often considered more external or mediated by a group, whereas spirituality is more closely associated with personal experience and is less doctrinaire (Masters & Hooker, 2012, p. 2).

Heedful that definitions and distinctions will remain fuzzy, we believe there is merit in developing measures of spirituality and religiousness as separate but overlapping constructs (Hill & Pargament, 2008).

In spite of challenges with definition, efforts to develop measures of spirituality and religiousness have flourished in recent years. For example, Hill and Hood (1999) compiled information on 125 measures of spirituality/religiosity. Dozens of new scales have been developed since the release of their compendium. The Search Institute, which serves educators, parents, youth groups, faith communities, and researchers in efforts to create a better world for children, lists 18 easily accessible measures of spirituality, the majority published in recent years (www.search-institute.org). There is an abundance of available instruments.

The motivations for completing an assessment of spirituality or religiousness might include personal curiosity, but are there other purposes for these tools? Richards and Bergin (2005) make a strong case that clinicians need to include spiritual and religious assessment in psychotherapy. They list five reasons for a spiritual-religious assessment of clients, which include: understanding client world view and improving the capacity of the therapist to empathize; establishing the impact of spiritual-religious views on the presenting problem; determining if the spiritual-religious views of the client can be used for growth or coping; identifying which spiritual interventions might be useful in therapy; and, recognizing any spiritual doubts that need to be addressed in therapy. These benefits of spiritual-religious assessment can be extended beyond the therapeutic alliance. Even individuals who are functioning within the normal spectrum of personality will benefit from feedback about their spiritual-religious health.

Historical Overview on Spiritual and Religious Assessment

Interest in the psychology of religion can be traced to the early 1900s when William James (1902) composed his masterpiece, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* In this book, James catalogued the manifold ways in which humans reveal their interest in transcendent matters. His overall conclusion was that religion is "an essential organ of our life, performing a function which no other portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill."

Although many writers have offered psychological analyses of religion since the seminal writings of James, it was not until the 1960s that scales for the assessment of religious variables began to appear (Wulff, 1996). One of the first such measures was the Allport-Ross Religious Orientation scales, which proposed to assess two dimensions of religious expression, the **intrinsic** and the **extrinsic** (Allport & Ross, 1967). Intrinsically religious persons were thought to *live* their religion (e.g., to find meaning, direction, outlook), whereas extrinsically religious persons were believed to *use* their religion (e.g., to seek security, status, sociability). In his earlier writings on this topic, Allport referred to intrinsic religious expression as a genuine or mature religious orientation, whereas extrinsic religious expression was viewed as immature. Later he dropped the mature–immature designations because the labels seemed overly judgmental.

The impetus for development of these scales was Allport's distressing observation of a positive relationship between religiosity (in certain forms) and authoritarian, bigoted, prejudicial attitudes. As a devoutly religious person, Allport was convinced that intrinsically oriented religious individuals rarely would harbor these attitudes. After all, an essential precept of almost every religious faith is an attitude of love toward one's neighbors. In the Christian faith, this view is summed up in the famous dictum "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Mark 12:31). Yet the evidence was overwhelming to Allport that at least some religious individuals did reveal hatred, bigotry, and prejudice toward their neighbors. The usual targets of these malicious attitudes were racial minorities, Jews, and homosexual persons, among others. He reasoned that religious persons with intolerant attitudes possessed a predominantly extrinsic religious orientation; that is, their faith served external goals such as status in the community, belonging to an in-group, and the like. The investigation of this hypothesis (that extrinsically religious persons would be more authoritarian, bigoted, and prejudiced than intrinsically religious persons) required appropriate tools. For this purpose, Allport and colleagues developed the Religious Orientation scales.

Examples of the kinds of items on the 11-item Extrinsic scale and the 9-item Intrinsic scale are as follows:

- The church is important as a place to develop good social relationships. (Extrinsic)
- Sometimes I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs for economic reasons. (Extrinsic)
- I try hard to carry my religion over into other aspects of my life. (Intrinsic)
- My religion is important because it provides meaning to my life. (Intrinsic)

Although originally devised in a yes–no format, modern applications of these scales utilize a nine-point continuum from (1) strongly disagree to (9) strongly agree (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993).

Research on the Religious Orientation scales has not provided strong support for Allport's original hypothesis (Wulff, 1996). In fact, several studies have shown that persons scoring high on the Intrinsic scale actually reveal *higher* levels of authoritarianism, close-mindedness, and prejudice toward African Americans, gays, and lesbians. Hunsberger (1995) concludes that it is not religion per se that makes for prejudice, nor is it intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation. Instead, "it is the way in which religious beliefs are held that seems most directly associated with prejudice, and this is best explained by the tendency for fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism to be closely linked." Specifically, he links prejudice against minorities with authoritarian religious traditions that promote an absolute truth, divide the world into "Good" and "Evil," and shun complexity or doubt in their belief systems. These aspects of religious expression are not typically measured by paper-and-pencil tests.

Religion as Quest

Increasingly, the conceptual basis for the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation has been questioned. Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) summarized the major theoretical and methodological criticisms of the scales as follows:

- A lack of conceptual clarity in what the Intrinsic–Extrinsic scales are supposed to be measuring. Are these types of motivation (i.e., the motives associated with religious belief and practice), or personality variables (i.e., pervasive aspects of institutional behavior or involvement), or something else?
- A confusion over the relationship between the Intrinsic–Extrinsic scales. In particular, are these opposite ends of a single bipolar dimension, or do the scales measure separate dimensions (so that conceivably some persons could score high on *both*)?

Other problems cited include weaknesses in the factorial structure, reliability, and construct validity of the scales; excessive reliance on a "good religion" versus "bad religion" dichotomy; and the folly of defining and studying religiousness independent of belief content (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990).

In response to the limitations of the Religious Orientation scales, Batson and his associates (1993) developed a measure of a third religious orientation

known as Quest. These researchers consider Quest to be a more mature and flexible religious outlook than the intrinsic and extrinsic orientations. Actually, Allport recognized the elements inherent to this orientation but failed to incorporate them in his Intrinsic scale. **Religion as Quest** is characterized by complexity, doubt, and tentativeness as ways of being religious. Examples of the kinds of items on the 12-item Quest scale are as follows:

- My life experiences have led me to reconsider my religious convictions.
- I find religious doubts upsetting. (reverse scored)
- As I grow and mature, I expect my religious beliefs to change.
- Questions are more important to my religious faith than answers.

Items are scored on the same nine-point continuum from (1) strongly disagree to (9) strongly agree. Results are reported as an average rating. Research with 424 undergraduates interested in religion indicates that Quest is, indeed, a dimension of religious experience independent from both Intrinsic and Extrinsic orientations. Whereas Intrinsic and Extrinsic scores correlated .72, Quest revealed negligible relationships with both scales (–.05 with Intrinsic and .16 with Extrinsic).

But exactly what does the Quest scale measure? The intention of its authors was that it assess "the degree to which an individual's religion involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life" (Bateson et al., 1993, p. 169). The three components of the Quest orientation are (1) readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity, (2) self-criticism and perception of religious doubts as positive, and (3) openness to change. But critics have charged that the scale may not measure anything religious at all, that instead it may assess agnosticism, anti-orthodoxy, religious doubt, or religious conflict.

In response to these criticisms, Batson et al. (1993) note the following:

- Students at Princeton Theological Seminary scored significantly higher ($p < .001$) on the Quest scale (mean of 6.7) than undergraduates at the same institution (mean of 5.2). This finding supports the view that the scale is a valid measure of something religious.
- The 32 members of a charismatic Bible study group scored significantly higher ($p < .001$) on the Quest scale (mean of 5.5) than the 26 members of a traditional Bible study group (mean of 4.6). The charismatic group placed emphasis on religion as a shared search; most prayed with hands raised, and some members spoke in tongues.

Quest is its own dimension of religious expression, and substantial research on the meaning and correlates of this faith orientation has been completed. Batson et al. (1993) summarize research with the Quest scale by noting that it appears to measure a religion of less faith but more works.

Quest arose as a response to the limitations of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic approach to the measurement of religious orientation. But this brief 12-item scale possesses its own limitations, chief among them its brevity and factorial simplicity. Several other instruments have been proposed to measure aspects of religious experience. We survey a few prominent and representative approaches in the following sections.

The Spiritual Well-Being Scale

The concept of spiritual well-being can be traced to a paper by Moberg (1971) that proposed this form of well-being as an essential component of healthy aging. Spiritual well-being was conceptualized as a two-dimensional construct consisting of a vertical dimension and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension concerned well-being in relation to God or a higher power, whereas the horizontal dimension involved existential well-being, which is a sense of purpose in life without any specific religious reference. The challenge of developing a scale to measure these components of well-being was taken up by Ellison (1983) and Paloutzian and Ellison (1982).

Their instrument was designated the Spiritual Well-Being Scale (SWB Scale). The SWB Scale consists of two subscales: Religious Well-Being (RWB), which assesses the vertical dimension of well-being in relation to God; and Existential Well-Being (EWB), which measures the horizontal dimension of well-being in relation to life purpose and life

satisfaction. Each subscale consists of 10 items that are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items from the two subscales are combined on the SWB Scale, with odd-numbered items assessing religious well-being and even-numbered items assessing existential well-being. Some items are worded negatively; these are reverse scored so that a higher score always indicates greater well-being. Examples of SWB-like items include *My relationship with God helps me through hard times* and *Life is inherently without meaning* (Reverse scored).

The Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments (ASPIRES) Scale

The Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments (ASPIRES) scale is a recent and promising measure of spiritual and religious variables (Piedmont, 2010). What makes the test unique is its predictive power above and beyond the Big Five personality factors. In other words, ASPIRES represents an extension of these well established components into a sixth dimension of personality (Piedmont, 1999). The scale also is robust across cultures and useful within nonreligious samples, including agnostics and atheists.

The 35-item ASPIRES scale measures two dimensions, spiritual transcendence and religious sentiments. Spiritual transcendence is further subdivided into three facets: prayer fulfillment, universality, and connectedness. Religious sentiments consists of two facets: religious involvements, and religious crisis. The overall structure of the ASPIRES scale, with descriptions of dimensions and facets, is shown in Table 9.6. Items resemble *I find a sense of peace in the quiet of my prayers*, and *I follow the precepts of an organized faith*. Responses are provided on a 5-point Likert scale (*strongly agree*, *agree*, *neutral*, *disagree*, *strongly disagree*).

The ASPIRES scale demonstrates strong psychometric qualities. Alpha reliabilities for the facet scales range from .60 (CN) to .95 (PF) with a mean alpha of .82 (Piedmont, 2010). The normative sample consists of nearly 3,000 individuals, ages 17 to 94, from four geographic areas of the Midwestern and East Coast regions of the United States. The STS portion of the scale correlates with religious and spiritual variables and incrementally predicts (above and beyond the Big Five dimensions) relevant outcomes such as social support and prosocial behavior (Piedmont, 1999, 2001). The test holds up well cross-culturally, revealing a robust factor structure

TABLE 9.6 Structure and Description of the ASPIRES Scale (Piedmont, 2010)

Scale or Facet Name	Measure of
Spiritual Transcendence Scale (STS)	The motivational capacity to create a broad sense of personal meaning for one's life
Prayer Fulfillment (PF) Facet	The ability to create a personal space that enables one to feel a positive connection to some larger reality
Universality (UN) Facet	The belief in a larger meaning and purpose to life
Connectedness (CN) Facet	Feelings of belonging and responsibility to a larger human reality that cuts across generations and groups
Religious Sentiments Scale (RSS)	The extent to which an individual is involved in and committed to the precepts, teachings, and practices of a specific religious tradition
Religious Involvements (RI) Facet	How actively involved a person is in performing various religious rituals and activities
Religious Crisis (RC) Facet	Extent to which a person may be experiencing problems, difficulties, or conflicts with the God of their understanding

Source: Reprinted with permission from Brown, I. T., Chen, T., Gehlert, N. C., & Piedmont, R. L. (2012, October 8). Age and gender effects on the Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments (ASPIRES) Scale: A cross-sectional analysis. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, online publication.

in diverse religious groups and cultures (Nelson & Piedmont, 2008; Piedmont, Werdel, & Fernando, 2009). The STS component of ASPIRES yields incremental validity in the prediction of treatment outcome in spiritually based programs for alcohol and drug abuse (Piedmont, 2004). These findings further support the validity of ASPIRES and also uphold the contention that spirituality supplements the Big Five personality dimensions.

In later writings, Ellison described the SWB Scale as a measure of psychospiritual personality integration and resultant well-being (Ellison & Smith, 1991). According to this view, well-being consists of "the integral experience of a person who is functioning as God intended, in consonant relationship with Him, with others, and within one's self" (p. 36). This is the biblical notion of *shalom,* which denotes being harmoniously at peace within and without. If this conceptualization is correct, healthy spirituality as measured by the SWB Scale should show positive relationships with independent measures of health and subjective well-being. Literally dozens of studies have investigated this broad-range hypothesis, with generally positive findings.

The one identified shortcoming of the SWB Scale is an apparent low ceiling, especially in religious samples. Ledbetter, Smith, Vosler-Hunter, and Fischer (1991) caution that the clinical usefulness of the scale is limited to low scores (since high-functioning religious persons tend to "top out" on the scale). They also offer suggestions for revision (e.g., rewording items in more extreme directions) toward the goal of increasing the ceiling level of the SWB Scale. Bufford, Paloutzian, and Ellison (1991) have published norms for the test but caution that in many religious samples the typical individual receives the maximum score. This would indicate that the scale is helpful in research but is not useful for distinguishing among individuals with high levels of spiritual well-being.

The Faith Maturity Scale

In 1987, six major Protestant denominations undertook a national four-year study of personal faith, denominational allegiance, and their determinants (Benson, Donahue, & Erickson, 1993). Funded in part by the Lilly Endowment, this project spawned what is undoubtedly the most sophisticated measure of spiritual maturity ever conceived. The Faith Maturity Scale (FMS) arose as a practical tool to serve three research purposes:

1. Provide baseline data on the vitality of faith in mainstream Protestant congregations
2. Identify the contributions of demographic, personal, and congregational variables to faith development
3. Furnish a criterion variable for evaluating the impact of religious education in mainstream denominations

The development of the scale was a time-consuming and careful process that began with a working definition:

> Faith maturity is the degree to which a person embodies the priorities, commitments, and perspectives characteristic of vibrant and life-transforming faith, as they have been understood in "mainline" Protestant traditions. (Benson, Donahue, & Erickson, 1993, p. 3)

Using open-ended questionnaires with a convenience sample of 410 mainline Protestant adults, the test developers next identified eight core dimensions of faith maturity. Three advisory panels provided ongoing counsel during this stage and the next phase of item writing. These interactions assured that the scale possessed face and content validity.

The resulting FMS is a 38-item test that embodies key indicators of faith maturity in eight core areas (Table 9.7). Items are answered on a seven-point scale from 1 = never true to 7 = always true. Based upon the areas assessed, the reader will notice that right belief is only one aspect of a mature faith. In large measure, faith maturity is defined by value and behavioral consequences. As the authors note, the Faith Maturity Scale "parts company with more traditional ways of defining and measuring personal religion." Yet it does embody the kinds of behaviors and attitudes that derive from a dynamic, life-transforming faith. These behaviors and attitudes are consistent with the theology found in most religious traditions but are especially pertinent for the particular purpose of assessing faith maturity in the Protestant context.

TABLE 9.7 The Eight Core Dimensions and Sample Items from the Faith Maturity Scale

A.	Trusts and believes (5 items)
	Every day I see evidence that God is at work in the world
B.	Experiences the fruits of faith (5 items)
	I feel weighed down by all my responsibilities (reverse scored)
C.	Integrates faith and life (5 items)
	My faith influences how I think and act every day
D.	Seeks spiritual growth (4 items)
	I take time to meditate or pray
E.	Experiences and nurtures faith in community (4 items)
	I talk with others about my faith
F.	Holds life-affirming values (6 items)
	I tend to be critical of other persons (reverse scored)
G.	Advocates social change (4 items)
	I believe the churches of this nation should get involved in political issues
H.	Acts and serves (5 items)
	I offer significant amounts of time to help others

Note: The sample items are similar to those on the Faith Maturity Scale.
Source: Based on Benson, P., Donahue, M., & Erickson, J. (1993). The Faith Maturity Scale: Conceptualization, measurement, and empirical validation. In M. L. Lynn & D. O. Moberg (Eds.), *Research in the social scientific study of religion* (vol. 5). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

The FMS is scored as the mean of the 38 items, which yields a potential range of 1 to 7. The average score for 3,040 adults in five Protestant denominations was 4.63, which indicates that the instrument avoids the "ceiling effect" found on other scales such as the Spiritual Well-Being Scale, discussed previously. The estimated reliability of the scale is very robust across age, gender, occupation, and denomination, with typical coefficient alphas of .88 (Benson et al., 1993). Test–retest reliability was not reported.

The validity of the scale is supported by several lines of evidence, beginning with the careful approach to item selection, by which face validity and content validity were built-in. Construct validity was demonstrated in several ways. First, it was predicted and confirmed that groups presumed to differ in levels of faith maturity would obtain significantly different mean scores on the FMS. Indeed, pastors scored the highest (5.3), followed by church education coordinators (4.9), teachers (4.7), adults (4.6), and youth (4.1)—each group in respective order scoring significantly lower than the others. Second, pastors' ratings of the faith maturity of 123 congregation members on a 1 to 10 scale correlated very substantially ($r = .61$) with the FMS scores of these persons, indicating a correspondence between independent expert ratings and self-report. The scale also revealed predictive utility. Specifically, FMS scale scores were strongly related to a variety of prosocial behaviors such as donating time to help those who are poor, hungry, or sick; promoting a greater role for women in the church; and endorsing the use of foreign policy to challenge apartheid.

TOPIC 9B Positive Psychological Assessment

Assessment of Creativity
Measures of Emotional Intelligence
Assessment of Optimism
Assessment of Gratitude
Sense of Humor: Self-Report Measures

With few exceptions, clinical psychology since World War II has focused on what is wrong with people and how to alleviate or diminish a host of symptoms and syndromes. Research abounds on the assessment and treatment of anxiety, depression, serious mental illnesses, dementia, marital discord, drug abuse, mental retardation, and brain damage, to name a few areas of significant inquiry.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this extensive body of research on psychopathology. In fact, huge strides have been made in the understanding and treatment of many conditions that entail serious and crippling emotional pain or other forms of disability. Even so, this one-sided emphasis from the perspective of disease and repair has led to a relative void of positive perspectives. Consider the results of Table 9.8, which compiles the number of PsychINFO listings conjured up for a variety of terms, some pathological and some positive. The reader will notice that pathological concepts like *Depression* or *Dementia* are 50 to 100 times more likely to be the topic of inquiry than positive concepts like *Resilience* or *Gratitude*.

In recent years, a movement known as positive psychology has emerged to redress this imbalance. A simple definition of **positive psychology** is the scientific and practical pursuit of optimal human functioning (Lopez & Snyder, 2003). One of the founders of the movement, Martin Seligman, provides a detailed perspective on the movement:

> The field of positive psychology at the subjective level is about valued subjective experiences: well-being, contentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and optimism (for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present). At the individual level, it is about positive individual traits: the capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal skill, aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, originality, future-mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wisdom. (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5)

Also included in positive psychology are civic virtues such as altruism, tolerance, and work ethic.

TABLE 9.8 Number of PsychINFO Listings for a Sampling of Pathological and Positive Terms

Pathological Term	*Number of Listings*
Depression	130,033
Abuse	106,772
Anxiety	113,316
Schizophrenia	74,979
Brain damage	70,235
Addiction	51,969
Mental retardation	39,660
Dementia	29,860
Positive Term	*Number of Listings*
Resilience	5,668
Optimism	4,784
Wisdom	4,712
Altruism	3,502
Genius	1,818
Courage	1,740
Forgiveness	1,667
Gratitude	751

In sum, positive psychology is a broad movement linked by the focus on life-affirming concepts. The goal is to bring balance to psychology by helping to build human strengths.

An important element of this movement is **positive psychological assessment**, which can be defined as the measurement of specific human strengths such as those mentioned above. After all, if a psychological movement proposes to increase human strengths and virtues, it is also obligated to develop measurement approaches for purposes of research and assessment. In recent years, psychologists have paid increasing attention to positive forms of assessment, resulting in dozens of new instruments and approaches. In their path-breaking edited book on positive psychological assessment, Lopez and Snyder (2003) compiled 24 chapters, each detailing several instruments. In other words, there are now hundreds of instruments available for positive psychological assessment. Some of the constructs measured with psychological tests include hope, emotional intelligence, optimism, romantic love, empathy, forgiveness, gratitude, and wisdom-related performance, to name just a few.

A comprehensive review of positive psychological assessment would entail a textbook in its own right (if not several). The best we can do here is focus on a few key areas of assessment with a small number of tests that illustrate important or interesting approaches to positive psychological assessment. In particular, we will review issues involved in the assessment of creativity, emotional intelligence, optimism, hope, forgiveness, and gratitude.

ASSESSMENT OF CREATIVITY

The topic of creativity has fascinated and yet also vexed psychologists and educators for more than a century. Researchers are beginning to understand fundamental elements common to many forms of creativity, yet, a simple definition of creativity remains elusive, and its assessment continues to be problematic. It is no exaggeration to state that hundreds of tests of creativity have been published. Some of these instruments possess respectable psychometric qualities, but most are of questionable validity. Unlike other fields of assessment such as intelligence or personality—where a few instruments have risen to the top and dominate the field—in the field of creativity there are no acknowledged "gold standards" for assessment. In part, this is because of the criterion problem—the difficulty in defining creativity. Thus, we begin with a foundational question: What is creativity?

Psychologists have sought to understand creativity since at least the early 1900s. For example, John B. Watson, the famous American behaviorist, suggested simplistically that a poem or brilliant essay is the mere product of shifting words around until a new pattern is hit upon (Watson, 1928). Fortunately, Watson's simplistic views were followed by a large number of more thoughtful formulations. We have quoted below a few perspectives on creativity from eminent researchers:

- If a response is to be called original, it must be to some extent adaptive to reality (Barron, 1955, p. 553).
- We may proceed to define the creative thinking process as the forming of associative elements into new combinations that either meet specified requirements or are in some way useful (Mednick, 1962, p. 221).
- Creativity can be regarded as the quality of products or responses judged to be creative by appropriate observers, and it can also be regarded as the process by which something so judged is produced (Amabile, 1983, p. 31).
- Creativity involves bringing something into being that is original (new, unusual, novel, unexpected) and also valuable (useful, good, adaptive, appropriate) (Ochse, 1990, p. 2).
- Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints) (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999, p. 3).
- Creativity is a specific capacity to not only solve problems but to solve them originally and adaptively (Feist & Barron, 2003, p. 63).
- Creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising, and valuable (Boden, 2004, p. 1).

These conceptual definitions emphasize novelty and usefulness of the creative product, but also

suggest that creativity is a particular kind of process as well. On these elements, there is broad agreement in the field of creativity research. However, going from conceptual definitions to operational definitions has proved to be difficult, to say the least. Prentky (2001) notes that "what creativity is, and what it is not, hangs as the mythical albatross around the neck of scientific research on creativity" (p. 97).

Relevant to assessment, one controversy overshadows the study of creativity. This is the question whether creativity is general or domain-specific in nature. Kaufman and Baer (2004) articulate the concern as follows:

> Is there perhaps something we might label *c*, analogous to the *g* of intelligence, that transcends domains and enhances the creativity of a person in all fields of endeavor? And does it make sense to call someone "creative," or should attributions of creativity always be qualified in some way (e.g., "a creative storyteller" or "a creative mathematician," but not "a creative person")? (p. 4).

In their lengthy review chapter, Kaufman and Baer (2004) acknowledge the complexity of the specific versus general debate, noting that the answer hinges on the definition of creativity and the assessment methods employed. But they also render a final conclusion that that the evidence for *c* (general creativity) is weak. We agree with their verdict that creativity appears to be domain-specific.

What, then, is the best way to partition the domains of creativity? One answer might be to claim that there are as many domains of creativity as there are fields of inquiry or expression, whether in science, art, economics, service, leadership, entrepreneurship, or whatever. But this anarchical response rings hollow. People who are creative in one field typically reveal talent in closely allied fields as well. Gifted writers usually can be good poets, if they choose, and vice versa. A creative scientist might excel at mechanical problem-solving as well. The number of domains must be somewhere between huge (nearly infinite), and small (a handful). But creativity is not a single general factor.

Several investigators have derived empirical classifications of creativity, with the number of domains typically in the range of 5 to 10 (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009; Ivcevic & Mayer, 2009). The study by Kaufman (2012) is representative, and we provide modest details here. His investigation was based on the common sense view that layperson perceptions of constructs like intelligence, wisdom, personality, or creativity, when analyzed collectively, embody some degree of practical wisdom (Sternberg, 1985). Participants were 2,318 college students asked to rate an initial collection of 94 items as follows:

> Compared to people of approximately your age and life experience, how *creative* would you rate yourself for each of the following acts? For acts that you have not specifically done, estimate your creative potential based on your performance on similar tasks (Kaufman, 2012, p. 300).

Students rated themselves on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*much less creative*) to 5 (*much more creative*) on each item. The items were gleaned from several prior research projects. The 94 items coalesced into five factors (from factor analysis), which provided a basis for reducing the scale to 50 items organized into 5 domains of about 10 items each. The emergent domains were the following:

- Self/Everyday: Successfully dealing with problems in self and others, teaching creatively. Items resemble *Helping friends deal with difficult problems*.
- Scholarly: Effectively analyzing problems and coming up with new and creative ideas. Items resemble *Finding a new way to think about old problems*.
- Performance: Successfully composing lyrics and singing a new song in public. Items resemble *Making up lyrics and melody for an amusing song*.
- Mechanical/Scientific: Efficiently solving a scientific or mechanical problem. Items resemble *Designing and conducting a scientific experiment*.
- Artistic: Productively drawing or painting a landscape or still life. Items resemble *Crafting a sculpture or piece of pottery*.

The new instrument, called the Kaufman Domains of Creativity Scale (K-DOCS), demonstrated strong psychometric qualities, with internal consistency coefficients of .83 to .86 and test–retest reliabilities (132 participants retested after two weeks) of .78 to .86. In addition to finding a clear-cut five-factor structure for the test, additional evidence of validity was found in the domain scale correlations with Big Five personality dimensions, which were theoretical sensible, for example, Openness to Experience correlated significantly with all creativity domains except Mechanical/Scientific (Kaufman, 2012).

We turn now to a brief discussion of instruments for the assessment of creativity. Over the years, creativity has been studied in terms of cognitive processes, personal characteristics, and behavioral products (Batey & Furnham, 2006). We will review these approaches in turn and examine the assessment methods that each has spawned.

Creativity as Process

Several theorists and researchers have focused on underlying cognitive processes in their understanding of creativity. Of historical interest is Wertheimer's (1945) suggestion that creativity arises when the thinker grasps the essential features of a problem and their relation to a final solution—the so-called "aha!" phenomenon. Wallas (1926) theorized that such insights often occur after a period of incubation wherein the unconscious mind rearranges the features of the puzzle even while the conscious mind takes "time off" from the problem.

Mednick (1962) proposed that creativity is the capacity to combine remote associations. According to this view, creativity is a matter of novel arrangements of unusual associations to a given stimulus. Consider the invention of the grain reaper by McCormick, based on the association between grain and hair (Weber, 1969). It occurred to the inventor that grain is like the hair on a person's head. Since mechanical clippers are used to cut hair, something like hair clippers could be used to cut grain. We see in this example how a creative invention was developed from a remote association.

Based on his process-oriented view of creativity, Mednick (1962) developed the Remote Associates Test (RAT), a clever index of the remoteness of verbal associations. The RAT is a timed, 40-minute paper-and-pencil test with inter item reliability consistently above .90. (Mednick & Mednick, 1966). Some examples of the kinds of items encountered on the RAT:

rat–blue–cottage _____
out–dog–cat _____
wheel–electric–high _____
surprise–line–birthday _____

For each triplet, the examinee must find a fourth word that "fits" in the sense of having reasonable (but often remote) associations to the other three words. (The correct answers above are *cheese, house, wire,* and *party*.) Competent performance on this test would appear to require a capacity to examine several novel or remote associations at the same time and to search for the one association that is common to all three stimulus words.

Validity studies of the RAT have been mixed in outcome. Early studies were promising and indicated that high RAT-scorers tended to receive higher ratings for the creativity of their products (e.g., architectural designs, research projects, suggestions, and drawings) than low scorers (Mednick & Mednick, 1966). One early study showed that high RAT-scoring scientists tended to write more research proposals, to win more research grants, and to win bigger grants than lower scorers (Gordon & Charanian, 1964). However, later studies indicated complex patterns between RAT scores and other creativity indices. For example, Andrews (1975) found that RAT scores predicted the innovativeness of research for medical sociologists only for a small subsample of the respondents whose environment provided certain "prerequisites" for achieving payoff from creative ability. Specifically, among those researchers who were responsible for initiating new activities, who hired their own research assistants, who had stable employment and low interference from superiors, the correlation between RAT scores and innovativeness of research was a healthy +.55. But these researchers constituted less than a fourth of the sample; for the remainder of the subjects there was no relationship between the RAT and creativity. These complex and contradictory findings are typical of research on the assessment of creativity.

Ochse (1990) provides a thorough appraisal of RAT validity. He concludes that the test may predict scores on tests of verbal fluency, but fails to predict creativity in general. In other words, the RAT is not so much a general measure of creativity as a specialized measure of verbal intelligence. Recently, Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) published extensive normative data for RAT-type items. Based on 289 university students, their normative data consists of percentage correct for 144 items under four time limits (2, 7, 15, and 30 seconds). They recommend using these normative data to investigate process factors such as incubation, the impact of hints, and techniques to facilitate problem solving.

Creativity as Personal Characteristics

Guilford (1950) was one of the first researchers to define creativity in terms of the person when he asserted that "creativity refers to the abilities that are most characteristic of creative people." His pronouncement helped inspire an expansion of research on the personal characteristics of creative persons. Much of this research has relied upon contrasts of peer nominated high- and low-creative persons in various professions (Barron, 1968; Martindale, 1981). In this methodology, colleagues within a field of study nominate other individuals who are high and low in creativity, and their consensus view is used to identify two select groups of individuals (high-creative, low-creative). These groups are then contrasted on personality measures, including self-checked adjectives and standard personality inventories.

Based on hundreds of studies, a fairly stable set of core characteristics of creative persons has emerged (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Dellas & Gaier, 1970). Interestingly, the distinguishing characteristics of creative individuals appear to be largely temperamental, although a certain minimum level of intelligence also is required. Harrington (1975) has captured a not altogether flattering portrait of the creative person in his Composite Creative Personality Scale, which consists of 42 self-checked adjectives (from a larger list) that empirically distinguish creative from noncreative persons. These adjectives include many positive terms such as *active, curious, imaginative, inventive, original, resourceful,* and *sensitive,* but also embrace negative terms such as *argumentative, cynical, egotistical, impulsive, rebellious,* and *unconventional.* These qualities fit well with the observation of Feist (1999):

> One of the most distinguishing characteristics of creative people is their desire and preference to be somewhat removed from regular social-contact, to spend time alone working on their craft . . . to be autonomous and independent of the influence of a group. (p. 158)

In addition to the broad generalizations noted above, the particular link between personality characteristics and creative behavior also depends on the specific domain of investigation. For example, compared with their less creative counterparts, creative artists tend to be more spontaneous, creative writers tend to be more nonconforming, creative architects tend to be less flexible, and creative engineers tend to be better adjusted than other groups (Piirto, 1998). In attempting to predict creative behavior from personality characteristics, one creative personality type may not fit all creative occupations (Kerr & Gagliardi, 2003). Batey and Furnham (2006) provide an excellent review of the complex literature on creativity and personality.

Recently, Sternberg (2002) has proposed that creative individuals are distinguished not so much by specific traits as by the heartfelt *decision* to be creative:

> I believe that, although creative people differ in an astonishing number of ways, there is, in fact, one key attribute that they all possess. . . . This attribute is the decision to be creative. People who create decide that they will forge their own path and follow it, for better or for worse. The path is a difficult one because people who defy convention often are not rewarded. (p. 376)

This perspective suggests that creative individuals will be characterized by a stubborn dedication to their creative endeavors, even when rewards for their activities seem to be lacking.

The opinion that creativity resides within qualities of the person continues to be popular.

From this perspective, self-report measures are the natural and preferred assessment method (Silvia, Wigert, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2012). Table 9.9 summarizes a few promising instruments.

Creativity as Product

The most enduring definitions of creativity have used the *product* as the distinguishing sign of this capacity. According to this approach, creative persons create products (ideas, inventions, writings, artistic outputs, etc.) that meet certain criteria. For example, Jackson and Messick (1968) applied four criteria to creativity:

- Novelty: Creative products are new, or at least represent a new application of the familiar.
- Appropriateness: The product must be appropriate to the context, not merely novel.
- Transcendence of constraints: A product transcends constraints when it goes beyond the traditional.
- Coalescence of meaning: The value of creative products may not be apparent at first, the full significance may only be appreciated with time.

The Jackson and Messick (1968) criteria have proved helpful in delineating the special characteristics of a creative outcome, but they do not constitute a psychological *measure* of creativity. For measures of creativity based on the product-oriented approach, we must examine the seminal studies of Joy Paul Guilford and the various tests inspired by his factor-analytic research.

As the reader will recall from an earlier chapter, Guilford (1959, 1985) formulated a structure of

TABLE 9.9 Self-Report Measures of Creativity

Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors (BICB) (Batey, 2007)

Based on the implicit assumption that creativity is a general attribute, the BICB consists of 34-items rated yes/no by the respondent. Items consist of behaviorally anchored creative accomplishments "actively involved in" over the last 12 months. Results range from 0 to 34, yielding a single overall score without subscales. Higher scores indicate greater creativity. Domain coverage is broad. Items resemble written a poem, painted a picture, devised a recipe, coached a team, held an office. The scale possesses good internal consistency (α = .74) and correlates appropriately with other measures of creativity (Furnham, Batey, Anand, & Manfield, 2008).

Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005)

Innovative in its measurement approach, the CAQ assesses creativity in 10 domains: Visual Arts, Music, Dance, Architectural Design, Creative Writing, Humor, Inventions, and Scientific Discovery. Although an overall score can be obtained, the implicit assumption of the test is that creativity is domain specific. Hence, a high score in one domain is sufficient to demonstrate creativity. Each domain consists of eight items, numbered 0 through 7, representing increasing levels of creative achievement. Most items are binary, but higher numbered items in each domain require a numerical entry. For example, item 7 in Creative Writing might request the number of stories published in literary sources. The entry for this item (for example, "3") is multiplied by the item number to obtain the score ($7 \times 3 = 21$). This inventive scoring approach allows for the detection of persons with exceptional creativity in one or more domains.

Revised Creative Domain Questionnaire (CDQ-R) (Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009)

Simple but effective in its format, the CDQ-R consists of 21 items in four domains: Drama (e.g., acting, dancing, writing), Math/science (e.g., chemistry, logic, computers), Arts (e.g., crafts, design, painting), and interaction (e.g., leadership, selling, teaching). Respondents are asked to self-rate their creativity in each activity. Items are completed on a six-point scale (no midpoint) ranging from Not at all creative to Extremely creative. The four domain scores are averaged to obtain an overall creativity score. The scale possesses reasonable reliability, with internal consistencies of.71 to .76. for the domains and .82 for the overall scale. Unlike measures of creative accomplishments which are typically skewed, the four domain scores and the overall score reveal approximately normal distributions. Regarding validity, the CDQ-R domain scores reveal theoretically appropriate correlations with Big Five personality dimensions (e.g., Openness to Experience correlates with all four domains; Extraversion correlates with Drama but not Math/Science).

intellect model that parceled intelligence into 150 factors aligned upon three dimensions: operations, constructs, and products. One of the operations that emerged from Guilford's factor analyses was **divergent thinking**:

> Divergent thinking is defined as the kind that goes off in different directions. It makes possible changes of direction in problem solving and also leads to a diversity of answers, where more than one answer may be acceptable. (Guilford, 1959)

Divergent thinking is virtually the opposite of convergent thinking. **Convergent thinking** is the production of a single correct answer determined by facts and reason. Western civilization places such a heavy emphasis on convergent thinking that we are inclined to dismiss the value of divergent thinking, even to mock it as undisciplined and, therefore, unproductive. But divergent thinking is essential to creative discovery. Unconstrained, freewheeling thought is the hallmark of the creative person. Tests of divergent thinking are therefore considered excellent measures of creativity.

Guilford and his colleagues developed about a dozen experimental measures of divergent thinking (Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971), some of which were subsequently standardized and published as the Christensen-Guilford Fluency Tests. Subtests and items similar to his measures include:

- Alternate Uses: List possible but unusual uses for a common object such as a brick (use it as a door stop, hammer, anchor, or wheel stop)
- Consequences: List possible consequences of a specific hypothetical event, for example, "What would happen if clouds had strings hanging down from them?" (macramé would make a comeback, people would be whisked away, air travel would be hazardous, farmers could winch the clouds down for watering, etc.)
- Ideational Fluency: Name things that belong in a given class such as "Long, thin items" (hair, pin, wire, needle, snake, string, spaghetti, pulled taffy)

Although Guilford's tests never received wide usage and eventually faded into obscurity, his theories and contributions were highly influential in the field of creativity studies. In particular, Guilford's influence is found in the work of E. Paul Torrance (1915–2003), who developed a group of tests still in use today.

The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) (Kim, 2006; Torrance, 1966) are based loosely on Guilford's model, although Torrance was more concerned with the interest level of his measures than with their factorial purity. These tests purport to assess a global cognitive construct of creativity—a style of thinking believed to be essential to creative achievements. The TTCT subtests do not assess motivation, expertise, intelligence, or other capacities that could contribute to creative productivity. The test comes in two parallel forms, A and B, which are highly comparable. The comments below refer to both forms.

The TTCT consists of two parts: The TTCT-Verbal and the TTCT-Figural. Suitable for ages 6 through 18 and beyond, the TTCT-Verbal contains six subtests:

Asking Questions
Guessing Causes
Guessing Consequences
Product Improvement
Unusual Uses
Just Suppose

The first three verbal subtests are based on the same stimulus card which shows a simple pen and ink drawing of one or two human-like figures engaged in ambiguous activity. A TTCT-like drawing is shown in Figure 9.1. In the first activity, *Asking Questions,* the child is encouraged to ask questions about the picture. In the second activity, *Guessing Causes,* the child is told to guess the causes of the action in the picture. In the third activity, *Guessing Consequences,* the child is instructed to speculate about the immediate and long-term consequences. The time limit for each activity is five minutes.

In the fourth activity of the Verbal subtests, *Product Improvement,* the task is to suggest improvements to a toy that would make it more appealing to children. For example, the child might be shown a picture of a stuffed rabbit and asked to think of ways

FIGURE 9.1 Example Stimulus Card Used for the First Three TTCT-Verbal Subtests

Note: A stimulus card similar to the above is used for the Asking Questions, Guessing Causes, and Guessing Consequences subtests.

to change the toy so that others would have more fun playing with it. *Unusual Uses*, the fifth activity, is a familiar standby in creativity assessment, namely, thinking of unusual uses for a common object such as a brick. The final Verbal subtest is *Just Suppose*, which involves asking the examinee to list the problems and benefits that might arise from an improbable situation. For example, the child might be told "Just suppose that clouds had strings hanging down from them—what might be some problems or benefits of this situation?"

The verbal subtests are scored according to three criteria:

1. Fluency—the raw number of relevant ideas;
2. Originality—the inventiveness or creativity of the ideas;
3. Flexibility—the flexibility of categories of ideas.

Of course, the manual for the TTCT, which is periodically updated for normative data, provides significant guidance on scoring (Torrance, 1974, 1998).

The TTCT-Figural consists of three activities, which are suitable for ages 5 through 18 and beyond:

Picture Construction

Picture Completion

Repeated Figures

The time limit for each activity is 10 minutes. In the first activity, *Picture Construction*, the child draws a picture using a simple shape (jelly bean or pear) as a starting point. The stimulus shape must become an integral part of the constructed picture. In the second activity, *Picture Completion,* the examinee encounters 10 incomplete figures and is asked to complete a drawing from each and then to name each drawing. An example of a TTCT-like drawing (with completion and title) is shown in Figure 9.2. In the last activity, *Repeated Figures,* the child is provided two or three pages of repeated figures (e.g., circles) and asked to use them in constructing pictures that are then named. For example, the child might draw a rectangle encompassing six circles and name it "swiss cheese."

Scoring of the TTCT-Figural subtests is based on five norm-referenced measures and 13 criterion-referenced outcomes. The five norm-referenced measures include:

1. Fluency—the raw number of stimuli provided;
2. Originality—the number of statistically infrequent drawings;

FIGURE 9.2 Example TTCT-Figural Picture Completion Drawing with Title

Note: This sample resembles one of the ten incomplete figures used on the Picture Completion subtest.

3. Abstractness of Titles—the abstraction level of the titles;
4. Elaboration—the provision of details and elaboration;
5. Resistance to Premature Closure—the degree of openness for incomplete figures.

The 13 criterion-referenced measures include a variety of creative strengths expressed in the drawings such as emotional fluency, unusual visual perspective, humor, colorful imagery, and fantasy.

Although scoring of the TTCT is tedious and elaborate—especially for the Figural subtests—experienced testers produce interrater reliabilities in the .90s. Test–retest reliability coefficients are lower, in the range of .50 to .93 (Kim, 2006). Reliability data certainly are strong enough to support the use of the test for group testing and research purposes (Trefflinger, 1985). However, making individual decisions (e.g., admission to special program for gifted children) solely on the basis of TTCT scores could be problematic.

The validity of the TTCT is a more complicated question, especially in light of the difficulty of defining the criterion—what is creativity? Yet, the instrument is reasonably predictive of later creative accomplishments, even in the long run. For example, in a sample of 80 participants, the correlation between a TTCT creativity index derived from assessment in elementary years and the quality of highest creative achievements in adulthood (40-year follow-up) was a healthy $r = .43$ (Cramond, Matthews-Morgan, Bandalos, & Zuo, 2005). In this study, the quality of creative achievements was rated blindly from autobiographical materials supplied by the research participants. The correlation, $r = .43$, was higher than the observed relationship between childhood IQ and adult creativity, $r = .32$. Creativity as measured by the TTCT appears to be more predictive of certain forms of achievement than intelligence.

Overall, with its 50 years of research and strong psychometric properties, the TTCT is one of the best instruments for creativity assessment. The test has been translated into 35 languages and has spawned more research than any other measure in the field. Among its many strong features, age- and grade-norms are available for more than 50,000 participants, kindergarten through high school. Applications of the test are mainly with school-aged children, although norms are provided for adults as well (Kim, 2006).

Comment on Creativity Tests

Tests of creativity have served a useful function in highlighting the diversity of skills that make up the whole of intellectual ability. As a consequence of research on creativity, educators and psychologists now realize that an exclusive emphasis on "correct" thinking (i.e., convergent problem solving) is too narrow a focus for education and assessment alike. However, the validity of creativity tests is still an open question. One problem is that definitions of creativity (e.g., Jackson & Messick, 1968, above) do not lend themselves easily to psychometric measurement, that is, tests of creativity do not operationalize the construct of creativity very well (Chase, 1985). In part, the failure to operationalize creativity stems from the multifactorial nature of this puzzling ability. Consider this observation: whereas a general factor almost always can be extracted from intelligence and ability tests, it seems clear that there is no corresponding factor in the realm of creativity. For example, a creative painter is unlikely to be a creative musician or a creative research scientist. Creativity is almost always specific to the realm in which it is identified. This specificity poses a difficult obstacle to general measures of creativity.

MEASURES OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In the history of psychology, emotions and intelligence generally have been viewed as distinct capacities of the individual, each capable of influencing the other, but separate nonetheless. For example, Thomas Chalmers (1833) wrote an early chapter titled *On the Connection between the Intellect and the Emotions*. Chalmers was a Scottish church leader who catalogued the disruptive influence of emotions on clear thinking. In like manner, the American psychologist Henry H. Goddard (1919) proposed a separation of the emotions and intelligence. He argued

that intelligence, properly exercised, can modify and influence emotions for the benefit of the individual.

The first person to hint at a possible union of emotional and intellectual factors was the eminent American psychologist E. L. Thorndike (1920). In a short essay published in *Harper's Magazine* for a general audience, Thorndike spoke of three kinds of intelligence: abstract, mechanical, and social. The first two types are well known in assessment and have been validated repeatedly. However, the third kind of intelligence, social intelligence, has proved more elusive. Thorndike defined social intelligence as "the ability to understand and manage people." An essential part of this ability is the accurate recognition of emotions in others. Unfortunately, early attempts to measure social intelligence proved fruitless (Thorndike & Stein, 1937). The concept gradually fell out of favor.

Recently, the idea that emotions and intellect might constitute a single cluster of intertwined abilities has reemerged in the concept of emotional intelligence, as proposed by Mayer, Salovey, and colleagues (Salovey & Mayer, 1989–90; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008). The notion of emotional intelligence has been pursued by other researchers as well (discussed below); however, the Mayer-Salovey model boasts the strongest theoretical and empirical underpinnings, so we begin with their approach. Mayer et al. (2008) define **emotional intelligence** as follows:

- Managing emotions so as to attain specific goals;
- Understanding emotions, emotional language, and the signals conveyed by emotions;
- Using emotions to facilitate thinking; and
- Perceiving emotions accurately in oneself and others. (p. 507)

These theorists propose that emotional intelligence is an instance of traditional intelligence, not something different from it. In other words, emotional intelligence (EI) is an important and overlooked subset of abilities that contribute to human efficiency and adaptation. Thus, just as prior researchers have documented verbal forms of intelligence (e.g., verbal comprehension) and perceptual forms of intelligence (e.g., perceptual reasoning) Mayer et al. (2008) propose that emotional intelligence is a third major subdivision that complements the traditional dichotomy of verbal and perceptual abilities.

To understand how emotional intelligence differs from traditional forms of intelligence, imagine a situation in which you visit a close friend in the hospital. He has just emerged from emergency surgery after a serious head injury from a fall. He lies still in bed with his eyes closed. Standing around your friend are anxious family members and a stern-faced doctor. What would you do or say? Would you press forward to join the family members? Would you leave the room and return later? Would you hug or console others? Would you ask the doctor for an update? You will need to make these and many other choices in a matter of seconds. Adaptive functioning in this complex situation would require you to manage your own emotions (maybe you feel strong relief that you are not the one in the hospital bed), understand the subtle emotional signals conveyed by others (perhaps the glassy stare of the sister indicates that you are not welcome at this time), use your emotions to facilitate thinking (maybe your anguish is so strong that you think it wise to remain quiet), and perceive emotions accurately in others (perhaps everyone is quiet because your friend has just drifted off to sleep). Successful navigation of this difficult and painful situation would require high levels of emotional intelligence.

Because of the subtlety and complexity of the construct, the assessment of emotional intelligence has proved challenging. However, with innovative forms of testing such as embodied in the MSCEIT or Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), progress is being made. This instrument consists of 141 items that yield a total emotional intelligence score as well as two Area scores, four Branch Scores, and eight Task scores. Table 9.10 provides a brief description of the test, which is designed for adults age 17 and older. Normative data are based on a sample of more than 5,000 individuals.

The overall score on the MSCEIT is called the Emotional Intelligence (EI) score. This score is normed to a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. The two Area scores (Experiential and Strategic)

TABLE 9.10 Brief Description of the MSCEIT Tasks

EXPERIENTIAL AREA
Perceiving Branch
Faces: Identify from photographs of faces how each person feels on a 1 to 5 scale (e.g., 1 = no happiness, 5 = extreme happiness).
Pictures: Indicate the extent to which images and photographs express various emotions on a 1 to 5 scale (e.g., 1 = not at all, 5 = very much).
Facilitating Branch
Sensations: Compare different emotions to different sensations such as light, color, and temperature on a 1 to 5 scale (e.g., 1 = not at all, 5 = very much).
Facilitation: Specify how certain moods might assist in responding to social situations (e.g., 1 = not useful, 5 = useful).
STRATEGIC AREA
Understanding Branch
Blends: Indicate which emotion (from 5 choices) tends to occur in the presence of a described emotional situation.
Changes: Indicate which emotion (from 5 choices) tends to be the transition state from a described emotional starting point.
Managing Branch
Emotion Management: Rate the effectiveness of alternative actions in achieving a specified emotional state on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = very ineffective, 5 = very effective).
Emotional Relations: Evaluate the effectiveness of alternative actions in achieving a desired outcome involving other people on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = very ineffective, 5 = very effective).

and the four Branch scores (Perceiving, Facilitating, Understanding, and Managing) likewise are normed to these traditional benchmarks. While scores are provided for the eight Tasks (see Table 9.10), the test developers caution against overinterpretation of these elemental scores because of their lower reliability. The overall EI score demonstrates strong internal reliability, in the low .90s, whereas the reliability of the two Area scores is slightly lower and more variable, typically in the high .80s (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). Test–retest reliability of the overall score is respectable at .86 (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).

An interesting issue with tests of emotional intelligence like the MSCEIT is how to determine the correct answers. After all, the questions involve subtle emotional concepts, for which the "correct" responses are not necessarily obvious. Consider the following question, which resembles some found on the MSCEIT:

What emotion(s) might prove helpful to feel when talking with a police officer who has just stopped you for speeding?

Deference	not helpful 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . very helpful
Mild anxiety	not helpful . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . very helpful
Surprise	not helpful . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . very helpful
Irritation	not helpful . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 . . . 5 . . . very helpful

The authors of the MSCEIT propose two different scoring methods: consensus scoring and

expert scoring. In consensus scoring, the majority choices of the normative sample are used to identify the correct options. For example, in the example above if 67% of the general population circled the number "1" for "irritation" (i.e., it is not helpful), this answer would be coded as the correct alternative. Respondents would receive lower scores to the extent they deviated from this alternative. This method is also called general scoring because the reference point is the general, normative sample.

The second approach, expert scoring, relies on the judgment of experts in the field of emotion to determine the correct options. In particular, the authors used 21 experts attending a conference of the International Society for Research on Emotion. Scoring for this approach relies on the consensus of these experts. Fortunately, the two scoring approaches (general and expert) reveal a very high agreement, on the order of .96 to .98 (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002).

The rationale for consensus scoring—whether based on the general population or experts—is that emotions and their expression possess an evolutionary and social basis. Emotions constitute a "signal system" that conveys important information to those around us. For example, the emotion of sadness signals loss and wanting to be comforted; the emotion of anger indicates the individual feels threatened and could respond forcefully; the emotion of happiness conveys an interest in joining others. Individuals who do not "read" emotions in a consensual manner likely will experience difficulty in a broad range of social situations.

The validity of the MSCEIT has been investigated from numerous perspectives, including factorial, discriminant, and predictive validity. Some results indicate that the instrument measures a unitary skill that can be subdivided into the four branches described above (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Further, EI as measured by the MSCEIT reveals generally low correlations with verbal intelligence, general intelligence, and major dimensions of personality, that is, the construct provides something that goes beyond established measures (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). EI is potentially useful because of its inverse relationship with deviant behaviors such as bullying, substance abuse, and violence. These relationships—high EI scores corresponding to low deviance—hold true even after the statistical control of intelligence and personality variables (Rubin, 1999; Trinidad & Johnson, 2002).

In spite of the supportive literature provided by proponents of EI measures, other reviewers maintain a cautious stance about the MSCEIT and similar tests. For example, in a comprehensive review of the psychometrics of emotional intelligence, Zeidner, Roberts, and Matthews (2008, p. 71) concluded that there has been "irrational enthusiasm surrounding the practical utility of emotional intelligence." They note that evidence regarding the role of EI in occupational success is weak, based largely on anecdotal reports and popular sources like Daniel Goleman's (1995) book, *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ*.

Even the developers of the MSCEIT acknowledge the potential for misuse of their instrument. Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios (2003, p. 104) state flatly that "the applied use of EI testing must proceed with great caution." The growing trend to use these instruments in selection of employees is, therefore, disquieting. As Conte (2005, p. 438) notes, managers and organizational leaders "should be wary of making this leap unless more rigorous discriminant, predictive, and incremental validity evidence for EI measures is shown."

In addition to the MSCEIT, a few other measures of emotional intelligence have gained recognition. One of these is the Emotional Competence Inventory (Sala, 2002), based on Goleman's (1995) conception of emotional intelligence. The Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI) contains 110 items organized into four clusters: (1) Self-Awareness, (2) Social Awareness, (3) Self-Management, and (4) Social Skills. One appealing feature of this instrument is the 360-degree feedback that it yields. In this method, self-ratings, peer ratings, and supervisor ratings are reported separately for comparison and contrast. The ECI is used mainly in large corporate settings for formative evaluation of employees. The publishers have maintained tight proprietary control over the test, which has limited independent research on its psychometric qualities.

Another widely used test is the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 2000), which

is traditionally known by the acronym EQ-i. This 133-item self-report instrument yields an overall EQ score as well as five composite scores: (1) intrapersonal, (2) interpersonal, (3) adaptability, (4) general mood, and (5) stress management. Reviewers of the EQ-i have noted that the theory behind the test is unclear (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Further, the test appears to overlap substantially with major personality constructs. For example, a correlation of $r = -.77$ with the anxiety scale from Cattell's 16PF is reported (Newsome et al., 2000). The EQ-i appears to demonstrate strong reliability, with test–retest reliability of .85 after one month (Bar-On, 1997). What remains unclear is whether the test measures emotional intelligence as a construct, as it is understood by others (Conte, 2005).

ASSESSMENT OF OPTIMISM

Optimism is another fruitful area for psychometric research and assessment. Typically this construct is viewed as one end of a bipolar continuum, optimism–pessimism. The difference between the two ends of the spectrum is captured in the familiar adage about the glass of water that is half-full to the optimist and half-empty to the pessimist. Whether this bipolar depiction is an accurate portrayal of the underlying construct(s) is a topic we take up below. Nonetheless, it is certainly the starting point for many theorists and for the perceptions of the lay public as well. Carver and Scheier capture why this area of assessment is important: "Optimists are people who expect good things to happen to them; pessimists are people who expect bad things to happen to them. Does this difference among people matter? It certainly does. Optimists and pessimists differ in several ways that have a big impact on their lives. They differ in how they approach problems and challenges they encounter, and they differ in the manner and the success with which they cope with life's difficulties" (2003, p. 75). In short, optimism and pessimism have to do with people's expectations for the future. Optimists expect a better future than pessimists and generally have more confidence in their ability to manage challenges when they arise. Generally, optimists fare better than pessimists in terms of personal adjustment and even physical health, although the differences for health are not substantial (Peterson, 2000). How these individual differences arise in personal development is an important and intriguing question that we do not pursue here. Instead we focus on assessment issues, namely, how is optimism measured?

The most widely used instrument is the revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). This is an intriguingly simple scale that consists of six scored items and four "filler" items (10 items total). Respondents indicate their extent of agreement with the items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 or "strongly disagree" to 5 or "strongly agree." Items similar to those found on the LOT-R include:

> I have a positive outlook and expect the best in life
>
> I don't expect good things to happen to me (reverse scored)
>
> I enjoy my family life a great deal (filler)

Of course, negatively worded items are reverse scored. Responses on the six scored items are then summed to yield a total from 6 (highly pessimistic) to 30 (highly optimistic). Even though "pessimist" and "optimist" are categories in popular language, the LOT-R instead provides a score on a continuum, without strict cut-offs. In large samples of respondents, the score distribution tends to be skewed toward the optimistic side, but not excessively so (Carver & Scheier, 2003).

Although the theoretical basis for the LOT-R postulates an optimism-pessimism continuum, psychometric analyses by Herzberg, Glaesmer, and Hoyer (2006) with huge samples of adults ($N = 46{,}133$) reveal that the optimism and pessimism items on the test measure two independent constructs rather than a single, bipolar trait. This is a counterintuitive finding which suggests that optimism and pessimism are partly independent. Conceivably, an individual could earn high scores on both (or low scores on both), although these outcomes probably are rare. In practice, many researchers now report three scores from the LOT-R: an optimism score based on the positively worded items, a pessimism score based on

the negatively worded items, and a total score that combines the two.

An additional finding of the Herzberg et al. study (2006) is that the reliability of the instrument is low (Cronbach alphas of .71 for the Optimism items and .68 for the Pessimism items). Thus, the test is recommended for group research only; it is not suitable for clinical practice with individuals.

A substantial literature points to the general conclusion that LOT-R optimists fare much better than pessimists on a wide variety of outcome measures (Snyder & Lopez, 2007). For example, in a sample of 275 Japanese college students, LOT-R total scores correlated $r = .39$ with social support, and $r = -.26$ with interpersonal conflict (Sumi, 2006). In a sample of 504 Australian high school students, LOT-R scores correlated $r = .55$ with self-esteem and $r = -.38$ with psychological distress (Creed, Patton, & Bartrum, 2002). In other words, for both studies LOT-R total scores modestly predicted good social adjustment.

Steptoe, Wright, Kunz-Ebrecht, and Iliffe (2006) investigated the relationship between LOT-R scores and numerous health behaviors in 128 community-dwelling seniors 65 to 80 years old. Dispositional optimism as measured by the LOT-R total score was associated with many healthful behaviors, including moderate alcohol consumption, not smoking, brisk walking, and vigorous physical activities (women only). Self-rated health and physical health status both were associated with optimism, although the direction of influence would be difficult to determine from this cross-sectional study. The full scale was more consistently associated with these positive relationships than either the optimism or pessimism subscales of the test. Carver and Scheier (2002) review additional external correlates of optimism as measured by the LOT-R.

ASSESSMENT OF GRATITUDE

As Emmons, McCullough, and Tsang (2003) observe, gratitude is difficult to define. In part, this is because the concept can be viewed as an attitude, an emotion, a disposition, or a personality trait. A simple definition is that gratitude is a response of thankfulness and joy when receiving a gift. But delving further, difficulties arise. What constitutes a gift? What are the possible sources of a gift? Some gifts are obvious and not debatable, as when neighbors deliver a precooked meal to someone who is grieving a loss. Almost everyone would experience gratitude in this situation. But what about viewing a sunrise, taking a hot shower, or seeing a baby smile in the supermarket? Should we experience gratitude for these opportunities as well? In other words, does gratitude require a personal benefactor, or can it be expanded to the countless ways in which life pleasantly surprises the mindful person?

Regardless of how it is conceptualized, gratitude is universally recognized as a personal virtue because it promotes social cohesion and provides an inner buffer against the toil and pain of everyday life. In general, people with a grateful disposition experience greater well-being than those without this asset (Emmons et al., 2003). The German-French theologian and physician Albert Schweitzer (1969), who founded a hospital in west central Africa and received the Nobel Peace Prize for his philosophy of "Reverence for Life," referred to gratitude as the "secret of life" (p. 36). Truly, that is a strong statement! In general, gratitude has received less attention as a topic of measurement than it deserves. But recent efforts are beginning to redress this deficiency.

One such effort is the Gratitude Questionnaire-Six Item Form (GQ-6) developed by McCullough, Emmons, and Tsang, 2002. The GQ-6 is a simple self-report measure of the disposition to experience gratitude (Figure 9.3). The test consists of the six best items from a longer list of statements that articulate gratitude and appreciation.

The reader will notice that the GQ-6 is based on a Likert-type format with seven alternatives ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strong agree). Two items are stated in the reverse (and therefore reverse scored) as a way of inhibiting response bias. The development and choice of specific test items was based on a thorough analysis of the many facets of the grateful disposition (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002). The authors determined that gratitude reflects intensity (feeling more intensely grateful), frequency (feeling grateful many times a day), span (grateful for many things), and density (grateful to many individuals). Initially, they proposed 39

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much you agree with it.

1 = strongly disagree
2 = disagree
3 = slightly disagree
4 = neutral
5 = slightly agree
6 = agree
7 = strongly agree

_____1. I have so much in life to be thankful for.
_____2. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list.
_____3. When I look at the world, I don't see much to be grateful for.*
_____4. I am grateful to a wide variety of people.
_____5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and situations that have been part of my life history.
_____6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or someone.*

*Items 3 and 6 are reverse scored.

FIGURE 9.3 The Gratitude Questionnaire-Six Item Form (GQ-6) *Source:* Reprinted with permission of Michael McCullough and Robert Emmons. Copyright 2002, all rights reserved.

items to measure these qualities. The GQ-6 is composed of the six best items, as determined by factor-analytic procedures performed with test results from two samples: 238 undergraduates and 1,228 adult volunteers surveyed via the Internet. Reliability of the instrument is good, with coefficient alphas between .82 and .87. Validity of the GQ-6 is based on numerous theory-confirming relationships with other measures. For example, self-ratings on the GQ-6 correlated modestly with external observers' perceptions of gratitude in the participants. Additional studies indicated that the GQ-6 is positively related to optimism, hope, spirituality, religiousness, forgiveness, empathy, and prosocial behavior. The scale is negatively related to depression, anxiety, materialism, and envy (McCullough et al., 2002).

While the GQ-6 conceives of gratitude as a single dimension, other researchers have proposed a multidimensional model. For example, the Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (GRAT, Watkins, Woodward, Stone, & Kolts, 2003) proposes three dimensions to gratitude:

- Appreciation of others, expressed as gratitude toward other people.
- Simple appreciation, expressed as gratitude toward non-social sources.
- Sense of abundance, expressed as the absence of general resentment.

The 42 items of the GRAT are rated on a 1 to 5 scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). The test possesses excellent reliability for the three subscales and the total score (Thomas & Watkins, 2003), and reveals theory-consistent relationships with external criteria such as spirituality and the absence of materialism (Diessner & Lewis, 2007).

Even though the authors of the GRAT hypothesized a multidimensional model in the development of their test, subsequent research indicates that gratitude might actually be a unitary trait. Wood, Maltby, Stewart, and Joseph (2007) conducted a factor analysis of the three GRAT subscales and nine other indices of gratitude (including the GQ-6), and found a clear one-factor solution. The 12 measures were highly intercorrelated, indicating a single latent construct which the researchers called gratitude/appreciation. Gratitude is an essential element of human experience that deserves ongoing psychometric inquiry.

SENSE OF HUMOR: SELF-REPORT MEASURES

Humor is a broad construct that has many meanings. Humor can refer to the characteristics of the material (a funny joke or cartoon) or the responses of the individual (a chuckle or belly laugh). Humor can be constructive when it brings people together, or destructive when it is at someone's expense. In contemporary Western society, having a sense of humor is generally viewed as a virtue. It is thought that individuals with a "good" sense of humor will more easily befriend others and also will be able to weather the adversities of life with greater balance.

But how do we conceptualize the loose notion of "sense of humor?" Is this an enduring personality trait, an ability to make others laugh, a temperamental feature of good cheer, a world view that life is fundamentally absurd, or something else? Martin (2003, p. 315) argues that: "One of the challenges of research on humor in the context of positive psychology is to identify which aspects or components of the humor construct are most relevant to mental health and successful adaptation." His answer is to conceptualize humor as a way of coping with stress and enhancing relationships. With this approach, Martin has developed three instruments used widely in humor research: The Coping Humor Scale, the Situational Humor Response Questionnaire, and the Humor Styles Questionnaire.

The Coping Humor Scale was designed to assess the extent to which individuals report using humor to cope with stress (Martin & Lefcourt, 1983). The CHS consists of 7 items similar to "When things are tense I look for something funny to say" or "I think humor is a useful way of coping with problems." These items are rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). There is no neutral point on the scale, which forces the respondent to take a position.

The CHS has good test–retest reliability, with $r = .80$ over a 12-week period, but only fair internal consistency, with coefficient alphas of .60 to .70 (Martin, 1996). Regarding validity, Martin (2003, p. 317) summarizes a number of robust external correlates of the test. CHS total scores correlate strongly with the following constructs:

- Peer ratings of using humor to cope with stress
- Peer ratings of not taking one's self too seriously
- Researcher ratings of funniness of monologues produced under stress
- Researcher ratings of using laughter and humor before dental surgery

The CHS is a respected instrument in humor research. Nonetheless, it has faded in use because later instruments (discussed below) provide broader measures of sense of humor.

The Situational Humor Response Questionnaire provides a measure of the degree to which the respondent is easily amused and laughs in a wide range of situations (Martin, 1996; Martin & Lefcourt, 1984). The SHRQ consists of 21 items, the first 18 of which describe ordinary life situations such as "You were at a party and the host accidentally spilled a drink on you." Each item is rated on a scale from 1 ("I would not have been particularly amused") to 5 ("I would have laughed heartily"). The last three items refer to laughing and being amused in general.

As summarized by Martin (1996), the SHRQ reveals adequate psychometric qualities, including test-retest correlations of around .70 and Cronbach alphas in the vicinity of .70 to .85. An interesting validity criterion used in several studies is the correlation of test scores with observed frequency of laughter, with *r*s ranging from .30 to .60. As noted by Martin (2003), frequency of laughter is a good validity criterion, but it is not perfect. After all, there is laughter without humor and humor without laughter. Fortunately, the validity evidence for this instrument includes a wide base of diverse studies, such as correlations with rated funniness of monologues produced by participants, and correlations with other humor scales. Another concern about the test is that the humor situations were designed with college students in mind and may not generalize to other groups. The humor situations date to the 1980s and earlier; some are no longer funny. After all, what is deemed funny shifts over time, is specific to cultures, and is sometimes idiosyncratic. For example, some viewers find the video clips featured on the television show *America's Funniest Home Videos* to be hilarious, whereas others regard this weekly offering with bewilderment or even downright scorn.

Recently, Martin and colleagues have developed a new humor instrument that represents the culmination of decades of research. The Humor Styles Questionnaire (HSQ, Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, & Weir, 2003) assesses four dimensions that convey individual differences in uses of humor:

- Affiliative: Use of humor to entertain others and facilitate relationships.
- Self-enhancing: Use of humor to cope with stress and uphold a positive outlook during difficult times.
- Aggressive: Use of mocking, manipulative, put-down, or disparaging humor.
- Self-defeating: Use of humor for undue self-disparagement, ingratiation, or defensive reply.

The HSQ includes 32 self-descriptive statements (8 for each subscale) that depict specific uses of humor. For example, items on the Affiliative scale might resemble: "I like to tell silly jokes based on word play." Items on the Aggressive scale might resemble: "I like to poke fun at people when they make mistakes."

The first two styles, Affiliative and Self-enhancing, embody constructive and healthy uses of humor. The last two styles, Aggressive and Self-defeating, involve unhealthy uses of humor that distance the individual from others. For each item, respondents indicate agreement or disagreement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The HSQ reveals excellent psychometric properties, with strong internal consistencies of the subscales (around .80), and good test–retest reliabilities (.80 to .85). Validity is based on convergent and discriminant correlations of the subscales with appropriate external criteria including well-being, hostility, intimacy, coping, satisfaction with relationships, and major personality variables (Martin et al., 2003).

How do individual differences in humor styles arise? A recent behavioral genetics analysis comparing HSQ scores of identical and fraternal twins found fascinating differences in developmental influences among the four humor styles (Vernon, Martin, Schermer, & Mackie, 2008). In this study of 300 pairs of identical twins and 156 pairs of fraternal twins, the positive forms of humor (Affiliative and Self-enhancing) were found to display significant genetic influences whereas the negative forms of humor (Aggressive and Self-defeating) arose in greater measure from common environmental influences. The authors offer the following conclusion:

> These results may have implications for potential therapeutic interventions designed to modify individuals' sense of humor. Because traits that are mainly influenced by environmental factors may be more malleable than those that are mainly influenced by genetic factors, our findings suggest that it may be easier to help people reduce their levels of aggressive and self-defeating humor styles than to increase their use of affiliative and self-enhancing humor. This is clearly a topic for further experimental study. (Vernon et al., 2008, pp. 1123–1124)

The lesson here for psychological testing is that the development of good measures such as the HSQ often generates far-reaching consequences.

CHAPTER 10

Neuropsychological Testing

TOPIC 10A Neurobiological Concepts and Behavioral Assessment

The Human Brain: An Overview
Structures and Systems of the Brain
Survival Systems: The Hindbrain and Midbrain
Attentional Systems
Motor/Coordination Systems
Memory Systems
Limbic System
Language Functions and Cerebral Lateralization
Visual System
Executive Functions
Neuropathology of Adulthood and Aging
Behavioral Assessment of Neuropathology

In the practice of assessment, psychologists often discover that their clients need assistance with serious problems that are best understood from a neurobiological standpoint. These problems typically arise as a consequence of head injury, learning disability, memory impairment, language disorder, or attentional difficulties, to list just a few examples. Tens of millions of individuals are affected. For example, in the United States an estimated 5 to 8 million children struggle with a learning disability (Dey, Schiller, & Tai, 2004), about 13 to 16 million adults live with memory loss and other symptoms related to dementia (Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association, 2000), and approximately 1.7 million people experience a head injury *each year* (Faul, Xu, Wald, & Coronado, 2010).

These numbers are staggering, and they provide an ongoing mandate for psychologists to develop specialized tests and procedures at the interface of psychology and medicine. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize pertinent tests, concepts, methods, and issues encountered in neuropsychological assessment and ancillary areas of appraisal such as substance

abuse evaluation and screening for dementia. In Topic 10A, Neurobiological Concepts and Behavioral Assessment, we provide a condensed review of neurobiological concepts relevant to psychological testing and assessment. The emphasis in this topic is upon the various brain systems that underlie effective cognitive and emotional functioning. Understanding these brain systems is essential for those who study or use psychological tests. In this primer, the reader also will encounter several of the simpler approaches to assessment used by neuropsychologists. In the process, a good foundation will be set for Topic 10B, Neuropsychological Tests, Batteries, and Screening Tools, which reviews prominent neuropsychological instruments, test batteries, and screening tools.

THE HUMAN BRAIN: AN OVERVIEW

By convention the nervous system is divided into the central nervous system consisting of the brain and spinal cord, and the peripheral nervous system that includes the cranial nerves and the network of nerves emanating from the spinal cord. The brain is intimately involved in thinking, feeling, and behaving. For these reasons, our focus in this topic is the structure and function of the brain.

The brain is beyond doubt the most protected organ in the human body. The first line of defense against physical trauma is the skull, consisting of several intermeshed, rigid bones that almost completely encase the brain. Beneath the skull, the brain is also surrounded by the **meninges**, a thin layering of three tough membranes that encases the brain and spinal cord, providing additional protection. The middle spongy layer of the meninges is filled with another form of protection, cerebrospinal fluid, which buffers the brain against sudden acceleration and deceleration, such as from a blow to the head. The brain literally floats in a snugly fitting bath of cerebrospinal fluid. Buoyancy reduces the effective weight of the organ to a few ounces, vastly reducing pressure upon the base of the brain. Without the protection of this fluid, the brain would bruise easily from any rapid movement of the head.

When unbouyed, the brain weighs less than three pounds. It is composed principally of five elements: gray matter, white matter, glial cells, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), and the blood vessels of the vascular system that provide the brain with oxygen and nutrients.

The 10^{11} or 100 billion neurons in the brain are arranged in complex networks that largely have defied understanding. In part, the inscrutability of the brain derives from its computational complexity. Neurons communicate by sending all-or-none electrochemical impulses to one another. Each neuron might send transmissions to thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of other neurons at near and distant sites called synapses. Chemical communications across the synapses can occur up to a thousand times a second. Even if we use a conservative estimate of a thousand synapses per neuron, in theory the number of neural transmissions that could occur in just one second is a staggering 10^{17} or 100,000,000,000,000,000 (one hundred quadrillion). No wonder that staid neuroscientists such as Sir John Eccles (who received a Nobel Prize for his work in neurophysiology) resort to hyperbole and describe the brain as "without qualification the most highly organized and most complexly organized matter in the universe" (Eccles, 1973). Considering how little we know of the universe, the truth of this statement is open to question. But it does effectively underscore the point that neuroscientists approach the study of the human brain with a sense of awe.

Cerebrospinal Fluid and the Ventricular System

Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) is a clear liquid that is continuously produced and replenished within the ventricles. The **ventricles** are hollow, interconnected chambers found in the middle of the brain. There are four ventricles: two side-by-side ventricles, called the lateral ventricles, and two midline ventricles known as the third and fourth ventricles.

In rare cases, the normal flow of CSF can become constricted, such as when the aqueduct leaving the third or fourth ventricle becomes too small. This can be a congenital condition present at birth or a disease-related state observed in adulthood. In children, the increase in pressure can lead to enlargement of the ventricles and compression of the brain against the skull. In time, the skull can even

enlarge. This condition is known as hydrocephalus or, literally, "water on the brain." Untreated, the consequence of hydrocephalus can be mental retardation and early mortality. Fortunately, effective treatments are available, including the insertion of a shunt to drain the excess fluid from the ventricles—usually into the child's abdomen.

The Vascular System of the Brain

Metabolically, the brain is a highly active organ, needing substantial supplies of oxygen and glucose to function effectively. These energy sources are supplied by the flow of blood through the cardiovascular system. Hence, the general physical health of the client and the specific condition of his or her vascular system in the brain are essential to high-level cognitive functioning.

Two pairs of arteries carry blood to the brain. These are the left and right internal carotid arteries, found in the front of the neck, and the left and right vertebral arteries, found in the back of the neck. The vertebral arteries come together just below the base of the brain to form a single artery, the basilar artery. These three arteries—the left and right internal carotids and the basilar artery—all feed into a circular arterial structure at the base of the brain known as the circle of Willis. This circular network ensures that the brain receives a continual supply of blood, even if one of the input arteries is compromised.

From this circular arterial system at the base of the brain, three arteries branch upward on each side to the roughly symmetrical cerebral hemispheres of the brain. The anterior cerebral arteries supply blood to the left and right frontal lobes and some midline structures. The middle cerebral arteries provide blood to the vast majority of the lateral surface of each hemisphere, including the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes, and to some internal structures as well. Finally, the posterior cerebral arteries supply blood to the left and right occipital lobes and to additional subcortical structures.

Especially with advancing age, it is not unusual for one or more arteries in the brain to become completely obstructed by a condition known as atherosclerosis, the gradual buildup of fatty plaque. When an artery in the brain becomes completely obstructed—whether gradually or suddenly from a piece of dislodged plaque—the brain tissue supplied by that vessel dies because it is deprived of oxygen. This event is called an infarct, which is one kind of stroke or **cerebrovascular accident** (CVA). Another kind of CVA occurs when a bulging area of arterial weakness, called an aneurysm, bursts open, allowing blood to spurt directly into the brain tissue. This is technically known as an arterial rupture. The effects of a CVA depend upon the size and location of the resulting damage to the brain. For example, an infarct occurring at the base of the left middle cerebral artery would have calamitous generalized effects (e.g., right-sided paralysis of the body, loss of speech), whereas an infarct occurring higher up, in a smaller offshoot from the artery, might have limited effects or even go unnoticed. One form of vascular impairment known as **multi-infarct dementia** (MID) occurs when the hardly noticeable individual effects of many small infarcts accumulate over a number of years. The symptoms of MID are varied but often impact the ability to perform everyday activities such as eating, dressing, and shopping. The symptoms might include forgetfulness, vague or circumstantial speech, lack of concentration, loss of balance, physical weakness, difficulty following instructions, and problems handling money. Often the onset of MID is so gradual and insidious that relatives recognize only in retrospect that something has been wrong for months after the onset of problems.

STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS OF THE BRAIN

The organization of the human brain is difficult to comprehend because important structures are interwoven and folded over upon one another. As noted, the brain also contains an intricate system of fluid-filled caverns, the ventricles, further complicating the spatial arrangement of important brain structures. In addition, functional brain systems rarely obey any simple structural organization—they typically meander their way from one part of the brain to another. Hence, we will focus mainly on a functional systems approach to explaining the operation of the brain, alluding to structures when appropriate.

We begin with a quick overview of the central nervous system and its primary subdivisions. The

most basic element of the nervous system is the **cerebrum**, consisting of the left and right cerebral hemispheres, which are connected by the corpus callosum, a band of fibers that transfers information from one hemisphere to the other. From the standpoint of evolution, the cerebrum is the most recent part of the brain to develop. This is where thought, perception, imagination, judgment, and decision occur. Some essential structures located beneath the cerebrum are the basal ganglia and the cerebellum (both important in coordinated movement), the diencephalon (including the thalamus), the midbrain (consisting of the cranial nerves and other important relay stations), the pons (connecting the cerebrum with the cerebellum and the spinal cord), and the medulla (mediating essential bodily functions).

Corpus Callosum

The **corpus callosum** is the major commissure that serves to integrate the functions of the two cerebral hemispheres. This large bundle of subcortical nerve fibers is about four inches long and a quarter inch thick. The corpus callosum spans the brain from side to side just above the level of the thalamus. Although there are exceptions, the corpus callosum generally connects homologous brain sites in the left and right hemispheres.

The function of the corpus callosum was poorly understood until the 1960s when Sperry, Gazzaniga, and others initiated sophisticated laboratory studies of so-called split-brain patients (Sperry, 1964; Gazzaniga, 1970; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). These patients were persons with epilepsy whose corpus callosa had been severed to prevent the transport of epileptic discharges from one hemisphere to the other. Although outwardly normal, split-brain patients revealed a striking isolation of consciousness when visual information was restricted to one hemisphere or the other. For example, when a picture of an apple was tachistoscopically presented to the left side of the examinee's fixation point, this stimulus was processed only in the right hemisphere (on account of the normal crossing over of neural connections). Furthermore, because the corpus callosum was severed, the image of the apple remained trapped in the right hemisphere. As the reader will discover later, the right hemisphere is usually mute and does not subserve important language functions. Thus, when asked, "What did you see?" the examinees, responding from the verbal left hemisphere, would honestly reply, "Nothing." Yet, these patients could readily identify the object by pointing to it with the left hand (which is under the neural control of the right hemisphere). This suggests that although the right hemisphere cannot talk, it has a separate and independent capacity to perceive, learn, remember, and issue commands for motor tasks.

In a normal individual with intact corpus callosum, consciousness appears unitary because the two halves of the brain can communicate and forge a compromise as regards perception, thought, and action. Much of our knowledge of hemispheric specializations, discussed later, has been garnered from the detailed study of split-brain patients. Further insight has been gained from studies of persons living with the congenital absence of this structure, a condition known as agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC). Present in about 1 in 4,000 live births, ACC manifests with a variety of deficits, superbly summarized by Paul, Brown, Adolphs, and others (2007). Even though overall IQ is minimally impacted, impairments are observed in abstract reasoning, problem solving, and category fluency (e.g., the ability to list multiple items in a category such as animals). One intriguing symptom that bears on current understanding of language function is that persons with ACC show marked difficulty in the verbal expression of emotional experience. Parents of children with the disorder consistently describe conversations that are meaningless or out of place (Paul et al., 2007). This corresponds well with known lateralization of brain function, in which logical components of language are underwritten by the left hemisphere, whereas the emotional aspects of language are subserved by the right hemisphere. In the absence of a corpus callosum, individuals with ACC find it particularly difficult to synthesize these two elements of language.

Cerebral Cortex

The **cerebral cortex**, the outermost layer of the brain, is the source of the highest levels of sensory,

motor, and cognitive processing. Also called the neocortex, the cerebral cortex is a very recent evolutionary development. It is the functional capacity of this brain system—a uniform six layers deep—that most dramatically separates humans from the lower animals.

The tissue of the cerebral cortex is folded over into elaborate convolutions consisting of bulges and grooves. The prominent bulges are called gyri (singular *gyrus*), whereas the clefts, fissures, and grooves are called sulci (singular *sulcus*). This arrangement allows the brain to have a great deal more cerebral cortex than if the surface were smooth. Although the pattern of gyri and sulci is subtly unique for each person, certain major landmarks such as the central sulcus and the lateral sulcus (Figure 10.1) are always discernible in a normal brain.

A small portion of the cerebral cortex is committed cortex. These sites are dedicated to basic sensory processing of vision, hearing, touch, and motor control. Nonetheless, the specificity of committed cortex is relative, not absolute. For example, the precentral gyrus classically is regarded as the motor cortex (see Figure 10.1), but only a fraction of the neurons subserving voluntary movement are located there. This has been demonstrated through neurosurgical investigations of the exposed cortex in persons with epilepsy, beginning with the pioneering work of Wilder Penfield (1958). The fully conscious patient received local anesthesia while surgeons opened a skull flap to expose one side of the brain. Then a stylus was used to deliver a small, brief, harmless electrical charge to specific sites in the sensory, motor, and language areas. The purpose of this procedure was to map the topography of the cortex so that vital brain sites were not excised. Using this approach, Uematsu, Lesser, Fisher, and others (1992) reconfirmed that a significant proportion—more than one-third—of motor responses originate outside the classic narrow cortical strip. Some motor responses emanate from the sensory strip, and others from adjoining brain sites. Furthermore, the motor strip contains a sizeable proportion of sensory cells, too. Thus, cells that subserve each specific sensory or motor function are highly concentrated in the respective committed area, but also thin out and overlap with nearby brain sites. In brief, the committed cortex of the **frontal lobe** is dedicated to motor control, the **parietal lobe** is concerned with the processing of touch and other somatosensory information, the occipital lobe is involved in visual perception, and the **temporal lobe** is essential to the processing of auditory information. Of course, these brain regions serve other functions as well, but part of each major lobe is dedicated to a specific motor or sensory function (Figure 10.2).



FIGURE 10.1 **Major Landmarks of the Left Cerebral Hemisphere**



FIGURE 10.2 **The Structural Model of Left Hemisphere Language Functions**

SURVIVAL SYSTEMS: THE HINDBRAIN AND MIDBRAIN

The lowest part of the brain, located at the top of the spinal cord, consists of the **hindbrain**, which includes the medulla oblongata, the pons, the reticular formation, and the cerebellum. From the standpoint of evolution, the hindbrain was the first brain system to develop, which explains why so many vital bodily functions are governed by this brain area. For example, the automatic control of breathing is mediated here—we breathe even when asleep, or for that matter, when in a deep coma.

The lowest section of the hindbrain is the medulla oblongata, which mediates several essential bodily functions: breathing, swallowing, vomiting, blood pressure, and, partially, heart rate (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1995). Aspects of talking and singing also are governed here, although higher brain sites are intimately involved in these functions as well.

Significant damage to the medulla usually is fatal. In rare cases, a small stroke in the medulla causes one or more of the following symptoms: opposite-sided paralysis, partial loss of pain and temperature sense, clumsiness, dizziness, partial loss of the gag reflex, and same-sided paralysis and atrophy of the tongue. Thus, one reason why neurologists ask patients to stick out their tongue and move it from side to side is specifically to check for neurological damage in and around the medulla. The polio virus—rampant in the 1950s but now well controlled—may attack the medulla, shutting down the neural control of breathing and necessitating a mechanical respirator.

The pons and cerebellum are the highest structures in the hindbrain. Together they help coordinate muscle tone, posture, and hand and eye movement. The role of the cerebellum in motor control is discussed later. Lesions of the pons may render the individual incapable of making coordinated lateral eye movements. For this reason, neurologists and neuropsychologists commonly ask patients to demonstrate left-right and up-down eye movements.

Located just above the hindbrain is the **midbrain**, which includes a number of important relay stations involved in hearing and vision. In addition, the midbrain contains nuclei for many of the cranial nerves (some of which also emanate from the hindbrain). The 12 paired **cranial nerves** are major neural tracts whose functions are well understood and easily tested. Some are exclusively sensory, relaying information from the external world to the brain; some are exclusively motor, serving to execute commands from the brain; about a third of the cranial nerves possess both sensory and motor functions. Neurologists refer to the cranial nerves by number. The numbers correspond roughly to the top to bottom sequence of the nerves' emergence from the brain (Table 10.1). The reader will notice that many

TABLE 10.1 The Cranial Nerves and Their Functions

1. Olfactory	Sense of smell
2. Optic	Vision
3. Oculomotor	Horizontal and vertical eye movement
4. Trochlear	Vertical eye movement
5. Trigeminal	Facial sensation, jaw movement
6. Abducens	Horizontal eye movement
7. Facial	Facial movement and taste
8. Auditory/vestibular	Hearing and balance
9. Glossopharyngeal	Taste, swallowing
10. Vagus	Visceral reflexes
11. Accessory	Head movement
12. Hypoglossal	Tongue movement

cranial nerves mediate aspects of vision and eye movement, basic sensory functions, and movement of jaw, tongue, face, and head. Over the centuries, neurologists have devised a variety of simple confrontational techniques to assess the cranial nerves. As peculiar as it may appear, asking the patient to stick out his or her tongue and move it left, right, up, or down can provide important information about the functioning of the hypoglossal (12th) cranial nerve. In like manner, various simple tests of hearing, balance, eye movement, and so on are used to complete the examination of the cranial nerves.

ATTENTIONAL SYSTEMS

Attention has been likened to a "spotlight" that our brain uses to identify what is relevant and ignore what is irrelevant (Andreasen, 2001). Attention is often a primitive, automatic cognitive system that is essential for survival. Consider the variety of competing stimuli encountered when you drive a car down the highway, perhaps with a friend sitting next to you. A realistic scenario is that your friend asks a question, an airplane flies low in the distant horizon, a billboard on the left lures your visual focus, a siren blares in the distance, your back aches from a strenuous workout—all these sources of stimulation compete for your attention. Then a car swerves into your lane. Instantly, without conscious forethought, your brain focuses every last fragment of attention on this one looming threat, ignoring all else.

Neuropsychologists have identified several kinds of **attention**, including the following types:

- Orienting
- Selective
- Divided
- Sustained

Orienting attention is the simplest and most primitive form, related to the "fight" or "flight" reflex. This is the straightforward direction of all attentional resources to a single threatening stimulus, such as a car swerving into your lane. Selective attention refers to the identification of a single, personally relevant stimulus embedded within a flow of extraneous information. This is exemplified when, for example, a young boy who seems absorbed in solitary play nonetheless turns his head when he overhears his name spoken quietly in the background. Divided attention, also known as distributed attention, pertains to the ability to shift back and forth between two or more tasks. An example might be when a partygoer tries to follow two conversations at the same time. Sustained attention, also known as vigilance, refers to the ability to sustain attention over relatively long periods of time. This involves the capacity to resist distraction and stay on task for a prolonged period. A good example is the air traffic controller who must monitor radar images carefully to keep airplanes at a safe distance from one another.

The exact neurological mechanisms of attention are not well understood. Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell (1995) note that the "neuronal mechanisms of focused attention and conscious awareness are now emerging as one of the great unresolved problems in perception and indeed in all of neurobiology" (p. 402). Neurologically, attention is a complex function that involves the collaborative effort of several brain sites. Furthermore, different forms of attention appear to invoke different brain systems. For example, sustained attention or vigilance is mediated by

the reticular formation, a network of ascending and descending nerve cell bodies and fibers, which begins in the spinal cord and extends through the medulla all the way up to the thalamus. Specific nuclei within the reticular formation project through the thalamus to wide areas of the brain and thereby help mediate attention. Based upon the classic studies of Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) demonstrating that ascending nerve tracts within the **reticular formation** govern general arousal or consciousness, portions of this structure are also known as the reticular activating system. Damage to the reticular activating system gives rise to global diminution of consciousness ranging from chronic drowsiness to stupor or coma (Carpenter, 1991).

Selective attention appears to invoke brain sites in addition to the reticular formation. For example, based upon functional imaging studies that highlight active brain sites, it appears that the cingulate gyrus is essential for focusing upon relevant aspects of the environment while ignoring irrelevant information. One finding is that, when asked to perform complex attentional tasks, persons who suffer from schizophrenia and who, therefore, reveal deficits in selective attention also show dysfunction in the cingulate gyrus (Carter, Mintun, Nichols, & Cohen, 1997).

MOTOR/COORDINATION SYSTEMS

Although many brain sites are involved in motor control, three areas are of special significance: the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, and the motor cortex. The **cerebellum** sits just below the cerebrum at the back of the brain. Together with other brain structures, it helps coordinate muscle tone, posture, and hand and eye movements. Lesions in or near the cerebellum may render the individual incapable of making coordinated lateral eye movements. For this reason, neurologists and neuropsychologists commonly ask patients to demonstrate left-right and up-down eye movements. An individual with damage to the cerebellum might not be able to move his or her eyes with facility in all directions.

The cerebellum receives sensory information from every part of the body and coordinates the details of automatic skilled movements. Damage to the cerebellum may cause a variety of motor disturbances, depending upon the specific sites affected (Manto & Pandolfo, 2002). Slurred, hesitant speech known as **dysarthria** may be a symptom of cerebellar damage. Muscles may become flabby and tire easily. Rapid, coordinated tapping of the index finger may prove difficult. Measures of finger-tapping speed (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993) are, therefore, an important component of neuropsychological test batteries.

Bodily movements may lose their coordination in cerebellar disease, becoming spasmodic and jerky. Even a simple gesture such as reaching for a cup may result in the inadvertent thrusting of cup and contents halfway across the room. The characteristic wide-based gait of alcoholics—called ataxia—is a consequence of cerebellar degeneration (Ghez, 1991). Another symptom of cerebellar damage is intention tremor, so named because it is not present at rest but arises during voluntary, intentional movements of the hands. Nystagmus also is common in cerebellar disease. In this symptom, the eyes appear to jitter back and forth even when the individual attempts to hold a steady gaze.

In conjunction with the vestibular center in the inner ear, the cerebellum also helps coordinate the vestibuloocular reflex (VOR). The VOR acts to maintain the eyes on a fixed target when the head is rotated. Without the VOR, vision would be incredibly blurred whenever the head moved even a fraction of an inch. Instead, a small area of the cerebellum coordinates a rapid refixation of the eyes to compensate for head movements.

The **basal ganglia** consist of a collection of nuclei in the in the forebrain that makes connections with the cerebral cortex above and the thalamus below. The basal ganglia are traditionally considered as part of the motor system. The main constituents of the basal ganglia are three large subcortical nuclei: the caudate, the putamen, and the globus pallidus. Some authorities also consider the amygdala to be part of the basal ganglia (Carpenter, 1991). These structures are interconnected with and functionally related to the subthalamic nucleus and the substantia nigra. Along with the cerebellum, the corticospinal system, and the motor nuclei in the brain stem, the basal ganglia participate in the control of movement. Unlike the other components of the motor system, the basal ganglia do not have

direct connections with the spinal cord. The motor functions of the basal ganglia are indirect and are mediated via neural connections with the frontal cerebral cortex.

The most common syndrome caused by damage to the basal ganglia is **Parkinson's disease** (PD) (Factor & Weiner, 2008). In Parkinson's disease, three characteristic types of motor disturbances are observed: involuntary movement, including tremor; poverty and slowness of movement without paralysis; and changes in posture and muscle tone. In its later stages, this disease is typified by an immobile, masklike facial expression, an extreme difficulty initiating movements, and a fine tremor that may disappear once a movement is under way.

Patients with Parkinson's disease also reveal specific cognitive deficits, suggesting that the basal ganglia contribute not just to movement but to thinking as well. Deficits observed in these patients include problems formulating goals and evaluating progress, difficulties with attention, limitations in word-finding, and slowed thinking. Some patients with PD report that their brain feels "swampy" (Tröster, 2012). A loss of spontaneity and a lack of initiative also are observed (La Rue, 1992).

The **motor cortex** is found on the precentral gyrus of the frontal lobe. Primary motor cells that subserve voluntary movement are located here and in adjoining brain sites. Motor control is substantially but not exclusively contralateral (opposite-sided), meaning that the left precentral gyrus subserves the right side of the body, and vice versa. Thus, when an individual makes a decision, say, to lift his right hand, motor neurons in the left precentral gyrus will be activated. For obvious reasons, this area is also known as the motor strip.

The fact that motor control is substantially opposite-sided is the basis for several neuropsychological procedures that compare the function of the two sides of the body as a means of determining the integrity of the left and right motor strips. Consider the finger-tapping test, employed with many neuropsychological test batteries (e.g., Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). In a typical finger-tapping procedure, the examiner uses standardized procedures with repeated trials to determine the maximal tapping rates of the left and right index fingers over a 10-second span. Of course, the preferred hand will have a slight advantage, with a normative expectation of a rate that is 10 percent higher. For example, in a right-handed person, a tapping rate of 55 for the right index finger and 50 for the left index finger might be typical.

Any significant deviation from this expected pattern may suggest impairment in the opposite-sided motor strip. For example, suppose a right-handed examinee has a tapping rate of 47 for the right index finger and 50 for the left index finger. Because the right-sided tapping rate is comparatively slower than expected (i.e., 6 percent slower instead of 10 percent faster than the left-sided tapping rate), this would suggest impairment in the left motor strip.

MEMORY SYSTEMS

Although the lay public thinks of memory as a single thing, psychologists have known for more than a century that there are many types of memory and also several stages of memory (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). We can provide only a cursory review here. The importance of reviewing these basic distinctions is that different brain systems may be involved in different kinds of memory.

As to types of memory, Andreasen (2001) posits the existence of at least four different polarities of **memory**: episodic versus semantic, working versus associative, declarative versus procedural, and explicit versus implicit. To this list, we would add a fifth dimension: short-term versus long-term memory. These dimensions are not completely separate and distinct from one another. Episodic memory refers to memory of events or experiences, such as recalling that you had oatmeal for breakfast. In contrast, semantic memory is general knowledge not tied to a specific learning experience, such as knowing that a butterfly is an insect, not a bird. Working memory is the retention of information that we need only briefly, such as remembering the digits of a phone number just long enough to complete the call. Associative memory involves memories that are invoked because of their association with particular cues, for example, recalling the smell and taste of popcorn when hearing the sound of it popping in the microwave. Declarative memory involves the "what" of memory (e.g., knowing that a bicycle has

two wheels) whereas procedural memory involves the "how" of memory (e.g., knowing how to ride a bicycle). Another way of dividing memory is explicit versus implicit, which defines the difference between memories that are immediately accessible and obvious (e.g., knowing your name) compared to those that are latent, beneath the surface (e.g., surprising yourself when you are able to recall the name of your first-grade teacher).

Another important distinction is between short-term and long-term memory. Short-term memory is synonymous with working memory and is very short in duration, lasting from perhaps 10 seconds to a minute. If short-term memories are not "refreshed" through rehearsal, they disappear after this brief duration. Long-term memory refers to memories that have been consolidated in some way so that they are more lasting in duration—hours or years—although not necessarily permanent.

Describing the brain systems involved in memory is challenging because multiple brain sites are typically involved and different types of memory utilize different pathways. Even so, there is substantial evidence that structures within the temporal lobes are essential to many important features of memory. In particular, the **hippocampus** and the **amygdala** appear to be involved in various aspects of memory and learning. Specifically, these brain sites are involved in the consolidation of short-term memories into long-term memories. The amygdala may play a special role in integrating memories from different modalities and, especially, in consolidating memories with strong emotional meaning (Andreasen, 2001).

Humans have both a left hippocampus and right hippocampus (plural: *hippocampi*), located subcortically within the left and right temporal lobes. The same is true for the amygdala (plural: *amygdalae*), which is also a bilateral structure. The crucial role of these structures in the consolidation of memory was revealed by the case of H.M., a patient with intractable epilepsy who was treated by the surgical removal of the forward section of the temporal lobe on both sides of his brain (Milner, 1968). Prior to this case, many individuals with epilepsy had been successfully treated by the removal of the diseased portion of one temporal lobe. The goal of this kind of surgery is to remove the diseased brain areas that serve as the "trigger" or focus point for seizure activity. The cognitive consequences of single-sided temporal lobe surgery had proved to be minimal. H.M. was the first carefully studied case of bilateral temporal lobe surgery.

The consequences of his surgery were devastating, which was a shocking revelation to everyone involved. Put simply, H.M. proved incapable of forming any new memories from the point of the surgery onward (Milner, 1968). His old long-term memories remained intact, so he could recall where he attended high school, and so forth. And his short-term memory was intact, so he could remember a phone number briefly, for example. But his ability to consolidate new long-term memories was completely annihilated. He could read the same magazine from day to day, unaware that he had read it, cover to cover, the day before. A new doctor remained a new doctor on each new visit. He was essentially a prisoner of the moment, able to converse and interact with apparent normality but unable to remember anything new for more than a few minutes.

Structured testing of H.M. confirmed that different forms of memory are subserved by different brain systems. Consider procedural memory, for example, the recollection of how to do something. H.M. was asked to undertake repeated trials of mirror drawing—a complex procedural task in which the examinee traces a path on a sheet of paper while looking in a mirror. This is a daunting assignment in which directionality—left and right—are effectively reversed. With practice, normal individuals typically show slow improvement, tracing the path more quickly and with fewer errors. Intriguingly, H.M. likewise showed normal improvement on this task from day to day—indicating that his procedural memory remained intact—even though he had no realization that he had seen the puzzle before (Corkin, 1968). Most likely, this kind of procedural memory is subserved by the cerebellum. Clearly, it is not underwritten by the temporal lobes.

LIMBIC SYSTEM

The **limbic system** is a "primitive" central brain system that is involved in emotions and basic survival drives. This system overlaps with other brain sites, especially those involved in memory. The structures

of the limbic system are involved in emotions, such as fear and aggression, as well as in the acquisition of memory. The pleasure centers of the brain are located here, too, within the nucleus acumbens. In addition to the hippocampus and amygdala, other limbic structures are the cingulate gyrus, mammillary bodies, and the fornix. Andreasen (2001) points out that the exact boundaries of what constitutes the limbic system are not well established because our understanding of this brain system has been steadily growing.

In evolutionary terms, the limbic system is very old and, consequently, involved in primitive survival functions. Because of its proximity to and connections with the hypothalamus, the limbic system indirectly exerts autonomic nervous system control over crucial bodily functions needed for continued existence.

The **hypothalamus** is a deceptively small structure that sits just below and in front of the thalamus. Even though it composes only about 0.3 percent of the brain's weight, the hypothalamus is involved in numerous aspects of motivated behavior and bodily regulation: blood pressure, feeding, sexual behavior, sleep/wake cycle, temperature regulation, emotional behavior, and movement. Well studied in lower animals, the functions of the hypothalamus are less well known in humans (Kolb & Whishaw, 2011). It is known that the hypothalamus exerts proprietary control over the pituitary gland, thereby modulating a wide range of endocrine functions. The most common cause of a hypothalamic lesion is a severe head injury. Hypothalamic lesions often lead to disturbances of pituitary function, including excessive or deficient intake of food or water and temperature and blood pressure dysregulation (Kupfermann, 1991a). Dysfunction of the hypothalamus also can lead to emotional dysregulation (especially fear or rage) and sleep disturbance (hypersomnolence or insomnia).

LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AND CEREBRAL LATERALIZATION

Language Functions of the Left Hemisphere

Language is primarily (but not exclusively) a left hemisphere function that involves widely separated cortical and subcortical structures. Because so many regions of the left hemisphere are involved in language, virtually any significant left hemisphere lesion will produce some kind of disturbance in the production or comprehension of language. For this reason a detailed profile of language skills offers a window to the integrity and functioning of the left hemisphere.

Yet, we need to keep in mind that virtually any high-level intellectual activity, including language expression and comprehension, requires the synthetic interaction of the entire brain. Speech is a case in point. While primarily subserved by the left hemisphere in most individuals, the right cerebral hemisphere does provide the intonation patterns for speech. As a result, patients with right-sided lesions (particularly in the frontal area) may speak in an eerie monotone (Kalat, 2012).

Modern conceptions of brain–language correlations actually stem from the late nineteenth century. In 1861, Paul Broca observed that damage to a small region just in front of the motor cortex of the left hemisphere caused a language disorder originally called expressive aphasia and now more typically known as nonfluent aphasia. Persons with damage to this left hemisphere premotor area—aptly named Broca's area—speak in a slow, labored manner. They have difficulty enunciating words correctly; the act of speaking seems to be torturous for them. Speech takes on a frankly telegrammatic nature; adjectives, adverbs, articles, and conjunctions—the words that add color to speech—frequently are omitted. Writing also is difficult for these persons. Fortunately, persons who experience **Broca's aphasia** have little difficulty understanding either spoken or written language. In its pure form, the disorder involves expressive language only.

In 1874, Wernicke announced that damage to the upper and rearward portion of the left temporal lobe—a region now known as Wernicke's area—was linked to a language disorder originally called receptive aphasia and now more typically known as fluent aphasia. Affected individuals appear unable to comprehend spoken or written language. Apparently, persons with **Wernicke's aphasia** have no difficulty perceiving words but cannot associate the words with their underlying meaning. As a consequence, the written and verbal expressions of persons with

this aphasia are fluent but meaningless. For example, when asked to define *book,* a patient might respond, "Book, a husbelt, a king of prepator, find it in front of a car ready to be directed." The same person might define *scarecrow* as, "We'll call that a three-minute resk witch, you'll find one in the country in three witches" (Williams, 1979).

Building on the observations of Broca and Wernicke, Geschwind (1972) proposed a structural, neurological model of left hemisphere language functions that has been highly influential in neuropsychological assessment. This model bears directly upon the assessment of language skills; the major elements are outlined next and depicted in Figure 10.2. Geschwind postulated the following:

1. Spoken language is perceived in the left auditory cortex at the top of the temporal lobe and then transferred to Wernicke's area.
2. In Wernicke's area, the meanings of words are activated and the auditory codes are transported to a subcortical bundle of transmission fibers called the arcuate fasciculus.
3. The arcuate fasciculus sends the auditory codes directly to Broca's area.
4. Upon reaching Broca's area, the auditory code activates the corresponding articulatory code that specifies the sequence of muscle actions required to pronounce a word.
5. In turn, the articulatory code is transmitted to the portions of the motor cortex governing tongue, lips, larynx, and so forth in order to produce the desired spoken word.

Comprehending or speaking a written word involves most of the previously outlined pathways, but with a different starting point:

6. Written words are first registered in the visual cortex, then relayed through the visual association cortex to the angular gyrus.
7. In the angular gyrus, the visual form of the word is mapped into the auditory code stored in Wernicke's area, thereby gaining access to the meaning of the written word, which can also be spoken (steps 2 through 5 previously).

The Geschwind model is helpful in explaining a number of clinical syndromes caused by discrete left hemisphere brain damage (Gregory, 1999):

- Lesions to Broca's area will cause slow, labored, telegraphic speech, but the comprehension of spoken or written language will not be affected.
- Damage to Wernicke's area will have more serious and pervasive implications for language comprehension; namely, the patient will be unable to understand spoken or written communications.
- Damage to the angular gyrus will cause serious reading disability, but there will be little problem in comprehending speech or in speaking.
- Impairment limited to the left auditory cortex will result in serious disruption of verbal comprehension. However, such persons will be able to speak and read normally.

In practice, few patients reveal aphasic symptoms that fall neatly into one or another of the preceding categories. Furthermore, modern conceptions of aphasia point to weaknesses in the classical model (e.g., its overly simplistic view of the structure of language) and propose a complex, nonlinear model of aphasia that is beyond the scope of coverage here (Bonner, Ash, & Grossman, 2010). Nonetheless, a thorough assessment of language functions is an essential part of every neuropsychological evaluation and the classical model of Broca, Wernicke, and Geschwind provides a useful starting point. Additional perspectives on aphasia and the structural model of language can be found in Benson (1994) and Mayeux and Kandel (1991).

Specialized Functions of the Right Hemisphere

Based on thousands of studies of normal and brain-damaged persons, it is now well established that the right hemisphere is dominant for a variety of cognitive and perceptual skills. However, a detailed discussion of specialized right hemisphere functions is beyond the scope of this section. Competent reviews of the extensive literature on this topic can be found in Bradshaw and Mattingley (1995), Fonseca, Scherer, de Oliviera, and others (2009), Springer and Deutsch (1997), and Witelson (2007). In general, the right hemisphere appears to be dominant for the analysis of geometric and visual space, the comprehension

and expression of emotion, the processing of music and nonverbal environmental sounds, the production of nonverbal and spatial memories, and the tactual recognition of complex shapes.

A frequent symptom of right hemisphere damage is **constructional dyspraxia**, the impaired ability to deal with spatial relationships either in a two- or three-dimensional framework (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). This symptom is commonly exhibited by an impaired ability to copy simple shapes such as a cross. Left hemisphere lesions can also cause constructional dyspraxia, but the correlation is less consistent. Most neuropsychological test batteries include one or more copying tasks to screen for constructional dyspraxia. We include a summary of findings on cerebral lateralization in Table 10.2.

VISUAL SYSTEM

The primary sensory areas for vision are located in the occipital lobes; much of this projection area is on the mesial or midline surface that separates the two cerebral hemispheres. Each occipital lobe sees the opposite side of the visual world. Thus, all visual stimuli to the left of the reader's fixation point are ultimately processed in the right occipital lobe, and vice versa. The split visual world is shared across the splenium, the rearward portion of the corpus callosum, producing a unified perception of the entire visual field. Damage to the primary visual area produces a corresponding loss of visual field on the opposite side. For example, an extensive lesion in the left occipital lobe would render a person blind to the right half of the visual world. A very small lesion might produce a scotoma or blind spot.

The forward portion of each occipital lobe is unimodal association cortex. These regions synthesize visual stimuli and produce meaning from them. This is where the high-level processing of visual information occurs. Damage to the association cortex of the occipital lobes may cause **visual agnosia**, a difficulty in the recognition of drawings, objects, or faces (Kandel, 1991). Luria

TABLE 10.2 A Summary of Findings on Cerebral Lateralization

Functional System	*Left Hemisphere Dominance*	*Right Hemisphere Dominance*
Vision	Processing of the right visual field Recognition of letters, words	Processing of the left visual field Recognition of faces
Audition	Processing of right ear Processing of language-related sounds	Processing of left ear Processing of music and environmental sounds
Somatosensory	Sensory input from the right side	Sensory input from the left side
Movement	Motor output to the right side Complex voluntary movement, including speech	Motor output to the left side
Language	Speech, reading, writing, and arithmetic	Intonation and emotional patterning to speech
Memory	Verbal memory	Pictorial memory
Spatial processes		Analysis of geometric and visual space
Emotion		Comprehension and expression of emotion
Olfaction	Smell in left nostril	Smell in right nostril

(1973) described a typical case of a patient with such a lesion:

> The patient carefully examines the picture of a pair of spectacles shown to him. He is confused and does not know what the picture represents. He starts to guess. "There is a circle . . . and another circle . . . and a stick . . . a crossbar . . . why, it must be a bicycle?"

The visual agnosias are especially linked to right-sided lesions of occipital association cortex, but may also involve impairment of the parietal and temporal lobes as well. A particularly dramatic form of visual agnosia is prosopagnosia, the inability to recognize familiar faces. Benson (1994) cites the example of a 70-year-old man who suffered a series of strokes affecting the forward portions of the occipital lobes. The patient's chief complaint was that he could not recognize his wife or his daughter by sight, although he immediately recognized them by their voices. In another case of visual agnosia known as object agnosia, a patient reproduced a drawing of a train with great skill but had no idea what he had drawn. Benson (1988) describes the many fascinating symptoms of visual agnosia.

EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

The **executive functions** of the brain provide the ability to respond to novel situations in an adaptive manner. Lezak, Howieson, and Loring (2004) propose that the executive functions consist of four components:

- Volition
- Planning
- Purposive action
- Effective performance

Volition is the capacity for intentional behavior, the ability to conceptualize a goal. Planning is the identification of the steps needed to achieve the goal. Purposive action is the capacity to take action and sustain it in an orderly manner. Effective performance requires the ability to monitor one's activities in light of the original goals and shift strategies as needed. Thus, executive functions are implicated in a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and social skills.

An intriguing paradox of psychological testing is that few instruments are sensitive to impairments of executive functions. When provided with the structure of a typical psychological test, individuals with impaired executive functions often rise to the occasion and perform well. However, in the perplexity of real life, personal functioning may reveal catastrophic disability. For example, a successful financial planner who sustained a brain injury

> . . . can no longer formulate plans well because of an inability to take all aspects of a situation into account and integrate them. This disability is further aggravated by his lack of awareness of his mistakes. Problems occasioned by the man's emotional lability and proneness to irritability are overshadowed by the crises resulting from his efforts to carry out inappropriate and sometimes financially hazardous plans. (Lezak, 1995, p. 650)

Yet, cognitive test scores for this individual—and others like him with impaired executive functions—might well be normal.

Executive functions are substantially but not exclusively underwritten by the frontal lobes. Although it is true that disturbances in executive functions can arise from a variety of neurological conditions that involve diverse brain sites, in the vast majority of cases damage to the frontal lobes is implicated. It is with the frontal lobes that humans create intentions, form plans, and regulate their behavior by comparing the effects of their actions with their original intentions. In short, the frontal lobes are essential for the programming, regulation, verification, and motor performance of executive functions.

Enacting a plan requires a bodily movement of some kind. People pursue their goals by physically manipulating the environment, whether with their hands or through the motor activity of speech. It is

not surprising, then, to find that the primary motor cortex is located in the frontal lobes—where plans and intentions are also formed.

The primary motor cortex is found on the precentral gyrus, at the rear of the frontal lobe, just in front of the central sulcus. Motor control is opposite-sided, with the left motor cortex controlling bodily movements on the right, and vice versa. The topical organization of the motor strip was first mapped by Penfield (1958) during a series of operations to remove damaged cortical tissue in persons with epilepsy. He stimulated different areas of the motor cortex with a harmless electrical current to map the correspondence between cortex and different body parts. Penfield found that those areas of the body requiring precise control, such as fingers and mouth, occupy a disproportionately large amount of cortical space.

Just in front of the primary motor cortex is the supplementary motor cortex. The supplementary motor cortex is involved in the serial ordering of complex motor chains, that is, movement programming. A portion of the frontal lobes just below the supplementary motor cortex is involved in the control of voluntary eye gaze. The left frontal lobe also mediates expressive language, discussed in detail later.

Damage to the primary motor cortex causes opposite-sided deficits in fine motor control and also reduces the speed and strength of limb movements. These effects are easily detected with simple motor tests such as finger-tapping speed. Severe damage to the motor cortex causes total paralysis of the affected bodily parts. Damage to the supplementary motor cortex causes deficits in the execution of motor sequences such as copying a series of arm or facial movements (Kolb & Milner, 1981).

The most common cause of frontal lobe damage is closed head injury, which is one type of traumatic brain injury. In a closed head injury, acceleration/deceleration forces are instantly applied to the entire brain, as when a person's head strikes the dashboard in an automobile accident. Because of the irregular surfaces of the surrounding skull, the forward underside surfaces of the frontal lobes are almost always damaged (Jennett & Teasdale, 1981). The front ends of the temporal lobes also are highly vulnerable in closed head injury.

Nauta (1971) summarizes the effects of frontal lobe dysfunction as a "derangement of behavioral programming." Lezak (1983, 1995) has catalogued the behavioral disturbances that can result from generalized, bilateral frontal lobe damage:

1. Motivational-like problems involving decreased spontaneity, decreased productivity, reduced rate of behavior, and lack of initiative
2. Difficulties in making mental shifts and perseveration of activities and responses
3. Problems in stopping that are often described as impulsivity, overreactivity, and difficulty in holding back a wrong or unwanted response
4. Deficits in self-awareness resulting in an inability to perceive performance errors or to size up social situations appropriately
5. A concrete attitude (Goldstein, 1944) in which objects, experiences, and behavior are all taken at their most obvious face value

Curiously, frontal lobe lesions may have little effect on old learning and well-established skills. Both Hebb and Penfield reported that surgical removal of frontal lobe tissue caused little change in IQ scores (Hebb, 1939; Penfield & Evans, 1935). Early studies of prefrontal lobotomy demonstrated much the same finding: no change in IQ or even a slight improvement after disconnection of the frontal lobes.

Devising adequate measures of frontal lobe function has proved to be difficult. Lezak et al. (2004) note that frontal lobe disorders change how a person responds, whereas most tests measure what a person knows. Lezak (1982) has devised an ingenious method called the Tinkertoy® Test, discussed in the next topic, to assess the programming difficulties experienced by persons with frontal lobe lesions. More commonly, clinicians rely upon observation and checklists to diagnose frontal lobe dysfunction. A generic example of a checklist for executive functions is provided in Figure 10.3.

Awareness						
Is unaware of limitations	1	2	3	4	5	Has insight into limitations
Goal Selection						
Sets no goals	1	2	3	4	5	Sets suitable long-term goals
Logical Analysis						
Is disorganized	1	2	3	4	5	Plans thoughtfully
Action Orientation						
Needs prompting	1	2	3	4	5	Takes decisive action
Self-Monitoring						
Is unable to identify errors	1	2	3	4	5	Detects and corrects mistakes
Impulse Control						
Is highly impulsive	1	2	3	4	5	Thinks before acting
Flexibility						
Is inflexible in approach	1	2	3	4	5	Learns from feedback

1 = profoundly deficient
2 = severely deficient
3 = moderately deficient
4 = mildly deficient
5 = normal

FIGURE 10.3 Example of a Structured Checklist for the Assessment of Executive Functions

NEUROPATHOLOGY OF ADULTHOOD AND AGING

Although most individuals age gracefully and maintain good health into old age, an unfortunate minority experience one or more neurological syndromes such as brain injury, dementia, or Parkinson's disease. In this section we provide a brief synopsis of a number of more common neurological problems encountered in adulthood and old age. Because neuropsychological tests excel in the evaluation of these syndromes, a brief survey will provide an important backdrop to the selected instruments discussed in the second half of the chapter.

Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic brain injury or TBI is an inclusive term that encompasses everything from a "mild" concussion to severe brain injury (Silver, McAllister, & Yudofsky, 2011). TBI is most commonly the consequence of a blow to the head, and concussion is probably the most common form of TBI. The classic example of a concussion is the football player who receives a hard hit ("sees stars"), is rendered briefly unconscious and immobile, and then gradually walks off the field with assistance. Within hours or a few days, he is back to normal. The symptoms of **concussion** include a brief loss of consciousness followed by a low-grade headache, difficulty concentrating, fatigue, irritability, and other emotional symptoms. Although some concussions can have serious, lasting effects, most patients appear to make a full recovery in a few days or weeks. A concussion is one example of a closed head injury (CHI)—a trauma to the head and brain in which the skull remains intact. But *closed head injury* is a broader term than *concussion* and potentially signifies a greater level of impairment than typically found in a concussion. Closed head injury is often contrasted with open head injury or OHI—a trauma to the head and brain in which the skull is penetrated. OHI is also known as penetrating head injury. Typically, the consequences of OHI are focal or localized in and near the site of impact, whereas the effects of CHI are more diffuse, affecting areas throughout the brain.

The neurological consequences of TBI depend upon the nature and severity of the injury, but any or all of the following are possible:

- a contusion or bruising of the brain underneath the site of impact known as a coup injury

- a contusion opposite the side of the impact, caused by rebound, and known as a contrecoup injury
- frequent contusions in the undersurfaces of the frontal lobes and the tips of the temporal lobes because of the bony skull protrusions located there
- diffuse axonal injury or nonspecific brain cell damage from shear-strain effects on neural pathways
- brain tissue damage due to obstructed blood flow when cerebral arteries are ruptured
- hematoma or bleeding into the brain between the skull and the surface of the brain
- edema or swelling of the brain, which can lead to secondary brain damage
- in the long term, possible shrinkage of the brain and enlargement of the ventricular system

As to the neurobehavioral effects of TBI, the most common and reliable complaints are of concentration and memory problems. This is why tests of concentration and memory are found in virtually every test battery used in neuropsychological assessment. Other generalizations about TBI are difficult because the nature and severity of the brain damage will not be the same in any two patients. Focal damage may lead to specific symptoms (e.g., damage to the left hemisphere language areas may cause expressive aphasia). Many studies suggest that TBI patients are more seriously handicapped by personality and emotional disturbances than by cognitive and physical disabilities (Lezak & O'Brien, 1990).

Modern warfare constitutes a major source of TBI cases. Beginning just after the stunning and devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, more than two million U.S. troops have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost half of these soldiers have been deployed more than once, totaling in excess of three million tours of duty (*Marine Corps Times*, December 18, 2009). In these contemporary war theatres, blast injuries from roadside bombs known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) comprise a common source of TBI. The detonation of an IED produces a pressure shock wave that reverberates through the brain and body, often causing neuronal changes that include diffuse axonal injury. TBI from these deadly devices is recognized as the "signature injury" of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Dixon, 2011). Even a "mild" blast can produce subtle deficits that are difficult to detect and measure.

The prevalence of troop exposure to IED blasts is not well appreciated by the public. In a study of 2,525 U.S. Army infantry soldiers conducted three to four months after a year-long deployment to Iraq (Hoge, McGurk, Thomas, and others, 2008), *fully 62 percent* of the sample reported that an IED had exploded near them *on two or more* occasions! From the large subsample of IED-exposed soldiers (N = 1,556), 7 percent reported an injury with loss of consciousness, 15 percent told of injury with altered mental status, and 18 percent reported other injury. Emotional and health consequences likewise were common, with many troops demonstrating Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, and health problems such as stomach pain, headache, fatigue, and sleep disturbance. Overall, 15 percent of the original sample met the criteria for mild TBI (mTBI). The presence of mTBI was especially correlated with IED blasts that caused a loss of consciousness.

Neoplastic Disease (Tumor)

Neoplastic disease or brain tumor encompasses many different forms of tumorous growth (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). For example, gliomas are tendril-like tumors of the glial cells that infiltrate the brain over a period of weeks or months; meningiomas are slower-growing, globular-shaped tumors of the meninges (membranes encasing the brain) that press down upon the brain.

Brain tumors produce a variety of effects, depending upon their location, size, and rate of growth. A rapidly infiltrating tumor such as a glioma quickly may compromise many skills. For example, if the tumor is on the left side of the brain, motor and sensory functions on the right side of the body may be severely impacted, as well as language and problem-solving abilities. If the tumor is on the right side of the brain, constructional abilities (e.g., drawing, assembling three-dimensional objects) will be impaired as well as motor and sensory functions on the left side. A slower-growing meningioma may produce no symptoms for years and then create focal

symptoms that relate to the site of encroachment on the brain. For example, if the right parietal area is affected, deficits in spatial ability may be observed.

Chronic Alcohol Abuse

Chronic alcohol ingestion leads to neuronal changes that include a loss of dendritic branches and dendritic spines, especially in areas important for memory such as the hippocampus. Over time, enlargement of the ventricles and widening of the cerebral sulci also are observed. In severe cases, atrophy of the medial thalamus and mamillary bodies is found, leading to the pronounced memory problems that characterize Wernicke-Korsakoff's syndrome (Davila, Shear, Lane, Sullivan, & Pfefferbaum, 1994). The neuropathology of alcoholism often is exacerbated by vitamin and nutritional deficiencies.

In those tragic cases of severe alcohol abuse in which the medial thalamus and mamillary bodies are damaged, the profound anterograde amnesia of Wernicke-Korsakoff's syndrome is noted. Patients show an inability to retain memory of events for more than a short time even though immediate memory is intact and remote memory is only mildly impaired. The falsification of memory known as confabulation, in the presence of clear consciousness, is noted. Other symptoms of severe abuse include gait disturbance and gaze difficulties. In neurologically intact alcoholics, neurobehavioral effects are more elusive and controversial but may include subtle memory deficits and difficulties with novel problem solving (e.g., Waugh, Jackson, Fox, Hawke, & Tuck, 1989).

Recent research indicates that the brain changes and neurocognitive impairments caused by prolonged alcohol abuse can be partially reversed. A common problem observed in chronic alcoholics is, literally, shrinkage of brain tissue and enlargement of the ventricles. The ventricles are fluid-filled caverns at the center of the brain. The relationship is linear, with greater alcohol intake predicting greater brain shrinkage and larger ventricular enlargement (Anstey, Jorm, Reglade-Méslin, and others, 2006). Using sophisticated imaging techniques, Bartsch, Homola, Biller, and others (2007) studied longitudinal changes in brain volume in 15 alcoholics and 10 matched controls. After 6–7 weeks of abstinence, the alcoholics revealed a 2 percent gain in volume of brain tissue, compared to no change among the controls. While a 2 percent improvement may not seem like much, it could foretell even more dramatic gains with long-term abstinence. The common metric among substance abuse professionals is that full cognitive recovery takes at least a year. In the Bartsch et al. study (2007), pretest versus posttest scores on the d2-test, a measure of attention and concentration, also improved in the recovery group but showed no change in the control group. Several other studies confirm improvement in neuropsychological test results after abstinence in recovering alcoholics, as summarized by Walker (2006).

Normal Pressure Hydrocephalus

Hydrocephalus is a build-up of cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) inside the skull, which causes brain swelling. In normal pressure hydrocephalus (NPH), which mainly affects individuals aged 60 or older, there is an increase in CSF, but the pressure of the fluid remains normal. Even so, brain function is affected, leading to a classic triad of symptoms: gait ataxia, incontinence, and dementia. Conn (2011) describes his own case of NPH from a unique perspective (he is a physician) and suggests that many cases of dementia caused by NPH are misdiagnosed with potentially tragic consequences. NPH is highly treatable, whereas other forms of dementia resist intervention. His story is a warning against complacency and fatalism among health care workers who deal with assessment and diagnosis, including psychologists. His case of NPH

> . . . began in about 1992 as a trivial abnormality of gait that was misdiagnosed as Parkinson's disease (PD). Over the next 10 years, during which I was being unsuccessfully treated with dopaminergic drugs for PD, the illness gradually progressed until I could barely walk with a walking frame, had become incontinent of urine and, sometimes, faeces and began to show signs of cognitive loss. In the process of obtaining a motorised wheelchair I was referred to a younger neurologist who recognised that I had run the whole classic course of NPH, a disease of which I had never heard.

> I had a ventriculoperitoneal shunt (VPS) implanted in 2003 and was miraculously restored virtually to normal (p. 162).

A VPS shunt is a catheter extending beneath the skin from the ventricles of the brain to the abdominal cavity, allowing excess CSF to drain off.

The prevalence of NPH is difficult to ascertain because it resembles other forms of diffuse dementia. Many cases likely are overlooked. Based on his evaluation of published studies, Conn (2011) estimates that 1 percent of the population will develop NPH by the age of 80.

Alzheimer's Disease

The most common degenerative neurological disease is **Alzheimer's disease** (AD), which features an insidious degeneration of the brain. The pathophysiology includes clumplike deposits in the brain known as neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Koss, 1994). Additional brain changes include neuronal loss, shrinkage or atrophy of the brain, depletion of acetylcholine neurotransmitters involved in memory, and accumulation of foreign deposits in the cerebral vasculature; the course of the disease invariably is downhill. First described in 1907, Alois Alzheimer portrayed his initial case as follows:

> The first noticeable symptom of illness shown by this 51-year-old woman was suspiciousness of her husband. Soon, a rapidly increasing memory impairment became evident; she could no longer orient herself in her own dwelling, dragged objects here and there and hid them, and at times, believing that people were out to murder her, started to scream loudly. On observation at the institution, her entire demeanor bears the stamp of utter bewilderment. She is completely disoriented to time and place. (La Rue, 1992)

Although Alzheimer's disease is not part of normal aging, advanced age is an important risk factor. Rare before age 65, the disease afflicts 3 percent of persons 65 to 74 years of age, 18 percent of persons 75 to 84 years of age, and nearly half of those 85 years and older (Evans, Funkenstein, Albert, and others, 1989). Symptoms and examples suggestive of Alzheimer's disease are listed in Table 10.3. These examples characterize other forms of dementia as well.

As detailed by Storandt and Hill (1989), difficulty with the acquisition of new information (short-term memory dysfunction) is generally the

TABLE 10.3 General Symptoms and Specific Examples Suggestive of Alzheimer's Disease

Significant memory problems that extend beyond benign forgetfulness
Fails to recall what was eaten for breakfast
Difficulty with everyday tasks and commonplace activities
No longer balances the checkbook, prepares the same meal
Loss of orientation to date, time and/or place
Significantly off as to date or time, loses the way going home
Gradual and insidious onset
Onset is hard to identify, problem is recognized in retrospect
Language and word finding difficulties
Conversation characterized by circumlocution and vagueness
Problems with abstract thinking
Difficulty following the rules of simple card games
Deterioration of social judgment
Dresses inappropriately, neglects personal hygiene
Misplaces or loses important items
Car keys disappear, eyeglasses are found in a kitchen drawer
Changes in Personality:
Onset of suspiciousness, periods of agitation, mood changes
Loss of Initiative
Absence of self-initiation, needs prompting to become involved

Note: These examples characterize other forms of dementia as well.
Source: A synthesis based on Alzheimer's disease websites.

most salient symptom in the early stages. As the disease progresses, patients may also show a prominent language dysfunction (e.g., pronounced word finding difficulty) or a striking visuospatial disturbance. Reports of personality change, including delusions and agitation, also are common. The late stages are characterized by severe, pervasive disability.

Vascular Dementia (Stroke)

The second most common cause of dementia in the elderly is vascular dementia, caused by blockage of an artery and subsequent death of brain tissue due to insufficient blood supply (infarction) or bleeding into or around the brain (hemorrhage). Sudden onset is the rule, but the accumulation of small strokes over time, known as multi-infarct dementia (MID), may produce an apparently progressive disorder. The Hachinski Ischemic Score was developed to distinguish multi-infarct dementia from Alzheimer's disease (Hachinski, Iliff, Zilha, and others, 1975). Using this index, MID is indicated by the presence of several of the following factors: abrupt onset, somatic complaints, stepwise deterioration, emotional incontinence, fluctuating course, history of hypertension, nocturnal confusion, history of strokes, personality preserved, atherosclerosis present, depression, and focal neurological signs. Because MID may be treatable to some degree, the differential diagnosis of MID versus Alzheimer's disease is more than academic.

The stroke syndrome is defined by the acute onset of a focal deficit involving the central nervous system. The specific symptoms depend upon the site of infarction but may include motor weakness and impaired sensibility in the limbs on the opposite side; nonfluent aphasia if the dominant hemisphere is affected; partial loss of the visual field if the stroke occurs in the rear of the brain. The acute symptoms of stroke often subside in some measure and lead to a plateau of stable functioning.

Parkinson's Disease (PD)

Parkinson's disease (PD) is almost nonexistent before age 40 and affects only 1 or 2 in 1,000 persons ages 70 and over (La Rue, 1992). Primarily identified as a movement disorder, cognitive and emotional problems are common in PD. In fact, the late stages of PD may entail a clear dementia. The symptoms include slowness of movement (bradykinesia), tremor at rest, shuffling gait, and postural rigidity. The neuropathology includes depletion of dopamine and neuron loss in the basal ganglia.

Tremor is the most common and the least debilitating early symptom in PD. The rate of progression is quite variable, but movement disability in PD can become pronounced and lead to confinement; 10 to 20 percent of PD patients develop a clear dementia. Patients with PD reveal a deficit on neuropsychological tests requiring speed (e.g., Digit Symbol, Trail Making, reaction time measures). Surprisingly, tests of visual discrimination and paired-associate learning—which do not require speed—also differentiate patients with moderate to severe PD from matched controls (Pirozzolo, Hansch, Mortimer, Webster, & Kuskowski, 1982). About 40 to 60 percent of PD patients also experience depression (La Rue, 1992).

BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT OF NEUROPATHOLOGY

Psychological testing can be essential in the evaluation of neuropathology, as we will see in the next topic. Yet, it is easy for psychologists to become enamored of tests and to overlook the value of simple observation, interview, and behavioral evaluation. In medicine, the field of behavioral neurology has recognized the merit of these straightforward approaches for at least 150 years, dating back to the pioneering observations of Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke on syndromes of aphasia (Pincus & Tucker, 2003). Psychologists make use of this long-established tradition when they conduct a mental status examination at the beginning of assessment (Sonne, 2012).

Assessment of Mental Status

The mental status examination (MSE) is a loosely structured interview that usually precedes other forms of psychological and medical assessment. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide an accurate description of the patient's functioning in the realms of orientation, memory, thought, feeling, and

judgment. The MSE is the psychological equivalent of the general physical examination: Just as the physician reviews all the major organ systems, looking for evidence of disease, the psychologist reviews the major categories of personal and intellectual functioning, looking for signs and symptoms of psychopathology (Gregory, 1999). Although there is some latitude as to the scope of the MSE, certain mental functions are almost always investigated. A typical evaluation touches upon the areas listed in Table 10.4.

TABLE 10.4 Major Areas of a Typical Mental Status Exam

Appearance and Behavior
Grooming
Facial expressions
Gross motor behavior
Eye contact
Speech and Communication Processes
Speech content, rate, tone, volume
Word difficulty, confusion, misuse
Thought Content
Logic, clarity, appropriateness
Delusions
Cognitive and Memory Functioning
Calculating ability
Immediate recall
Recent and remote memory
Fund of information
Abstracting ability
Emotional Functioning
Predominant mood
Appropriateness of affect
Insight and Judgment
Awareness of problems
Orientation
Day, date, time, location

Source: Based on Gregory, R. J. (1999). *Foundations of intellectual assessment: The WAIS-III and other tests in clinical practice.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Some of the elements in this list can be assessed with short screening tests. In particular, cognition, memory, and orientation are intellectual functions that can be tested in a formal, structured manner (Hodges, 1994). These measures are most commonly used in the mental status evaluation of the elderly, especially when the client appears to have a dementia such as Alzheimer's disease, as discussed later in this chapter. Formal tests of mental status are also helpful in the assessment of certain brain-impairing conditions such as head injury, schizophrenia, severe depression, and drug-induced delirium. It is important to emphasize that screening tests are supplementary—they do not replace clinical judgment in the evaluation of mental status. Some areas covered by the MSE are simply impossible to quantify. For example, the evaluation of a patient's insight requires keen observation and sensitive interviewing skills. An MSE screening test for insight does not exist.

Behavioral Rating Scales

Another approach in the behavioral tradition is to utilize observations from persons familiar with the patient, such as a spouse, parent, close friend, or caretaker. Asking them questions about the patient is a good starting point. But a more efficient method is to employ a relevant behavior rating scale tied to the specific behaviors of the individual. This allows for reliable assessment and provides access to normative data. Hundreds of behaviorally based scales exist (Tate, 2010). These can be broad-spectrum (such as establishing the likelihood of dementia) or narrow in focus (such as verifying the presence of the syndrome of disinhibition). For purposes of illustration, we will summarize two instruments here, one for the evaluation of dementia in general, and another for the appraisal of specific frontal lobe syndromes.

The Behavioral and Psychological Assessment of Dementia (BPAD) is a proxy-report rating scale designed to assess dementia-related changes in behavior among adults 30 years of age and older (Schmidt & Gallo, 2007). In completing the BPAD, the informant rates the client on 78 items *Within the past four weeks (current),* and also *five years ago (past)*. Items are rated on a four-point scale. The

BPAD assesses the symptoms for each of the two time periods (current and past) and also computes a change score. The change score reflects changes in mood and behavior that might signal the onset of dementia. Thus, three sets of scores emerge: Current, Past, and Change.

For each of the three sets of scores, the BPAD yields a total score and seven domain scores. All scores are reported as T-scores with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10, relative to the standardization sample. The test was standardized and validated on a large sample of men and women 30 to 90 years of age. The sample was matched to U.S. census proportions in regard to racial/ethnic makeup, educational backgrou nds, and geographic regions.

The seven domains of the test are grouped into three clusters, as follows:

Psychopathological Symptom Cluster
Perceptual Delusions
Positive Mood/Anxiety
Negative Mood/Anxiety
Behavioral Symptom Cluster
Aggressive
Perseverative/Rigid
Disinhibited
Biological Symptom Cluster
Biological Rhythms

The instrument also yields a total score based on the sum of all seven domains. The BPAD items are at a grade 6 reading level. The test can be used in a variety of settings (inpatient, outpatient, assisted living) with patients suspected of having Alzheimer's disease, vascular dementia, and psychiatric problems.

The BPAD is a promising test, but there is scant validity research at this time. Certainly the domains exemplify good content validity, insofar as they overlap with the consensus of experts on the behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia. For example, a prominent international group provides the following authoritative statement on the behavioral manifestations of dementia:

> *Behavioral symptoms*: Usually identified on the basis of observation of the patient, including physical aggression, screaming, restlessness, agitation, wandering, culturally inappropriate behaviors, sexual disinhibition, hoarding, cursing and shadowing.
>
> *Psychological symptoms*: Usually and mainly assessed on the basis of interviews with patients and relatives; these symptoms include anxiety, depressive mood, hallucinations and delusions. A psychosis of Alzheimer's disease has been accepted since the 1999 conference (International Psychogeriatric Association, 2002).

Although terminology is not identical, the BPAD domains possess a clear commonality with the above description of dementia.

A test that embodies a more specific application is the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe) (Grace & Malloy, 2001). The purpose of this instrument is to provide a behaviorally oriented assessment of three frontal lobe syndromes: apathy, disinhibition, and executive dysfunction. The scale consists of 46 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale by either the patient or a family member. Results from a family member are considered more reliable and valid. Items are written at a 6th grade level. Separate norms are provided for the patient and family form. The scale also attempts to quantify behavioral changes over time by including a baseline (retrospective) and a current assessment. A highly desirable feature of the form is that it takes only 10 minutes to administer and 10–15 minutes to score.

The subscales include Apathy (14 items), Disinhibition (15 items), and Executive Dysfunction (17 items), which are reported as T-scores (mean of 50, *SD* of 10) derived from a community-based sample of 436 men and women with two levels of education. Comparison data also are provided for several clinical groups: frontotemporal dementia, frontal lesions, nonfrontal stroke, head injury, Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, and Huntington's disease.

The construct validity of the FrSBe is firmly upheld by an exploratory factor analytic study of results for 324 neurological patients and research participants, the majority diagnosed with neurodegenerative disorders such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Huntington's disease (Stout, Ready, Grace, Malloy, & Paulsen, 2006). The three-factor solution revealed that 83 percent of the items

from the Apathy, Disinhibition, and Executive Dysfunction scales loaded prominently on the corresponding factors from the analysis. These results highly support the utility of the scale in assessment of the three frontal syndromes.

In a study of 66 individuals with a history of traumatic brain injury, Reid-Arndt, Nehl, and Hinkebein (2007) found that the FrSBe was a better predictor of community integration than neuropsychological tests. Mendez, Licht, and Saul (2008) reported that the scale differentiates patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD) from those with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and vascular dementia (VaD). Specifically, the FTD patients had significantly greater scores on Disinhibition than the AD patients and the VaD patients. Chiaravalloti and DeLuca (2003) testify that the FrSBe is sensitive to the behavioral changes observed in patients with Multiple Sclerosis. In sum, this simple, brief scale is an excellent measure for use with patients who display frontal lobe manifestations related to a variety of neurodegenerative disorders.

TOPIC 10B Neuropsychological Tests, Batteries, and Screening Tools

A Conceptual Model of Brain–Behavior Relationships
Assessment of Sensory Input
Measures of Attention and Concentration
Tests of Learning and Memory
Assessment of Language Functions
Tests of Spatial and Manipulatory Ability
Assessment of Executive Functions
Assessment of Motor Output
Test Batteries in Neuropsychological Assessment
Screening for Alcohol Use Disorders
Assessment of Mental Status in the Elderly

The purpose of this topic is to review a diverse collection of neuropsychological tests, batteries, and screening tools. We focus here on representative tests, prominent batteries, and useful screening tools, recognizing that comprehensive coverage is well beyond the scope of the book. For a complete treatment of neuropsychological assessment, the reader is referred to the authoritative tome amassed by Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, and Tranel (2012), which runs to an amazing 1,200 pages in length. By necessity, the coverage here is more discerning and emphasizes better-known tests and batteries.

Neuropsychologists and other clinicians often encounter clients who struggle with alcoholism or other types of substance abuse. For this reason, we also review a few simple but practical tools for rapid screening of clients with possible alcohol problems. This issue is vital because, at any given time, 10 percent of the adult population manifests an alcohol disorder (Yalisove, 2004). Although it might appear a straightforward matter to identify patients with alcohol problems—just ask them how much and how often they drink—in reality this is a vexing diagnostic challenge due to the active façade of denial maintained by most alcoholics. However, a number of screening tools summarized later are useful for this task.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that neuropsychological assessment involves more than the administration and scoring of specialized tests and screening tools. An essential component of any assessment is the evaluation of a client's mental status. This is particularly true with elderly clients who may experience Alzheimer's disease or other forms of dementia. Accordingly, we close this chapter with a focus upon mental status assessment in the elderly. In this concluding topic, we pay special attention to the Mini-Mental Status Exam (Tombaugh, McDowell, Kristjansson, & Hubley, 1996), one of the most widely used screening tools in existence.

Neuropsychological tests and procedures encompass an eclectic assortment of methods and purposes. At one end of the spectrum are simple, 10-minute screening tests used to probe the need for further assessment. At the other end of the spectrum are exhaustive, six-hour test batteries designed to provide a comprehensive assessment. In between are hundreds of specialized instruments developed to measure particular neuropsychological abilities. At first glance, this multitude of tests would appear to resist simple categorization, as if researchers in this area had followed an incoherent philosophy of trial and error in the development of new instruments and procedures. However, with closer scrutiny it is evident that most neuropsychological tests fit within a simple, logical model of brain–behavior relationships. We will use this model as a framework for discussing well-known neuropsychological tests and procedures.

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF BRAIN–BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIPS

Bennett (1988) has proposed a simplified model of brain–behavior relationships that is helpful in organizing the seemingly chaotic profusion of neuropsychological tests (Figure 10.4). His conceptualization is a slight expansion of the model presented by Reitan and Wolfson (1993). According to this view, each neuropsychological test or procedure evaluates one or more of the following categories:

1. Sensory input
2. Attention and concentration
3. Learning and memory
4. Language
5. Spatial and manipulatory ability
6. Executive functions:
   - Logical analysis
   - Concept formation
   - Reasoning
   - Planning
   - Flexibility of thinking
7. Motor output

The order of the categories listed corresponds roughly to the order in which incoming information is analyzed by the brain in preparation for a response or motor output.

In the remainder of this topic, the discussion of neuropsychological tests and procedures is organized around these seven categories. Within each category we will review established tests and also introduce new instruments that show promise of extending the horizons of neuropsychological assessment. However, the reader needs to know that neuropsychological assessment commonly involves a battery of tests. One approach is flexible or patient-centered testing in which an individualized test battery is fashioned for each client. These batteries are based upon the presenting complaints, referral issues, and an initial assessment (Kane, 1991; Larrabee, 2008). More typically, neuropsychologists employ a fixed battery of tests for most referrals. One of the most widely used fixed batteries, the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery, is outlined in Table 10.5. Even though the HRNB is an old test—the elements of the battery have not been changed since its inception in the 1950s—many neuropsychologists still regard this battery as the "gold standard" in the field (Horton, 2008; Sweeney, et al., 2007). In large measure, this is because of the steadily accumulating body of affirming research on the battery, which includes 267 publications by its developer, Ralph Reitan, and literally hundreds of additional articles from the dozens of neuropsychologists mentored by him. Yet, the HRNB is not without competition. The chapter closes with a presentation of two other batteries, namely, the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery and the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery.


Sensory Reception
Attention and Concentration
Memory and Learning
Left Hemisphere: Language, Linear Thinking
Right Hemisphere: Visuospatial, Holistic Thinking
Executive Functions: Organization and Regulation of Goal-Directed Behavior
Motor Output

FIGURE 10.4 Conceptual Model of Brain Behavior Relationships *Source:* Adapted with permission from Reitan and Wolfson (1993).

ASSESSMENT OF SENSORY INPUT

The accuracy of sensory input is crucial to the proficiency of perception, thought, plans, and action. An individual who does not see stimuli correctly, hear sounds accurately, or process touch reliably may

TABLE 10.5 Tests and Procedures of the Halstead-Reitan Test Battery

Test	*Description*
Category Test*	Measures abstract reasoning and concept formation; requires examinee to find the rule for categorizing pictures of geometric shapes
Tactual Performance Test*	Measures kinesthetic and sensorimotor ability; requires blindfolded examinee to place blocks in appropriate cutout on an upright board with dominant hand, then nondominant hand, then both hands; also tests for incidental memory of blocks
Speech Sounds Perception Test*	Measures attention and auditory-visual synthesis; requires examinee to pick from four choices the written version of taped nonsense words
Seashore Rhythm Test*	Measures attention and auditory perception; requires examinee to indicate whether paired musical rhythms are same or different
Finger Tapping Test*	Measures motor speed; requires examinee to tap a telegraph keylike lever as quickly as possible for 10 seconds
Grip Strength	Measures grip strength with dynamometer; requires examinee to squeeze as hard as possible; separate trials with each hand
Trail Making, parts A, B	Measures scanning ability, mental flexibility, and speed; requires examinee to connect numbers (part A) or numbers and letters in alternating order (part B) with a pencil line under pressure of time
Tactile Form Recognition	Measures sensory-perceptual ability; requires examinee to recognize simple shapes (e.g., triangle) placed in the palm of the hand
Sensory-Perceptual Exam	Measures sensory-perceptual ability; requires examinee to respond to simple bilateral sensory tasks, e.g., detecting which finger has been touched, which ear has received a brief sound; assesses the visual fields
Aphasia Screening Test	Measures expressive and receptive language abilities; tasks include naming a pictured item (e.g., fork) repeating short phrases; copying tasks (not a measure of aphasia) included here for historical reasons
Supplementary	WAIS-III, WRAT-3, MMPI-2, memory tests such as Wechsler Memory Scale-III or Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test

*Strictly speaking, these five measures constitute the Halstead-Reitan Test Battery. However, in common parlance reference to the Halstead-Reitan includes all of the measures listed in the table.

encounter additional handicaps at higher levels of perception and cognition. Neuropsychological assessment always incorporates a multimodal examination of sensory capacities.

Sensory-Perceptual Exam

The procedures developed by Reitan and Klove are entirely typical of sensory-perceptual procedures (Reitan, 1984, 1985). The Reitan-Klove Sensory-Perceptual Examination consists of several methods for delivering unilateral and bilateral stimulation in the modalities of touch, hearing, and vision. The tasks are so simple that normal persons seldom make any errors at all. For example, the examinee is asked to say which hand has been touched (with eyes closed), or to report which ear has received a barely audible finger snap, or to identify which number has been traced on the fingertip. The results of this test are especially diagnostic if the examinee consistently makes more errors on one side of the body than the other. The reader will recall from the previous chapter that neural innervation is almost exclusively opposite-sided. Furthermore, certain areas of the cerebral cortex are devoted to primary processing of touch, hearing, and vision. Thus, an examinee who

finds it difficult to process touch in the right hand may have a lesion in the postcentral gyrus of the left parietal lobe. Similarly, difficulty processing sound in the right ear may indicate a lesion in the superior portion of the left temporal lobe, and right-sided visual defects may indicate brain impairment in the left occipital lobe.

Finger Localization Test

Finger localization is a venerable procedure developed by neurologists to evaluate possible sensory losses caused by impairment of brain functions. Most neuropsychological test batteries employ a variant of this test, in which examinees must identify those fingers that have been touched (without benefit of sight). Benton has developed a well-normed 60-item test of finger localization that consists of three parts: (1) with the hand visible, identifying single fingers touched by the examiner with the pointed end of a pencil (10 trials each hand); (2) with the hand hidden from view, identifying single fingers touched by the examiner (10 trials each hand); (3) with the hand hidden from view, identifying pairs of fingers simultaneously touched by the examiner (10 trials each hand). The method of response is left to the patient: naming, touching, or pointing to fingers on a diagram (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994). Each stimulus presentation is scored right or wrong, and normal adults typically make very few errors in the 60 trials. Mean scores for normal adults are near perfect, ranging from 56 to 60 in various samples. In contrast, patients with brain disease find finger localization to be a challenging task, particularly on the second and third parts of the test.

MEASURES OF ATTENTION AND CONCENTRATION

The attentional capacity of the brain makes it possible to attend to meaningful stimuli, screen irrelevant sensory input from the profusion of incoming stimuli, and flexibly shift to alternative stimuli when conditions demand it (Kinsbourne, 1994). While in theory it might be possible to make subtle distinctions between simple attention, concentration, mental shifting, mental tracking, vigilance, and other variants of attention/concentration, in practice these skills are difficult to separate. Only one attentional measure—the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA)—has succeeded in partitioning attention into its component sources. We discuss the TEA and other prominent measures of attentional impairment in the following sections.

Test of Everyday Attention

The Test of Everyday Attention (TEA) is a promising measure devised in Great Britain by Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, and NimmoSmith (1994, 1996). The TEA measures the subcomponents of attention, including sustained attention, selective attention, divided attention, and attentional switching. The subtests of the TEA are outlined in Table 10.6. The test has three parallel versions and has been well validated with closed head injury clients, stroke patients, and persons with Alzheimer's disease. Normative data are based upon the performance of 154 healthy individuals between the ages of 18 and 80. Examinees enjoy the real-life scenarios of the TEA, which adds to the ecological validity of the instrument. The TEA is highly sensitive to normal age effects in the general population and is, therefore, well suited to geriatric assessment. With the exception of the Elevator Counting subtest, the eight subtests were standardized to yield equivalent scores with a common mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3. Thus, the TEA allows for subtest analysis as a means of identifying an individual's particular strengths and weaknesses (Crawford, Sommerville, & Robertson, 1997). The TEA is highly sensitive to the effects of closed head injury (Chan, 2000), with the Map Search and Telephone Search subtests revealing the largest deficits from brain injury (Bate, Mathias, & Crawford, 2001). Chan and his colleagues developed a Cantonese version of the TEA and report favorably on its use with clinical and nonclinical Chinese participants (Chan, Lai, & Robertson, 2006; Chan & Lai, 2006). A children's version (TEA-ch) is also available (Manly, Nimmo-Smith, Watson, and others, 2001).

Continuous Performance Test

The Continuous Performance Test (CPT) is not really a single test but rather a family of similar

TABLE 10.6 Subtests of the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA)

Map Search: A two-minute speeded search for 80 symbols on a colored map; measures selective attention.

Elevator Counting: Simulation of elevator floor counting from tape-presented tones; measures sustained attention.

Elevator Counting with Distraction: Same as above but with auditory distractors; measures sustained attention.

Visual Elevator: Visual simulation of elevator floor counting with up-down reversals; measures attentional switching.

Auditory Elevator with Reversal: Same as visual elevator, except it is presented on tape; measures attentional switching.

Telephone Search: Search for key symbols while searching entries in a simulated classified telephone directory; measures divided attention.

Telephone Search Dual Task: Combines Telephone Search with simultaneous counting of auditory tones; measures divided attention.

Lottery: Subject listens for winning numbers known to end in 55 and then writes down preceding stimuli; measures sustained attention.

procedures that dates back to the pathbreaking research of Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, and others (1956). These authors devised a measure of sustained attention (also called vigilance) that involved continuous presentation of letters on a screen. In some cases, examinees were to press a key when a certain letter appeared (e.g., *x*). In other instances, examinees were to press a key when a certain letter appeared *after* another letter (e.g., *x* when it occurs after *a*). Errors of omission are noted when the examinee fails to press for a target stimulus. Errors of commission are noted when the examinee presses the key for a nontarget stimulus. Normal subjects make few errors.

Although CPT tests are sensitive to a wide variety of brain-impairing conditions including hyperactivity, drug effects, schizophrenia, and overt brain damage, these tests are not a panacea for the diagnosis of attention-deficit disorders. For example, in one study of the popular Conners (1995) CPT, children with diagnosed Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) did not score worse than clinical controls; on the other hand, children with diagnosed reading disorders showed impaired performance on the CPT (McGee, Clark, & Symons, 2000). In general, reviewers recommend that CPT tests should be interpreted in the context of a comprehensive test battery, especially when they are used in the assessment of persons with suspected attentional problems (Riccio, Reynolds, & Lowe, 2001).

The CPT is ideal for computerized adaptation, and dozens of different versions of it have appeared in the literature (e.g.,Conners, 1995; Gordon & Mettelman, 1988). Unfortunately, the proliferation of similar but not identical tests has hindered research on the practical utility of this promising measure of attention. Sandford and Turner (1997) have published a computerized CPT that uses both visual and auditory stimuli. The Intermediate Visual and Auditory Continuous Performance Test (IVA) is normed on 781 normal persons ranging from 5 to 90 years of age and screened for attention deficit, learning difficulties, emotional problems, and medication use. In one analysis, the IVA showed 92 percent sensitivity (i.e., an 8 percent rate of false negatives) and 90 percent specificity (i.e., a 10 percent rate of false positives) in differentiating children diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) from normal children. Research by Tinius (2003) further endorses the validity of the IVA. He found that adults with mild traumatic brain injury or ADHD performed significantly lower than normal controls on IVA subtests assessing reaction time, inattention, impulsivity, and variability of reaction time. This instrument is just one of many promising neuropsychological tests that takes advantage of microcomputer technology.

TESTS OF LEARNING AND MEMORY

Learning and memory are intertwined processes that are difficult to discuss in isolation. Learning new material usually requires the exercise of memory. Furthermore, many tests of memory incorporate a learning curve through repeated administrations.

The separation of learning and memory processes is theoretically possible but of little practical value in clinical assessment. We make no tight distinction between these processes.

Memory tests can be categorized according to several dimensions, including short term versus long term, verbal versus pictorial, and learning curve versus no learning curve. These dimensions reflect neurological factors discussed in the previous section. For example, verbal memory is significantly lateralized to the left hemisphere, whereas pictorial memory is largely underwritten by the right hemisphere. The interested reader can consult Lezak et al. (2012) for more detailed analyses of the neural substrates for different types of memory. Here we will concentrate on the psychometric characteristics of four quite dissimilar memory tests.

Wechsler Memory Scale-IV

The Wechsler Memory Scale-IV (Wechsler, 2009) is a monumental revision of the previous edition. The latest version is barely recognizable as the offspring of the original one-page test published more than 60 years ago (Wechsler, 1945). The fourth edition is an extensive, multiphasic memory test consisting of nine subtests, although seven are sufficient for the Standard Battery. The nine subtests are described in Table 10.7. The first seven subtests constitute the basis for obtaining age-adjusted scaled scores (mean of 100 and SD of 15) for five standard indices:

Immediate Memory Index
Delayed Memory Index
Auditory Memory Index
Visual Memory Index
Visual Working Memory Index

If the ancillary subtests (Logos and Names) are employed, five additional index scores can be computed. We confine our discussion here to the Standard Battery, although it is worth noting that the WMS-IV provides for five flexible batteries (e.g., Older Adult/Abbreviated Battery, Logical Memory/Designs Battery) using different combinations of the nine subtests. The standard battery requires about 75 minutes to administer, while the abbreviated battery can be completed in 35–40 minutes.

TABLE 10.7 WMS-IV Subtests

Immediate Recall Subtests
Brief Cognitive Status Exam: Brief assessment for significant cognitive impairment.
Logical Memory I: Verbal recall of essential elements from brief stories read to the examinee.
Verbal Paired Associates I: Verbal recall for a list of 10 to 14 paired terms (e.g., bicycle—arrow) when only the first term is presented (e.g., bicycle—?).
Designs I: Visual recall for specific elements in a 4 × 4 puzzle grid exposed for 10 seconds; examinee must select small cards with the proper designs and place them correctly within a blank 4 × 4 grid.
Visual Reproduction I: Visual reproduction (drawing) of five (easy to hard) simple geometric designs each exposed for 10 seconds.
Spatial Addition: Visual spatial recall for locations of dots on two separate 4 × 4 grids, adding or subtracting the locations.
Symbol Span: Visual recall for symbols viewed briefly by selecting correct options in the proper order from a large array of symbols.
Logos I: Visual recognition for unique logos paired with fictitious company names by selecting the correct logo from an array when only the company name is provided.
Names I: Recall of names and relevant information about a person from facial images by selecting named persons from a group picture.
Delayed Recall Subtests*
Logical Memory II
Verbal Paired Associates II
Designs II
Visual Reproduction II
Logos II
Names II

*30-minute delayed recall for stimuli in administration I.

The WMS-IV was co-normed with the WAIS-IV in 2009. The standardization of the new instrument is superb. Based on 2005 census data, the 2,200 participants were stratified as to age (13 age

bands spanning 16 to 90), gender, race/ethnicity, educational level, and geographic region.

Because the WMS-IV is a relatively new version, there is currently little external research on its reliability and validity. Even so, the *WMS-IV Technical and Interpretive Manual* (Pearson, 2009) provides a mountain of supportive data. Subtests internal consistencies range from a low of .74 (Visual Reproduction I) to highs of .94 to .97 (Verbal Paired Associates I and Visual Reproduction II, respectively). Internal consistencies of the index scores were excellent, consistently in the mid-to high-90s. Test–retest reliabilities for the index scores were lower, in the low .80s.

Validity of the battery appears strong, based on a variety of approaches, including confirmatory factor analysis, correlations with other measures, and test profiles for special groups (Pearson, 2009). In general, the index scores reveal good convergent validity (high correlations with similar measures) and good discriminant validity (low correlations with dissimilar measures). Test profiles for special groups (e.g., intellectual disability, traumatic brain injury, Alzheimer's disease, and schizophrenia) likewise make theoretical sense in light of the aims of the test battery.

An important disclaimer with any multiphasic battery like the WMS-IV is that distinctive profiles should not be used in isolation for diagnosis. If A implies B, it does not follow that B implies A. This is a logical fallacy. A specific example will illustrate the point. If Alzheimer's disease, on average, yields a distinctive WMS-IV profile, it does not follow that the presence of that profile in a new patient signifies that the patient has Alzheimer's disease. Proper diagnosis always entails the synthesis of many sources, including interview with patient and informants.

Likewise, isolated low scores on a WMS-IV index should not be overinterpreted. Accessing the original standardization data, Brooks, Holdnack, and Iverson (2011) found that healthy people often obtain low scores on one or more index scores, especially when they had lower education levels or intelligence. Moderating influences need to be considered in test interpretation.

Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test

In the early 1900s, the Swiss psychologist Edouard Claparede (1873–1940) proposed a memory test consisting of the free-recall of a 15-item word list. This test evolved into the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT), making it one of the oldest mental tests in continuous use (Boake, 2002). The test first appeared in French (Rey, 1964), but an English-language adaptation has been provided by Lezak (1983, 1995) and others. The RAVLT is a very popular test of memory, especially for purposes of clinical research. A search of PsychINFO from 1950 onward revealed more than 400 published articles using this simple instrument.

In administering the RAVLT, the examiner reads a list of 15 concrete nouns at the rate of one per second. The examinee recalls as many as possible in any order. Forewarning the examinee to recall all the words, including those previously recalled, the examiner reads the entire list a second time. A third, fourth, and fifth administration and recall then ensue; these are followed by an interference trial with a new list of words. Next, immediate recall of the original list is tested (without benefit of a new presentation). Finally, a recognition trial is included in which the examinee must underline the administered words from a longer written paragraph. The test yields a number of scores, including the number recalled (of 15) for each of the initial five trials, the total for the five trials (75 possible), the immediate recall after the distractor list is read, and the recognition score.

Rosenberg, Ryan, and Prifitera (1984) concluded that the RAVLT performs well in the identification of patients known to be memory impaired by other criteria. In addition to an overall reduction in performance, memory-impaired patients showed a reduced rate of improvement across the five learning trials. Abundant norms for the RAVLT can be found in Strauss, Sherman, and Spreen (2006). Schoenberg, Dawson, Duff, and others (2006) provide normative data for 392 individuals with documented neurological dysfunction.

The RAVLT is available in at least seven parallel versions, which is both a strength and a weakness of the test (Hawkins, Dean, & Pearlson, 2004). It is a strength because clinicians often employ repeat testing as they follow patients with memory difficulties. Of course, this raises the specter of practice effects: examinees will do better on

second, third, and ensuing administrations to some degree because of their prior exposure to the specific items, regardless of whether their clinical condition is improving or getting worse. With parallel versions of a test, the impact of practice effects can be mitigated by using a different form for each administration. Yet, this is a potential weakness, too, because the equivalence of the seven parallel forms is not well established. In reviewing studies of the seven forms of the RAVLT, Hawkins, Dean, and Pearlson (2004) could locate only six studies, and four of these were limited to comparisons of the original test against one other form. Although differences between forms likely are minor, their exact magnitude is simply unknown.

Fuld Object-Memory Evaluation

The Fuld Object-Memory Evaluation is a useful test of memory impairment in the elderly (Fuld, 1977). The test begins by presenting the examinee with a bag containing 10 common objects (ball, bottle, button, etc.). The task is not described as a memory test. The examinee is asked to determine whether he or she can identify objects by touch alone. Each object is felt and then named; the examinee then pulls it out of the bag to see if he or she was right. After all 10 items have been correctly identified, a distractor task is administered: rapidly naming words in a semantic category (e.g., names, foods, things that make people happy, vegetables, or things that make people sad). Then the examinee is asked to recall as many of the objects as possible. After each recall, the subject is slowly and clearly reminded verbally of each item omitted on that trial, a procedure called selective reminding (Buschke & Fuld, 1974). The examinee is then administered four more chances to recall the list by selective reminding, with a distractor task after each trial. Delayed recall is tested after a 5-minute interval. Finally, the test closes with a multiple-choice recognition test.

The Fuld test is often used to help confirm a diagnosis of **Alzheimer's disease**, a degenerative neurological disorder described in the previous topic. In the early stages of Alzheimer's disease the most prominent symptom is memory loss. Elderly persons with memory impairment not only score lower than control subjects on the Fuld Object-Memory Evaluation, but they also benefit very little from the selective reminding. Fuld (1977) has provided norms for community-active and healthy nursing-home residents in their 70s and 80s. Fuld, Masur, Blau, Crystal, and Aronson (1990) describe a prospective study in which the Fuld Object-Memory Evaluation demonstrated promise as a predictor of dementia in cognitively normal elderly. Lichtenberg, Manning, Vangel, and Ross (1995) describe a program of neuropsychological research using the Fuld test with older urban medical patients.

Chung (2009) reports very favorably on the validity of the Fuld test as a screening measure of dementia in Chinese elderly. In a sample of 192 community-dwelling individuals, 57 with confirmed dementia, the optimal cut-off on the total retrieval score yielded an amazing 93 percent sensitivity and 90 percent specificity. In other words, 93 percent of the individuals with dementia were correctly spotted, and 90 percent of the normal individuals were appropriately classified. These are impressive findings for a simple screening test. Chung and Ho (2009) report similarly favorable results in a Chinese nursing-home sample.

Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test

The Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test (RBMT) is a measure of everyday memory such as route finding, remembering names, and recalling information (Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1991). The instrument includes the following subtests:

Names: A photograph is shown along with the first and second names of the person in the photograph. The examinee is tested on both the first and the second names.

Belonging: At the beginning of the test, the examinee is required to hand over a personal belonging (e.g., wallet), which is then hidden while the examinee observes. Later the examinee must remember to ask for the item and then also to find it.

Appointment: The examinee is asked to remember to ask the date of the next appointment when he or she hears the sound of an alarm timer.

Pictures: The examinee is shown 10 cards with simple pictures or drawings and later is asked to recognize them among a set of 20 cards.

Immediate Story: The examiner reads a short paragraph and immediately afterward asks the examinee to recall as many elements of the brief story as possible.

Delayed Story: After completing a number of additional subtests, the examinee is asked to recall as many elements of the story as possible.

Faces: The examinee is shown 5 cards with a face on them and then asked to recognize them among a set of 10 cards.

Immediate Route: The examiner demonstrates a short route with the examinee and leaves an envelope with a written message at the destination. The examinee is asked to reproduce the route and to recall the message.

Immediate Message: This item is linked to Immediate Route (above). The examinee is asked to recall the written message.

Delayed Message: After completing a number of intervening tasks, the examinee is asked to recall the written message again.

Orientation: This subtest consists of 10 items tapping knowledge of personal and societal information.

Date: The examinee is asked the date of the examination.

The RBMT is highly popular in geriatric and rehabilitation settings because of its robust ecological validity—the subtests parallel the tasks and activities of everyday life (Guaiana, Tyson, & Mortimer, 2004). Another strong point of the instrument is that it assesses many elements of memory. For example, the test evaluates all of the following aspects: short-term, long-term, verbal, spatial, retrospective, and prospective memory. The focus on prospective memory—remembering to do something in the future—is a rare but welcome addition to the appraisal of memory.

Man, Chung, and Mak (2009) developed an online version of the RBMT for use with Chinese examinees. They compared scores of 30 stroke patients on the original, face-to-face version of the test versus the online version, and found exceptionally strong correlations on the 12 subtests, with *r*s ranging from .84 to .93. The new version also was highly successful in distinguishing stroke patients from controls. In sum, the online adaptation looks highly promising as a replacement for the more cumbersome face-to-face edition.

Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning-2

The original version of the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (WRAML) was the first comprehensive memory scale designed for use with children (ages 5 to 17 years). The second edition of the test, the WRAML-2 (Sheslow & Adams, 2004), retains the pediatric focus but also extends the norms upward to 90 years of age. The WRAML-2 is, therefore, unique as the only memory scale that can be used with both children and adults. In addition to examiner convenience (no need to buy and learn several memory tests), there is clinical value as well in using a single test across a wide range of ages. Specifically, when clinicians desire to do follow-up testing on a child or teenage client who subsequently transitions into adulthood, using a single test avoids the pitfall of introducing measurement error associated with different tests.

The WRAML-2 consists of six core subtests that contribute to three Index scores: Verbal Memory, Visual Memory, and Attention/Concentration. Collectively, these Index scores establish the overall General Memory Index. A description of the core memory tasks is provided in Table 10.8.

In addition to the core memory subtests, the WRAML-2 also utilizes delayed memory tasks and recognition memory tasks. The delayed memory tasks require free recall of previously presented material whereas the recognition memory tasks involve mere recognition of the material. The two formats (delayed and recognition) help distinguish between storage and retrieval problems in memory. In particular, a client who performs poorly on delayed memory but who excels at recognition memory most likely has a problem with retrieval rather than storage. This is somewhat similar to not remembering a test item when a fill-in-the blank format is used but succeeding when a multiple-choice format is

TABLE 10.8 Description of Core WRAML-2 Subtests

Verbal Memory Subtests
Story Memory: Two short stories are read to the participant who, following each, is asked to recall as many parts of the story as can be remembered. This task measures immediate verbal memory.
Verbal Learning: The examinee is read a relatively long list of simple words followed by an immediate free-recall trial. Three additional presentation/recall trials are used. This task evaluates the ability to actively learn verbal information and yields a verbal learning curve over the four trials.
Visual Learning Subtests
Design Memory: A card with a simple geometric array is presented for a 5-second exposure. Following a 10-second delay, the participant is asked to draw what is remembered about the card. This procedure is used for five separate cards of increasing difficulty.
Picture Memory: The examinee visually scans a complex but common meaningful scene for 10 seconds. Then the examinee is presented with a second similar scene and asked to indicate which elements "have been moved, changed, or added" in the second picture. The procedure is used with four separate scenes.
Attention/Concentration Subtests
Finger Windows: The participant demonstrates memory of a visual pattern using a vertically resting card containing asymmetrically located holes or "windows." The examiner points out a sequence of windows, and then the participant is asked to duplicate the sequence.
Number Letter: The examinee is asked to verbally repeat a random series of numbers and letters orally presented at one per second.

Note: All subtests listed contribute to the General Memory Index.

used. In fact, retrieval memory requires a different neurological substrate than recognition memory. Although capable functioning in both retrieval and recognition memory is typical throughout life, distinct differences (favoring recognition) are observed in old age, with certain neurological conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, and in some forms of brain injury.

The WRAML-2 also includes optional subtests that can be used to evaluate a relatively new area of memory measurement, namely, working memory (Baddeley, 1986). Working memory is a complex form of short-term memory. In addition to simply holding on to rote information for several seconds, when using working memory the client is also "working" with a part of the memory trace without distorting the whole trace. For example, try to read the following sentence only once (i.e., do not reread the sentence to answer the question): If in a bag you had two red balls, three yellow balls, and one green ball, what is the probability the ball would be yellow if you reached into the bag and randomly chose one ball? To answer this question, the short-term verbal memory processor must hold on to all the words in the sentence until the last phrase containing the question. Then it must reproduce the sentence, remembering how many red balls there were, and so on, then hold that information secure, returning to accumulate all the numbers in order to compute the answer. There are two working memory subtests on the WRAML-2, one that examines verbal working memory and another that examines a combination of verbal and visual working memory.

The adult standardization age bands used in norming the WRAML-2 are similar to those of the WMS-III, with similar attention given to stratification variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, geographic region, and educational level. "Tighter" age bands exist for the 5- to 14-year-old samples because there is more change in memory abilities across these ages than in adulthood (except for the oldest age groups). For the WRAML-2, factor-analytic studies show strong support for the three discrete domains being measured (Verbal Memory, Visual Memory, and Attention/Concentration) as well as the newly introduced domain of Working Memory. Especially impressive are the analyses showing extremely low item bias for gender as well as ethnicity. As with the WMS-III, validity studies show clinical groups with neurological disorders scoring significantly lower than nonclinical groups on all WRAML-2 Indexes. The correlation of the WRAML-2 with WAIS-III

Full Scale IQ is moderate, supporting the claim that it measures something different from, although related to, intelligence. Of interest, though, a much lower correlation with the WISC-III suggests that there is less correlation between intelligence and memory ability among children than among adults.

Because both tests claim to be memory tests and show some similarities across tasks used to assess memory, it is reasonable to wonder if the WMS-III and WRAML-2 yield similar scores (i.e., if there is reasonable concurrent validity). Using 79 adults from ages 17 through 74 years, the test developers showed that overall memory indexes of the two measures differed by only 4.7 points. However, the correlations between scores on the two memory instruments ranged from .29 to .60. These moderate correlations suggest that they are measuring somewhat different aspects of memory and are not interchangeable instruments.

Additional Tests of Learning and Memory

Because of space limitations, we can do no more than briefly mention several other useful tests of learning and memory. The California Verbal Learning Test-II is patterned after the Rey AVLT but provides software to quantify and analyze the pattern of results (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 2000). The Benton Visual Retention Test is a design-copying test of visual memory (Sivan, 1991). Good reviews of memory tests can be found in Lezak et al. (2012) and Strauss, Sherman, and Spreen (2006).

ASSESSMENT OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS

As noted in a previous section, language functioning offers a window to the integrity of the left cerebral hemisphere. Thus, neuropsychologists are keenly interested in an examinee's ability to speak, read, write, and comprehend what others say. Little wonder that a comprehensive neuropsychological examination always includes one or more methods for assessing language functions.

Neuropsychologists exhibit a special interest in a variety of language dysfunctions known collectively as aphasia. Briefly stated, **aphasia** is any deviation in language performance caused by brain damage. In testing for aphasia, a neuropsychologist might use any or all of three approaches: (1) a nonstandardized clinical examination, (2) a standardized screening test, or (3) a comprehensive diagnostic test of aphasia. We will provide examples of each in our brief review of assessment methods in aphasia.

Clinical Examination for Aphasia

A clinical examination for aphasia has the advantages of simplicity, flexibility, and brevity. These are important attributes when assessing a severely impaired patient who may require bedside testing. Every practitioner has a slightly different version of the brief clinical exam (Lezak et al., 2012; Reitan, 1984, 1985). Nonetheless, certain elements commonly are assessed:

- *Spontaneous speech:* The examiner looks for distinctive symptoms of aphasia such as word-finding difficulty or neologisms (e.g., referring to a comb as a "planker").
- *Repetition of sentences and phrases:* The examiner asks the patient to repeat stimuli such as "No ifs, ands, or buts," and "Methodist Episcopal." The repetition tasks are so simple that normal subjects almost never fail them.
- *Comprehension of spoken language:* The examiner asks questions ("Does a car have handlebars?") and issues commands ("Take this paper, fold it in half, and put it on the floor"). Again, the tasks are so simple that normal subjects almost never fail them.
- *Word finding:* The examiner points to common, easily recognized objects and asks, "What's this?" Typical items include watch, pen, pencil, glasses, ring, and shoes. The examiner may ask the patient to name numbers, letters, or colors.
- *Reading:* The examiner requests the patient to read and explain a short paragraph suited to prior level of education and intelligence. The examiner may ask the patient to follow written instructions (e.g., "Close your eyes" or "Clap your hands three times").
- *Writing and copying:* The examiner asks the patient to write spontaneously and from

dictation. Also, the examiner may ask the patient to copy written matter and geometric shapes. The examiner is interested in grossly ungrammatical written productions and significant distortions in copying.

- *Calculation:* The examiner asks the patient to perform very simple mathematical calculations (e.g., 17 × 3) with and without aid of scratch paper. The tasks are so simple that normal subjects rarely fail.

Based on the clinical assessment, the examiner may fill out a rating scale for severity of aphasia. For example, the rating scale used in the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Exam (Goodglass, Kaplan, & Barresi, 2000) includes the following speech characteristics: melodic line, phrase length, articulatory agility, grammatical form, word finding, and auditory comprehension.

Screening and Comprehensive Diagnostic Tests for Aphasia

Standardized screening tests for aphasia closely resemble the brief clinical exam. The essential difference is that standardized screening tests incorporate objective and precise instructions for administration and scoring. The weakness of screening tests is that they will not detect subtle forms of aphasia.

Comprehensive diagnostic tests for aphasia are quite lengthy and used mainly when a patient is known to experience aphasia. These tests provide a profile of language skills that is helpful in treatment planning. We provide a brief description of several aphasia tests in Table 10.9.

TABLE 10.9 Brief Description of Several Aphasia Tests

Multilingual Aphasia Examination (Benton, Hamsher, Rey, & Sivan, 1994)

This respected, comprehensive battery consists of 11 subtests and rating scales that assess visual naming, repetition, fluency, articulation, spelling, and other language variables; available in a Spanish edition, too.

Western Aphasia Battery—Revised (Kertesz, 2000)

Comprehensive test of verbal fluency, auditory comprehension, and repetition that aims to identify aphasia syndromes and determine their severity.

Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (Goodglass, Kaplan, & Barresi, 2000)

Comprehensive test with 46 subscales that include music, spatial, computation, and seven types of writing skill in addition to traditional aphasia measures, available in French and Hindi versions, too.

Porch Index of Communicative Ability—Revised (Porch, 2001)

A battery containing eighteen 10-item subtests, four verbal, eight gestural, and six graphic. Very reliable test often used to measure small changes in patient performance.

Token Test (Spreen & Strauss, 1998)

An extremely sensitive test that presents little challenge to normal individuals. The examinee must complete oral commands with colored tokens, e.g., "Put the small red token on top of the large square token." Originally devised by Boller & Vignolo (1966), numerous versions of the Token Test are now available.

TESTS OF SPATIAL AND MANIPULATORY ABILITY

Tests of spatial and manipulatory ability are also known as tests of constructional performance. A constructional performance test combines perceptual activity with motor response and always has a spatial component (Lezak et al., 2012). Because constructional ability involves several complex functions, even mild forms of brain dysfunction will result in impaired constructional performance. However, careful observation is needed to distinguish the cause of the failed performance, which may include spatial confusion, perceptual deficiency, attentional difficulties, motivational problems, and apraxias. The term apraxia refers to a variety of dysfunctions characterized by a breakdown in the direction or execution of complex motor acts (Strub & Black, 2000). For example, a patient who could not demonstrate how to use a key would be diagnosed as suffering from ideomotor apraxia.

Tests of constructional performance embrace two large classes of activities: drawing and assembling. Owing to limitations of space, we will review only a few prominent instruments in each category.

Design Copying Tests

Drawing a copy of simple geometric shapes such as two overlapping pentagons is a complex activity that requires accurate visual perception, correct spatial analysis, as well as intact motor functions and the executive ability to make mid-course corrections in the drawing. Because the activity of copying a design involves so many cognitive capacities, it is sensitive to a wide variety of brain impairing conditions. For this reason, design copying has been a mainstay of cognitive screening for brain impairment.

One of the most widely used design copying tests—indeed, one of the most widely used individual tests of any kind—is the Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test (Bender, 1938), more commonly known as the Bender Gestalt Test (BGT). In the last half of the twentieth century, the BGT consistently ranked among the top four or five most frequently used tests in clinical psychology (Piotrowski, 1995). The original version consisted of nine stimulus drawings similar to those in Figure 10.5. The test is simple to explain and administer. The examinee is instructed to copy one drawing at a time on a sheet of blank paper. Erasures are discouraged. If needed, additional sheets of paper are provided. The examinee is told "this is not a test of artistic ability, but try to copy the drawings as accurately as possible. Work as fast or as slowly as you wish" (Hutt, 1977). Use of a ruler or straight edge is not permitted.

For the original version of the BGT, a number of complex scoring systems have been developed for adults (Hain, 1964; Hutt & Briskin, 1960; Lacks, 1999). In addition, Koppitz (1963, 1975) produced an elaborate scoring system for children aged 5 to 11. The Koppitz system yielded a raw score (total errors) that could be converted to an age-equivalent score as well. In contrast to the use of the BGT with adults—where the examiner is looking for signs of brain impairment—when used with children, the primary purpose of the test is to assess the level of developmental maturity. Several interesting variations on the original BGT are discussed in Gregory (1999).

A revised and expanded version of the BGT was published by Brannigan and Decker (2003). The BGT-II adds to the original test rather than revamping it. Specifically, it includes the original nine stimulus cards supplemented by seven new drawings (four very easy drawings, and three that provide substantial challenge). The four additional "easy"



FIGURE 10.5 Stimuli Similar to Those From the Bender Gestalt Test-II.
Note: The Bender-Gestalt-II consists of sixteen stimuli similar to these.

cards are administered only to younger examinees 4 through 7 years of age, whereas the three "difficult" cards are administered only to older examinees 8 through 85+ years of age. Unlike previous editions of the test which lacked serious efforts at standardization, the BGT-II norms are based on more than 4,000 individuals, ages 4 through 85, stratified on important demographics according to the 2000 census.

These new stimulus cards are intended to extend the measurement scale at the lower and higher extremes of ability. The authors also provide an explicit scoring system whereby each reproduction is scored on a 5-point scale from 0 (no resemblance) to 4 (nearly perfect). Of course, comprehensive, census-based norms are provided by way of standard scores, *T* scores, percentile ranks, confidence intervals, and classification labels. The standard score is called the Visual Motor Integration (VMI) and is anchored to a mean of 100 and standard deviation (SD) of 15. This is a useful feature of the BG-II because it allows for comparisons of the VMI score with IQs, memory quotients, and other indices normed to mean of 100 and SD of 15. Marnic (2011) found that the test is valuable in the diagnosis of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder in referred children and adolescents. Decker (2008) provides a sophisticated analysis of subtle changes in BGT-II protocols across the life span, suggesting that visual-motor skills mature rapidly from childhood into middle adolescence, decline steadily through adulthood, and drop steeply in old age.

The Greek Cross (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993) is a very simple drawing task that is surprisingly sensitive to brain impairment. The examinee is requested to carefully copy the figure without lifting the pencil, that is, by tracing the perimeter. The stimulus figure and examples of defective performance are shown in Figure 10.6. This test is most often evaluated on a qualitative basis, although scoring guides do exist (Gregory, 1999).

Assembly Tests

In his classic book on the parietal lobes, Critchley (1953) provided the rationale for including three-dimensional construction tasks in a neuropsychological test battery:

> It is possible, and indeed useful, to proceed to problems in three-dimensional space though tests of this character are only too rarely employed. This is a more difficult undertaking, and patients who respond moderately well to the usual procedures with sticks and pencil-and-paper may display gross abnormalities when told to assemble bricks according to a three-dimensional pattern.

Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, and Spreen (1994) present a three-dimensional block construction test with excellent norms and scoring guide. The two forms of the test (Form A and Form B) consist of three block models that are presented one at a time to the patient. The patient is requested to construct an exact replica of the model by selecting the appropriate blocks from a set of loose blocks on a tray. Based on omissions, additions, substitutions, and displacements, the three models are scored from 0 to 6, 8, and 15 points, respectively. This test is quite sensitive to brain impairment, especially when the left or right parietal area is affected. Lezak et al. (2012) discusses other assembly tasks. We should mention that the Tactual Performance Test from the Halstead-Reitan battery is, in part, an assembly task that measures spatial and manipulatory abilities (see Table 10.4).

ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

Executive functions include logical analysis, conceptualization, reasoning, planning, and flexibility of thinking. The assessment of executive functions presents an unusual quandary to neuropsychologists:

> A major obstacle to examining the executive functions is the paradoxical need to structure a situation in which patients can show whether and how well they can make structure for themselves. Typically in formal examinations, the examiner determines what activity the subject is to do with what materials, when, where, and how. Most cognitive tests, for example, allow the subject little room for discretionary behavior, including many tests thought to be sensitive to executive—or frontal lobe—disorders . . . The



FIGURE 10.6 The Greek Cross Stimulus Figure and Reproductions from Persons with Known Brain Damage

(a) Stimulus figure.
(b) Clerical worker with diffuse right hemisphere dysfunction of unknown origin.
(c) College professor two years after a right hemisphere stroke.
(d) Patient with generalized, diffuse dementia.

Source: From Gregory, Robert J. *Foundations of intellectual assessment: The WAIS-III and other tests in clinical practice,* p. 197. Published by Allyn and Bacon, Boston, MA. Copyright © 1999 by Pearson Education. Adapted by permission of the publisher.

> problem for clinicians who want to examine the executive functions becomes how to transfer goal setting, structuring, and decision making from the clinician to the subject within the structured examination. (Lezak, 1995)

Many neuropsychologists resolve this quandary by using the clinical method to evaluate executive functions rather than administering formal tests (Cripe, 1996). For example, Pollens, McBratnie, and Burton (1988) use interview and observations to fill out the structured checklist on executive functions mentioned in the previous topic.

Only a limited number of neuropsychological tests tap executive functions to any appreciable degree. Useful instruments in this regard include the Porteus Mazes, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and a novel approach known as the Tinkertoy® Test. We remind the reader that the Category Test from the Halstead-Reitan battery also captures executive functions to some extent (Table 10.4).

The Porteus Maze Test was devised as a culture-reduced measure of planning and foresight (Porteus, 1965). Without lifting the pencil and attempting to avoid dead ends, the examinee must trace a line through a series of increasingly difficult mazes. This underused instrument is quite sensitive to the effects of brain damage, particularly in the frontal lobes (Smith & Kinder, 1959; Smith, 1960).

Krikorian and Bartok (1998) have published contemporary Porteus Maze norms for children and young adults 7 to 21 years of age; these researchers also demonstrated that test scores are minimally related to IQ scores. Mack and Patterson (1995) investigated the Porteus test as a useful measure of executive function in elderly patients with Alzheimer's disease. In a study of 276 pediatric patients who had sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI), Levin, Song, Ewing-Cobbs, and Roberson (2001) found that the Porteus test was highly sensitive to TBI severity as measured by the volume of tissue damage in the prefrontal areas of the brain.

The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is a good measure of executive functions, although its differential sensitivity to frontal lobe damage is debated (Mountain & Snow, 1993). The instrument was devised to study abstract thinking and the ability to shift set (Berg, 1948; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, and others, 1993). The examinee is given a pack of 64 cards on which are printed one to four symbols (triangle, star, cross, or circle) in one of four colors (red, green, yellow, or blue). No two cards are identical. Thus, each card embodies a number, a particular shape, and a specific color. The examinee must sort these cards underneath four stimulus cards according to an unknown principle (Figure 10.7). For example, the unknown principle might be "sort according to color." As the examinee places cards, the examiner says "right" or "wrong." After the examinee has sorted a run of 10 correct placements in a row, the examiner shifts the principle without warning. The test continues until the examinee has made six runs of 10 correct placements. The test can be scored in several different ways, including total number of trials to criterion (Axelrod, Greve, & Goldman, 1994). A common use of the WCST is to gauge ongoing recovery in patients with brain trauma of recent onset. Thus, the longitudinal constancy of test scores in patients with stabilized conditions is a reassuring characteristic of this test (Greve, Love, Sherwin, and others, 2002).

Lezak (1982) devised the Tinkertoy® Test to give patients the opportunity to demonstrate executive capacities within the structured format of an examination. Fifty pieces of a standard Tinkertoy® set are placed on a clean surface and the examinee is told, "Make whatever you want with these. You will have at least five minutes and as much more time as you wish to make something." The test is scored from −1 to +12 based on several variables including the number of pieces used, the mobility of the construction, symmetry, and the naming of the construction. Head-injured patients produce impoverished designs consisting of a small number of pieces. These individuals often are unable to provide a name for their constructions.

Bayless, Varney, and Roberts (1989) studied the predictive validity of the Tinkertoy® Test by comparing the results of 50 patients with closed-head injuries versus 25 normal controls. Half of the head-injured individuals had returned to work while



FIGURE 10.7 Cards and Sorting Piles Similar to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test

half had not. Whereas all but one of the head-injured who returned to work scored normally on the Tinkertoy® Test, nearly half of the nonreturnees performed below the level of the worst control subject. The researchers conclude:

> The test seems particularly well suited for demonstrating the presence of deficits in executive functioning, which have proven to be difficult to demonstrate with clinical tests even though they have catastrophic sequelae in daily vocational or psychosocial endeavors. (Bayless et al., 1989)

The Tinkertoy® Test also shows promise in the assessment of individuals with Alzheimer's disease (Koss, Patterson, Mack, Smyth, & Whitehouse, 1998).

Neuropsychologists still need additional measures of executive functions. One promising approach in the early stages of development is real-world assessment of route finding. The ability to find an unfamiliar location in the city requires strategy, self-monitoring, and corrective maneuvers. These are executive functions applied to a realistic problem (Boyd & Sauter, 1993). Another promising approach to the assessment of executive functions is embodied in a recent battery called the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive System (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, and others, 1996). The BADS battery consists of six novel situational tests that resemble real-life daily activities:

> *Temporal Orientation:* The examinee is asked to estimate how long various common activities take, such as a routine dental checkup.
>
> *Rule Shift Cards:* This test measures the ability to shift set after establishing a card-sorting pattern according to a simple rule.
>
> *Action Program:* This test of practical problem solving involves a task in which a cork must be extracted from a test tube by planning the use of available materials.
>
> *Key Search:* In this analogue test, examinees are required to demonstrate how they would search a field for a set of lost keys.
>
> *Zoo Map:* This is a test of planning and route finding in which the examinee is asked to plan a route to visit six of a possible 12 locations in a zoo.
>
> *Six Elements:* This is a multitasking subtest in which the examinee must complete six activities (two naming, two dictation, two mental arithmetic) in 10 minutes.

The battery also includes a 20-item dysexecutive questionnaire with items rated on a 5-point (0 to 4) Likert scale. The items involve likely changes when executive functions are impaired, for example, "I have difficulty thinking ahead and planning for the future." The questions are in four broad areas: personality/emotional changes, motivational changes, behavioral changes, and cognitive changes. Spreen and Strauss (1998) provide a helpful review of this battery. Norris and Tate (2000) compared the BADS with six other commonly used tests of executive functioning. In a sample of 36 neurological patients, they demonstrated the ecological superiority of this new instrument in predicting competency in everyday role functioning. Simon, Giacomini, Ferrero, and Mohr (2003) found that the BADS was a fair measure of social adjustment in patients with schizophrenia, correlating $r = .34$ with an index of psychosocial adjustment. The BADS outperformed the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Trail Making Test (part B) in this context. In a study comparing healthy controls, patients with mild cognitive impairment, and patients with mild Alzheimer's disease, the BADS was highly sensitive to the impact of mild Alzheimer's disease, but did not differentiate the other two groups (da Costa Armentano, Porto, Brucki, & Nitrini, 2009).

ASSESSMENT OF MOTOR OUTPUT

Most neuropsychological test batteries include measures of manipulative speed and accuracy. Lezak et al. (2012) provides a comprehensive review. We will briefly summarize three approaches: finger tapping, pegboard performance, and line tracing.

Perhaps the most widely used test of motor dexterity is the Finger-Tapping Test from the Halstead-Reitan battery. This test consists of a tapping key that extends from a mechanical counting

device attached to a flat board. With the index finger of each hand, the examinee completes a series of 10-second trials until five trials in a row are within a 5-point range. The score for each hand is the average of these five trials, rounded to the nearest whole number. With the dominant hand, males typically score about 54 taps (SD of 4), whereas females typically score about 51 taps (SD of 5; Dodrill, 1979; Morrison, Gregory, & Paul, 1979).

In general, the absolute level of performance is of less interest than the relative abilities on the two sides of the body. Normative expectation is that the nondominant hand will yield a tapping rate about 90 percent of the dominant hand. Significant deviations from this pattern are thought to indicate a lesion in the hemisphere opposite that of the slowed hand (Haaland & Delaney, 1981). However, such inferences must be made with great caution owing to the very low reliability of the ratio score. Although test–retest and interexaminer reliabilities for either hand alone approach .80, the reliability of the ratio score is a dismal .44 to .54 (Morrison, Gregory, & Paul, 1979). The ratio score should be used with extreme caution in making clinical inferences about lateralization of damage.

The Purdue Pegboard Test requires the examinee to place pegs in holes with the left hand, right hand, and then both hands. Each trial lasts only 30 seconds, so the entire test can be administered in a matter of minutes. Tiffin (1968) reports normative scores for work applicants. Relative slowing in one hand suggests a lesion in the opposite hemisphere, whereas bilateral slowing indicates diffuse or bilateral brain damage. Using the Purdue Pegboard Test in isolation, one study found an 80 percent accuracy in identifying brain impairment among a large group of normal subjects and neurological patients (Lezak, 1983). Other studies report much less favorable findings (Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978). The Purdue Pegboard Test is a useful addition to a comprehensive battery but should not be used in isolation for screening purposes. Spreen and Strauss (1998) provide an excellent summary of norms for this widely used test.

Klove has developed a variation on the pegboard test in which the pegs have a ridge along one side (Klove, 1963). Because each peg must be rotated into position, the Grooved Pegboard requires complex coordination in addition to motor dexterity. The Grooved Pegboard test is an excellent instrument for assessing lateralized brain damage (Haaland & Delaney, 1981).

Finally, we should mention that useful motor tests need not require sophisticated equipment. Lezak (1995) recommends a line tracing task to assess difficulties in motor regulation (Figure 10.8). The examinee is given a brightly colored felt-tipped pen and a sheet of paper with several figures and told to draw over the lines as rapidly as possible. Difficulties with motor regulation show up in overshooting corners, perseveration of an ongoing response, and inability to follow the reduced curves in the bottom figure. Because this task is easily completed by most 10-year-olds, any noticeable deviations are suggestive of difficulties in motor regulation.

TEST BATTERIES IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

We remind the reader that the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (Reitan & Wolfson, 1993), discussed earlier, is a respected and widely used battery in neuropsychological assessment. Here we summarize competing approaches.

The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery

Now that we have completed a tour of some individual neuropsychological tests and procedures, it is time once again to remind the reader that many



FIGURE 10.8 A Typical Line-Tracing Task (Reduced Size)

neuropsychologists prefer to use a fixed battery rather than an ever-shifting, individualized assortment of instruments. Certainly, one of the most widely used fixed batteries is the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (LNNB; Golden, 2004; Golden, Purish, & Hammeke, 1980, 1986), now in its third edition (LNNB-III; Teichner, Golden, Bradley, & Crum, 1999).

The test consists of 269 discrete items, chosen from the work of Luria (1966) and formally standardized. These items are scored 0, 1, or 2 according to precise criteria in the administration and scoring manual. Similar items are grouped into 11 clinical scales, C1 through C11 (Table 10.10). Raw scores on each scale are converted into *T* scores, with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Higher scores reflect more psychopathology; scores above 70 are especially suggestive of brain impairment.

TABLE 10.10 Tests and Procedures of the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery

Ability Scale: Tasks Included
C1 Motor: Coordination, speed, drawing, complex motor abilities
C2 Rhythm: Attend to, discriminate, and produce verbal and nonverbal rhythmic stimuli
C3 Tactile: Identify tactile stimuli, including stimuli traced on the wrists
C4 Visual: Identify drawings, including overlapping and unfocused objects; solve progressive matrices and other visuospatial skills
C5 Receptive Speech: Discriminate phonemes and comprehend words, phrases, sentences
C6 Expressive Speech: Articulate sounds, words, and sentences fluently; identify pictured or described objects
C7 Writing: Use motor writing abilities in general; copy and write from dictation
C8 Reading: Read letters, words, and sentences; synthesize letters into sounds and words
C9 Arithmetic: Complete simple mathematical computations; comprehend mathematical signs and number structure
C10 Memory: Remember verbal and nonverbal stimuli under both interference and noninterference conditions
C11 Intelligence: Reasoning, concept formation, and complex mathematical problem solving

Three summary scales are also derived from test performance: S1 (Pathognomonic), S2 (Left Hemisphere), and S3 (Right Hemisphere). The Pathognomonic scale reflects the degree of compensation that has occurred since an injury, such as functional reorganization of the brain as well as actual physical recovery. Higher scores reflect less compensation. The Left Hemisphere and Right Hemisphere scales can be used to help determine whether an injury is diffuse or lateralized. A number of other scales and interpretive factors are also available (Golden, Purish, & Hammeke, 1986).

We cannot review the voluminous literature on the LNNB, but brief mention of a few key studies certainly is merited. The reliability of the LNNB has been evaluated from the usual perspectives (split-half, internal consistency, and test–retest), with excellent results. For example, the mean test-retest reliability for the clinical scales was near .90 (Bach, Harowski, Kirby, Peterson, & Schulein, 1981; Plaisted & Golden, 1982; Teichner et al., 1999). In various validity studies of classification of brain-damaged persons versus other criterion groups, the LNNB has shown hit rates of 80 percent or better (Golden, Moses, Graber, & Berg, 1981; Hammeke, Golden, & Purish, 1978; Moses & Golden, 1979; Teichner et al., 1999).

In spite of the positive appraisals of the LNNB reported by Golden and his colleagues, some neuropsychologists remain skeptical of the test (e.g., Lezak, 1995). One concern is that the heterogeneity of the scales is so great that the individual scale scores do not quantify specific neuropsychological deficits but instead serve only to differentiate normal persons from brain-damaged patients (Snow, 1992; Van Gorp, 1992). Early reviewers also expressed concern that the speech scales were not oriented to syndromes of aphasia and could therefore misdiagnose language deficits (Delis & Kaplan, 1982). In defense of the LNNB, Purish (2001) contends that initial criticisms were based on misconceptions as to the theoretical basis for the instrument. Furthermore, in his view, these criticisms have been

largely negated by an expanding body of empirical research supporting the test.

Yet, it is possible that the LNNB and its chief rival, the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery, have reached their peak of popularity and clinical utility (Davis, Johnson, and D'Amato, 2005). New batteries emerge every few years. A promising addition is the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery.

The Neuropsychological Assessment Battery (NAB)

The Neuropsychological Assessment Battery or NAB (Stern & White, 2003ab) is a recent and promising entry in the field that is remarkable for its breadth and sophistication. Suitable for adults 18 to 97 years of age, the NAB is a comprehensive battery of 24 individual tests in five modular areas: attention, language, memory, spatial, and executive functions. Twelve of the subtests also can be used as a separate screening module. The instrument comes in two parallel and psychometrically equivalent versions, Form 1 and Form 2. Norms are based on data from 1,448 neurologically healthy individuals matching the U.S. population on educational level, gender, ethnicity, and geographic region.

The five major modules, each consisting of four to six subtests, are listed in Table 10.11. Subtests used in the Screening Module are indicated with an asterisk. One feature evident in this table is that each module contains one subtest designed to possess ecological validity as well as psychometric validity. **Ecological validity** refers to the congruence between testing situations and analogous real-world circumstances. A test with strong ecological validity is one that highly resembles practical behaviors required in the real world. Among the NAB subtests with ecological validity are Driving Scenes, Bill Payment, Daily Living Memory, Map Reading, and Judgments. Each resembles a real world situation of importance in daily life. Ecological validity is beneficial because it increases the acceptability of testing to examinees.

The modular nature of the NAB allows for fixed administration of the entire battery (which takes about three hours), or flexible administration of the Screening Module followed by full administration of one or more of the five modules, depending on screening results. Once the test has been administered, software is available to compute a large array of output scores in a highly user-friendly computerized report. The module scores are reported as standard scores ($M = 100$, $SD = 15$), whereas the subtest scores are rendered as T-scores ($M = 50$, $SD = 10$).

The reliability of test scores is highly variable across the different modules and subtests, and is influenced by the examinee's age as well. The average coefficient alphas for the subtests in the five major modules revealed the following ranges (Stern & White, 2003b):

Attention Module:	.78 to .79
Language Module:	.48 to .84
Memory Module:	.47 to .86
Spatial Module	.65 to .67
Executive Functions Module:	.45 to .77

Test–retest reliability was evaluated with 95 individuals who were tested twice over an average span of 6 months. Understandably, these average coefficients were somewhat lower and more variable:

Attention Module:	.44 to .87
Language Module:	.23 to .70
Memory Module:	.41 to .61
Spatial Module	.13 to .68
Executive Functions Module:	.43 to .64

These relationships between test and retest NAB scores are respectable, given the lengthy test-retest interval.

The validity of the NAB is difficult to summarize concisely, because of the complexity of the instrument. The authors provide extensive documentation on validity, as evaluated from the traditional perspectives, including content validity, factor-analytic evidence of construct validity, and convergent and divergent correlations with similar and dissimilar external measures (all supportive). The authors conclude:

> Although the data presented in this chapter support the validity of the NAB, these data and analyses should be considered only the beginning steps in the ongoing process of test validation. (Stern & White, 2003b, p. 141)

TABLE 10.11 Modules and Subtests of the NAB

Attention	
Orientation*	Questions about orientation to self, time, place, and situation
Digits Forward*	Repetition of orally presented digit sequences of increasing length
Digits Backward*	Orally presented digit sequences recalled in reverse order
Dots	Delayed recognition of the "new" dot in visual presentation of dots
Numbers & Letters*	Timed tests of letter cancellation, letter counting, serial addition
Driving Scenes	Recognition of what is "new" in presentation of a second driving scene
Language	
Oral Production	Speech output when the examinee orally describes a picture
Auditory Comprehension	Comprehension of orally presented commands and instructions
Naming*	Ability to name a pictured object, with cues if necessary
Reading Comprehension	Reading comprehension of single words and sentences
Writing	Writing sample scored for delivery, legibility, syntax, spelling
Bill Payment	Real world task of writing a check to pay a utility bill
Memory	
List Learning	Verbal learning of 12-word list with interference trial
Shape Learning*	Visual learning of 9 shapes with delayed recognition
Story Learning*	Verbal learning of a short narrative story of five sentences
Daily Living Memory	Verbal learning of medication instructions, address, phone number
Spatial	
Visual Discrimination	Matching of stimuli presented visually from an array
Design Construction	Assembling a tangram design from individual pieces
Figure Drawing	Drawing task involving copy and recall of geometric shapes
Map Reading	Answering practical questions based on the map of a city
Executive Functions	
Mazes*	Solving paper-and-pencil mazes of increasing complexity
Categories	Classifying and categorizing task based on photos of six people
Word Generation*	Creating three-letter words from two vowels and six consonants
Judgment	Answering practical questions about home safety and health

*Subtests used on the Screening Module.

Temple and Zgaljardic (2009) provide independent evidence for the validity of the Screening Module of the NAB. They note strong associations with a measure of functional independence in a sample of 70 individuals with moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury at a residential post-acute rehabilitation facility. Yet, Iverson, Williamson, Ropacki, and Reilly (2007) come down on the other side of the fence. In their study of 37 outpatients with neurological problems, results on the Screening Module were better than expected. In other words, in their sample the instrument did not show good sensitivity.

We need to keep in mind that the establishment of test validity is a dynamic process, not something set in stone when a test is released. The meaning of tests scores is sharpened and refined by ongoing research. Several recent reports support the validity of the NAB. For example, in a study of 54 patients with TBI and 54 matched controls, Donders and Levitt (2012) found that the Attention, Executive Functions, and Memory modules were highly sensitive to brain impairment. Gavett et al. (2012) reported that the Daily Living memory subtest provided the greatest accuracy in identifying patients with Alzheimer's Disease. It will prove interesting in the years ahead to see how additional studies bear on the validity of the NAB.

Baseline Testing With Brief Neuropsychological Test Batteries

As with most human attributes, variability in neurocognitive abilities from one person to the next is substantial. Some people are quick with reaction times, strong in memory skills, and facile with mathematical processing; others innately possess lower levels of ability; and, most of us are somewhere in between. Individual differences present a quandary in assessment, especially when the objective is to identify mild or subtle neuropsychological deficits such as mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI). When do low scores indicate mTBI and when do they signify a typical level of functioning? Access to baseline testing can prove invaluable in making this distinction. For at least two areas of assessment, the acquisition of baseline test data has become the expected practice.

One application of baseline testing is the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Battery used in the armed forces. U.S. military troops deployed to war zones are administered the latest version, the ANAM4 TBI Battery, to obtain baseline neurocognitive performance levels. In situations where a soldier has been exposed to trauma such as an IED blast, retesting with the ANAM4 TBI Battery will help identify the presence of TBI, even if it is mild in severity. The battery was designed to minimize retesting effects by providing a nearly endless source of potential stimuli within each test module. Developed under the guidance of the U.S. Army, the battery is widely available and used in diverse settings worldwide.

The full ANAM4 consists of 22 assessments that can be grouped into flexible or standardized batteries. The subtests include measures of reaction time, learning, memory, mathematical processing, spatial processing, executive functions, and symptoms. Based on decades of study by dozens of neuropsychological and human performance researchers, the subtests are highly sensitive to the impact of brain injury, degenerative disease, toxin exposure, medication effects, and rehabilitation efforts. All modules are administered with a personal laptop computer. For the performance-based measures, stimuli are presented visually, and the left–right mouse buttons are used for the forced-choice options.

The ANAM4 TBI Battery consists of eight assessments that can be administered in about 20 minutes, making it highly feasible as a follow-up test when a soldier has been exposed to trauma such as an IED blast. The eight modules are listed in Table 10.12. The ANAM4 software generates a full report providing the examiner with the current neurocognitive status of the soldier, comparisons to previous testing sessions, and comparisons to selected reference and norm groups. Researchers can transfer data in spreadsheet format to preferred statistical packages.

Normative data based on extraordinarily large samples are available for the ANAM4 TBI Battery. Vincent, Roebuck-Spencer, Gilleland, and Schlegel (2012) collected test data from over 107,500 active duty service members 17 to 65 years of age. The norms are carefully stratified by age and gender. The main criticism of ANAM4 is the lack of research on its effectiveness in identifying mTBI in soldiers (Kennedy & Moore, 2010). While it is clear that the individual subtests possess strong psychometric qualities, there is surprisingly little research on such matters as sensitivity and specificity of the overall battery in the identification of mTBI.

Another laptop-based neurocognitive battery is ImPACT (Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing), developed in the 1990s

TABLE 10.12 Subtests of the ANAM4 TBI Battery

Sleepiness scale: A self-assessment of the soldier's sleepiness/fatigue level on a 7-point scale from "very alert" to "very sleepy."

Mood scale: A self-assessment of the user's mood state in seven categories (Vigor, Happiness, Depression, Anger, Fatigue, Anxiety, and Restlessness). A number of adjectives related to these mood categories are rated on a 7-point scale.

Simple reaction time (SRT): The user clicks the left mouse button when an asterisk appears on the screen at random intervals. A measure of attention and reaction time.

Code substitution: A display of digits 1 through 9 appears in a row at the top of the screen with a different symbol above each digit. A series of 72 individual probes appears at the bottom of the screen, each showing a pairing of a digit and symbol. The soldier clicks the left or right mouse button to signify a match or non-match, respectively, with the static display at the top of the screen. A measure of visual search, sustained attention, and encoding.

Procedural reaction time: A series of single digits (2, 3, 4, or 5) is presented in 32 trials. The user clicks the left mouse button to indicate the digit is "low" (2 or 3) or the right mouse button to indicate the digit is "high" (4 or 5). A measure of processing efficiency and rule-following.

Mathematical processing: A series of single-digit arithmetic equations (e.g., $3 + 4 - 1$) is presented in 20 trials. The user clicks the left mouse button to indicate the answer is less than 5 or the right mouse button if the answer is greater than 5. A measure of basic computational skills, concentration, and working memory.

Matching to sample: A series of 4×4 matrices with cells in a 2-color format are presented in 20 trials. Following each stimulus, a pair of slightly different 4×4 matrices appears side-by-side. The user clicks the left or right mouse button to indicate the correct match to the previous stimulus. A measure of spatial processing and visuo-spatial working memory.

Code substitution delayed: A series of 36 probes appears as in the previous code substitution test. The soldier response in the same fashion, but must access memory of the static display, which is not represented. A measure of delayed recall for visual stimuli.

Source: Based on Eonta, S. E., Carr, W., McArdle, J. J., and others (2011). Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics: Repeated assessments with two military samples. *Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine*, *82*, 34–39.

by Mark Lovell and Joseph Maroon (Lovell, 2006; Lovell, Iverson, Collins, and others, 2006). ImPACT is intended for sports settings to help in making return-to-play decisions following concussions. The 20-minute battery is widely used in clinical management of concussions for athletes ages 10 through adulthood. The instrument is intended for use when baseline results are available for individual team members. Impact is a highly popular computer-based testing program that is used in high school, college, and professional sports programs. It should be given only by persons trained in its administration and interpretation. The test developers caution that the battery should never be used as a "stand-alone" device for diagnosis or decision-making.

ImPACT typically is administered from a laptop computer by an athletic trainer, school nurse, team doctor, or psychologist to help determine when a player is ready to return to the field after a possible concussion from a hard "hit" or other head trauma. The six modules are described in Table 10.13.

Dozens of published studies pertain to the reliability and validity of ImPACT. See ***impacttest.com*** for a listing of references. We will summarize here two studies on the sensitivity and specificity of test scores in predicting certain outcomes. The reader will recall that sensitivity refers to the percentage of respondents with a known condition who are correctly detected, whereas specificity refers to the percentage of respondents without the condition who

TABLE 10.13 The Six Modules from the ImPACT Test Battery

Word Discrimination: A measure of attention and verbal recognition memory. Twelve target words are presented for 750 milliseconds each on the computer screen. The list is presented twice. The athlete is tested for recall with the presentation of a 24-word list that includes the 12 target words and 12 non-target words from the same semantic category. For example, if the target word was "carrot" the non-target word might be "celery." Using the mouse, the examinee clicks "yes" or "no" for each of the 24 stimuli.

Design Memory: A measure of attention and visual recognition memory. Twelve target designs are presented for 750 milliseconds each on the computer screen. The designs are presented twice. The athlete is tested for recall with the presentation of 24 designs that include the 12 target designs and 12 non-target designs consisting of the original designs rotated in space. Using the mouse, the examinee clicks "yes" or "no" for each of the 24 designs.

X's and O's: A measure of visual working memory and visual processing speed. The athlete views a screen of randomly placed X's and O's, three of which are illuminated in yellow, for 1.5 seconds. A distractor task ensues (click P key for a red circle, Q key for a blue square). Then, the screen of X's and O's reappears, but no letters are illuminated. The task of the respondent is to click on the stimuli previously illuminated in yellow.

Symbol Matching: A measure of visual processing speed, learning, and memory. The athlete is presented a screen depicting the digits 1 through 9, with a common symbol (circle, square, triangle) above each digit. Below this display a symbol is presented. The examinee clicks the corresponding digit as quickly as possible. If correct, the digit turns green, if wrong, it turns red. Eventually, the symbols above the digits disappear, so that correct responses depend upon memory. Results consist of both reaction time and number of correct responses.

Color Match: A measure of choice reaction time, impulse control, and response inhibition. A brief test of color blindness first is given (ability to perceive the colors red, blue, and green). Next, a color word appears, either in the matching color (e.g., the word RED in red ink) or nonmatching color (e.g., the word BLUE in green ink). The athlete clicks the mouse if the word and color match, otherwise waits for the next stimulus. Both reaction time and errors are assessed.

Three Letter Memory: A measure of working memory and visual-motor response speed. Three consonant letters are displayed on the screen. A distractor task ensues. This consists of the numbers 1 through 25 randomly placed in a 5 × 5. The athlete is instructed to click on the numbers in reversed order, 25 to 1. Then, the examinee is asked to recall the three consonant letters. Five trials are presented. This module yields a memory score (total number of consonants correctly recalled) and a distractor score (total number of digits clicked in the correct order).

Source: Based on descriptions from *impacttest.com* and Lovell (2006).

are correctly designated. Lau, Collins, and Lovell (2011) followed 108 male high school football players who sustained a concussion and then divided the group into protracted recovery (14 or more days) before returning to play, and short recovery (less than 14 days) before returning to play. A combination of four symptom clusters and four ImPACT scores yielded a sensitivity of 65 percent and specificity of 80 percent. Schatz, Pardini, Lovell, Collins, and Podell (2006) tested 12 recently concussed athletes with ImPACT and compared the data to results for 66 high school athletes with no history of concussion. The best discriminant function analysis correctly classified 82 percent of participants in the concussion group (sensitivity) and 89 percent of participants in the control group (specificity). These two studies support the overall utility of ImPACT.

But the battery is not without its critics. ESPN contributor Peter Keating (2012) cites a concern about the high false positive rate, and notes the conflict of interest in which the test developers, who have published the vast majority of research on the battery, also are involved in marketing the battery for profit. Further, he notes that

> . . . in practice, it's hard for any neuropsychological test to get good data. Some athletes intentionally try to perform poorly on baselines so their post-injury tests won't keep them out of play. Peyton Manning [Denver Broncos quarterback] admitted to this practice, which players call sandbagging, in April 2011 (ESPN The Magazine, "Concussion Test May Not Be Panacea," August 26, 2012).

After reviewing the available research, Mayers and Redick (2012) conclude that the empirical evidence does not support the use of the battery for making return-to-play decisions. ImPACT likely serves a positive purpose by sensitizing players, coaches, and others to the dangers of repeated concussion. But as the test developers acknowledge, test results alone should never be the basis for important decisions like returning to play after head trauma.

The stakes are high for athletes and their families. In the long-term, repeated blows to the head are known to cause chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), a degenerative brain disease associated with memory loss, confusion, aggression, impulse control problems, Parkinsonian symptoms (tremor, gait abnormalities, slurred speech), and, eventually, progressive dementia (Saulle & Greenwald, 2012). Even "minor" blows to the head that do not result in serious symptoms can lead to CTE if they occur with sufficient frequency, as in boxing or football (McKee, Cantu, Nowinski, and others, 2009). In a recent post-mortem analysis of brain tissue in 85 former football players, hockey players, and military veterans, McKee, Stein, Nowinski, and others (2012) concluded that "for some athletes and war fighters, there may be severe and devastating long-term consequences of repetitive brain trauma that has traditionally been considered only mild (p. 20)." As a society, we may want to reconsider the glamorization of contact sports like football, boxing, and hockey.

SCREENING FOR ALCOHOL USE DISORDERS

The ways in which people can abuse alcohol include a spectrum of misfortune and tragedy ranging from an occasional hangover to, literally, drinking oneself to death. But clinicians and researchers generally recognize two diagnoses: alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Loosely speaking, the more generic syndrome of alcoholism refers to either diagnosis. A full discussion of these syndromes is not justified here, but a brief summary is warranted. Interestingly, neither alcohol abuse nor dependence is defined by ingestion of a particular amount of alcohol, although substantial quantities typically are involved. The criteria for alcohol abuse refer to the functional impact of drinking on the life of the patient. In particular, if an individual meets one or more of four criteria, a diagnosis of alcohol abuse is defensible. Briefly, the criteria are:

- Drinking interferes with important life responsibilities at work, home, or school.
- Drinking leads to unsafe behavior such as driving while intoxicated.
- Drinking causes persistent legal problems such as arrests for fighting.
- Drinking leads to conflict with a spouse or significant other.

In addition to meeting one or more of these criteria, the patient must not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of substance dependence, which often entails a more serious and chronic syndrome. Specifically, if a patient meets three or more of seven criteria, a diagnosis of **alcohol dependence** is warranted. Briefly, the criteria are:

- Tolerance or needing increasingly more alcohol to get the same effect.
- Withdrawal symptoms such as tremor when drinking ceases.
- Drinking in greater quantities or for longer periods than intended.
- Desire to cut down but unsuccessful efforts to control drinking.
- Spending large amounts of time using alcohol or recovering from use.
- Giving up important social, occupational, or recreational activities to drink.
- Continued use in spite of demonstrable health problems such as an ulcer.

Given the high prevalence of alcohol use disorders in the United States, it is nearly inevitable

that psychologists and other clinicians will encounter patients who experience problems in this spectrum. Fortunately, there are several simple devices useful for screening and assessment, which we review here. In some cases, these tools are pristinely simple and consist of the clinician casually asking a handful of "yes-no" questions. In other cases, a more traditional paper-and-pencil questionnaire is needed.

The CAGE questionnaire is a short screening instrument that consists of the practitioner asking if the client has thought about Cutting down on drinking, become Annoyed by criticism of his or her drinking, felt Guilty about his or her drinking, or had an Eye-opener drink in the morning. A simple "yes–no" question pertinent to each symptom is asked as part of a general health history. The exact wording of this copyrighted instrument can be found in Ewing (1984). The endorsement of even a single item suggests the presence of an alcohol use disorder, whereas saying "yes" to two or more items virtually guarantees that the patient will meet the criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence. Research indicates that the tool is more effective when it is not preceded by questions about how much or how often the patient drinks (Steinweg & Worth, 1993). Apparently, questions about quantity and frequency trigger denial in the patient, making accurate assessment nearly impossible. The CAGE questionnaire has proved valuable as a screening tool in numerous locations, including general psychological practice and medical settings. In one study of a "walk-in" or immediate-care Veterans hospital clinic, the test correctly identified 86 percent of patients later confirmed to have alcoholism and accurately ruled out 93 percent of patients later confirmed not to have alcohol problems. Astonishingly, the prevalence rate for alcoholism was determined to be 22 percent for this largely male clinic population (Liskow, Campbell, Nickel, & Powell, 1995).

A recent epidemiological study conducted in and around Paris, France, casts doubt on the usefulness of the CAGE test as a screening device for alcoholism (Messiah, et al., 2007). In 2005, the researchers conducted a follow-up to a 1991 study of 1,991 participant responses to the Cut-down, Annoyed, Guilt, and Eye-opener (CAGE) questionnaire through telephone interview of 5,382 residents. The time period in question, 1991 to 2005, was an era in which alcohol consumption was known to be in decline, so it was surprising to the researchers when they found that the percentage of respondents endorsing each of the symptoms had increased substantially. In fact, the magnitude of the paradoxical increase astonished the researchers. For example, when asked whether they had thought about cutting down on their drinking, the percentage of respondents who answered "yes" increased from 4.3 percent in 1991 to 16.6 percent in 2005. The researchers speculate that the results might indicate the emergence of a temperance movement in France. Whether or not this is true, the findings most certainly cast doubt on the value of the CAGE in general population surveys.

Some researchers find that the CAGE questionnaire is more effective for screening with men than women (Cherpitel, 2002). In response to this shortcoming, a similar instrument called the TWEAK questionnaire was developed specifically for women. The acronym refers to Tolerance for drinking, Worried friends or relatives, Eye-opener to get going in the morning, Amnesia for things done or said while drinking, and feeling the need to Kut down on intake (Russell, Martier, Sokol, and others, 1994). TWEAK is scored on a 7-point scale, with the first two items earning two points each, the last three items earning one point each. A total score of two or more points indicates the likelihood of an alcohol problem. TWEAK is highly accurate in screening for alcohol problems in women (Bradley, Boyd-Wickizer, Powell, & Burman, 1998).

CAGE and TWEAK are by no means the only acronymic screening tools for alcohol problems. Other instruments include the five-item RAPS questionnaire or Rapid Alcohol Problems Screen (Cherpitel, 1995) and the 10-item AUDIT questionnaire or Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (Saunders, Aasland, Babor, and others, 1993). A huge amount of effort was invested in the development and validation of the AUDIT questionnaire. Research on this instrument was underwritten by the World Health Organization (WHO), and the scale has been translated into many languages.

Dozens of additional screening tests could be mentioned, but we want to close this section by reviewing an interesting scale that embodies some appealing methods of test construction. The Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory-3 or SASSI-3 (Miller, Roberts, Brooks, & Lazowski, 1997) consists of two types of questions: obvious and subtle. The obvious questions include 26 behaviors that are endorsed on a 4-point Likert-type continuum ranging from *never* to *repeatedly*. These questions embody high face validity and are on a par with "I have taken drugs to improve how I feel" and "I have had more to drink than I planned." The subtle questions consist of 67 true–false items that are more indirect and indicative of the attitudes and behaviors that commonly accompany substance abuse. These questions are on par with "I probably break the law more than others" and "I tend to be a responsible person" [reverse scored]. Both types of items—obvious and subtle—were carefully validated during test construction.

Test construction consisted of administering a large group of preliminary items to three groups of individuals: substance abusers, non–substance abusers, and substance abusers instructed to "fake good." The SASSI-3 emerged after this large pool of items was winnowed down to a smaller number, based on group contrasts. The resulting instrument includes the direct items—those that discriminated substance abusers from non–substance abusers, and the indirect items—those that discriminated the "fake-good" substance abusers from non–substance abusers. In addition to the adult scale, an adolescent version now has been published, and the instrument is available for supervised online administration. A Spanish version also is available.

The test developers report excellent reliability for the SASSI-3, with two-week test–retest stability coefficients for 40 respondents ranging from .92 to 1.00 for the subscales and coefficient alpha of .93 for the test overall. A validity study of 419 respondents revealed a 95 percent rate of correct classification for substance abusers and a 93 percent correct classification rate for non–substance abusers—very impressive results for a short screening test (Miller & Lazowski, 1999). Laux, Salyers, and Kotova (2005) found strong test-retest reliability with the SASSI-3 in a sample of 103 college students, reporting $r = .94$ over a one-week period. Feldstein and Miller (2007) reviewed 36 studies on all editions of the SASSI and weigh in skeptically, citing high rates of false positives. They propose that public domain instruments (e.g., CAGE, AUDIT) perform just as well and have the added advantage of being free.

The SASSI-3 appears to be a capable tool. Yet, given the frequency of its use—the instrument has been administered *millions* of times—it is disconcerting that few independent studies have been published (Gray, 2001). A search of PsychInfo yielded only 15 studies on the test, and the majority of these were unpublished doctoral dissertations. More research is needed to corroborate the value of this promising inventory.

Mini-Mental State Exam

The most widely used mental status tool with the elderly is the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), a 5- to 10-minute screening test that yields an objective global index of cognitive functioning (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Tombaugh, McDowell, Kristjansson, & Hubley, 1996). The test contains 30 scorable items having to do with orientation, immediate memory, attention, calculation, language production, language comprehension, and design copying. The items are so easy that normal adults almost always obtain scores in the range of 27 to 30 points (Figure 10.9).

The reliability of this simple instrument is excellent. Folstein et al. (1975) report a 24-hour test-retest reliability of .89 for 22 patients with varied depressive symptoms. Reliability over a 28-day period for 23 clinically stable patients with diagnoses of dementia, depression, and schizophrenia was an impressive .99. Normative data are available from several sources (e.g., Lindal & Stefansson, 1993; Tombaugh, McDowell, Kristjansson, & Hubley, 1996).

Using a cutting score of 23 or below as abnormal and 24 or above as normal, the MMSE is about 80 to 90 percent accurate in identifying elderly patients

5	Orientation to Time (day, date, month, season, and year)
5	Orientation to Place (floor, building, city area, city, state)
3	Immediate Memory (three words presented orally)
5	Attention and Calculation (serial 7s, five subtractions)
3	Delayed Recall (three words presented orally above)
2	Naming (pencil and watch)
1	Repetition (brief sentence presented orally)
3	Comprehension (follow simple three-part oral command)
1	Reading (read simple command and obey)
1	Writing (compose a simple sentence)
1	Drawing (reproduce two intersecting pentagons)
30	Total

FIGURE 10.9 **Scoring Weights and Domains of the Mini-Mental State Examination**

with suspected Alzheimer's disease or other dementia. This cutting score produces few false-positives (normal patients classified as having dementia). The sensitivity of the instrument depends on a number of factors, including the cutting score used, the educational level of the examinee, the extent of the dementia, the nature of the underlying pathology, and the type of setting in which assessments are undertaken (Anthony, LeResche, Niaz, Von Korff, & Folstein, 1982; Tombaugh, McDowell, Kristjansson, & Hubley, 1996; Tsai & Tsuang, 1979). In spite of its limitations, the MMSE remains the most reliable and practical screening test for dementia in the elderly (Ferris, 1992). Drebing, Van Gorp, Stuck, and others (1994) recommend its use as part of a short screening battery for cognitive decline in the elderly.

Research on the MMSE continues unabated. A search of PsychINFO for articles with "MMSE" in the title yielded 128 hits with 27 of them published since 2010. A final caution is worth mentioning. The MMSE has become so popular that some practitioners use MMSE total scores as a shortcut toward a diagnosis of dementia (Nieuwenhuis-Mark, 2010). Tests should never be used as a substitute for clinical judgment.

CHAPTER 11

Industrial, Occupational, and Career Assessment

TOPIC 11A Industrial and Organizational Assessment

The Role of Testing in Personnel Selection
Autobiographical Data
The Employment Interview
Cognitive Ability Tests
Personality Tests
Paper-and-Pencil Integrity Tests
Work Sample and Situational Exercises
Appraisal of Work Performance
Approaches to Performance Appraisal
Sources of Error in Performance Appraisal

In this chapter we explore the specialized applications of testing within two distinctive environments—occupational settings and vocational settings. Although disparate in many respects, these two fields of assessment share essential features. For example, legal guidelines exert a powerful and constraining influence upon the practice of testing in both arenas. Moreover, issues of empirical validation of methods are especially pertinent in occupational and areas of practice. In Topic 11A, Industrial and Organizational Assessment, we review the role of psychological tests in making decisions about personnel such as hiring, placement, promotion, and evaluation. In Topic 11B, Assessment for Career Development in a Global Economy, we analyze the unique challenges encountered by vocational psychologists who provide career guidance and assessment. Of course, relevant tests are surveyed and catalogued throughout. But more important, we focus upon the special issues and challenges encountered within these distinctive milieus.

Industrial and organizational psychology (I/O psychology) is the subspecialty of psychology that deals with behavior in work situations (Borman, Ilgen, Klimoski, & Weiner, 2003). In its broadest sense, I/O psychology includes diverse applications in business, advertising, and the military. For example, corporations typically consult I/O psychologists to help design and evaluate hiring procedures; businesses may ask I/O psychologists to appraise the effectiveness of advertising; and military leaders rely heavily upon I/O psychologists in the testing and placement

of recruits. Psychological testing in the service of decision making about personnel is, thus, a prominent focus of this profession. Of course, specialists in I/O psychology possess broad skills and often handle many corporate responsibilities not previously mentioned. Nonetheless, there is no denying the centrality of assessment to their profession.

We begin our review of assessment in the occupational arena by surveying the role of testing in personnel selection. This is followed by a discussion of ways that psychological measurement is used in the appraisal of work performance.

THE ROLE OF TESTING IN PERSONNEL SELECTION

Complexities of Personnel Selection

Based upon the assumption that psychological tests and assessments can provide valuable information about potential job performance, many businesses, corporations, and military settings have used test scores and assessment results for personnel selection. As Guion (1998) has noted, I/O research on personnel selection has emphasized criterion-related validity as opposed to content or construct validity. These other approaches to validity are certainly relevant but usually take a back seat to criterion-related validity, which preaches that current assessment results must predict the future criterion of job performance.

From the standpoint of criterion-related validity, the logic of personnel selection is seductively simple. Whether in a large corporation or a small business, those who select employees should use tests or assessments that have documented, strong correlations with the criterion of job performance, and then hire the individuals who obtain the highest test scores or show the strongest assessment results. What could be simpler than that?

Unfortunately, the real-world application of employment selection procedures is fraught with psychometric complexities and legal pitfalls. The psychometric intricacies arise, in large measure, from the fact that job behavior is rarely simple, unidimensional behavior. There are some exceptions (such as assembly-line production) but the general rule in our postindustrial society is that job behavior is complex, multidimensional behavior. Even jobs that seem simple may be highly complex. For example, consider what is required for effective performance in the delivery of the U.S. mail. The individual who delivers your mail six days a week must do more than merely place it in your mailbox. He or she must accurately sort mail on the run, interpret and enforce government regulations about package size, manage pesky and even dangerous animals, recognize and avoid physical dangers, and exercise effective interpersonal skills in dealing with the public, to cite just a few of the complexities of this position.

Personnel selection is, therefore, a fuzzy, conditional, and uncertain task. Guion (1991) has highlighted the difficulty in predicting complex behavior from simple tests. For one thing, complex behavior is, in part, a function of the situation. This means that even an optimal selection approach may not be valid for all candidates. Quite clearly, personnel selection is not a simple matter of administering tests and consulting cutoff scores.

We must also acknowledge the profound impact of legal and regulatory edicts upon I/O testing practices. Given that such practices may have weighty consequences—determining who is hired or promoted, for example—it is not surprising to learn that I/O testing practices are rigorously constrained by legal precedents and regulatory mandates. These topics are reviewed in Topic 12A, Psychological Testing and the Law.

Approaches to Personnel Selection

Acknowledging that the interview is a widely used form of personnel assessment, it is safe to conclude that psychological assessment is almost a universal practice in hiring decisions. Even by a narrow definition that includes only paper-and-pencil measures, at least two-thirds of the companies in the United States engage in personnel testing (Schmitt & Robertson, 1990). For purposes of personnel selection, the I/O psychologist may recommend one or more of the following:

- Autobiographical data
- Employment interview

- Cognitive ability tests
- Personality, temperament, and motivation tests
- Paper-and-pencil integrity tests
- Sensory, physical, and dexterity tests
- Work sample and situational tests

We turn now to a brief survey of typical tests and assessment approaches within each of these categories. We close this topic with a discussion of legal issues in personnel testing.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL DATA

According to Owens (1976), application forms that request personal and work history as well as demographic data such as age and marital status have been used in industry since at least 1894. Objective or scorable autobiographical data—sometimes called **biodata**—are typically secured by means of a structured form variously referred to as a biographical information blank, biographical data form, application blank, interview guide, individual background survey, or similar device. Although the lay public may not recognize these devices as true tests with predictive power, I/O psychologists have known for some time that biodata furnish an exceptionally powerful basis for the prediction of employee performance (Cascio, 1976; Ghiselli, 1966; Hunter & Hunter, 1984). An important milestone in the biodata approach is the publication of the *Biodata Handbook,* a thorough survey of the use of biographical information in selection and the prediction of performance (Stokes, Mumford, & Owens, 1994).

The rationale for the biodata approach is that future work-related behavior can be predicted from past choices and accomplishments. Biodata have predictive power because certain character traits that are essential for success also are stable and enduring. The consistently ambitious youth with accolades and accomplishments in high school is likely to continue this pattern into adulthood. Thus, the job applicant who served as editor of the high school newspaper—and who answers a biodata item to this effect—is probably a better candidate for corporate management than the applicant who reports no extracurricular activities on a biodata form.

The Nature of Biodata

Biodata items usually call for "factual" data; however, items that tap attitudes, feelings, and value judgments are sometimes included. Except for demographic data such as age and marital status, biodata items always refer to past accomplishments and events. Some examples of biodata items are listed in Table 11.1.

Once biodata are collected, the I/O psychologist must devise a means for predicting job performance from this information. The most common strategy is a form of empirical keying not unlike that used in personality testing. From a large sample of workers who are already hired, the I/O psychologist designates a successful group and an unsuccessful group, based on performance, tenure, salary, or supervisor ratings. Individual biodata items are then contrasted for these two groups to determine which items most accurately discriminate between successful and unsuccessful workers. Items that are strongly discriminative are assigned large weights in the scoring scheme. New applicants who respond to items in the keyed direction,

TABLE 11.1 Examples of Biodata Questions

How long have you lived at your present address?
What is your highest educational degree?
How old were you when you obtained your first paying job?
How many books (not work related) did you read last month?
At what age did you get your driver's license?
In high school, did you hold a class office?
How punctual are you in arriving at work?
What job do you think you will hold in 10 years?
How many hours do you watch television in a typical week?
Have you ever been fired from a job?
How many hours a week do you spend on hobbies?
How many job projects did you manage in the last year?
In college, did you participate in a sports team?
How many hours per month do you volunteer?
What is your attitude toward others who use marijuana?

therefore, receive high scores on the biodata instrument and are predicted to succeed. Cross validation of the scoring scheme on a second sample of successful and unsuccessful workers is a crucial step in guaranteeing the validity of the biodata selection method. Readers who wish to pursue the details of empirical scoring methods for biodata instruments should consult Murphy and Davidshofer (2004), Mount, Witt, and Barrick (2000), and Stokes and Cooper (2001).

The Validity of Biodata

The validity of biodata has been surveyed by several reviewers, with generally positive findings (Breaugh, 2009; Stokes et al., 1994; Stokes & Cooper, 2004). An early study by Cascio (1976) is typical of the findings. He used a very simple biodata instrument—a weighted combination of 10 application blank items—to predict turnover for female clerical personnel in a medium-sized insurance company. The cross-validated correlations between biodata score and length of tenure were .58 for minorities and .56 for nonminorities.[1] Drakeley et al. (1988) compared biodata and cognitive ability tests as predictors of training success. Biodata scores possessed the same predictive validity as the cognitive tests. Furthermore, when added to the regression equation, the biodata information improved the predictive accuracy of the cognitive tests.

In an extensive research survey, Reilly and Chao (1982) compared eight selection procedures as to validity and adverse impact on minorities. The procedures were biodata, peer evaluation, interviews, self-assessments, reference checks, academic achievement, expert judgment, and projective techniques. Noting that properly standardized ability tests provide the fairest and most valid selection procedure, Reilly and Chao (1982) concluded that only biodata and peer evaluations had validities substantially equal to those of standardized tests. For example, in the prediction of sales productivity, the average validity coefficient of biodata was a very healthy .62.

Certain cautions need to be mentioned with respect to biodata approaches in personnel selection. Employers may be prohibited by law from asking questions about age, race, sex, religion, and other personal issues—even when such biodata can be shown empirically to predict job performance. Also, even though the incidence of faking is very low, there is no doubt that shrewd respondents can falsify results in a favorable direction. For example, Schmitt and Kunce (2002) addressed the concern that some examinees might distort their answers to biodata items in a socially desirable direction. These researchers compared the scores obtained when examinees were asked to elaborate their biodata responses versus when they were not. Requiring elaborated answers reduced the scores on biodata items; that is, it appears that respondents were more truthful when asked to provide corroborating details to their written responses.

Recently, Levashina, Morgeson, and Campion (2012) proved the same point in a large scale, high-stakes selection project with 16,304 applicants for employment. Biodata constituted a significant portion of the selection procedure. The researchers used the response elaboration technique (RET), which obliges job applicants to provide written elaborations of their responses. Perhaps an example will help. A naked, unadorned biodata question might ask:

- How many times in the last 12 months did you develop novel solutions to a work problem in your area of responsibility?

Most likely, a higher number would indicate greater creativity and empirically predict superior work productivity. The score on this item would be combined with others to produce an overall biodata score used in personnel selection. But notice that nothing prevents the respondent from exaggeration or outright

[1]The curious reader may wish to know which 10 biodata items could possess such predictive power. The items were age, marital status, children's age, education, tenure on previous job, previous salary, friend or relative in company, location of residence, home ownership, and length of time at present address. Unfortunately, Cascio (1976) does not reveal the relative weights or direction of scoring for the items.

lying. Now, consider the original question with the addition of response elaboration:

- How many times in the last 12 months did you develop novel solutions to a work problem in your area of responsibility?
- For each circumstance, please provide specific details as to the problem and your solution.

Levashina et al. (2012) found that using the RET technique produced more honest and realistic biodata scores. Further, for those items possessing the potential for external verification, responses were even more realistic. The researchers conclude that RET decreases faking because it increases accountability.

As with any measurement instrument, biodata items will need periodic restandardization. Finally, a potential drawback to the biodata approach is that, by its nature, this method captures the organizational status quo and might, therefore, squelch innovation. Becker and Colquitt (1992) discuss precautions in the development of biodata forms.

The use of biodata in personnel selection appears to be on the rise. Some corporations rely on biodata almost to the exclusion of other approaches in screening applicants. The software giant Google is a case in point. In years past, the company used traditional methods such as hiring candidates from top schools who earned the best grades. But that tactic now is used rarely in industry. Instead, many corporations like Google are moving toward automated systems that collect biodata from the many thousands of applicants processed each year. Using online surveys, these companies ask applicants to provide personal details about accomplishments, attitudes, and behaviors as far back as high school. Questions can be quite detailed, such as whether the applicant has ever published a book, received a patent, or started a club. Formulas are then used to compute a score from 0 to 100, designed to predict the degree to fit with corporate culture (Ottinger & Kurzon, 2007). The system works well for Google, which claims to have only a 4 percent turnover rate.

There is little doubt, then, that purely objective biodata information can predict aspects of job performance with fair accuracy. However, employers are perhaps more likely to rely upon subjective information such as interview impressions when making decisions about hiring. We turn now to research on the validity of the employment interview in the selection process.

THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW

The employment interview is usually only one part of the evaluation process, but many administrators regard it as the vital make-or-break component of hiring. It is not unusual for companies to interview from 5 to 20 individuals for each person hired! Considering the importance of the interview and its huge costs to industry and the professions, it is not surprising to learn that thousands of studies address the reliability and validity of the interview. We can only highlight a few trends here; more detailed reviews can be found in Conway, Jako, and Goodman (1995), Huffcutt (2007), Guion (1998), and Schmidt and Zimmerman (2004).

Early studies of interview reliability were quite sobering. In various studies and reviews, reliability was typically assessed by correlating evaluations of different interviewers who had access to the same job candidates (Wagner, 1949; Ulrich & Trumbo, 1965). The interrater reliability from dozens of these early studies was typically in the mid-.50s, much too low to provide accurate assessments of job candidates. This research also revealed that interviewers were prone to halo bias and other distorting influences upon their perceptions of candidates. *Halo bias*—discussed in the next topic—is the tendency to rate a candidate high or low on all dimensions because of a global impression.

Later, researchers discovered that interview reliability could be increased substantially if the interview was jointly conducted by a panel instead of a single interviewer (Landy, 1996). In addition, structured interviews in which each candidate was asked the same questions by each interviewer also proved to be much more reliable than unstructured interviews (Borman, Hanson, & Hedge, 1997; Campion, Pursell, & Brown, 1988). In these studies, reliabilities in the .70s and higher were found.

Research on validity of the interview has followed the same evolutionary course noted for reliability: Early research that examined unstructured

interviews was quite pessimistic, while later research using structured approaches produced more promising findings. In these studies, interview validity was typically assessed by correlating interview judgments with some measure of on-the-job performance. Early studies of interview validity yielded almost uniformly dismal results, with typical validity coefficients hovering in the mid-.20s (Arvey & Campion, 1982).

Mindful that interviews are seldom used in isolation, early researchers also investigated incremental validity, which is the potential increase in validity when the interview is used in conjunction with other information. These studies were predicated on the optimistic assumption that the interview would contribute positively to candidate evaluation when used alongside objective test scores and background data. Unfortunately, the initial findings were almost entirely unsupportive (Landy, 1996).

In some instances, attempts to prove incremental validity of the interview demonstrated just the opposite, what might be called decremental validity. For example, Kelly and Fiske (1951) established that interview information actually decreased the validity of graduate student evaluations. In this early and classic study, the task was to predict the academic performance of more than 500 graduate students in psychology. Various combinations of credentials (a form of biodata), objective test scores, and interview were used as the basis for clinical predictions of academic performance. The validity coefficients are reported in Table 11.2. The reader will notice that credentials alone provided a much better basis for prediction than credentials plus a one-hour interview. The best predictions were based upon credentials and objective test scores; adding a two-hour interview to this information actually decreased the accuracy of predictions. These findings highlighted the superiority of actuarial prediction (based on empirically derived formulas) over clinical prediction (based on subjective impressions). We pursue the actuarial versus clinical debate in the last chapter of this text.

Studies using carefully structured interviews, including situational interviews, provide a more positive picture of interview validity (Borman, Hanson, & Hedge, 1997; Maurer & Fay, 1988; Schmitt & Robertson, 1990). When the findings are corrected for restriction of range and unreliability of job performance ratings, the mean validity coefficient for structured interviews turns out to be an impressive .63 (Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988). A meta-analysis by Conway, Jako, and Goodman (1995) concluded that the upper limit for the validity coefficient of structured interviews was .67, whereas for unstructured interviews the validity coefficient was only .34. Additional reasons for preferring structured interviews include their legal defensibility in the event of litigation (Williamson, Campion, Malo, and others, 1997) and, surprisingly, their minimal bias across different racial groups of applicants (Huffcutt & Roth, 1998).

TABLE 11.2 Validity Coefficients for Ratings Based on Various Combinations of Information

Basis for Rating	*Correlation with Academic Performance*
Credentials alone	.26
Credentials and one-hour interview	.13
Credentials and objective test scores	.36
Credentials, test scores, and two-hour interview	.32

Source: Based on data in Kelly, E. L., & Fiske, D. W. (1951). *The prediction of performance in clinical psychology*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

In order to reach acceptable levels of reliability and validity, structured interviews must be designed with painstaking care. Consider the protocol used by Motowidlo et al. (1992) in their research on structured interviews for management and marketing positions in eight telecommunications companies. Their interview format was based upon a careful analysis of critical incidents in marketing and management. Prospective employees were asked a set of standard questions about how they had handled past situations similar to these critical incidents. Interviewers were trained to ask discretionary probing questions for details about how the applicants handled these situations. Throughout, the interviewers took copious notes. Applicants were then rated

on scales anchored with behavioral illustrations. Finally, these ratings were combined to yield a total interview score used in selection decisions.

In summary, under carefully designed conditions, the interview can provide a reliable and valid basis for personnel selection. However, as noted by Schmitt and Robertson (1990), the prerequisite conditions for interview validity are not always available. Guion (1998) has expressed the same point:

> A large body of research on interviewing has, in my opinion, given too little practical information about how to structure an interview, how to conduct it, and how to use it as an assessment device. I think I know from the research that (a) interviews can be valid, (b) for validity they require structuring and standardization, (c) that structure, like many other things, can be carried too far, (d) that without carefully planned structure (and maybe even with it) interviewers talk too much, and (e) that the interviews made routinely in nearly every organization could be vastly improved if interviewers were aware of and used these conclusions. There is more to be learned and applied. (p. 624)

The essential problem is that each interviewer may evaluate only a small number of applicants, so that standardization of interviewer ratings is not always realistic. While the interview is potentially valid as a selection technique, in its common, unstructured application there is probably substantial reason for concern.

Why are interviews used? If the typical, unstructured interview is so unreliable and ineffectual a basis for job candidate evaluation, why do administrators continue to value interviews so highly? In their review of the employment interview, Arvey and Campion (1982) outline several reasons for the persistence of the interview, including practical considerations such as the need to sell the candidate on the job, and social reasons such as the susceptibility of interviewers to the illusion of personal validity. Others have emphasized the importance of the interview for assessing a good fit between applicant and organization (Adams, Elacqua, & Colarelli, 1994; Latham & Skarlicki, 1995).

It is difficult to imagine that most employers would ever eliminate entirely the interview from the screening and selection process. After all, the interview does serve the simple human need of meeting the persons who might be hired. However, based on 50 years worth of research, it is evident that biodata and objective tests often provide a more powerful basis for candidate evaluation and selection than unstructured interviews.

One interview component that has received recent attention is the impact of the handshake on subsequent ratings of job candidates. Stewart, Dustin, Barrick, and Darnold (2008) used simulated hiring interviews to investigate the commonly held conviction that a firm handshake bears a critical nonverbal influence on impressions formed during the employment interview. Briefly, 98 undergraduates underwent realistic job interviews during which their handshakes were surreptitiously rated on 5-point scales for grip strength, completeness, duration, and vigor; degree of eye contact during the handshake also was rated. Independent ratings were completed at different times by five individuals involved in the process. Real human-resources professionals conducted the interviews and then offered simulated hiring recommendations. The professionals shook hands with the candidates but were not asked to provide handshake ratings because this would have cued them to the purposes of the study. This is the barest outline of this complex investigation. The big picture that emerged was that the quality of the handshake was positively related to hiring recommendations. Further, women benefited more than men from a strong handshake. The researchers conclude their study with these thoughts:

> The handshake is thought to have originated in medieval Europe as a way for kings and knights to show that they did not intend to harm each other and possessed no concealed weapons (Hall & Hall, 1983). The results presented in this study show that this age-old social custom has an important place in modern business interactions. Although the handshake may appear to be a business formality, it can indeed communicate critical information and influence interviewer assessments. (p. 1145)

Perhaps this study will provide an impetus for additional investigation of this important component of the job interview.

Barrick, Swider, and Stewart (2010) make the general case that initial impressions formed in the first few seconds or minutes of the employment interview significantly influence the final outcomes. They cite the social psychology literature to argue that initial impressions are nearly instinctual and based on evolutionary mechanisms that aid survival. Handshake, smile, grooming, manner of dress—the interviewer gauges these as favorable (or not) almost instantaneously. The purpose of their study was to examine whether these "fast and frugal" judgments formed in the first few seconds or minutes even before the "real" interview begins affect interview outcomes. Participants for their research were 189 undergraduate students in a program for professional accountants. The students were preinterviewed for just 2–3 minutes by trained graduate students for purposes of rapport building, before a more thorough structured mock interview was conducted. After the brief pre-interview, the graduate interviewers filled out a short rating scale on liking for the candidate, the candidate's competence, and perceived "personal" similarity. The interviewers then conducted a full structured interview and filled out ratings. Weeks after these mock interviews, participants engaged in real interviews with four major accounting firms (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) to determine whether they would receive an offer of an internship. Just over half of the students received an offer. Candidates who made better first impressions during the initial pre-interview (that lasted just 2–3 minutes) received more internship offers ($r = .22$) and higher interviewer ratings ($r = .42$). In sum, initial impressions in the employment interview do matter.

COGNITIVE ABILITY TESTS

Cognitive ability can refer either to a general construct akin to intelligence or to a variety of specific constructs such as verbal skills, numerical ability, spatial perception, or perceptual speed (Kline, 1999). Tests of general cognitive ability and measures of specific cognitive skills have many applications in personnel selection, evaluation, and screening. Such tests are quick, inexpensive, and easy to interpret.

A vast body of empirical research offers strong support for the validity of standardized cognitive ability tests in personnel selection. For example, Bertua, Anderson, and Salgado (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 283 independent employee samples in the United Kingdom. They found that general mental ability as well as specific ability tests (verbal, numerical, perceptual, and spatial) are valid predictors of job performance and training success, with validity coefficients in the magnitude of .5 to .6. Surveying a large number of studies and employment settings, Kuncel and Hezlett (2010) summarized correlations between cognitive ability and seven measures of work performance as follows:

Job performance, high complexity:	.58
Job performance, medium complexity:	.52
Job performance, low complexity:	.40
Training success, civilian:	.55
Training success, military:	.62
Objective leader effectiveness:	.33
Creativity:	.37

Beyond a doubt, there is merit in the use of cognitive ability tests for personnel selection.

Even so, a significant concern with the use of cognitive ability tests for personnel selection is that these instruments may result in an adverse impact on minority groups. *Adverse impact* is a legal term (discussed later in this chapter) referring to the disproportionate selection of white candidates over minority candidates. Most authorities in personnel psychology recognize that cognitive tests play an essential role in applicant selection; nonetheless, these experts also affirm that cognitive tests provide maximum benefit (and minimum adverse impact) when combined with other approaches such as biodata. Selection decisions never should be made exclusively on the basis of cognitive test results (Robertson & Smith, 2001).

An ongoing debate within I/O psychology is whether employment testing is best accomplished with highly specific ability tests or with measures of general cognitive ability. The weight of the evidence seems to support the conclusion that a general factor of intelligence (the so-called *g* factor) is usually

a better predictor of training and job success than are scores on specific cognitive measures—even when several specific cognitive measures are used in combination. Of course, this conclusion runs counter to common sense and anecdotal evidence. For example, Kline (1993) offers the following vignette:

> The point is that the *g* factors are important but so also are these other factors. For example, high *g* is necessary to be a good engineer and to be a good journalist. However for the former high spatial ability is also required, a factor which confers little advantage on a journalist. For her or him, however, high verbal ability is obviously useful.

Curiously, empirical research provides only mixed support for this position (Gottfredson, 1986; Larson & Wolfe, 1995; Ree, Earles, & Teachout, 1994). Although the topic continues to be debated, most studies support the primacy of *g* in personnel selection (Borman et al., 1997; Schmidt, 2002). Perhaps the reason that *g* usually works better than specific cognitive factors in predicting job performance is that most jobs are factorially complex in their requirements, stereotypes notwithstanding (Guion, 1998). For example, the successful engineer must explain his or her ideas to others and so needs verbal ability as well as spatial skills. Since measures of general cognitive ability tap many specific cognitive skills, a general test often predicts performance in complex jobs as well as, or better than, measures of specific skills.

Literally hundreds of cognitive ability tests are available for personnel selection, so it is not feasible to survey the entire range of instruments here. Instead, we will highlight three representative tests: one that measures general cognitive ability, a second that is germane to assessment of mechanical abilities, and a third that taps a highly specific facet of clerical work. The three instruments chosen for review—the Wonderlic Personnel Test-Revised, the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test, and the Minnesota Clerical Test—are merely exemplars of the hundreds of cognitive ability tests available for personnel selection. All three tests are often used in business settings and, therefore, worthy of specific mention. Representative cognitive ability tests encountered in personnel selection are listed in Table 11.3. Some classic viewpoints on cognitive ability testing for personnel selection are found in Ghiselli (1966), Hunter and Hunter (1984), and Reilly and Chao (1982). More recent discussion of this issue is provided by Borman et al. (1997), Guion (1998), and Schmidt (2002).

TABLE 11.3 Representative Cognitive Ability Tests Used in Personnel Selection

General Ability Tests
Shipley Institute of Living Scale
Wonderlic Personnel Test-Revised
Wesman Personnel Classification Test
Personnel Tests for Industry
Multiple Aptitude Test Batteries
General Aptitude Test Battery
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
Differential Aptitude Test
Employee Aptitude Survey
Mechanical Aptitude Tests
Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test
Minnesota Spatial Relations Test
Revised Minnesota Paper Form Board Test
SRA Mechanical Aptitudes
Motor Ability Tests
Crawford Small Parts Dexterity Test
Purdue Pegboard
Hand-Tool Dexterity Test
Stromberg Dexterity Test
Clerical Tests
Minnesota Clerical Test
Clerical Abilities Battery
General Clerical Test
SRA Clerical Aptitudes

Note: SRA denotes Science Research Associates. These tests are reviewed in the *Mental Measurements Yearbook* series.

Wonderlic Personnel Test-Revised

Even though it is described as a personnel test, the Wonderlic Personnel Test-Revised (WPT-R) is

really a group test of general mental ability (Hunter, 1989; Wonderlic, 1983). The revised version was released in 2007 and is now named the Wonderlic Contemporary Cognitive Ability Test. We refer to it as the WPT-R here. What makes this instrument somewhat of an institution in personnel testing is its format (50 multiple-choice items), its brevity (a 12-minute time limit), and its numerous parallel forms (16 at last count). Item types on the Wonderlic are quite varied and include vocabulary, sentence rearrangement, arithmetic problem solving, logical induction, and interpretation of proverbs. The following items capture the flavor of the Wonderlic:

1. REGRESS is the opposite of
   (a) ingest (b) advance
   (c) close (d) open
2. Two men buy a car which costs $550; X pays $50 more than Y. How much did X pay?
   (a) $500 (b) $300 (c) $400 (d) $275
3. HEFT CLEFT—Do these words have
   (a) similar meaning (b) opposite meaning
   (c) neither similar nor opposite meaning

The reliability of the WPT-R is quite impressive, especially considering the brevity of the instrument. Internal consistency reliabilities typically reach .90, while alternative-form reliabilities usually exceed .90. Normative data are available on hundreds of thousands of adults and hundreds of occupations. Regarding validity, if the WPT-R is considered a brief test of general mental ability, the findings are quite positive (Dodrill & Warner, 1988). For example, Dodrill (1981) reports a correlation of .91 between scores on the original WPT and scores on the WAIS. This correlation is as high as that found between any two mainstream tests of general intelligence. Bell, Matthews, Lassister, and Leverett (2002) reported strong congruence between the WPT and the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test in a sample of adults. Hawkins, Faraone, Pepple, Seidman, and Tsuang (1990) report a similar correlation ($r = .92$) between WPT and WAIS-R IQ for 18 chronically ill psychiatric patients. However, in their study, one subject was unable to manage the format of the WPT, suggesting that severe visuospatial impairment can invalidate the test.

Another concern about the Wonderlic is that examinees whose native language is not English will be unfairly penalized on the test (Belcher, 1992). The Wonderlic is a speeded test. In fact, it has such a heavy reliance on speed that points are added for subjects aged 30 and older to compensate for the well-known decrement in speed that accompanies normal aging. However, no accommodation is made for nonnative English speakers who might also perform more slowly. One solution to the various issues of fairness cited would be to provide norms for untimed performance on the Wonderlic. However, the publishers have resisted this suggestion.

Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test

In many trades and occupations, the understanding of mechanical principles is a prerequisite to successful performance. Automotive mechanics, plumbers, mechanical engineers, trade school applicants, and persons in many other "hands-on" vocations need to comprehend basic mechanical principles in order to succeed in their fields. In these cases, a useful instrument for occupational testing is the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test (BMCT). This test consists of pictures about which the examinee must answer straightforward questions. The situations depicted emphasize basic mechanical principles that might be encountered in everyday life. For example, a series of belts and flywheels might be depicted, and the examinee would be asked to discern the relative revolutions per minute of two flywheels. The test includes two equivalent forms (S and T).

The BMCT has been widely used since World War II for military and civilian testing, so an extensive body of technical and validity data exist for this instrument. Split-half reliability coefficients range from the .80s to the low .90s. Comprehensive normative data are provided for several groups. Based on a huge body of earlier research, the concurrent and predictive validity of the BMCT appear to be well established (Wing, 1992). For example, in one study with 175 employees, the correlation between

the BMCT and the DAT Mechanical Reasoning subtest was an impressive .80. An intriguing finding is that the test proved to be one of the best predictors of pilot success during World War II (Ghiselli, 1966).

In spite of its psychometric excellence, the BMCT is in need of modernization. The test looks old and many items are dated. By contemporary standards, some BMCT items are sexist or potentially offensive to minorities (Wing, 1992). The problem with dated and offensive test items is that they can subtly bias test scores. Modernization of the BMCT would be a straightforward project that could increase the acceptability of the test to women and minorities while simultaneously preserving its psychometric excellence.

Minnesota Clerical Test

The Minnesota Clerical Test (MCT), which purports to measure perceptual speed and accuracy relevant to clerical work, has remained essentially unchanged in format since its introduction in 1931, although the norms have undergone several revisions, most recently in 1979 (Andrew, Peterson, & Longstaff, 1979). The MCT is divided into two subtests: Number Comparison and Name Comparison. Each subtest consists of 100 identical and 100 dissimilar pairs of digit or letter combinations (Table 11.4). The dissimilar pairs generally differ in regard to only one digit or letter, so the comparison task is challenging. The examinee is required to check only the identical pairs, which are randomly intermixed with dissimilar pairs. The score depends predominantly upon speed, although the examinee is penalized for incorrect items (errors are subtracted from the number of correct items).

TABLE 11.4 Items Similar to Those Found on the Minnesota Clerical Test

Number Comparison

1. 3496482	———	3495482
2. 17439903	———	17439903
3. 84023971	———	84023971
4. 910386294	———	910368294

Name Comparison

1. New York Globe	———	New York Globe
2. Brownell Seed	———	Brownel Seed
3. John G. Smith	———	John G Smith
4. Daniel Gregory	———	Daniel Gregory

The reliability of the MCT is acceptable, with reported stability coefficients in the range of .81 to .87 (Andrew, Peterson, & Longstaff, 1979). The manual also reports a wealth of validity data, including some findings that are not altogether flattering. In these studies, the MCT was correlated with measures of job performance, measures of training outcome, and scores from related tests. The job performance of directory assistants, clerks, clerk-typists, and bank tellers was correlated significantly but not robustly with scores on the MCT. The MCT is also highly correlated with other tests of clerical ability.

Nonetheless, questions still remain about the validity and applicability of the MCT. Ryan (1985) notes that the manual lacks a discussion of the significant versus the nonsignificant validity studies. In addition, the MCT authors fail to provide detailed information concerning the specific attributes of the jobs, tests, and courses used as criterion measures in the reported validity studies. For this reason, it is difficult to surmise exactly what the MCT measures. Ryan (1985) complains that the 1979 norms are difficult to use because the MCT authors provide so little information on how the various norm groups were constituted. Thus, even though the revised MCT manual presents new norms for 10 vocational categories, the test user may not be sure which norm group applies to his or her setting. Because of the marked differences in performance between the norm groups, the vagueness of definition poses a significant problem to potential users of this test.

PERSONALITY TESTS

It is only in recent years, with the emergence of the "big five" approach to the measurement of personality and the development of strong measures of these five factors, that personality has proved to be a *valid* basis for employee selection, at least in some instances. In earlier times such as the 1950s into

the 1990s, personality tests were used by many in a reckless manner for personnel selection:

> Personality inventories such as the MMPI were used for many years for personnel selection—in fact, overused or misused. They were used indiscriminately to assess a candidate's personality, even when there was no established relation between test scores and job success. Soon personality inventories came under attack. (Muchinsky, 1990)

In effect, for many of these earlier uses of testing, a consultant psychologist or human resource manager would look at the personality test results of a candidate and implicitly (or explicitly) make an argument along these lines: "In my judgment people with test results like this are [or are not] a good fit for this kind of position." Sadly, there was little or no empirical support for such imperious conclusions, which basically amounted to a version of "because I said so."

Certainly early research on personality and job performance was rather sobering for many personality scales and constructs. For example, Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, and McCloy (1990) analyzed hundreds of published studies on the relationship between personality constructs and various job performance criteria. For these studies, they grouped the personality constructs into several categories (e.g., Extroversion, Affiliation, Adjustment, Agreeableness, and Dependability) and then computed the average validity coefficient for criteria of job performance (e.g., involvement, proficiency, delinquency, and substance abuse). Most of the average correlations were indistinguishable from zero! For job proficiency as the outcome criterion, the strongest relationships were found for measures of Adjustment and Dependability, both of which revealed correlations of $r = .13$ with general ratings of job proficiency. Even though statistically significant (because of the large number of clients amassed in the hundreds of studies), correlations of this magnitude are essentially useless, accounting for less than 2 percent of the variance.[2] Specific job criteria such as delinquency (e.g., neglect of work duties) and substance abuse were better predicted in specific instances. For example, measures of Adjustment correlated $r = -.43$ with delinquency, and measures of Dependability correlated $r = -.28$ with substance abuse. Of course, the negative correlations indicate an inverse relationship: higher scores on Adjustment go along with lower levels of delinquency, and higher scores on Dependability indicate lower levels of substance abuse. Apparently, it is easier to predict specific job-related criteria than to predict general job proficiency.

Beginning in the 1990s, a renewed optimism about the utility of personality tests in personnel selection began to emerge (Behling, 1998; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). The reason for this change in perspective was the emergence of the Big Five framework for research on selection, and the development of robust measures of the five constructs confirmed by this approach such as the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Evidence began to mount that personality—as conceptualized by the Big Five approach—possessed some utility for employee selection. The reader will recall from an earlier chapter that the five dimensions of this model are Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. Shuffling the first letters, the acronym OCEAN can be used to remember the elements. In place of Neuroticism (which pertains to the negative pole of this factor), some researchers use the term Emotional Stability (which describes the positive pole of the same factor) so as to achieve consistency of positive orientation among the five factors.

A meta-analysis by Hurtz and Donovan (2000) solidified Big Five personality factors as important tools in predicting job performance. These researchers located 45 studies using suitable measures of Big Five personality factors as predictors of job performance. In total, their data set was based on more than eight thousand employees, providing stable and robust findings, even though not all dimensions were measured in all studies. The researchers

[2]The strength of a correlation is indexed by squaring it, which provides the proportion of variance accounted for in one variable by knowing the value of the other variable. In this case, the square of .13 is .0169 which is 1.69 percent.

conducted multiple analyses involving different occupational categories and diverse outcome measures such as task performance, job dedication, and interpersonal facilitation. We discuss here only the most general results, namely, the operational validity for the five factors in predicting overall job performance. Operational validity refers to the correlation between personality measures and job performance, corrected for sampling error, range restriction, and unreliability of the criterion. Big Five factors and validity coefficients were as follows:

Conscientiousness	.26
Neuroticism	.13
Extraversion	.15
Agreeableness	.05
Openness to Experience	.04

Overall, Conscientiousness is the big winner in their analysis, although for some specific occupational categories, other factors were valuable (e.g., Agreeableness paid off for Customer Service personnel). Hurtz and Donovan (2000) use caution and understatement to summarize the implications of their study:

> What degree of utility do these global Big Five measures offer for predicting job performance? Overall, it appears that global measures of Conscientiousness can be expected to consistently add a small portion of explained variance in job performance across jobs and across criterion dimension. In addition, for certain jobs and for certain criterion dimensions, certain other Big Five dimensions will likely add a very small but consistent degree of explained variance. (p. 876)

In sum, people who describe themselves as reliable, organized, and hard-working (i.e., high on Conscientiousness) appear to perform better at work than those with fewer of these qualities.

For specific applications in personnel selection, certain tests are known to have greater validity than others. For example, the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) provides an accurate measure of managerial potential (Gough, 1984, 1987). Certain scales of the CPI predict overall performance of military academy students reasonably well (Blake, Potter, & Sliwak, 1993). The Inwald Personality Inventory is well validated as a preemployment screening test for law enforcement (Chibnall & Detrick, 2003; Inwald, 2008). The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory also bears mention as a selection tool for law enforcement (Selbom, Fischler, & Ben-Porath, 2007). Finally, the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI) is well validated for prediction of job performance in military, hospital, and corporate settings (Hogan, 2002). The HPI was based upon the Big Five theory of personality (see Topic 8A, Theories and the Measurement of Personality). This instrument has cross-validated criterion-related validities as high as .60 for some scales (Hogan, 1986; Hogan & Hogan, 1986).

PAPER-AND-PENCIL INTEGRITY TESTS

Several test publishers have introduced instruments designed to screen theft-prone individuals and other undesirable job candidates such as persons who are undependable or frequently absent from work (Cullen & Sackett, 2004; Wanek, 1999). We will focus on issues raised by these tests rather than detailing the merits or demerits of individual instruments. Table 11.5 lists some of the more commonly used instruments.

One problem with integrity tests is that their proprietary nature makes it difficult to scrutinize them in the same manner as traditional instruments. In most cases, scoring keys are available only to in-house psychologists, which makes independent research difficult. Nonetheless, a sizable body of research now exists on integrity tests, as discussed in the following section on validity.

An **integrity test** evaluates attitudes and experiences relating to the honesty, dependability, trustworthiness, and pro-social behaviors of a respondent. Integrity tests typically consist of two sections. The first is a section dealing with attitudes toward theft and other forms of dishonesty such as beliefs about extent of employee theft, degree of condemnation of theft, endorsement of common rationalizations about theft, and perceived ease of theft. The second is a section dealing with overt admissions of theft and other illegal activities such as items stolen in the last year, gambling,

TABLE 11.5 Commonly Used Integrity Tests

Overt Integrity Tests
Accutrac Evaluation System
Compuscan
Employee Integrity Index
Orion Survey
PEOPLE Survey
Personnel Selection Inventory
Phase II Profile
Reid Report and Reid Survey
Stanton Survey
Personality-Based Integrity Tests
Employment Productivity Index
Hogan Personnel Selection Series
Inwald Personality Inventory
Personnel Decisions, Inc., Employment Inventory
Personnel Reaction Blank

Note: Publishers of these tests can be easily found by using Google or another internet search engine.

and drug use. The most widely researched tests of this type include the Personnel Selection Inventory, the Reid Report, and the Stanton Survey. The interested reader can find addresses for the publishers of these and related instruments through Internet search.

Apparently, integrity tests can be easily faked and might, therefore, be of less value in screening dishonest applicants than other approaches such as background check. For example, Ryan and Sackett (1987) created a generic overt integrity test modeled upon existing instruments. The test contained 52 attitude and 11 admission items. In comparison to a contrast group asked to respond truthfully and another contrast group asked to respond as job applicants, subjects asked to "fake good" produced substantially superior scores (i.e., better attitudes and fewer theft admissions).

Validity of Integrity Tests

In a recent meta-analysis of 104 criterion-related validity studies, Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and Odle-Dusseau (2012) found that integrity tests were not particularly useful in predicting job performance, training performance, or work turnover (corrected *r*s of .15, .16, and .09, respectively). However, when counterproductive work behavior (CWB, e.g., theft, poor attendance, unsafe behavior, property destruction) was the criterion, the corrected *r* was a healthy .32. The correlation was even higher, $r = .42$, when based on self-reports of CWB as opposed to other reports or employee records. Overall, these findings support the value of integrity testing in personnel selection. Ones et al. (1993) requested data on integrity tests from publishers, authors, and colleagues. These sources proved highly cooperative: The authors collected 665 validity coefficients based upon 25 integrity tests administered to more than half a million employees. Using the intricate procedures of meta-analysis, Ones et al. (1993) computed an average validity coefficient of .41 when integrity tests were used to predict supervisory ratings of job performance. Interestingly, integrity tests predicted global disruptive behaviors (theft, illegal activities, absenteeism, tardiness, drug abuse, dismissals for theft, and violence on the job) better than they predicted employee theft alone. The authors concluded with a mild endorsement of these instruments:

> When we started our research on integrity tests, we, like many other industrial psychologists, were skeptical of integrity tests used in industry. Now, on the basis of analyses of a large database consisting of more than 600 validity coefficients, we conclude that integrity tests have substantial evidence of generalizable validity.

This conclusion is echoed in a series of ingenious studies by Cunningham, Wong, and Barbee (1994). Among other supportive findings, these researchers discovered that integrity test results were correlated with returning an overpayment—even when subjects were instructed to provide a positive impression on the integrity test.

Other reviewers are more cautious in their conclusions. In commenting on reviews by the American Psychological Association and the Office of Technology Assessment, Camara and Schneider

(1994) concluded that integrity tests do not measure up to expectations of experts in assessment, but that they are probably better than hit-or-miss, unstandardized methods used by many employers to screen applicants.

Several concerns remain about integrity tests. Publishers may release their instruments to unqualified users, which is a violation of ethical standards of the American Psychological Association. A second problem arises from the unknown base rate of theft and other undesirable behaviors, which makes it difficult to identify optimal cutting scores on integrity tests. If cutting scores are too stringent, honest job candidates will be disqualified unfairly. Conversely, too lenient a cutting score renders the testing pointless. A final concern is that situational factors may moderate the validity of these instruments. For example, how a test is portrayed to examinees may powerfully affect their responses and therefore skew the validity of the instrument.

The debate about integrity tests juxtaposes the legitimate interests of business against the individual rights of workers. Certainly, businesses have a right not to hire thieves, drug addicts, and malcontents. But in pursuing this goal, what is the ultimate cost to society of asking millions of job applicants about past behaviors involving drugs, alcohol, criminal behavior, and other highly personal matters? Hanson (1991) has asked rhetorically whether society is well served by the current balance of power—in which businesses can obtain proprietary information about who is seemingly worthy and who is not. It is not out of the question that Congress could enter the debate. In 1988, President Reagan signed into law the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, which effectively eliminated polygraph testing in industry. Perhaps in the years ahead we will see integrity testing sharply curtailed by an Employee Integrity Test Protection Act. Berry, Sackett, and Wiemann (2007) provide an excellent review of the current state of integrity testing.

WORK SAMPLE AND SITUATIONAL EXERCISES

A **work sample** is a miniature replica of the job for which examinees have applied. Muchinsky (2003) points out that the I/O psychologist's goal in devising a work sample is "to take the content of a person's job, shrink it down to a manageable time period, and let applicants demonstrate their ability in performing this replica of the job." Guion (1998) has emphasized that work samples need not include every aspect of a job but should focus upon the more difficult elements that effectively discriminate strong from weak candidates. For example, a position as clerk-typist may also include making coffee and running errands for the boss. However, these are trivial tasks demanding so little skill that it would be pointless to include them in a work sample. A work sample should test important job domains, not the entire job universe.

Campion (1972) devised an ingenious work sample for mechanics that illustrates the preceding point. Using the job analysis techniques discussed at the beginning of this topic, Campion determined that the essence of being a good mechanic was defined by successful use of tools, accuracy of work, and overall mechanical ability. With the help of skilled mechanics, he devised a work sample that incorporated these job aspects through typical tasks such as installing pulleys and repairing a gearbox. Points were assigned to component behaviors for each task. Example items and their corresponding weights were as follows:

Installing Pulleys and Belts	**Scoring Weights**
1. Checks key before installing against:	
___ shaft	2
___ pulley	2
___ neither	0
Disassembling and Repairing a Gear Box	
10. Removes old bearing with:	
___ press and driver	3
___ bearing puller	2
___ gear puller	1
___ other	0
Pressing a Bushing into Sprocket and Reaming to Fit a Shaft	
4. Checks internal diameter of bushing against shaft diameter:	
___ visually	1

___ hole gauge and micrometers	3
___ Vernier calipers	2
___ scale	1
___ does not check	0

Campion found that the performance of 34 male maintenance mechanics on the work sample measure was significantly and positively related to the supervisor's evaluations of their work performance, with validity coefficients ranging from .42 to .66.

A **situational exercise** is approximately the white-collar equivalent of a work sample. Situational exercises are largely used to select persons for managerial and professional positions. The main difference between a situational exercise and a work sample is that the former mirrors only part of the job, whereas the latter is a microcosm of the entire job (Muchinsky, 1990). In a situational exercise, the prospective employee is asked to perform under circumstances that are highly similar to the anticipated work environment. Measures of accomplishment can then be gathered as a basis for gauging likely productivity or other aspects of job effectiveness. The situational exercises with the highest validity show a close resemblance with the criterion; that is, the best exercises are highly realistic (Asher & Sciarrino, 1974; Muchinsky, 2003).

Work samples and situational exercises are based on the conventional wisdom that the best predictor of future performance in a specific domain is past performance in that same domain. Typically, a situational exercise requires the candidate to perform in a setting that is highly similar to the intended work environment. Thus, the resulting performance measures resemble those that make up the prospective job itself.

Hundreds of work samples and situational exercises have been proposed over the years. For example, in an earlier review, Asher and Sciarrino (1974) identified 60 procedures, including the following:

- Typing test for office personnel
- Mechanical assembly test for loom fixers
- Map-reading test for traffic control officers
- Tool dexterity test for machinists and riveters
- Headline, layout, and story organization test for magazine editors
- Oral fact-finding test for communication consultants
- Role-playing test for telephone salespersons
- Business-letter-writing test for managers

A very effective situational exercise that we will discuss here is the in-basket technique, a procedure that simulates the work environment of an administrator.

The In-Basket Test

The classic paper on the **in-basket test** is the monograph by Frederiksen (1962). For this comprehensive study Frederiksen devised the Bureau of Business In-Basket Test, which consists of the letters, memoranda, records of telephone calls, and other documents that have collected in the in-basket of a newly hired executive officer of a business bureau. In this test, the candidate is instructed not to play a role, but to be himself.[3] The candidate is not to say what he would do, he is to do it.

The letters, memoranda, phone calls, and interviews completed by him in this simulated job environment constitute the record of behavior that is scored according to both content and style of the responses. *Response style* refers to how a task was completed—courteously, by telephone, by involving a superior, through delegation to a subordinate, and so on. *Content* refers to what was done, including making plans, setting deadlines, seeking information; several quantitative indices were also computed, including number of items attempted and total words written. For some scoring criteria such as imaginativeness—the number of courses of action which seemed to be good ideas—expert judgment was required.

Frederiksen (1962) administered his in-basket test to 335 subjects, including students, administrators, executives, and army officers. Scoring the test was a complex procedure that required the development of a 165-page manual. The odd–even reliability

[3]We do not mean to promote a subtle sexism here, but in fact Frederiksen (1962) tested a predominantly (if not exclusively) male sample of students, administrators, executives, and army officers.

of the individual items varied considerably, but enough modestly reliable items emerged (*r*s of .70 and above) that Frederiksen could conduct several factor analyses and also make meaningful group comparisons.

When scores on the individual items were correlated with each other and then factor analyzed, the behavior of potential administrators could be described in terms of eight primary factors. When scores on these primary factors were themselves factor analyzed, three second-order factors emerged. These second-order factors describe administrative behavior in the most general terms possible. The first dimension is Preparing for Action, characterized by deferring final decisions until information and advice is obtained. The second dimension is simply Amount of Work, depicting the large individual differences in the sheer work output. The third major dimension is called Seeking Guidance, with high scorers appearing to be anxious and indecisive. These dimensions fit well with existing theory about administrator performance and therefore support the validity of Frederiksen's task.

A number of salient attributes emerged when Frederiksen compared the subject groups on the scorable dimensions of the in-basket test. For example, the undergraduates stressed verbal productivity, the government administrators lacked concern with outsiders, the business executives were highly courteous, the army officers exhibited strong control over subordinates, and school principals lacked firm control. These group differences speak strongly to the construct validity of the in-basket test, since the findings are consistent with theoretical expectations about these subject groups.

Early studies supported the predictive validity of in-basket tests. For example, Brass and Oldham (1976) demonstrated that performance on an in-basket test corresponded to on-the-job performance of supervisors if the appropriate in-basket scoring categories were used. Specifically, based on the in-basket test, supervisors who personally reward employees for good work, personally punish subordinates for poor work, set specific performance objectives, and enrich their subordinates' jobs are also rated by their superiors as being effective managers. The predictive power of these in-basket dimensions was significant, with a multiple correlation coefficient of .54 between predictors and criterion. Standardized in-basket tests can now be purchased for use by private organizations. Unfortunately, most of these tests are "in-house" instruments not available for general review. In spite of occasional cautionary reviews (e.g., Brannick et al., 1989; Schroffel, 2012), the in-basket technique is still highly regarded as a useful method of evaluating candidates for managerial positions.

Assessment Centers

An assessment center is not so much a place as a process (Highhouse & Nolan, 2012). Many corporations and military branches—as well as a few progressive governments—have dedicated special sites to the application of in-basket and other simulation exercises in the training and selection of managers. The purpose of an **assessment center** is to evaluate managerial potential by exposing candidates to multiple simulation techniques, including group presentations, problem-solving exercises, group discussion exercises, interviews, and in-basket techniques. Results from traditional aptitude and personality tests also are considered in the overall evaluation. The various simulation exercises are observed and evaluated by successful senior managers who have been specially trained in techniques of observation and evaluation. Assessment centers are used in a variety of settings, including business and industry, government, and the military. There is no doubt that a properly designed assessment center can provide a valid evaluation of managerial potential. Follow-up research has demonstrated that the performance of candidates at an assessment center is strongly correlated with supervisor ratings of job performance (Gifford, 1991). A more difficult question to answer is whether assessment centers are cost-effective in comparison to traditional selection procedures. After all, funding an assessment center is very expensive. The key question is whether the assessment center approach to selection boosts organizational productivity sufficiently to offset the expense of the selection process. Anecdotally, the answer would appear to be a resounding yes, since poor decisions from bad managers can be very expensive. However,

there is little empirical information that addresses this issue.

Goffin, Rothstein, and Johnston (1996) compared the validity of traditional personality testing (with the Personality Research Form; Jackson, 1984b) and the assessment center approach in the prediction of the managerial performance of 68 managers in a forestry products company. Both methods were equivalent in predicting performance, which would suggest that the assessment center approach is not worth the (very substantial) additional cost. However, when both methods were used in combination, personality testing provided significant incremental validity over that of the assessment center alone. Thus, personality testing and assessment center findings each contribute unique information helpful in predicting performance.

Putting a candidate through an assessment center is very expensive. Dayan, Fox, and Kasten (2008) speak to the cost of assessment center operations by arguing that an employment interview and cognitive ability test scores can be used to cull the best and the worst applicants so that only those in the middle need to undergo these expensive evaluations. Their study involved 423 Israeli police force candidates who underwent assessment center evaluations after meeting initial eligibility. The researchers concluded in retrospect that, with minimal loss of sensitivity and specificity, nearly 20 percent of this sample could have been excused from more extensive evaluation. These were individuals who, based on interview and cognitive test scores, were nearly sure to fail or nearly certain to succeed.

APPRAISAL OF WORK PERFORMANCE

The appraisal of work performance is crucial to the successful operation of any business or organization. In the absence of meaningful feedback, employees have no idea how to improve. In the absence of useful assessment, administrators have no idea how to manage personnel. It is difficult to imagine how a corporation, business, or organization could pursue an institutional mission without evaluating the performance of its employees in one manner or another.

Industrial and organizational psychologists frequently help devise rating scales and other instruments used for performance appraisal (Landy & Farr, 1983). When done properly, employee evaluation rests upon a solid foundation of applied psychological measurement—hence, its inclusion as a major topic in this text. In addition to introducing essential issues in the measurement of work performance, we also touch briefly on the many legal issues that surround the selection and appraisal of personnel. We begin by discussing the context of performance appraisal.

The evaluation of work performance serves many organizational purposes. The short list includes promotions, transfers, layoffs, and the setting of salaries—all of which may hang in the balance of performance appraisal. The long list includes at least 20 common uses identified by Cleveland, Murphy, and Williams (1989). These applications of performance evaluation cluster around four major uses: comparing individuals in terms of their overall performance levels; identifying and using information about individual strengths and weaknesses; implementing and evaluating human resource systems in organizations; and documenting or justifying personnel decisions. Beyond a doubt, performance evaluation is essential to the maintenance of organizational effectiveness.

As the reader will soon discover, performance evaluation is a perplexing problem for which the simple and obvious solutions are usually incorrect. In part, the task is difficult because the criteria for effective performance are seldom so straightforward as "dollar amount of widgets sold" (e.g., for a salesperson) or "percentage of students passing a national test" (e.g., for a teacher). As much as we might prefer objective methods for assessing the effectiveness of employees, judgmental approaches are often the only practical choice for performance evaluation.

The problems encountered in the implementation of performance evaluation are usually referred to collectively as the criterion problem—a designation that first appeared in the 1950s (e.g., Flanagan, 1956; Landy & Farr, 1983). The phrase **criterion problem** is meant to convey the difficulties involved in conceptualizing and measuring performance constructs, which are often complex, fuzzy, and

multidimensional. For a thorough discussion of the criterion problem, the reader should consult comprehensive reviews by Austin and Villanova (1992) and Campbell, Gasser, and Oswald (1996). We touch upon some aspects of the criterion problem in the following review.

APPROACHES TO PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

There are literally dozens of conceptually distinct approaches to the evaluation of work performance. In practice, these numerous approaches break down into four classes of information: performance measures such as productivity counts; personnel data such as rate of absenteeism; peer ratings and self-assessments; and supervisor evaluations such as rating scales. Rating scales completed by supervisors are by far the preferred method of performance appraisal, as discussed later. First, we mention the other approaches briefly.

Performance Measures

Performance measures include seemingly objective indices such as number of bricks laid for a mason, total profit for a salesperson, or percentage of students graduated for a teacher. Although production counts would seem to be the most objective and valid methods for criterion measurement, there are serious problems with this approach (Guion, 1965). The problems include the following:

- The rate of productivity may not be under the control of the worker. For example, the fast-food worker can only sell what people order, and the assembly-line worker can only proceed at the same pace as coworkers.
- Production counts are not applicable to most jobs. For example, relevant production units do not exist for a college professor, a judge, or a hotel clerk.
- An emphasis upon production counts may distort the quality of the output. For example, pharmacists in a mail-order drug emporium may fill prescriptions with the wrong medicine if their work is evaluated solely upon productivity.

Another problem is that production counts may be unreliable, especially over short periods of time. Finally, production counts may tap only a small proportion of job requirements, even when they appear to be the definitive criterion. For example, sales volume would appear to be the ideal criterion for most sales positions. Yet, a salesperson can boost sales by misrepresenting company products. Sales may be quite high for several years—until the company is sued by unhappy customers. Productivity is certainly important in this example, but the corporation should also desire to assess interpersonal factors such as honesty in customer relations.

Personnel Data: Absenteeism

Personnel data such as rate of absenteeism provide another possible basis for performance evaluation. Certainly employers have good reason to keep tabs on absenteeism and to reduce it through appropriate incentives. Steers and Rhodes (1978) calculated that absenteeism costs about $25 billion a year in lost productivity! Little wonder that absenteeism is a seductive criterion measure that has been researched extensively (Harrison & Hulin, 1989).

Unfortunately, absenteeism turns out to be a largely useless measure of work performance, except for the extreme cases of flagrant work truancy. A major problem is defining absenteeism. Landy and Farr (1983) list 28 categories of absenteeism, many of which are uncorrelated with the others. Different kinds of absenteeism include scheduled versus unscheduled, authorized versus unauthorized, justified versus unjustified, contractual versus noncontractual, sickness versus nonsickness, medical versus personal, voluntary versus involuntary, explained versus unexplained, compensable versus noncompensable, certified illness versus casual illness, Monday/Friday absence versus midweek, and reported versus unreported. When is a worker truly absent from work? The criteria are very slippery.

In addition, absenteeism turns out to be an atrociously unreliable variable. The test–retest correlations (absentee rates from two periods of identical length) are as low as .20, meaning that employees display highly variable rates of absenteeism from one time period to the next. A related

problem with absenteeism is that workers tend to underreport it for themselves and overreport it for others (Harrison & Shaffer, 1994). Finally, for the vast majority of workers, absenteeism rates are quite low. In short, absenteeism is a poor method for assessing worker performance, except for the small percentage of workers who are chronically truant.

Peer Ratings and Self-Assessments

Some researchers have proposed that peer ratings and self-assessments are highly valid and constitute an important complement to supervisor ratings. A substantial body of research pertains to this question, but the results are often confusing and contradictory. Nonetheless, it is possible to list several generalizations (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988; Smither, 1994):

- Peers give more lenient ratings than supervisors.
- The correlation between self-ratings and supervisor ratings is minimal.
- The correlation between peer ratings and supervisor ratings is moderate.
- Supervisors and subordinates have different ideas about what is important in jobs.

Overall, reviewers conclude that peer ratings and self-assessments may have limited application for purposes such as personal development, but their validity is not yet sufficiently established to justify widespread use (Smither, 1994).

Supervisor Rating Scales

Rating scales are the most common measure of job performance (Landy & Farr, 1983; Muchinsky, 2003). These instruments vary from simple graphic forms to complex scales anchored to concrete behaviors. In general, supervisor rating scales reveal only fair reliability, with a mean interrater reliability coefficient of .52 across many different approaches and studies (Viswesvaran, Ones, & Schmidt, 1996). In spite of their weak reliability, supervisor ratings still rank as the most widely used approach. About three-quarters of all performance evaluations are based upon judgmental methods such as supervisor rating scales (Landy, 1985).

The simplest rating scale is the graphic rating scale, introduced by Donald Paterson in 1922 (Landy & Farr, 1983). A **graphic rating scale** consists of trait labels, brief definitions of those labels, and a continuum for the rating. As the reader will notice in Figure 11.1, several types of graphic rating scales have been used.

The popularity of graphic rating scales is due, in part, to their simplicity. But this is also a central weakness because the dimension of work performance being evaluated may be vaguely defined. Dissatisfaction with graphic rating scales led to the development of many alternative approaches to performance appraisal, as discussed in this section.

A **critical incidents checklist** is based upon actual episodes of desirable and undesirable on-the-job behavior (Flanagan, 1954). Typically, a checklist developer will ask employees to help construct the instrument by submitting specific examples of desirable and undesirable job behavior. For example, suppose that we intended to develop a checklist to appraise the performance of resident advisers (RAs) in a dormitory. Modeling a study by Aamodt, Keller, Crawford, and Kimbrough (1981), we might ask current dormitory RAs the following question:

> Think of the best RA that you have ever known. Please describe in detail several incidents that reflect why this person was the best adviser. Please do the same for the worst RA you have ever known.

Based upon hundreds of nominated behaviors, checklist developers would then proceed to distill and codify these incidents into a smaller number of relevant behaviors, both desirable and undesirable. For example, the following items might qualify for the RA checklist:

_____ stays in dorm more than required
_____ breaks dormitory rules
_____ is fair about discipline
_____ plans special programs
_____ fails to discipline friends
_____ is often unfriendly
_____ shows concern about residents
_____ comes across as authoritarian



FIGURE 11.1 **Examples of Graphic Rating Scales**

Of course, the full checklist would be much longer than the preceding. The RA supervisor would complete this instrument as a basis for performance appraisal. If needed, an overall summary score can be derived from an appropriate weighting of individual items.

Another form of criterion-referenced judgmental measure is the **behaviorally anchored rating scale** (BARS). The classic work on BARS dates back to Smith and Kendall (1963). These authors proposed a complex developmental procedure for producing criterion-referenced judgments. The procedure uses a number of experts to identify and define performance dimensions, generate behavior examples, and scale the behaviors meaningfully. Overall, the procedure is quite complex, time-consuming, and expensive. A number of variations and improvements have been suggested. An advantage to BARS and other behavior-based scales is their strict adherence to EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) guidelines discussed later in this chapter. BARS and related approaches focus upon behaviors as opposed to personality or attitudinal characteristics. A behaviorally anchored scale for performance of college professors in posting office hours is depicted in Figure 11.2. Of course, the

Could be expected to post required and extra office hours the first week of the semester, maintain them without exception, and greet students in a friendly manner.	7
Could be expected to post required and extra office hours the first week of the semester, and maintain them without exception.	6
Could be expected to post required and extra office hours the first week of the semester, and maintain them most of the time.	5
Could be expected to post required office hours the first week of the semester, and maintain them most of the time.	4
Could be expected to post required office hours by mid-semester, and maintain them most of the time.	3
Could be expected to post required office hours with "push" from department chair, but would miss office hours without notice.	2
Could be expected to resist posting office hours and fail to maintain them.	1

FIGURE 11.2 **Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale for Posting and Maintaining Office Hours**

comprehensive evaluation of a sales manager would include additional scales for other aspects of work.

Research on improving the accuracy of ratings with BARS is mixed. Some studies find fewer rating errors—especially a reduction in unwarranted leniency of evaluations—whereas other studies report no improvement with BARS compared to other evaluation methods (Murphy & Pardaffy, 1989). Overall, Muchinsky (2003) concludes that the BARS approach is not much better than graphic rating scales in reducing rating errors. Nonetheless, the scale development process of BARS may have indirect benefits in that supervisors are compelled to pay close attention to the behavioral components of effective performance.

A **behavior observation scale** (BOS) is a variation upon the BARS technique. The difference between the two is that the BOS approach uses a continuum from "almost never" to "almost always" to measure how often an employee performs the specific tasks on each behavioral dimension. As with the BARS technique, researchers question whether behavior observation scales are worth the extra effort (Guion, 1998).

A **forced-choice scale** is designed to eliminate bias and subjectivity in supervisor ratings by forcing a choice between options that are equal in social desirability. In theory, this approach makes it impossible for the supervisor to slant ratings in a biased or subjective manner. We will use the pathbreaking research by Sisson (1948) to illustrate the features of this approach. He developed a scale to evaluate Army officers that consisted of tetrads of behavioral descriptors. Each tetrad contained two positive items matched for social desirability and two negative items also matched for social desirability. The four items in each tetrad were topically related to a single performance dimension. Unknown to the supervisors who completed the rating scale, one of the two positive items was judged very descriptive of effective Army officers and the other judged less so. Likewise, one of the two negative items was judged more descriptive of ineffective Army officers and the other judged less so. Here is a sample tetrad (Borman, 1991):

	Most Descriptive	Least Descriptive
A. Cannot assume responsibility	_____	_____
B. Knows how and when to delegate authority	_____	_____
C. Offers suggestions	_____	_____
D. Changes ideas too easily	_____	_____

Supervisors were asked to review the items in each tetrad and to check one item as most descriptive and one item as least descriptive of the officer being evaluated. A score of +1 was awarded for responding "most descriptive" to the positively keyed item

(in this case, alternative B) or "least descriptive" to the negatively keyed item (in this case alternative A), whereas a score of −1 was awarded for responding "least descriptive" to the positively keyed item or "most descriptive" to the negatively keyed item. Responding to the nonkeyed items (alternatives C and D) as most or least descriptive earned a score of 0. Thus, each tetrad yielded a five-point continuum of scores: +2, +1, 0, −1, −2. The summary score used for performance appraisal consisted of the algebraic sum of the individual items.

The forced-choice approach has never really caught on, due largely to the effort required in scale construction. This is unfortunate because the method does effectively reduce unwanted bias. Borman (1991) refers to this approach as a "bold initiative" that produces a relatively objective rating scale.

SOURCES OF ERROR IN PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

The most difficult problem in the assessment of job performance is the proper definition of appraisal criteria. If the supervisor is using a poorly designed instrument that does not tap the appropriate dimensions of job behavior, then almost by definition the performance appraisal will be inaccurate, incomplete, and erroneous. Undoubtedly, the failure to identify appropriate criteria for acceptable and unacceptable performance is a major source of error in performance appraisal. But it is not the only source. Even when supervisors have access to excellent, well-designed measures of performance appraisal, various sorts of subtle errors can creep in. We discuss three such additional sources of rating error: halo effect, rater bias, and criterion contamination.

Halo Effect

The tendency to rate an employee high or low on all dimensions because of a global impression is called **halo effect**. Research on the halo effect can be traced back to the early part of this century (Thorndike, 1920). The most common halo effect is a positive halo effect. In this case, an employee receives a higher rating than deserved because the supervisor fails to be objective when rating specific aspects of the employee's behavior. A positive halo effect is usually based upon overgeneralization from one element of a worker's behavior. For example, an employee with perfect attendance may receive higher-than-deserved evaluations on productivity and work quality—even though attendance is not directly related to these job dimensions.

Smither (1998) lists the following approaches to control for halo effects:

- Provide special training for raters
- Supervise the supervisors during the rating
- Practice simulations before doing the ratings
- Keep a diary of information relevant to appraisal
- Provide supervisors with a short lecture on halo effects

Additional approaches to rater training are discussed by Goldstein (1991). An intriguing analysis of the nature and consequences of halo error can be found in Murphy, Jako, and Anhalt (1993). Contrary to the reigning prejudice against halo errors, these researchers conclude that the halo effect does not necessarily detract from the accuracy of ratings. They point out that a presumed halo effect is often the by-product of true overlap on the dimensions being rated. The debate over halo effect is not likely to be resolved anytime soon (Arvey & Murphy, 1998).

Rater Bias

The potential sources of **rater bias** are so numerous that we can only mention a few prominent examples here. Leniency or severity errors occur when a supervisor tends to rate workers at the extremes of the scale. Leniency may reflect social dynamics, as when the supervisor wants to be liked by employees. Leniency is also caused by extraneous factors such as the attractiveness of the employee. Severity errors refer to the practice of rating all aspects of performance as deficient. In contrast, central tendency errors occur when the supervisor rates everyone as nearly average on all performance dimensions. Context errors occur when the rater evaluates an employee in the context of other employees rather than based upon objective performance. For example, the presence of a workaholic salesperson with extremely high

sales volume might cause the sales supervisor to rate other sales personnel lower than deserved.

Recently, researchers have paid considerable attention to the possible biasing effects of whether a supervisor likes or dislikes a subordinate. Surprisingly, the trend of the findings is that supervisor affect (liking or disliking) toward specific employees does not introduce rating bias. In general, strong affect in either direction represents valid information about an employee. Thus, ratings of affect often correlate strongly with performance ratings, but this is because both are a consequence of how well or poorly the employee does the job (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1994; Varma, DeNisi, & Peters, 1996). Other forms of rater bias are discussed by Goldstein (1991) and Smither (1994).

Criterion Contamination

Criterion contamination is said to exist when a criterion measure includes factors that are not demonstrably part of the job (Borman, 1991; Harvey, 1991). For example, if a performance measure includes appearance, this would most likely be a case of criterion contamination—unless appearance is relevant to job success. Likewise, evaluating an employee on "dealing with the public" is only appropriate if the job actually requires the employee to meet the public. Goldstein (1992) outlines three kinds of criterion contamination:

1. Opportunity bias occurs when workers have different opportunities for success, as when one salesperson is assigned to a wealthy neighborhood and others must seek sales in isolated, rural areas.
2. Group characteristic bias is present when the characteristics of the group affect individual performance, as when workers in the same unit agree to limit their productivity to maintain positive social relations.
3. Knowledge of predictor bias occurs when a supervisor permits personal knowledge about an employee to bias the appraisal, as when quality of the college attended by a new worker affects her evaluation.

Careful attention to job analysis as a basis for selection of appraisal criteria is the best way to reduce errors in performance appraisal. In addition, employers should follow certain guidelines in performance appraisal, as discussed in the following section.

Guidelines for Performance Appraisal

Performance appraisal is a formidable task. Not only must employers pay attention to the psychometric soundness of their approach, they must also design a practical system that meets organizational goals. For example, appraisal standards must be sufficiently difficult and detailed to ensure that organizational goals are accomplished. Another concern is that performance appraisal falls under the purview of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hence, employers must develop fair systems that do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and other protected categories. To complicate matters, these standards—soundness, practicality, legality—may conflict with one another. The practical approach may be neither psychometrically sound nor legal. Often, appraisal methods that show the best measurement characteristics (e.g., strong interrater reliability) will fail to assess the most important aspects of performance; that is, they are not practical. This is a familiar refrain within the measurement field. Too often, psychologists must choose between rigor and relevance, rarely achieving both at the same time. Finally, legal considerations must be considered when exploring the limits of performance appraisal.

Smither (1998) has published guidelines for developing performance appraisal systems that we paraphrase here:

- Base the performance appraisal upon a careful job analysis
- Develop specific, contamination-free criteria for appraisal from the job analysis
- Determine that the instrument used to rate performance is appropriate for the appraisal situation
- Train raters to be accurate, fair, and legal in their use of the appraisal instrument
- Use performance evaluations at regular intervals of six months to a year
- Evaluate the performance appraisal system periodically to determine whether it is actually improving performance

The training of raters is an especially important guideline. An appraisal system that seems perfectly straightforward to the employer could easily be misunderstood by an untrained rater, resulting in biased evaluations. Borman (1991) notes that two kinds of rater training are effective: rater error training, in which the trainer seeks simply to alert raters to specific kinds of errors (e.g., halo effect); and frame-of-reference training, in which the trainer familiarizes the raters with the specific content of each performance dimension. Research indicates that these kinds of training improve the accuracy of ratings.

Finally, we review an intriguing study conducted from an international perspective. Peretz and Fried (2012) remind us that cultural norms influence the nature, acceptability, and impact of different approaches to performance appraisal. They surveyed performance appraisal practices in 21 nations, obtained ratings on cultural norms for each nation, and determined their joint impact on organizational absenteeism and turnover. Specifically, the researchers collected data on personnel practices from thousands of organizations in these mainly European countries. Next, they obtained ratings for each country on four cultural practices: power distance (acceptance versus rejection of inequality), future orientation (present versus future orientation), person value (individualism versus collectivism), and uncertainty avoidance (acceptance versus avoidance of uncertainty). Each cultural norm was rated 1 to 7 for each nation based on an independent global data base. Then, they examined the joint impact of personnel practices and cultural norms on absenteeism and turnover. Their study is complex and detailed, beyond the scope of fine-tuned analysis here. In sum, they found that congruence between societal norms and personnel assessment methods tended to reduce turnover and/or absenteeism. One example is the use of the so-called 360-evaluation, in which performance appraisal is based on input from people at all levels who interact with the employee. This practice is more effective (leading to less absenteeism and turnover) in some cultures than others. Peretz and Fried (2012) found that personnel assessment systems with several sources of raters (e.g., supervisors, coworkers, and subordinates) were most acceptable to employees in companies located in societies with low power distance, high future orientation, and respect for individualism. In contrast, multiple sources of assessment were not well received by employees working in collectivistic societies. It appears the best practices in personnel assessment depend upon the cultural context.

TOPIC 11B Assessment for Career Development in a Global Economy

Career Developments and the Functions of Work
Origins of Career Development Theories
Theory of Person–Environment Fit
Theory of Person–Environment Correspondence
Stage Theories of Career Development
Social Cognitive Approaches
O*NET in Career Development
Inventories for Career Assessment

Prior to the 1700s, agrarian economies dominated cultural and economic life in the Western world. Vocational opportunities for most people remained limited to farming, crafts, labor, and small businesses. The modern vision that individuals could pursue dozens or hundreds of careers likely did not exist for the masses who scrambled simply to survive (Zinn, 1995). With the advent of the first industrial revolution in the 1700s, including the invention of the steam engine and other labor saving devices, the need for human labor diminished rapidly. In parallel, the vocational world expanded substantially, offering upward mobility to some of the working class and poor. Gradually, the concept of career identity emerged in the public consciousness.

Career identity is now recognized as essential to personhood and vital to a sense of well-being. When we meet someone for the first time, our natural inclination is to ask, or at least to wonder, "What do you do for a living?" The values, political views, and personal qualities of the individual are important, too, but how the individual contributes to society is typically the first thing we want to know. An occupational title communicates an abundance of information, including personality characteristics, economic class, and social standing (Andersen & Vandehey, 2011).

Work and career are so central to personal well-being that unemployment, especially when prolonged, consistently causes a wide range of physical, psychological, and spiritual maladies. These include:

> . . . economic hardship, loss of health insurance, foreclosure, and mental health problems. The mental health problems include depression and anxiety, feelings of hopelessness and shame, and familial tension and conflict (Jones & Barber, 2012, p. 18).

A meta-analysis of 104 empirical studies revealed that the negative impact of unemployment is buffered by the availability of coping resources (e.g., family and financial support) and, conversely, made worse by work-role centrality (e.g., the belief that work is central to one's life and satisfaction) (McKee-Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005).

Except in a few totalitarian states where occupational access is rigidly controlled by the ruling elite, individuals usually have some degree of latitude in finding their own way to a vocation. They also possess some capacity to change occupations in their lifetimes. Even though the widely cited assertion that the average individual will switch careers seven times has no factual basis, nonetheless, career change likely is more common now than in years past (Bialik, 2010). Also, initial career choice for the young adult remains a vexing issue for many, especially with the continual emergence of substantially new vocations. The advent of new vocations is driven by technological innovations and the aging of the population. A few examples of new careers include cloud computing expert, market research data analyst, and corporate listening officer (*Forbes* magazine, May 5, 2011).

The need for flexibility in career development originates, in part, from the globalization of the world economies, spelled out in the provocative best seller, *The World Is Flat* (Friedman, 2009).

Information technology is now instantly available to everyone, linking knowledge centers into a single worldwide network, creating a more level economic playing field, and requiring corporations to restructure as new opportunities emerge. One concrete example of the new, flat world: For the previous edition of this textbook, the editorial production and composition services were completed by the skilled and efficient employees of a dynamic company located in India. After a few phone calls and email exchanges of PDF files with the author, the text was ready for printing in the United States in a matter of weeks.

In summary, psychologists who provide career guidance will need new approaches to assessment that are sensitive to the need for transition planning in a rapidly changing and increasingly competitive global economy. But practitioners need to avoid the "Test and Tell" trap:

> Clients often come to career counseling assuming an expert will administer some test that tells the client "the answer" as to what occupation is "the right one." The client's expectation for "test and tell" sets the stage for the client and the counselor to depend on a limited, structured approach (Andersen & Vandehey, 2011, p. 10).

The problem with this method is that the counselor will fail to discern the unique needs of the client in a developmentally sensitive context. Guidance will be far more effective if the practitioner slows the process down and provides the opportunity for mutual exploration. In other words, career guidance is a tactic of assessment in the broader sense, not a limited method of testing in the narrow sense.

Assessment for career development requires knowledge of theories of career development, sensitivity to issues of diversity, and understanding of information resources. Thus, before turning to a survey of suitable instruments, we begin with a brief review of prominent career development theories. We start with a simple but provocative question pursued by Blustein (2006), "What is work for?"

CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF WORK

For some people, gainful employment provides more than just a means to pay for food and housing. Psychologists who provide assessment for career development need to keep in mind the multiple functions of work, reviewed here. Yet, it is also true that many people, perhaps the majority, do not have access to the educational and employment opportunities that would allow them to develop a work vision or to realize a career dream.

> Since recorded time, humanity has been plagued by various forms of structural barriers based on race, culture, immigration status, religion, gender, age, sexual orientation, and social class that have had a differential impact on individuals. Our belief is that counselors need to be fully cognizant of how these barriers affect clients so that they are able to provide maximally effective interventions that do not inadvertently blame the victims of social oppression (Blustein, Kenna, Gill, & DeVoy, 2008, p. 297).

It bears repeating that discrimination continues to obstruct career potential for minorities. A subtle racism on the part of employers and agencies often is the source. Many studies could be cited to buttress this point as a global issue. For reasons of space, we offer just two examples. A recent study from Great Britain confirms that ethnic minorities experience an "ethnic penalty" with higher unemployment rates, greater concentrations in dead-end assembly line jobs, and lower earnings than Whites, even for the same job (Bell & Casebourne, 2008). Immigrants to Great Britain likewise face career barriers. When able to find work, it is typically in just a few industries such as catering, language translation, shop work, and clerical jobs. Professional employment was notably lacking, despite previous experience (Bloch, 2002).

Unfortunately, most theories of career development do not acknowledge the profound challenges faced by low income individuals, minorities, and immigrants. The psychology-of-working viewpoint provided by Blustein and his collaborators

is an exception. These researchers provide a metatheoretical perspective that can be used alongside traditional models of career development. We begin with a summary of their model.

According to Blustein and colleagues (2008), work can fulfill any or all of three sets of needs:

> *Survival and Power*: These are the foundational reasons that most people work, namely, to meet basic subsistence needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. In varying degrees, work also provides access to economic and social power. Specifically, those with financial resources are more likely to prevail and to get their way in the wider community. Money talks.
>
> *Social Connection*: Work is the place where many of our vital human connections are formed. Deep friendships are forged and sometimes maintained over a lifetime. The quality of these relationships has the potential to enhance performance when coworkers are positive and supportive, or to create great stress when colleagues are abrasive and conflict-prone.
>
> *Self-Determination*: For some individuals, work is also a means of self-actualization and personal fulfillment. Everyone is familiar with those fortunate individuals who love what they do and are privileged to be paid for it, too. But Blustein et al. (2008) remind us that many workers do not have the opportunity to select a career that provides for creative and fulfilling self-expression.

In addition to discrimination, structural barriers often prevent career development among minorities. For example, African Americans may lack relevant social networks, lack public transit for employment, and lack savings needed to relocate for available work (Weller & Fields, 2011). Further, unemployment is itself a serious structural barrier. In 2011, unemployment among African Americans was about 16 percent, double that of Whites. These data do not include those who have quit looking for work, or who are chronically underemployed. Being out of work tends to become a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle, with the unemployed individual losing work skills with each passing month, further reducing employment prospects.

ORIGINS OF CAREER DEVELOPMENT THEORIES

Implicitly or explicitly, practitioners make use of a theoretical framework in their practice of assessment in career counseling. Thus, we provide a short review of essential viewpoints here. We begin with an historical note, acknowledging the seminal contributions of Frank Parsons, considered by many the founder of the field of career guidance. In 1909, he published *Choosing a Vocation*, a practical manual for providing career direction to young men and women. Parsons (1909) advocated making a career choice based on matching personal traits with job factors:

> In the wise choice of a vocation there are three broad factors: (1) a clear understanding of yourself, your aptitudes, abilities, interests, ambitions, resources, limitations, and their causes; (2) a knowledge of the requirements and conditions of success, advantages and disadvantages, compensation, opportunities, and prospects in different lines of work; (3) true reasoning on the relations of these two groups of facts (p. 5).

Parsons provided a 116-item questionnaire to survey the accomplishments, interests, and aptitudes of the client. This was followed by a lengthy, penetrating interview designed to illuminate aspects of social presentation and personal character (e.g., "Do you smile naturally and easily?" "Is your handshake warm and cordial?" "Are you careful about voice modulation?" "Are you honest, truthful, and candid?" "Are you industrious, hard-working, and persistent?" "Do you welcome people of different creed or political faith?"). His manual also provided an extensive analysis of the qualities needed for success in dozens of vocations. Consultation with each client continued over a span of several weeks. The task of the counselor was to match the traits of the client with the requirements of specific lines of work. Effectively, this was an early, rudimentary form of

the method advocated by John Holland and others, known as person–environment fit.

THEORY OF PERSON–ENVIRONMENT FIT

Over 50 years ago, John Holland (1959) established the framework for a sophisticated theory of vocational choice that has engendered more research than any other approach in the field. From the beginning, he also constructed and validated assessment tools that embodied the practical application of his model, known as Person-Environment Fit. He proposed that personality traits/interests tend to cluster into a small number of vocationally relevant patterns, called types. For each personality type, there is also a corresponding work environment best suited to that type. According to Holland, there are six types: Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional. Each type corresponds to both a set of personality traits/interests and also to a set of environmental work demands. Figure 11.3 depicts this approach, sometimes known as the **RIASEC model**, in reference to the first letters of the six types. The types are idealizations that few people (or work environments) fit completely. The RIASEC personality patterns are summarized in Table 11.6, and corresponding work environments are found in Table 11.7.

Regarding the six personality types, it is rare that an individual is a "pure" representation of only one type. Instead, most individuals reveal a preferred type, but display some resemblance to a secondary and a tertiary type as well. For example, someone who was very strong on the Investigative dimension (likes to analyze) might reveal a secondary emphasis for the Social aspect (enjoys helping others), and a lesser emphasis on the Artistic type (reveals a creative element). Using the first letters of these three types in descending order of emphasis, we arrive at the **Holland code** for the individual, namely, **ISA**. We will say more about Holland codes when we discuss assessment tools such as the *Self-Directed Search* developed for this purpose. For now it will suffice to know that excellent tools exist for the empirically validated assessment of the six types.

Consistency and differentiation are two concepts important in the Holland approach. Referring to the hexagonal model depicted in Figure 11.3, adjacent personality types bear greater similarity to one another than types that are separated on the figure. For example, the Realistic and Conventional types (side by side) are somewhat similar, whereas the Realistic and Social types (across the hexagon) are quite different or inconsistent. Thus, a client whose Holland code was **RCE** (adjacent codes) would be considered more consistent than a client whose code was **REA** (separated codes). This is



FIGURE 11.3 Holland's Hexagonal Model of Personality Types and Occupational Themes

TABLE 11.6 RIASEC Personality Types

Realistic individuals are practical, conservative, and value tangible rewards. They like to work with tools, machines, and things. They usually avoid interaction with others.

Investigative persons show a strong analytical bent. They value knowledge and like to explore, understand, and predict natural and social phenomena. They tend to avoid selling or persuading others.

Artistic individuals are unconventional and enjoy the creative expression of ideas and emotions. They value musical, literary, or artistic endeavors. They avoid conformity to standards and routine activities.

Social persons possess empathy and strong social skills. They value interpersonal contact, teaching, and serving others. They typically avoid technical or mechanical activities.

Enterprising individuals are good at persuading and directing others. They value social status and material accomplishment. They typically avoid intellectual or abstract topics.

Conventional persons like to maintain order and establish routines. They value financial success and power in social or business settings. They usually avoid ambiguous or unstructured situations.

Source: Based on Holland, J. L. (1985). *Vocational Preference Inventory (VPI) manual—1985 edition*. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.

TABLE 11.7 RIASEC Work Environments

Realistic work environments require hands-on involvement, physical movement, mechanical skill, and technical competencies. Pragmatic problem solving is needed. Typical vocations include auto repair, cook, drywall installer, machinist, taxi driver, and umpire.

Investigative settings require the use of abstract thinking and creative abilities. The focus is a rational approach and ideas, not people. Typical positions include architect, arson investigator, pharmacist, physician, psychologist, and software engineer.

Artistic environments require the creative application of artistic forms. These settings demand prolonged work and place a premium on access to intuition and emotional life. Typical vocations include actor, composer, graphic designer, model, photographer, and reporter.

Social environments involve an interest in caring for people and the ability to discern and influence their behavior. These work settings require good social skills and the ability to deal with emotionally laden interactions. Typical positions include clergy, teacher, emergency medical technician, marriage therapist, psychiatric aide, and waitperson.

Enterprising work environments involve the influence of others through verbal skills. These roles require self-confidence and leadership capacities for directing and controlling the activity of others. Typical vocations include bartender, real estate agent, construction manager, first-line supervisor, police detective, and travel agent.

Conventional work environments require the methodical, routine, and concrete processing of words and mathematical symbols. The key to these settings is repetitive application of established clerical procedures. Typical settings include bank teller, bookkeeper, court recorder, insurance underwriter, office clerk, and shipping clerk.

Source: Based on Holland, J. L. (1985). *Vocational Preference Inventory (VPI) manual—1985 edition*. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.

relevant to assessment and career guidance because work environments tend to possess consistency in regard to types. It is easier for clients to find person–environment fit when they possess consistency, too.

Differentiation refers to the relative strength of the first, second, and third personality types of the Holland code. A client with strong differentiation will reveal a marked preference for his or her first category, and less interest in the second and third categories. A client with weak differentiation might demonstrate scores that are nearly tied on the top three categories of the Holland code. This could

indicate a difficulty committing to one kind of work environment. Most work environments require some degree of differentiation. Hence, the undifferentiated client may struggle to find a satisfying work environment.

Holland's theoretical approach has been so influential that nearly every assessment tool in the field of career guidance makes reference to his six personality types. But the simple elegance of this approach is also a potential weakness. The assessment tools that embody the Holland model typically list suitable occupations and rule out nonmatching environments. Counselors and clients can foreclose on further exploration. It is easy to fall into the "test and tell" trap.

THEORY OF PERSON–ENVIRONMENT CORRESPONDENCE

The theory of Person–Environment Correspondence (PEC) evolved from the Theory of Work Adjustment (TWA). First envisioned in the 1950s, TWA arose as a basis for conducting research on the work adjustment of vocational rehabilitation clients. Soon it became clear that TWA applied to situations other than rehabilitation, and that the approach was a specific case of a more general method, which came to be known as Person–Environment Correspondence or PEC (Dawis, 2002).

PEC bears modest similarity to the person-environment approach advocated by Holland and colleagues. The central point of similarity is that, in determining suitable careers, both theories compare the attributes of individuals with the qualities needed in occupations (Dawis, 1996; Dawis & Lofquist, 1991). One difference is that PEC places greater emphasis on individual abilities and their match to the ability patterns required by specific occupations. Ability is different from skill level, which can be acquired with preparation. Ability refers to aptitude, indicating the level of mastery an individual can achieve with suitable training and experience. Another difference is that PEC places greater weight on individual values and their correspondence to the value fulfillments provided by specific occupations (Dawis, 2002; Eggerth, 2008).

PEC theory identifies six crucial values that need to be considered in assessment and counseling for career development. These values are as follows:

1. *Achievement*—the importance of using one's abilities and having a feeling of accomplishment
2. *Altruism*—the importance of harmony with, and being of service to, others
3. *Autonomy*—the importance of being independent and having a sense of control
4. *Comfort*—the importance of feeling comfortable and not being stressed
5. *Safety*—the importance of stability, order, and predictability
6. *Status*—the importance of recognition and being in a dominant position (Dawis, 2002, p. 446).

This list is not comprehensive and it is likely that additional values will emerge with further research. Of course, correspondence between personal values held by the client and the potential for their fulfillment in an occupation is central to work satisfaction and productivity.

PEC theory is rich in complexity because it has evolved over more than five decades; we can only provide a few highlights. The central principle is that the more closely the rewards of the job or the organization correspond to the core values of the individual, the more likely it is that he or she will find satisfaction with the position. But PEC also invokes cognitive, personality, and environmental styles in its understanding of work adjustment. For example, environmental styles include celerity, pace, rhythm, and endurance required to complete the job, which are each assessed on a continuum (Dawis, 1996):

> *Celerity* refers to the quickness of response that is needed in responding to job demands. For example, emergency room personnel often need to respond very quickly, whereas a diamond cutter would be foolhardy to do so.
>
> *Pace* refers to the level of effort needed in responding to the environment. A position such as office clerical worker might require modest effort in comparison to firefighter, where periods of intense effort will be encountered.

> *Rhythm* refers to whether the pattern of responding is steady, cyclical, or erratic. An example of a steady environment would be telephone operator, whereas a police officer might work in an erratic environment, facing hours of boredom interrupted with occasional bursts of fear.
>
> *Endurance* refers to whether the duration of responding to environmental demands is brief or protracted. A position requiring less endurance might be financial advisor, whereas a computer software engineer employed under deadline would need to keep working, day and night, until the project is finished.

Andersen and Vandehey (2012) provide a useful illustration of how these environmental styles play out for specific occupations:

> Two examples demonstrating differing styles are an emergency room and a gemsmith. An emergency room requires cyclical, intense work periods as well as down times. Medical personnel need high celerity (be fast) with a high level of effort (pace). Also, some surgeries could last up to 16 hours, requiring high endurance. By contrast, a gemsmith is ill advised to be fast when cutting gems, and the celerity requirements are low. In addition, several outstanding gems may be worth more money than many poorly cut stones (low pace). The work environment has a steady rhythm and probably requires varying amounts of endurance, depending upon the stone size and complexity of the cuts (p. 47).

Of course, these four dimensions also manifest as measurable personality styles. In the world of career counseling, a mismatch between these two broad factors (environmental style required by a job, personality style preferred by the client) often is a precipitating referral issue.

Dawis and colleagues offer 17 testable propositions derived from PEC and provide a wealth of supporting research (Dawis, 2002; Dawis & Lofquist, 1984). For example, one proposition is:

> Proposition III: P's satisfaction is a function of the correspondence of E's reinforcers to P's values, provided that P's abilities correspond to E's ability requirements.

Put simply, a person's satisfaction with a job is a function of the match of the available environmental reinforcers with the values of the individual, provided that his or her abilities correspond to those required by the position. This is an empirically testable hypothesis that has stood up well in research studies (Dawis, 2002).

STAGE THEORIES OF CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Beginning in the 1950s, Donald Super and colleagues developed an influential stage theory in the field of career guidance and development (Super, 1953, 1994). His approach departs from the trait-factor method preferred by many in the field, and embraces a more flexible, holistic, life span perspective. The essentials of the theory were stated with elegant simplicity in his first and most widely cited article, "A theory of vocational development" (Super, 1953). Later papers provided additional details to the original framework (Super, Savickas, & Super, 1996).

Super acknowledged the obvious fact that people differ in their abilities, interests, and personalities, but also believed that most people were qualified for several occupations, not just a few positions. Individuals and occupations were each flexible enough to "allow both some variety of occupations for each individual and some variety of individuals in each occupation" (Super, 1953, p. 189).

He argued that the individual self-concept evolves with time and experience, so that vocational choice and adjustment are continuous and lifelong processes. He envisioned five occupational life stages: growth, exploration, establishment, maintenance, and decline. These stages are sometimes known as a career ladder (Super et al., 1996).

The growth stage extends into the teenage years and involves the observation of adult behavior and the exploration of fantasies and interests. The exploration stage was subdivided into fantasy, tentative, and realistic phases, as the young adult tries out one or more lines of training or education

toward an eventual career. The establishment stage begins around age 25 or 30, and was subdivided into the trial and stabilization phases. Vocational development tasks encountered in this stage include the assimilation of organizational climate, the consolidation of positive relationships with coworkers, and the advancement of career responsibilities through promotion (Super, 1990).

In the maintenance stage of middle age, the individual may need to innovate, update skills, or face career stagnation. Additionally, some persons ask: "Should I remain in this career?" If the answer is "No" then the individual would reenter the exploration and establishment stages before attaining the maintenance stage. The last stage, decline, is hypothesized to occur in old age and may require possible specialization, disengagement, or retirement.

The stage development theory proposed by Super provides a useful reminder that career development does not end in young adulthood but extends throughout the life span. However, the theory was based on career development as found in the dominant culture of his time which was mainly white and often middle class or higher. In a changing global economy, some of the developmental stages no longer seem as relevant. In particular, the maintenance phase is difficult for many to sustain because of the need for frequent career transitions (Friedman, 2009). Super died in 1994. Toward the end of his career, he acknowledged new realities:

> Work and occupation provide a focus for personality organization for most men and women, although for some individuals this focus is peripheral, incidental, or even nonexistent. Then other foci such as leisure activities and homemaking, may be central. Social traditions such as sex-role stereotyping and modeling, racial and ethnic biases, and the opportunity structure, as well as individual differences are important determinants of preferences for such roles as worker, student, leisurite, homemaker, and citizen (Super et al., 1996, p. 126).

The brief mention of "opportunity structure" is important to underscore, in light of the Great Recession experienced worldwide in the early part of the twenty-first century.

SOCIAL COGNITIVE APPROACHES

Social cognitive approaches to career development acknowledge that people learn and develop attitudes about work within a social context through observation and modeling of behavior. Prominent exemplars of this approach include Gottfredson (2005), Lent, Brown, and Hackett (2000), and Krumboltz (2009). In our coverage here, we summarize the recent views of John Krumboltz because of their direct relevance to matters of assessment. Krumboltz (2009) calls his approach the **Happenstance Learning Theory** (HLT). In brief:

> HLT posits that human behavior is the product of countless numbers of learning experiences made available by both planned and unplanned situations in which individuals find themselves. The learning outcomes include skills, interests, knowledge, beliefs, preferences, sensitivities, emotions, and future actions (p. 135).

The theory is practical and compassionate in style, attempting to explain how and why each person follows a unique path, and describing how counselors can facilitate development. In regard to the how and why of behavior, Krumboltz surveys genetic influences, learning experiences, environmental conditions, parents and caretaker influences, peer groups, and structured educational settings. He concludes by noting that "Social justice is not equally distributed among humans on our planet." He argues powerfully that practitioners have a responsibility to help overcome social injustice. The proper uses of assessment might be a small part of the solution.

HLT is based on four premises (Krumboltz, 2009):

1. The goal of career counseling is to help clients learn to take actions to achieve more satisfying career and personal lives—not to make a single career decision.

   Krumboltz notes that the future is uncertain for everyone, especially in the world of

work, where new careers emerge and old ones die out. In his view, making a single career decision is potentially foolhardy. A more tentative, exploratory approach is to be preferred.

2. Assessments are used to stimulate learning—not to match personal characteristics with occupational characteristics.

   For example, in regard to interest assessment, Krumboltz contends that the goal is to help clients find attractive activities to explore now. In regard to happenstance, it is his experience that helping clients commit to new actions often will open up unexpected opportunities. A similar argument holds for personality assessment, which can be used to stimulate discussion about alternative settings for the client, and to identify areas of needed change (e.g., assertiveness training for an introverted client). It may also prove helpful to identify dysfunctional career beliefs by using the *Career Beliefs Inventory* (Krumboltz & Vosvick, 1996), which is discussed later in this topic.

   Krumboltz (1993, 1996) has been critical of many interest inventories because most clients have little or no experience with the topics being assessed. Instead of marking items as like, dislike, or indifferent, he playfully suggests that the response options should be "I don't know yet," "I haven't tried that yet," or "I'd like to learn more about that before I answer" (Krumboltz, 1996, p. 57). He also finds fault with these instruments because they focus excessively on cognitive matching of client to work environments, and overlook the emotional problems, including dysfunctional career beliefs, that hamper career development.

3. Clients learn to engage in exploratory actions as a way of generating beneficial unplanned events—not to plan all their actions in advance. The statement that "chance favors only the prepared mind" is attributed to Louis Pasteur (1822–1895), the French biologist and chemist. But the statement can be applied to career development as well. Krumboltz asserts that the goal of the counselor is to help clients engage in activities that are likely to generate unplanned events, and to prepare clients to benefit from these happenstance occurrences. An example might be encouraging an unemployed client to join a health club as a means of exploring her interests in yoga. At the club she befriends a bank manager who is impressed by her winsome personality, which leads to a job interview and a new career endeavor.

4. The success of counseling is assessed by what the client accomplishes in the real world outside the counseling session—not by what takes place during counseling.

   HLT is an action-based theory. The task of the counselor is to collaboratively identify things that the client can do outside of the consultation that will promote new learning and new opportunities. A simple example is asking the client to commit to one action step between appointments (e.g., ask three people how they came to be working in their current job) and to report back by email how things went.

O*NET IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT

The Occupational Information Network or O*NET is the primary source of occupational information in the United States. O*NET is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor and is free and open to anyone in the world who has an Internet connection. This is a rich and sophisticated database that includes detailed information on nearly 1,000 specific occupations. For each occupation, the website lists the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed. Personality qualities needed, education required, technology needs, and typical salary also are given.

The website provides several assessment tools for career exploration, including a number of instruments that can be self-administered. For example, the O*NET Interest Profiler is an online test consisting of 60 occupational activities that are rated on a five-point scale from *strongly dislike* to *strongly like*. The test not only yields a score for each of the six RIASEC dimensions, but also links to a user-friendly list of specific occupations suited to the preparation level selected by the examinee. Further, these occupations are individually rated for employment outlook, environmental or "green" appeal, and apprenticeship needed.

INVENTORIES FOR CAREER ASSESSMENT

One guiding motif in this topic is that successful assessment for career guidance requires ongoing interaction with clients. Career counseling extends well beyond mere testing. Avoiding the "test and tell" trap is vital. Even so, the use of appropriate assessment tools can be helpful, sometimes even essential. The number of instruments available for career assessment is huge, and new tools emerge every year. We survey a number of widely used tests here, to provide a sense of the diversity available. We begin with a specialized tool designed to challenge maladaptive career beliefs.

Career Beliefs Inventory

Krumboltz (1991) created the Career Beliefs Inventory to identify and measure attitudes and beliefs that might block career development. In his work with clients, he often noted that people firmly hold to self-limiting beliefs that prevent them from finding a satisfying job or career. Examples of such beliefs include:

- I don't have enough confidence to try that
- I don't have the skills needed for that position
- I can't do that because I don't have any experience
- I'm really dumb when it comes to that kind of activity
- It would involve too much risk to go in that direction
- That kind of work wouldn't give me any satisfaction

The Career Beliefs Inventory (CBI) was designed to increase the awareness of clients to underlying career beliefs and to gauge the potential influence of these beliefs on occupational choice and life satisfaction.

The CBI can be taken individually or administered in a group setting to persons in grade 8 or higher. The paper-and-pencil test can be hand-scored, but computer-scoring is preferable because it yields an elegant 12-page report. Hand scoring is also confusing and likely to introduce errors.

The 96 test items, all in Likert format, are grouped into 25 scales organized under the following five headings:

1. Your Current Career Situation. Four Scales: Employment Status, Career Plans, Acceptance of Uncertainty, and Openness.
2. What Seems Necessary for Your Happiness. Five scales: Achievement, College Education, Intrinsic Satisfaction, Peer Equality, and Structured Work Environment.
3. Factors that Influence Your Decisions. Six scales: Control, Responsibility, Approval of Others, Self-other Comparisons, Occupation/College Variation, and Career Path Flexibility.
4. Changes You Are Willing to Make. Three scales: Post-training Transition, Job Experimentation, and Relocation.
5. Effort You Are Willing to Initiate. Seven scales: Improving Self, Persisting While Uncertain, Taking Risks, Learning Job Skills, Negotiating/Searching, Overcoming Obstacles, and Working Hard.

Standardization of the CBI is based on more than 7,500 individuals in the United States and Australia. The sample was reasonably diverse, with age range of 12 to 75, including junior high, high school, and college students, as well as adults, both employed and unemployed. Initial test–retest reliability data for the CBI are mixed, with one month reliabilities ranging from .30s to the .70s for the high school sample. Internal consistencies were likewise modest, with coefficients mainly in the range of .40 to .50. This might be due to the small number of items for some scales, as few as two items for several scales. Fuqua and Newman (1994) recommend that the CBI could be improved if additional items were added to some of the scales.

Walsh (1996) supplemented the original standardization sample for the CBI with nearly 600 additional participants. She reported more promising results, with internal consistencies ranging from the low .30s to the high .80s, with a mean coefficient alpha of .57 for the CBI scale scores. Regarding validity, results of factor analyses did find reproducible clusters of beliefs, but these did not correspond to the scale clusters provided in the CBI reports. She

suggests that the practical application of the CBI might rest with exploring client beliefs at the level of the individual items (Walsh, Thompson, & Kapes, 1996).

In a study of convergent validity correlating CBI results with data from four other personality and vocational inventories, Holland, Johnston, Asama, and Polys (1993) reported at least moderate construct validity for most of the CBI scales. They concluded that the test seems to be measuring variance in career variables not assessed by other instruments. In addition, significant correlation of some CBI scales with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory indicated that certain self-limiting and irrational beliefs caused emotional discomfort.

INVENTORIES FOR INTEREST ASSESSMENT

In most applications of psychological testing, the goals of assessment are reasonably clear. For example, intelligence testing helps predict school performance; aptitude testing foretells potential for accomplishment; and personality testing provides information about social and emotional functioning. But what is the purpose of interest assessment? Why would a psychologist recommend it? What can a client expect to gain from a survey of his or her interests?

Interest assessment promotes two compatible goals: life satisfaction and vocational productivity. It is nearly self-evident that a good fit between individual interests and chosen vocation will help foster personal life satisfaction. After all, when work is interesting we are more likely to experience personal fulfillment as well. In addition, persons who are satisfied with their work are more likely to be productive. Thus, employees and employers both stand to gain from the artful application of interest assessment. Several useful instruments exist for this purpose, and we will review the most widely used interest inventories later.

In the selection of employees, the consideration of personal interests may be of great practical significance to employers and, therefore, circumstantially relevant to the job candidates as well. We may sketch out a rough equation as follows: productivity = ability × interest. In other words, high ability in a specific field does not guarantee success; neither does high interest level. The best predictions are possible when both variables are considered together. Thus, employers have good reason to determine whether a potential employee is well matched to the position; the employee should like to know as well.

Working from the Holland RIASEC model described earlier, Ny, Su, Rounds, and Drasgow (2012) recently completed an intriguing quantitative summary of 60 years of research on the relationship between vocational interests, person–environment fit, and job performance. Their review was based on 568 correlations from published empirical studies. The basic premise of their survey was that:

> Holland's theory suggests that the similarities between an individual's interest profile and the profile of his or her occupation should predict tenure and performance in academic and work domains (p. 387).

This is exactly what their analyses revealed. For the employment studies reviewed, the correlations between "fit" (congruence between an individual's Holland code and the code of his/her chosen occupation) and job performance ranged from .21 to .30, depending on the inventory used and the characteristics of the study. The same pattern emerged in the academic samples. The correlations between "fit" (congruence between a student's Holland code and the code of his/her chosen major) and grades were mainly in the range of .27 to .31. In other words, when employees or students possess interest patterns that match the expectations of their job or major, they are more likely to be productive in their work or studies.

We turn now to a critical examination of major interest tests. The four instruments chosen for review include:

- The Strong Interest Inventory-Revised (SII-R), the latest revision of the well-known Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB)
- The Vocational Preference Inventory (VPI), a useful inventory that embodies the RIASEC model of John Holland

- The Self-Directed Search (SDS), a self-administered and self-scored guide to exploring career options
- The Campbell Interest and Skill Survey (CISS), an appealing test that is simple in format but sophisticated in execution

Strong Interest Inventory-Revised (SII-R)

The Strong Interest Inventory-Revised (SII-R) is the latest revision of the Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB), one of the oldest and most prominent instruments in psychological testing (Donnay, Thompson, Morris, & Schaubhut, 2004). We can best understand the SII-R by studying the history of its esteemed predecessor, the SVIB. In particular, we need to review the guiding assumptions used in the construction of the SVIB that have been carried over into the SII-R.

The first edition of the SVIB appeared in 1927, eight years after E. K. Strong formulated the essential procedures for measuring occupational interests while attending a seminar at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Campbell, 1971; Strong, 1927). In constructing the SVIB, Strong employed two little-used techniques in measurement. First, the examinee was asked to express liking or disliking for a large and varied sample of occupations, educational disciplines, personality types, and recreational activities. Second, the responses were empirically keyed for specific occupations. In an empirical key, a specific response (e.g., liking to roller skate) is assigned to the scale for a particular occupation only if successful persons in that occupation tend to answer in that manner more often than comparison subjects.

Although Strong did not express his underlying assumptions in a simple and straightforward manner, it is clear that the theoretical foundation for the SVIB derives from a typological, trait-oriented conception of personality. Tzeng (1987) has identified the following basic assumptions in the development and application of the SVIB:

1. Each occupation has a desirable pattern of interests and personality characteristics among its workers. The ideal pattern is represented by successful people in that occupation.
2. Each individual has relatively stable interests and personality traits. When such interests and traits match the desirable interest patterns of the occupation the individual has a high probability to enter that occupation and be more likely to succeed in it.
3. It is highly possible to differentiate individuals in a given occupation from others-in-general in terms of the desirable patterns of interests and traits for that occupation.

Strong constructed the scales of his inventory by contrasting the responses of several specific occupational criterion groups with those of a people-in-general group. The subjects for each criterion group were workers in that occupation who were satisfied with their jobs and who had been so employed for at least three years. The items that differentiated the two groups, keyed in the appropriate direction, were selected for each occupational scale. For example, if members of a specific occupational group disliked "buying merchandise for a store" more often than people-in-general, then that item (keyed in the dislike direction) was added to the scale for that occupation.

The first SVIB consisted of 420 items and a mere handful of occupational scales (Strong, 1927). Separate editions for men and women followed shortly. The inventory has undergone numerous revisions over the years (Tzeng, 1987), culminating in the modern instrument known as the Strong Interest Inventory-Revised (Campbell, 1974; Hansen, 1992; Hansen & Campbell, 1985; Donnay, et al., 2004).

Although the Strong Interest Inventory (SII-R) was fashioned according to the same philosophy as the SVIB, the latest revision departs from its predecessors in a number of ways. The SII-R was developed with the following goals in mind:

- Shorten the instrument
- Add current occupations
- Increase the level of business, technology, and teamwork measures
- Broaden the assessment of work and leisure activities
- Reflect the diversity of the U.S. workforce in the samples obtained

The SII-R consists of 291 items answered in a 5-point Likert format, with options of *Strongly Like, Like, Indifferent, Dislike, Strongly Dislike*. The standardization sample ($N = 2{,}250$) consists of an equal number of employed men and women from the U.S. workforce. The sample is restricted to employed persons because the main purpose of the test is to determine interest patterns within occupational groups. Racial and ethnic groups accurately represent the U.S. population and constitute 30 percent of the sample.

Test results are organized in six sections. At the most global level are the six General Occupational Theme scores, namely, Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional. These scores are based on the theoretical analysis of Holland (1966, 1985), whose work was discussed earlier. Each theme score pertains to a major interest area that describes both a work environment and a type of person. For example, persons scoring high on the Realistic theme are generally quite robust, have difficulty expressing their feelings, and prefer to work outdoors with heavy machinery.

The 30 Basic Interest Scales are found within the general theme scores. These identify specific interest domains, indicating areas likely to be stimulating and rewarding to the client. Examples of these scales include Counseling and Helping, Visual Arts and Design, Marketing and Advertising, Finance and Investing, Medical Science, and Mechanics and Construction. The interest scales are empirically derived and consist of substantially intercorrelated items.

The most detailed results consist of 130 Occupational Scales, with separate normative data for each gender. Scores on these scales indicate the similarity of people of the client's gender who have been working in, and are satisfied with, the listed occupation. Each scale produced at least a one standard deviation separation between the occupational sample and the reference sample, supporting the distinctiveness of specific career paths (Donnay et al., 2004).

The SII-R also yields five Personal Style Scales. These are designed to measure preferences for broad styles of living and working. These scales assist in vocational guidance by showing the level of comfort with distinctive styles. The five style scales are as follows:

1. *Work Style*, on which a high score indicates a preference to work with people and a low score signifies an interest in ideas, data, and things;
2. *Learning Environment*, on which a high score indicates a preference for academic learning environments and a low score indicates a preference for more applied learning activities;
3. *Leadership Style*, on which a high score indicates comfort in taking charge of others and a low score indicates uneasiness; and
4. *Risk Taking/Adventure*, on which a high score indicates a preference for risky and adventurous activities as opposed to safe and predictable activities; and
5. *Team Orientation*, on which a high score indicates a preference for collaboration and working on teams as opposed to working independently.

The personal style scales each have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Note that these are truly bipolar scales for which each pole is distinct and meaningful.

The SII-R can only be scored by prepaid answer sheets or booklets that are mailed or faxed to the publisher, or through purchase of a software system that provides on-site scoring for immediate results. The results consist of a lengthy printout that is organized according to several themes. All scores are expressed as standard scores with a mean of 50 and an SD of 10.

Evaluation of the SII-R

The SII-R represents the culmination of over 70 years of study, involving literally thousands of research reports and hundreds of thousands of respondents. In evaluating this instrument, we can only outline basic trends in the research, referring the reader to other sources for details (Bailey, Larson, Borgen, & Gasser, 2008; Savickas, Taber, & Spokane, 2002; Hansen, 1992; Hansen & Campbell, 1985). We should also point out that evaluations of the reliability and validity of the SII-R are based in part upon

its similarity to the SII and SVIB, for which a huge amount of technical data exists.

Based upon test–retest studies, the reliability of the Strong has proved to be exceptionally good in the short run, with one- and two-week stability coefficients for the occupational scales generally in the .90s. When the test–retest interval is years or decades, the correlations drop to the .60s and .70s for the occupational scales, except for respondents who were older (over age 25) upon first testing. For younger respondents first tested as adolescents, the median test–retest correlation after 15 years is around .50 (Lubinski, Benbow, & Ryan, 1995). But for older respondents, first tested after the age of 25, the median test–retest correlation 10 to 20 years later is a phenomenal .80 (Campbell, 1971). Apparently, by the time we pass through young adulthood, personal interests become extremely stable. The questions on the SII-SVIB capture that stability in the occupational scores, providing support for the trait conception of personality upon which these instruments were based.

The validity of the Strong is premised largely on the ability of the initial occupational profile to predict the occupation eventually pursued. Strong (1955) reported that the chances were about two in three that people would be in occupations predicted by high occupational scale scores, and about one in five that respondents would be in occupations for which they had shown little interest when tested. Although other researchers have quibbled with the exact proportions (Dolliver, Irvin, & Bigley, 1972), it is clear that the SII-SVIB has impressive hit rates in predicting occupational entry. The instrument functions even better in predicting the occupations that an examinee will *not* enter. In a recent study, Donnay and Borgen (1996) provide evidence for construct validity by demonstrating strong overall differentiation between 50 occupational groups on the SII:

> The big picture is that people in diverse occupations show large and predictable differences in likes and dislikes, whether in terms of vocational interests or in terms of personal styles. And the Strong provides valid, structural, and comprehensive measures of these differences. (p. 290)

The SII-R is used mainly with high school and college students and adults seeking vocational guidance or advice on continued education. Because most students' interests are undeveloped and unstabilized prior to age 13 or 14, the test is not recommended for use below high-school level. As evident in the reliability data reported, the SII-R becomes increasingly valuable with older subjects, and it is not unusual to see middle-aged persons use the results of this instrument for guidance in career change.

Vocational Preference Inventory

The Vocational Preference Inventory is an objective, paper-and-pencil personality interest inventory used in vocational and career assessment (Holland, 1985c). The VPI measures 11 dimensions, including the six personality–environment themes of Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional, and five additional dimensions of Self-Control, Masculinity/Femininity, Status, Infrequency, and Acquiescence. The test items consist of 160 occupational titles toward which the examinee expresses a feeling by marking *y* (yes) or *n* (no). The VPI is a brief test (15 to 30 minutes) and is intended for persons 14 years and older with normal intelligence.

As noted previously, Holland proposes that personality traits tend to cluster into a small number of vocationally relevant patterns, called types. For each personality type there is also a corresponding work environment best suited to that type. According to Holland, there are six types: Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional. This is sometimes known as the **RIASEC model**, in reference to the first letters of the six types.

Test–retest reliability coefficients for the six major scales range from .89 to .97. VPI norms are based upon large convenience samples of college students and employed adults from earlier VPI editions. The characteristics of the standardization sample are not well defined, which makes the norms somewhat difficult to interpret (Rounds, 1985).

The validity of the VPI is essentially tied to the validity of Holland's (1985a) hexagonal model of vocational interests. Literally hundreds of studies have

examined this model from different perspectives. We will cite trends and representative studies. The reader is referred to Holland (1985c) and Walsh and Holland (1992) for more details.

Several VPI studies have investigated a key assumption of Holland's theory—that individuals tend to move toward environments that are congruent with their personality types. If this assumption is correct, then the real-world match between work environments and personality types of employees should be substantial. We should expect to find that Realistic environments have mainly Realistic employees, Social environments have mainly Social employees, and so on. Research on this topic has followed a straightforward methodology: Subjects are tested with the VPI and classified by their Holland types (using up to six letters); the work environments of the subjects are then independently classified by an appropriate environmental measure; finally, the degree of congruence between persons and environments is computed. In better studies, a correction for chance agreement is also applied.

Using his hexagonal model, Holland has developed occupational codes as a basis for classifying work environments (Gottfredson & Holland, 1989; Holland, 1966, 1978, 1985c). For example, landscape architect is coded as RIA (Realistic, Investigative, Artistic) because this occupation is known to be a technical, skilled trade (Realistic component) that requires scientific skills (Investigative component) and also demands artistic aptitude (Artistic component). The Realistic component is listed first because it is the most important for landscape architect, whereas the Investigative and Artistic components are of secondary and tertiary importance, respectively. Some other occupations and their codes are taxi driver (RSE), mathematics teacher (ISC), reporter (ASE), police officer (SRE), real estate appraiser (ECS), and secretary (CSA). In a similar manner, Holland has also worked out codes for different college majors.

One approach to congruence studies is to compare VPI results of students or workers with the Holland codes that correspond to their college majors or occupations. For example, VPI Holland codes for a sample of police officers should consist mainly of profiles that begin with S and should contain a larger-than-chance proportion of specifically SRE profiles. Furthermore, the degree of congruence should be related to the degree of expressed satisfaction with that line of work or study.

Research with college students provides strong support for the congruence prediction: Students tend to select and enter college majors that are congruent with their primary personality types (Holland, 1985a; Walsh & Holland, 1992). Thus, Artistic types tend to major in art, Investigative types tend to major in biology, and Enterprising types tend to major in business, to cite just a few examples. These results provide strong support for the VPI and the theory upon which it is based.

This short review has barely touched the surface of supportive validity studies with the VPI. Walsh and Holland (1992) cite several additional lines of research that buttress the validity of this test. But not all studies of the VPI affirm its validity. Furnham, Toop, Lewis, and Fisher (1995) failed to find a relationship between personality–environment (P-E) "fit" and job satisfaction, a key theoretical underpinning of the test. According to Holland's theory, the better the P–E fit, the greater should be job satisfaction. In three British samples, the relationships were weak or nonexistent, suggesting that the VPI does not "travel well" in cultures outside of the United States.

Self-Directed Search

Holland has always shown a keen interest in the practical applications of his research on vocational development. Consistent with this interest, he developed the Self-Directed Search, a highly practical, brief test that is appealing in its simplicity (Holland, 1985a, b). As the name suggests, the Self-Directed Search is designed to be a self-administered, self-scored, and self-interpreted test of vocational interest. The SDS measures the six RIASEC vocational themes described previously.

The SDS consists of dichotomous items that the examinee marks "like" or "dislike" (or "yes" or "no") in four sections: (1) Activities (six scales of 11 items each); (2) Competencies (six scales of 11 items each); (3) Occupations (six scales of 14 items each); and (4) Self-Estimates (two sets of six ratings). For each section, the face-valid items are grouped by

RIASEC themes. For each theme, the total number of "like" and "yes" answers is combined with the self-estimates of ability to come up with a total theme score. The SDS takes 30 to 50 minutes for completion and is intended for persons 15 years and older.

The RIASEC themes on the SDS showed test-retest reliabilities that range from .56 to .95 and internal consistencies that range from .70 to .93. Norms for SDS scales and codes are reported for pooled convenience samples of 4,675 high school students, 3,355 college students, and 4,250 employed adults ages 16 through 24 (Holland, 1985a, b). However, SDS results are typically interpreted in an individualized, ipsative manner ("Is this occupation a good fit for this client?"), so normative data are of limited relevance.

The SDS is available in a hand-scored paper-and-pencil version and a computerized version as well. Unfortunately, the paper-and-pencil version is prone to a 16 percent clerical error rate when used by high school students (Holland, 1985a, b). The user-friendly microcomputer test is probably the preferred version because of the ease of administration and the error-free scoring and interpretation.

When a subject takes the SDS, the three highest theme scores are used to denote a summary code. For example, a person whose three highest scores were on Investigative, Artistic, and Realistic would have a summary code of IAR. In a separate booklet distributed with the test—the *Occupations Finder*—the examinee can look up his or her summary code and find a list of occupations that provide the best "fit." For example, an examinee with an IAR summary code would learn that he or she most closely resembles persons in the following occupations: anthropologist, astronomer, chemist, pathologist, and physicist. The test booklet contains additional information, which helps the examinee explore relevant career options.

The SDS serves a very useful purpose in providing a quick and simple format for prompting young persons to examine career alternatives. By eliminating the time-consuming process of administration, scoring, interpretation, and counselor feedback, the test makes it possible for a wide audience to receive an introductory level of career counseling. Holland (1985a, b) proposes that the SDS is appropriate for up to 50 percent of students and adults who might desire career guidance. Presumably, the other 50 percent would find the SDS an insufficient basis for career exploration. Holland (1985a, b) rightfully warns users to consider many sources of information in career choice and not to rely too heavily on test scores per se. Levinson (1990) discusses the integration of SDS data with other psychoeducational data to make specific vocational recommendations for high school students.

LaBarbera (2005) illustrates the potential application of the SDS in a study of 463 physician assistants (PAs) known to be well satisfied with their work. The PAs are medical professionals who provide care under the supervision of a licensed physician. This is a demanding profession with well defined duties that include many of the same functions provided by a general practitioner. Who is a good candidate for this up-and-coming profession in high demand? LaBarbera (2005) determined that the Holland profile was a distinctive SIR for men, especially those with interests in surgery, whereas the profile for women maintained the first two letters (SI) but yielded a muddle for the third theme. This is valuable information for prospective students and career counselors.

The validity of the SDS is linked to the validity of the hexagonal model of personality and environments upon which the test is based. One aspect of validity, then, is whether the model makes predictions that are confirmed by SDS results in the real world. In general, the results from over 400 studies support the construct validity of the SDS (Dumenci, 1995; Holland, 1985a, b, 1987).

One approach to construct validity is to determine whether the relationships among SDS scales make theoretical sense. One tenet of construct validity is that similar scales should reveal stronger relationships, dissimilar scales weaker relationships. For example, it is not hard to imagine one person combining Artistic and Investigative themes in personality and work environment. After all, these themes are mildly similar, so we would predict a moderately positive correlation between them. This is exactly what Holland (1985a, b) found. In a general reference sample of 175 women aged 26 to 65 years, scores on these two themes correlated modestly, $r = .26$, as

would be predicted. Further, unrelated themes like Investigative and Enterprising (which bear little in common) should reveal a weak correlation. The value turned out to be a negligible $r = -.02$. Overall, the various correlations among the six themes of the SDS make theoretical sense, which supports the construct validity of the test.

The predictive validity of the SDS has been investigated in several dozen studies, which are summarized by Holland (1985a, b, 1987). The typical methodology for these studies is that SDS high-point codes for large samples of students are compared with the first letter of their occupational choices (or aspirations) one to three years later. Overall, the findings indicate that the SDS has moderate to high predictive efficiency, depending upon the age of the sample (hit rates go up with age), the length of the time interval (hit rates go down with time), and the specific category predicted (hit rates are better for Investigative and Social predictions) (Gottfredson & Holland, 1975).

Campbell Interest and Skill Survey

The Campbell Interest and Skill Survey (CISS; Campbell, Hyne, & Nilsen, 1992) is a newer measure of self-reported interests and skills. The test is designed to help individuals make better career choices by describing how their interests and skills match the occupational world. The primary target population for the CISS is students and young adults who have not entered the job market, but the test is also suitable for older workers who are considering a change in careers. The test is appropriate for persons 15 years of age and older with a sixth-grade reading level, although younger children can be tested in exceptional circumstances.

The CISS consists of 200 interest items and 120 skill items. The interest items include occupations, school subjects, and varied working activities that the examinee rates on a six-point scale from strongly like to strongly dislike. The interest items resemble the following:

A pilot, flying commercial aircraft

A biologist, working in a research lab

A police detective, solving crimes

The skill items include a list of activities that the examinee rates on a six-point scale from expert (widely recognized as excellent in this area) to none (have no skills in this area). The skill items resemble the following:

Helping a family resolve its conflicts

Making furniture, using woodworking and power tools

Writing a magazine story

CISS results are scored on several different kinds of scales: Orientation Scales, Basic Interest and Skill Scales, Occupational Scales, Special Scales, and Procedural Checks. All scale scores are reported as *T* scores, normed to a population average of 50, with a standard deviation of 10.

The Orientation Scales serve to organize the CISS profile—the interest, skill, and occupational scales are reported under the appropriate Orientations. The seven Orientations are as follows (Campbell et al., 1992, pp. 2–3):

- *Influencing*—influencing others through leadership, politics, public speaking, and marketing
- *Organizing*—organizing the work of others, managing, and monitoring financial performance
- *Helping*—helping others through teaching, healing, and counseling
- *Creating*—creating artistic, literary, or musical productions, and designing products or environments
- *Analyzing*—analyzing data, using mathematics, and carrying out scientific experiments
- *Producing*—producing products, using "hands- on" skills in farming, construction, and mechanical crafts
- *Adventuring*—adventuring, competing, and risk taking through athletic, police, and military activities

There are 29 pairs of Basic Scales, each pair consisting of parallel interest and skill scales. The Basic Scales are clustered within the seven Orientations, based upon their intercorrelations. For example, the Helping Orientation contains the following Basic

Scales, each with separate interest and skill components: Adult Development, Counseling, Child Development, Religious Activities, and Medical Practice.

The 58 pairs of Occupational Scales, each with separate interest and skill components, provide feedback on the degree of similarity between the examinee and satisfied workers in that occupation. These scales were constructed empirically by contrasting the responses of happily employed persons in specific occupations with responses of a general reference sample drawn from the working population at large.

In addition to Basic and Occupational Scales, the CISS incorporates three special scales: Academic Focus, a measure of interest and confidence in intellectual, scientific, and literary activities; Extraversion, a measure of social extraversion; and Variety, a measure of the examinee's breadth of interests and skills. Finally, the CISS reports a variety of Procedural Checks to detect possible problems in test taking such as random responding or excessive omissions.

Overall, the reliability of CISS scales is exceptionally strong. For example, coefficient alpha for the Orientation Scales is typically in the high .80s, and three-month test–retest reliabilities for 324 respondents are in the mid- to high .80s. Similar findings for reliability are reported for the Basic and Occupational Scales. Norms for the CISS are based upon 5,000 subjects spread over the 58 occupations. The authors report extensive validity data for the Occupational Scales, including sample means for each occupational sample as well as lists of the three highest- and lowest-scoring occupations for each scale (Campbell et al., 1992). These data document that the scales do discriminate between occupations in an effective and meaningful way. For example, the average *T* score on accountant by accountants is 75.8. Statisticians, bookkeepers, and financial planners achieve the next three highest scores for this scale, with average *T* scores in the low 60s. Commercial artists, professors, and social workers obtain the three lowest scores, with average *T* scores around 40. Because these results fit well with our expectations about occupational interest and skill patterns, they provide support for the validity of the CISS.

Independent correlational studies also support the validity of the CISS. For example, in a sample of 221 college students, Hansen (2007) correlated CISS Skill Scale scores with SII scores and found strong evidence for convergent and discriminant validity (i.e., strong correlations with similar scales, negligible correlations with dissimilar scales). In a sample of 118 adults, Savickas et al. (2002) correlated scores from individual occupational scales of the CISS with scores from the scales of other mainstream instruments such as the Strong Interest Inventory. They also found strong support for both convergent validity (i.e., modest correlations for same-named pairs of scales) and discriminant validity (i.e., negligible correlations for unlike pairs of scales). In a sample of 128 college students, Hansen and Neuman (1999) confirmed the concurrent validity of the CISS by finding a good fit between occupational scale scores and students' chosen majors. The fit was considered "excellent" or "moderately good" for more than 70 percent of the students. Boggs (1999) provides a review and critique of the CISS. Campbell (2002) presents the history and development of the instrument.

This instrument will almost certainly receive increased attention in the years ahead. One noteworthy feature of the CISS is the comprehensiveness and clarity of the profile report form. The report consists of 11 user-friendly pages. We have reprinted two pages in Figure 11.4 for illustrative purposes. This format is preferable to the detail-rich but eye-straining graphs encountered with many instruments. The CISS promises to rival the Strong Interest Inventory for vocational guidance of young adults.

CAMPBELL™ INTEREST AND SKILL SURVEY INDIVIDUAL PROFILE REPORT

SAMPLE REPORT

Date Scored: 07/27/2005



FIGURE 11.4 **Representative Sections from the Campbell Interest and Skill Survey**

Note: The full profile consists of an 11-page printout.

Source: From Campbell Interest and Skill Survey (CISS). Copyright © 1997 David Campbell, Ph.D. Reproduced with permission of the publisher NCS Pearson, Inc. All rights reserved. "Campbell" and "CISS" are trademarks, in the US and/or other countries, of Pearson Education, INC. or its affiliates.

CAMPBELL™ INTEREST AND SKILL SURVEY INDIVIDUAL PROFILE REPORT

SAMPLE REPORT Date Scored: 07/27/2005

Influencing Orientation

Orientation Scale

	* Standard Scores	Very Low 30 35	Low 40 45	Mid-Range 50	High 55 60	Very High 65 70	** Interest/ Skill Pattern
Influencing	I 52 S 48			◆ ◇			

Basic Interest and Skill Scales

	* Standard Scores	Very Low 30 35	Low 40 45	Mid-Range 50	High 55 60	Very High 65 70	** Interest/ Skill Pattern
Leadership	I 55 S 54				◆ ◇		Develop
Law/ Politics	I 60 S 49					◆ ◇	Develop
Public Speaking	I 30 S 47	◆		◇			
Sales	I 56 S 52				◆ ◇		Develop
Advertising/ Marketing	I 48 S 53			◆ ◇			

Occupational Scales

	*** Orientation Code	* Standard Scores 25 30 35	Very Low 40 45	Low 50	Mid-Range 55 60	High 65 70 75	Very High	** Interest/ Skill Pattern
Attorney	I	I 62 S 52			◇	◆		Develop
Financial Planner	IO	I 48 S 50		◆	◇			
Hotel Manager	IO	I 42 S 43		◆ ◇				Avoid
Manufacturer's Representative	IO	I 35 S 53	◆		◇			
Marketing Director	IO	I 50 S 49		◆ ◇				
Realtor	IO	I 58 S 60			◇	◆		Pursue
CEO/President	IOA	I 42 S 50		◆	◇			
Human Resources Director	IOH	I 60 S 59			◇	◆		Pursue
School Superintendent	IOH	I 75 S 51			◇		◆	Develop
Advertising Account Executive	IC	I 42 S 51		◆	◇			
Media Executive	IC	I 38 S 49	◆		◇			
Public Relations Director	IC	I 38 S 46	◆		◇			
Corporate Trainer	ICH	I 46 S 59		◆	◇			Explore

The Influencing Orientation focuses on influencing others through leadership, politics, public speaking, sales, and marketing. Influencers like to make things happen. They are often visible because they tend to take charge of activities that interest them. They typically work in organizations where they are responsible for directing activities, setting policies, and motivating people. Influencers are generally confident of their ability to persuade others and they usually enjoy the give-and-take of debating and negotiating. Typical high-scoring individuals include company presidents, corporate managers, school superintendents, sales representatives, and attorneys.

Your Influencing interest and skill scores are both mid-range. People who have this pattern of scores typically report moderate interest and confidence in leading, negotiating, marketing, selling, and public speaking.

Your scores on the Influencing Basic Scales, which provide more detail about your interests and skills in this area, are reported above on the left-hand side of the page. Your scores on the Influencing Occupational Scales, which show how your pattern of interests and skills compares with those of people employed in Influencing occupations, are reported above on the right-hand side of the page. Each occupation has a one-, two-, or three-letter code that indicates its highest Orientation score(s). The more similar the Orientation code is to your highest Orientation scores (which are reported on page 2), the more likely it is that you will find satisfaction working in that occupation.

* Standard Scores: I (◆) = Interests; S (◇) = Skills

** Interest/Skill Pattern: Pursue = High Interests, High Skills; Develop = High Interest, Lower Skills; Explore = High Skills, Lower Interests; Avoid = Low Interest, Low Skills

*** Orientation Code: I=Influencing; O=Organizing; H=Helping; C=Creating; N=aNalyzing; P=Producing; A=Adventuring

Range of middle 50% of people in the occupation: Solid Bar = Interests; Hollow Bar = Skills

FIGURE 11.4 Continued

APPENDIX A

Major Landmarks in the History of Psychological Testing

2200 B.C.	Chinese begin civil service examinations.
1838	Jean Esquirol distinguishes between mental illness and mental retardation.
1862	Wilhelm Wundt uses a calibrated pendulum to measure the "speed of thought."
1866	O. Edouard Seguin writes the first major textbook on the assessment and treatment of mental retardation.
1869	Wundt founds the first experimental laboratory in psychology in Leipzig, Germany.
1884	Francis Galton administers the first test battery to thousands of citizens at the International Health Exhibit.
1890	James McKeen Cattell uses the term *mental test* in announcing the agenda for his Galtonian test battery.
1896	Emil Kraepelin provides the first comprehensive classification of mental disorders.
1901	Clark Wissler discovers that Cattellian "brass instruments" tests have no correlation with college grades.
1904	Charles Spearman proposes that intelligence consists of a single general factor *g* and numerous specific factors s_1, s_2, s_3, and so forth.
1904	Karl Pearson formulates the theory of correlation.
1905	Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon invent the first modern intelligence test.
1908	Henry H. Goddard translates the Binet-Simon scales from French into English.
1912	Stern introduces the IQ, or intelligence quotient: the mental age divided by chronological age.
1916	Lewis Terman revises the Binet-Simon scales, publishes the Stanford-Binet; revisions appear in 1937, 1960, 1986, and 2003.
1917	Robert Yerkes spearheads the development of the Army Alpha and Beta examinations used for testing WWI recruits.
1917	Robert Woodworth develops the Personal Data Sheet, the first personality test.
1920	The Rorschach inkblot test is published.
1921	Psychological Corporation—the first major test publisher—is founded by Cattell, Thorndike, and Woodworth.
1926	Florence Goodenough publishes the Draw-A-Man Test.
1926	The first Scholastic Aptitude Test is published by the College Entrance Examination Board.
1927	The first edition of the Strong Vocational Interest Blank is published.
1935	The Thematic Apperception Test is released by Morgan and Murray at Harvard University.
1936	Lindquist and others publish the precursor to the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills.
1936	Edgar Doll publishes the Vineland Social Maturity Scale for assessment of adaptive behavior in those with mental retardation.
1938	L. L. Thurstone proposes that intelligence consists of about seven group factors known as primary mental abilities.
1938	Raven publishes the Raven's Progressive Matrices, a nonverbal test of reasoning intended to measure Spearman's *g* factor.
1938	Lauretta Bender publishes the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, a design-copying test of visual-motor integration.
1938	Oscar Buros publishes the first *Mental Measurements Yearbook.*
1938	Arnold Gesell releases his scale of infant development.
1939	The Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale is published; revisions are published in 1955 (WAIS), 1981 (WAIS-R), 1997 (WAIS-III), and 2008 (WAIS-IV).
1939	Taylor–Russell tables published for determining the expected proportion of successful applicants with a test.

1939 The Kuder Preference Record, a forced-choice interest inventory, is published.

1942 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is published.

1948 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) uses situational techniques for selection of officers.

1949 The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children is published; revisions are published in 1974 (WISC-R), 1991 (WISC-III), and 2003 (WISC-IV).

1950 The Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank is published.

1951 Lee Cronbach introduces coefficient alpha as an index of reliability (internal consistency) for tests and scales.

1952 American Psychiatric Association publishes the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-I).*

1953 Stephenson develops the Q-technique for studying the self-concept and other variables.

1954 Paul Meehl publishes *Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction.*

1956 The Halstead-Reitan Test Battery begins to emerge as the premiere test battery in neuropsychology.

1957 C. E. Osgood describes the semantic differential.

1958 Lawrence Kohlberg publishes the first version of his Moral Judgment Scale; research with it expands until the mid-1980s.

1959 Campbell and Fiske publish a test validation approach known as the multitrait-multimethod matrix.

1963 Raymond Cattell proposes the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligences.

1967 In *Hobson v. Hansen* the court rules against the use of group ability tests to "track" students on the grounds that such tests discriminate against minority children.

1968 American Psychiatric Association publishes *DSM-II.*

1969 Nancy Bayley publishes the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID). The revised version (BSID-2) is published in 1993.

1969 Arthur Jensen proposes the genetic hypothesis of African American versus white IQ differences in the *Harvard Educational Review.*

1971 In *Griggs v. Duke Power* the Supreme Court rules that employment test results must have a demonstrable link to job performance.

1971 George Vaillant popularizes a hierarchy of 18 ego adaptive mechanisms and describes a methodology for their assessment.

1971 Court decision requires that tests used for personnel selection must be job relevant (*Griggs v. Duke Power*).

1972 The Model Penal Code rule for legal insanity is published and widely adopted in the United States.

1974 Rudolf Moos begins publication of the Social Climate Scales to assess different environments.

1974 Friedman and Rosenman popularize the Type A coronary-prone behavior pattern; their assessment is interview-based.

1975 The U.S. Congress passes Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.

1978 Jane Mercer publishes SOMPA (System of Multicultural Pluralistic Assessment), a test battery designed to reduce cultural discrimination.

1978 In the *Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection* adverse impact is defined by the four-fifths rule; also guidelines for employee selection studies are published.

1979 In *Larry P. v. Riles* the court rules that standardized IQ tests are culturally biased against low-functioning black children.

1980 In *Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon* the court rules that standardized IQ tests are not racially or culturally biased.

1985 The American Psychological Association and other groups jointly publish the influential *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing.*

1985 Sparrow and others publish the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, a revision of the pathbreaking 1936 Vineland Social Maturity Scale.

1987	American Psychiatric Association publishes *DSM-III-R*.
1989	The Lake Wobegon Effect is noted: Virtually all states of the union claim that their achievement levels are above average.
1989	The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 is published.
1992	American Psychological Association publishes a revised *Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct* (*American Psychologist,* December 1992)
1994	American Psychiatric Association publishes *DSM-IV*.
1994	Herrnstein and Murray revive the race and IQ heritability debate in *The Bell Curve*.
1999	APA and other groups publish revised *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing*.
2003	New revision of APA *Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct* goes into effect.

APPENDIX B

Standard and Standardized-Score Equivalents of Percentile Ranks in a Normal Distribution

This table lists the equivalence between percentile ranks and four other types of scores: *z* scores (mean of 0, SD of 1.00), deviation IQs (mean of 100, SD of 15), *T* scores (mean of 50, SD of 10), and GRE-like scores (mean of 500, SD of 100). The application of the table assumes that the distribution of scores on a test or variable is normally distributed.

We illustrate how this appendix can be used with two examples. Suppose that we desire to know the WAIS-IV IQ that is equivalent to a percentile rank of 97. Reading across the row that begins with PR 97, we discover that the equivalent IQ is 128. Suppose that we desire to know the percentile rank that is equivalent to a GRE score of 675. In the far right column, we locate a score of 675 and read across to the left-hand column to discover that the equivalent percentile rank is 96.

	z	*Deviation IQ*	*T Score*	*GRE-Like Score*		*z*	*Deviation IQ*	*T Score*	*GRE-Like Score*
Mean	0.00	100	50	500	PR 82	0.91	114	59	591
St. Dev.	1.00	15	10	100	81	0.88	113	59	588
					80	0.84	113	58	584
PR 99	2.33	135	73	733	79	0.80	112	58	580
98	2.05	131	71	705	78	0.77	112	58	577
97	1.88	128	69	688	77	0.74	111	57	574
96	1.75	126	68	675	76	0.71	111	57	571
95	1.64	125	66	664	75	0.67	110	57	567
94	1.55	123	66	655	74	0.64	110	56	564
93	1.48	122	65	648	73	0.61	110	56	561
92	1.41	121	64	641	72	0.58	109	56	558
91	1.34	120	63	634	71	0.55	108	56	555
90	1.28	119	63	628	70	0.52	108	55	552
89	1.22	118	62	622	69	0.49	107	55	549
88	1.18	118	62	618	68	0.47	107	55	547
87	1.13	117	61	613	67	0.44	107	54	544
86	1.08	116	61	608	66	0.41	106	54	541
85	1.04	116	60	604	65	0.39	106	54	539
84	0.99	115	60	599	64	0.36	105	54	536
83	0.95	114	60	595	63	0.33	105	53	533

	z	*Deviation IQ*	*T Score*	*GRE-Like Score*		*z*	*Deviation IQ*	*T Score*	*GRE-Like Score*
PR 62	0.31	105	53	531	PR 31	−0.49	93	45	451
61	0.28	104	53	528	30	−0.52	92	45	448
60	0.25	104	53	525	29	−0.55	92	44	445
59	0.23	104	52	523	28	−0.58	91	44	442
58	0.20	103	52	520	27	−0.61	90	44	439
57	0.18	103	52	518	26	−0.64	90	44	436
56	0.15	102	52	515	25	−0.67	90	43	433
55	0.12	102	51	512	24	−0.71	89	43	429
54	0.10	102	51	510	23	−0.74	89	43	426
53	0.07	101	51	507	22	−0.77	88	42	423
52	0.05	101	51	505	21	−0.80	88	42	420
51	0.03	100	50	503	20	−0.84	87	42	416
50	0.00	100	50	500	19	−0.88	87	41	412
49	−0.03	100	50	497	18	−0.91	86	41	409
48	−0.05	99	49	495	17	−0.95	86	40	405
47	−0.07	99	49	493	16	−0.99	85	40	401
46	−0.10	98	49	490	15	−1.04	84	40	396
45	−0.12	98	49	488	14	−1.08	84	39	392
44	−0.15	98	48	485	13	−1.13	83	39	387
43	−0.18	97	48	482	12	−1.18	82	38	382
42	−0.20	97	48	480	11	−1.22	82	38	378
41	−0.23	96	48	477	10	−1.28	81	37	372
40	−0.25	96	47	475	9	−1.34	80	37	366
39	−0.28	96	47	472	8	−1.41	79	36	359
38	−0.31	95	47	469	7	−1.48	78	35	352
37	−0.33	95	47	467	6	−1.55	77	34	345
36	−0.36	95	46	464	5	−1.64	75	34	336
35	−0.39	94	46	461	4	−1.75	74	32	325
34	−0.41	94	46	459	3	−1.88	72	31	312
33	−0.44	93	46	456	2	−2.05	69	29	295
32	−0.47	93	45	453	1	−2.33	65	27	267

GLOSSARY

accommodation in Piaget's theory, the adjustment of an unsuccessful schema so that it works.

achievement test a test that measures the degree of learning, success, or accomplishment in a subject matter.

actuarial judgment the kind of automated judgment in which an empirically derived formula is used to diagnose or predict behavior.

adverse impact in hiring, adverse impact is said to exist if one group has a selection rate less than four-fifths of the rate of the group with the highest selection rate (*Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection,* 1978).

age norm a type of standardization that depicts the level of test performance for each separate age group in the normative sample.

alcohol abuse an alcohol use disorder characterized by the functional impact of drinking on the life of the patient (e.g., unsafe behavior, legal problems, family conflicts).

alcohol dependence an alcohol use disorder characterized by tolerance, withdrawal, and preoccupation with drinking.

alternate-forms reliability a form of reliability in which alternate forms of the same test are given to a group of heterogeneous and representative subjects; scores for the two forms are then correlated.

Alzheimer's disease a degenerative neurological disorder; in the early stages, the most prominent symptom is memory loss.

Americans with Disabilities Act an act passed by Congress in 1990 that forbids discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.

amygdala an almond-shaped mass of gray matter located in the anterior temporal lobe, involved in emotions and other capacities.

analogue behavioral assessment the observation of clients in a contrived but plausible setting in which they are instructed to engage in relevant tasks designed to elicit behaviors of interest.

aphasia any deviation in language performance caused by brain damage.

apraxia variety of dysfunctions characterized by a breakdown in the direction or execution of complex motor acts.

aptitude test a test that measures one or more clearly defined and relatively homogeneous segments of ability.

architectural system likened to "hardware" in the information-processing approach to intelligence, the architectural system refers to biologically based properties (e.g., memory span, speed of encoding) necessary for information processing.

assessment appraising or estimating the level or magnitude of some attribute of a person; testing is one small part of assessment which also incorporates observations, interviews, rating scales, and checklists.

assessment center an approach to assessment of managerial talent, which consists of multiple simulation techniques, including group presentations, problem-solving exercises, group discussion exercises, interviews, and in-basket techniques.

assimilation in Piaget's theory, the application of a schema to an object, person, or event.

attention the cognitive capacity of the brain to identify what is important and to ignore what is irrelevant.

attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder a behavioral syndrome characterized by fidgeting, distractibility, impulsivity, attentional deficits, poor social skills, and not considering consequences.

attitude learned cognitive, affective, and behavioral predispositions to respond positively or negatively to certain objects, situations, institutions, concepts, or persons.

basal ganglia a collection of nuclei in the forebrain that make connections with the cerebral cortex above and the thalamus below; the basal ganglia participate in the control of movement.

basal level for tests in which subtest items are ranked from easiest to hardest, the level below which the examinee would almost certainly answer all questions correctly.

base rate in decision theory, the proportion of successful applicants who would be selected using current methods, without benefit of the new test.

behavior observation scale a variation upon the BARS technique which uses a continuum from "almost never" to "almost always" to measure how often an employee performs specific tasks on each behavioral dimension.

behavior sample in testing, the notion that a test is just a sample of behaviors that permits the examiner to make inferences about a larger domain of relevant behaviors.

behavior therapy the application of the methods and findings of experimental psychology to the modification of maladaptive behavior; also called behavior modification.

behavioral assessment a variety of techniques that concentrate on behavior itself rather than on underlying traits, hypothetical causes, or presumed dimensions of personality.

behavioral avoidance test a behavioral procedure in which the therapist measures how long the client can tolerate an anxiety-inducing stimulus.

behavioral procedure a procedure for assessing the antecedents and consequences of behavior; behavioral procedures include checklists, rating scales, interviews, and structured observations.

behaviorally anchored rating scale a criterion-referenced rating scale.

bias in construct validity a type of bias demonstrated when a test is shown to measure different hypothetical traits (psychological constructs) for one group than another or to measure the same trait but with differing degrees of accuracy.

bias in content validity a type of bias demonstrated when an item or subscale is relatively more difficult for members of one group than another after the general ability level of the two groups is held constant.

bias in predictive validity a type of bias demonstrated when the inference drawn from the test score is not made with the smallest feasible random error or if there is constant error in an inference or prediction as a function of membership in a particular group.

biodata objective or scoreable autobiographical data; recognized as a valid adjunct to personnel selection.

Broca's aphasia also known as expressive aphasia, a form of language disturbance characterized by effortful, nonfluent speech and few words.

C scale a variant on the stanine scale with 11 units.

ceiling level for tests in which subtest items are ranked from easiest to hardest, the level above which the examinee would almost certainly fail all remaining questions.

cerebellum part of the hindbrain responsible for helping to coordinate muscle tone, posture, and skilled movements.

cerebral cortex the outermost layer of the brain that is the source of the highest levels of sensory, motor, and cognitive processing.

cerebrospinal fluid a clear liquid, continuously produced and replenished within the ventricles of the brain, that provides protection against external buffeting.

cerebrovascular accident a "stroke" most often caused by plugging up (infarction) of a brain artery, leading to death of surrounding brain tissue.

cerebrum the most substantial part of the brain, consisting of the two hemispheres that each contain four lobes.

certification testing to determine that a person has at least a minimum proficiency in some discipline or activity.

classical theory of measurement the dominant theory in psychological testing; the theory assumes that an observed score consists of a true score plus measurement error.

classification in testing, the process of using tests to assign a person to one category rather than another.

clerical scoring error in testing, an error in test scoring related to the mechanics of scoring, such as adding subscores incorrectly or consulting the wrong conversion table.

clinical judgment the kind of judgment in which the decision maker processes information in his or her head to diagnose or predict behavior.

coaching in testing, the attempt to boost test scores by providing the examinee with extra practice on testlike materials, review of fundamental concepts likely to be covered by the test, and advice about optimal test-taking strategies.

coding complexity in observational rating situations, the use of too many categories, or ill-defined categories, which leads to low inter-rater reliability.

coefficient alpha an index of reliability that may be thought of as the mean of all possible split-half coefficients, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula.

cognitive behavior therapy an approach to behavior change that emphasizes changing the client's belief structure.

collaboratory Internet-based arrangements that facilitate the collaboration of test specialists, regardless of geographical location.

competency to stand trial the determination by the presiding judge that a defendant does not have a mental defect, illness, or condition that renders him or her unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense.

componential intelligence in Sternberg's theory, the internal mental mechanisms that are responsible for intelligent behavior.

computer-assisted psychological assessment CAPA refers to the entire range of computer applications in psychological assessment and includes testing, scoring, report writing, and individualized test administration.

computer-based test interpretation CBTI refers to test interpretation and report writing by computer, which is a major component of computer-assisted psychological assessment (CAPA).

computerized adaptive testing a family of procedures that allows for accurate and efficient measurement of ability; individualized testing continues until a predetermined level of measurement precision is reached.

concurrent validity a type of criterion-related validity in which the criterion measures are obtained at approximately the same time as the test scores.

concussion a transitory alteration of consciousness from a blow to the head; may be followed by temporary amnesia, dizziness, nausea, weak pulse, and slow respiration, yet there is no demonstrable organic brain damage.

conservation in Piaget's theory, the awareness that physical quantities do not change in amount when they are superficially altered in appearance.

construct a theoretical, intangible quality or trait in which individuals differ.

construct validity a type of validity that refers to the appropriateness of test-based inferences about the underlying construct purportedly measured by the test.

constructional dyspraxia impairment of the ability to deal with spatial relationships either in a two- or three-dimensional framework.

consumer psychology the branch of industrial/organizational psychology that deals with the development, advertising, and marketing of products and services.

content validity the type of validity that is determined by the degree to which the questions, tasks, or items on a test are representative of the universe of behavior the test was designed to sample.

contextual intelligence in Sternberg's theory, the mental activity involved in purposive adaptation to, shaping of, and selection of real-world environments relevant to one's life.

contingency management procedure an approach to behavior therapy in which the therapist identifies and alters the consequences of unwanted behaviors.

convergent validity a type of validity that is demonstrated when a test correlates highly with other variables or tests with which it shares an overlap of constructs.

corpus callosum the major commissure that serves to integrate the functions of the two cerebral hemispheres.

correction for guessing in group testing, the practice of revising a subject's final score in light of apparent guessing.

correlation coefficient a numerical index of the degree of linear relationship between two sets of scores; correlation coefficients can vary between 21.00 and 11.00.

correlation matrix a complete table of intercorrelations between all the variables that is the beginning point of factor analysis.

cranial nerves 12 paired neural tracts that help govern basic sensory and motor functions such as vision, smell, facial movement, taste, and hearing.

creativity test a test that assesses the ability to produce new ideas, insights, or artistic creations that are accepted as being of social, aesthetic, or scientific value.

criterion contamination a source of error in test validation when the criterion is "contaminated" by its artificial commonality with the test, such as test and criterion contain nearly identical items. Also, a form of evaluation error in which a criterion measure includes factors that are not demonstrably part of the job, for example, rating appearance when it is not job related.

criterion-keyed approach a test development approach in which test items are assigned to a particular scale if, and only if, they discriminate between a well defined criterion group and a relevant control group.

criterion problem the difficult problem of conceptualizing and measuring work performance constructs which are often complex, fuzzy, and multidimensional.

criterion-referenced test a test in which the objective is to determine where the examinee stands with respect to very tightly defined educational objectives; no comparison is made to the performance of other examinees.

criterion-related validity the type of validity that is demonstrated when a test is shown to be effective in estimating an examinee's performance on some outcome measure.

critical incidents checklist a form of performance evaluation based upon actual episodes of desirable and undesirable on-the-job behavior.

cross-sectional design a research design in which subjects of different ages are tested at one point in time.

cross-sequential design a research design that combines cross-sectional and longitudinal methods.

cross-validation for predictive tests, the practice of using the original regression equation in a new sample to determine whether the test predicts the criterion as well as it did in the original sample.

crystallized intelligence in Cattell and Horn's theory, what one has already learned through the investment of fluid intelligence in cultural settings (e.g., learning algebra in school).

culture-fair test a test designed to minimize irrelevant influences of cultural learning and social climate and thereby produce a cleaner separation of natural ability from specific learning.

custody evaluation in divorce cases, the psychological evaluation of a child (or children) and both parents so as to offer an opinion to the court as to the best interests of the child (or children) in custody arrangements.

decision theory an approach to psychological measurement that considers the costs and benefits of test-based decisions, for example, in personnel selection.

defense mechanisms unconscious mental strategies available to the ego in dealing with the conflicting demands of id, superego, and external reality.

diagnosis determining the nature and source of a person's abnormal behavior, and classifying the behavior pattern within an accepted diagnostic system.

discriminant validity a type of validity that is demonstrated when a test does not correlate with variables or tests from which it should differ.

divergent production the creation of numerous appropriate responses to a single stimulus situation.

divergent thinking the kind of thinking that goes off in different directions.

Durham rule the legal provision for the defense of insanity if the criminal act was a "product" of mental disease or defect; dropped in 1972 and replaced by the Model Penal Code.

duty to warn stemming from the *Tarasoff* case, the responsibility of clinicians to communicate any serious threat to the potential victim, law enforcement agencies, or both.

dysarthria slurred, hesitant speech (not drug or alcohol induced) that often signifies damage to the cerebellum.

ecological momentary assessment using wireless technology to measure patient experience (e.g., pain, fatigue, mood) in the real world at the point of experience.

ego in psychoanalytic theory, the conscious self that mediates between the id and reality.

equilibration in Piaget's theory, the entire process of assimilation, accommodation, and equilibrium.

evidence-based assessment evaluation of a testing tool not only by means of the standard psychometric indices of reliability and validity but also through considerations of clinical utility.

executive functions brain functions that include logical analysis, conceptualization, reasoning, planning, and flexibility of thinking.

executive system likened to "software" in the information-processing approach to intelligence, the executive system refers to environmentally learned components that steer problem solving and provide overall guidance.

expectancy table a table that portrays the established relationship between test scores and expected outcome on a relevant task.

experiential intelligence in Sternberg's theory, the ability to deal effectively with novel tasks.

expert rankings a scaling method that relies upon the judgment of experts to determine the rankings for individual components.

expert witness in court cases, a witness whom the judge deems qualified to testify about a proper subject matter.

extravalidity concerns the side effects and unintended consequences of testing.

extraversion a sociable, outgoing, excitement-seeking personality disposition.

extrinsic religious expression the use of religion for external goals such as security, status, and friendship.

face validity for tests, the appearance of validity to test users, examiners, and especially the examinees; not a technical form of validity, but important for the social acceptability of a test.

factor an underlying construct or variable that helps explain the correlations between several tests or measures.

factor analysis a family of statistical procedures that researchers use to summarize relationships among variables that are correlated in highly complex ways; the goal of factor analysis is to derive a parsimonious set of derived factors.

factor loading in factor analysis, the correlation between an individual test and a single factor.

factor matrix a table of correlations between variables and factors; the correlations are called factor loadings.

false negatives in decision theory, a subject who is incorrectly predicted to fail on the criterion.

false positives in decision theory, a subject who is incorrectly predicted to succeed on the criterion.

fear survey schedule a behavioral assessment device which requires respondents to indicate the presence and intensity of their fears in relation to various stimuli, typically on a 5- or 7-point Likert scale.

fetal alcohol effect a subtle version of fetal alcohol syndrome in which physical abnormalities are not observed, but behavioral problems such as attentional difficulties are noted.

fetal alcohol syndrome a cluster of physical and behavioral abnormalities, including mental retardation, caused by the mother's drinking of alcohol during pregnancy.

fluid intelligence in Cattell and Horn's theory, a largely nonverbal and relatively culture-reduced form of mental efficiency.

forced-choice method in personality test development, an item-writing method in which the alternatives are matched for social desirability.

forced-choice scale a performance evaluation scale designed to eliminate bias and subjectivity in supervisor

ratings by forcing a choice between options that are equal in social desirability.

forebrain the large, outermost portion of the brain consisting of the cerebral cortex and underlying structures such as the corpus callosum, basal ganglia, limbic lobe, thalamus, and hypothalamus.

freedom from distractibility the third factor on the WISC-III consisting of Arithmetic and Digit Span.

frequency distribution a method of summarizing data or test scores by specifying a small number of usually equal-sized class intervals and then tallying how many scores fall within each interval.

frequency polygon a method of summarizing data or test scores in graphic form; similar to a histogram, except that the frequency of the class intervals is represented by single points rather than columns.

frontal lobe the part of the cerebral cortex at the front of the brain that is required for the programming, regulation, and verification of executive functions and motor performance.

frustration in Rosenzweig's system, the state that occurs whenever an organism encounters an obstacle or obstruction en route to the satisfaction of a need.

functionalist definition of validity the view that a test is valid if it serves the purpose for which it is used.

fundamental lexical hypothesis in personality theory, the notion that trait terms have survived in language because they convey important information about our dealings with others.

general factor according to Spearman, the single general factor of intelligence that must exist to account for the observed correlations between a large number of tests.

generalizability theory a domain sampling model of reliability that recognizes several alternatives of generalization for test results.

gifted the designation of a person as gifted typically means that he or she has extraordinary ability in some area.

glial cells cells that provide structural support for the neurons and also supply nutrients and perform other functions.

grade norm a type of standardization that depicts the level of test performance for each separate school grade in the normative sample.

graphic rating scale a scale that consists of trait labels, brief definitions of those labels, and a continuum for the rating.

gray matter those parts of the brain that consist of densely packed cell bodies of neurons that are gray in color.

group achievement tests also called educational achievement tests, these instruments are commonly administered to dozens or hundreds of students at the same time to gauge achievement levels in one or more well-defined academic domains.

group tests mainly pencil-and-paper measures suitable to the testing of large groups of persons at the same time.

guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) a verdict allowed in some states in which the intention is for the accused to begin his or her sentence in a psychiatric hospital.

halo effect the tendency to rate an employee high or low on all dimensions because of a global impression.

heritability index an estimate of how much of the total variance in a given trait is due to genetic factors; the index can vary from 0.0 to 1.0.

hindbrain the lowest, most simply organized, brain structures; the hindbrain consists of the myelencephalon and metencephalon.

hippocampus part of a complex, ill-defined memory circuit that consolidates new experiences into long-term memories.

histogram a method of summarizing data or test scores in graphic form; a histogram contains the same information as a frequency distribution.

homogeneous scale a scale in which the individual items tend to measure the same thing; homogeneity is gauged by item-total correlations.

hypothalamus a small structure at the center of the brain that helps govern motivated behavior and bodily regulation: feeding, sexual behavior, sleeping, temperature regulation, emotional behavior, and movement.

id in psychoanalytic theory, the unconscious part of personality that is the seat of all instinctual needs such as for food, water, sexual gratification, and avoidance of pain.

illusory validation in projective testing, the finding that subjects ignore disconfirming instances and cling to their preexisting stereotypes.

implicit association test a covert measure of attitudes that makes use of automatic or "unconscious" associations to target concepts (e.g., racial groups) as determined by sophisticated reaction time analyses.

in-basket technique a realistic work sample test that simulates the work environment of an administrator.

index of intellectual deterioration on the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, an index based on the discrepancy between verbal and abstractions ability that was intended to gauge the effects of organic brain impairment.

individual achievement tests achievement tests administered one-on-one to gauge achievement levels; these tests are essential in the assessment of potential learning disabilities.

individual tests instruments which by their design and purpose must be administered one on one.

informed consent in testing, the principle that test takers or their representatives are made aware, in language that they can understand, of the purposes and likely consequences of testing.

insanity plea in court cases, a defense based upon reference to legal insanity as spelled out by the Model Penal Code or other legal statutes.

instructional validity a view promoted by court systems that school districts must actually teach what it is they test for on state-wide achievement tests.

integrative model a model of career assessment in which information from interest, ability, and personality domains is considered simultaneously.

integrity test an instrument designed to screen potential employees for theft-proneness and other undesirable qualities; overt integrity tests contain questions about attitudes toward theft and items dealing with admission of theft and other illegal activities.

intelligence according to experts, (1) the capacity to learn from experience and (2) the capacity to adapt to one's environment.

intelligence test although there are exceptions, an intelligence test generally yields an overall summary score based on results from a heterogeneous sample of items (e.g., verbal skills, reasoning, spatial thinking).

interest inventory a test that measures the preference for certain activities or topics and thereby helps determine occupational choice.

interscorer reliability for tests that involve judgmental scoring, the typical degree of agreement between scorers.

interval scale a measurement scale that provides information about ranking and the relative strength of ranks; based on the assumption of equal-sized units or intervals for the underlying scale.

intrinsic religious expression the use of religion for internal goals such as finding meaning and direction in life.

introversion a quiet, "bookish," reserved personality disposition.

ipsative test a test in which the average of the subscales is always the same for every examinee; thus, for an individual examinee, high scores on subscales must be balanced by low scores on other subscales.

IQ constancy On the Wechsler tests, the axiomatic assumption that IQ must remain constant with normal aging, even though raw intellectual ability might shift or decline.

item-characteristic curve a graphical display of the relationship between the probability of a correct response and the examinee's position on the underlying trait measured by the test.

item-difficulty index for a single test item, the proportion of examinees in a large tryout sample who get that item correct.

item-discrimination index a statistical index of how efficiently an item discriminates between persons who obtain high and low scores on the entire test.

item information function a graph portraying the relationship between the trait level of examinees and the information provided by a test item.

item-reliability index $s_i r_{iT}$, the product of a test item's internal consistency as indexed by the correlation with the total score (r_{iT}) and its variability as indexed by the standard deviation (s_i).

item response function a mathematical equation that describes the relation between the amount of a latent trait an individual possesses and the probability that he or she will give a designated response to a test item designed to measure that construct.

item response theory also known as latent trait theory, a modern framework for test construction in which the psychometrician posits a single dimension of skill or underlying trait on which all of the test items rely; each respondent is assumed to have a certain amount of the latent trait being measured.

item-validity index $s_i r_{iC}$ consists of the product of a test item's standard deviation (s_i) and the point-biserial correlation with the criterion r_{iC}.

job analysis the process of defining a job in terms of the behaviors necessary to perform it; includes job description (physical characteristics of the work) and job specification (personal characteristics needed).

kappa the index of inter-rater agreement, corrected for chance, used as one measure of the reliability of diagnostic systems and rating scales.

Kuder–Richardson formula 20 an index of reliability that is relevant to the special case where each test item is scored 0 or 1 (e.g., right or wrong).

Lake Wobegon effect the observation that virtually all states of the union claim that average achievement scores for their school systems exceed the 50th percentile.

latent trait theory a modern framework for test construction in which a single dimension of skill or underlying trait is posited. *See* item response theory.

learning disability an indistinct concept that typically refers to a severe discrepancy between general ability and individual achievement that cannot be explained by sensory/motor handicaps, mental retardation, emotional problems, or cultural deprivation.

legally blind this term applies to individuals with central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the better eye (with correction) or to those with significant reduction in their visual field to a diameter of 20 degrees or less; used to determine eligibility for government benefits.

Lexile scale a measure of reading demand of a text, on a scale from 200 to 1,700, based on semantic difficulty (vocabulary) and syntactic complexity (sentence).

Likert scale a scale that presents the examinee with five responses ordered on an agree/disagree or approve/disapprove continuum.

limbic lobe a group of subcortical structures responsible for elaboration of emotion and the control of visceral activity.

limbic system a group of interconnected brain structures, located deep within the brain, and involved in olfaction, emotion, and motivation.

local norms norms derived from a representative local sample, as opposed to a national sample.

locus of control a construct that refers to perceptions that people have about the source of things that happen to them (e.g., internal versus external).

longitudinal design a research design in which the same subjects are tested at several points in time.

mean the arithmetic average of a group of scores.

measurement error everything other than the true score that makes up an examinee's obtained test score.

median the middlemost score when all the scores in a sample have been ranked.

medulla oblongata part of the hindbrain that helps mediate swallowing, vomiting, breathing, the control of blood pressure, respiration, and, partially, heart rate.

memory a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that allows for the recall of previously learned information and skills.

meninges a thin layering of three tough membranes that encase the brain and spinal cord, providing protection against external buffeting.

mental retardation significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.

mental state at the time of the offense (MSO) the mental state of a defendant at the time of the offense is relevant in special pleadings such as the insanity defense; psychologists and psychiatrists may offer opinions as to the MSO of defendants.

method of absolute scaling a procedure for obtaining a measure of absolute item difficulty based upon results for different age groups of test takers.

method of empirical keying a scale development method in which test items are selected based entirely on how well they contrast a criterion group from a normative sample.

method of equal-appearing intervals a method for constructing interval-level scales from attitude statements.

method of rational scaling a scale construction method in which all scale items correlate positively with each other and also with the total score for the scale; also known as the internal consistency approach.

midbrain the middle portion of the brain consisting of cranial nerves and relay stations for vision and hearing.

mixed-standard scale a complex approach to performance evaluation designed to minimize rating errors in performance appraisal; items for performance dimensions are randomly ordered on the scale.

M'Naughten rule one of several standards of legal insanity; essentially, "the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing. . . ."

mode the most frequently occurring score.

Model Penal Code rule a standard of legal insanity—"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."

moral dilemma a brief story that involves a difficult moral choice such as whether to steal to prolong someone's life; used in the study of moral reasoning.

motor cortex the strip of brain tissue located on the precentral gyrus that is involved in bodily movement.

multi-infarct dementia a form of vascular brain impairment in which the hardly noticeable individual effects of many small infarcts or "strokes" accumulate over a number of years.

multimedia the collective capacity of the modern computer to use still images, live video segments, music, tables, charts, animation, and other approaches in an interactive format.

multitrait-multimethod matrix a research design for assessing convergent and discriminant validity that calls for the assessment of two or more traits by two or more methods.

neuropsychological tests tests and procedures with proven sensitivity to the effects of brain damage.

neuropsychology the study of the relationship between brain function and behavior.

nominal scale a measurement scale in which the categories are arbitrary and do not designate "more" or "less" of anything; the simplest and lowest level of measurement.

nonverbal behavior the subtler forms of human communication contained in glance, gesture, body language, tone of voice, and facial expression.

norm group a sample of examinees who are representative of the population for whom the test is intended.

norm-referenced test a test in which the performance of each examinee is interpreted in reference to a relevant standardization sample.

normal distribution a symmetrical, mathematically defined, bell-shaped frequency distribution.

normal ogive the normal distribution graphed in cumulative form.

normalized standard score a score obtained by a transformation that renders a skewed distribution into a normal distribution.

norms a summary of test results for a large and representative group of subjects.

not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) a verdict allowed in some states in which the defendant is found not guilty because his or her criminal act was the result of mental disease or defect.

oblique axes in factor analysis, the assumption that factors are correlated with one another, that is, not at right angles.

observer drift in observational rating situations, the tendency for an observer to become fatigued and less vigilant over time, thus failing to notice target behaviors when they occur.

occipital lobe the part of the cerebral cortex at the rear of the brain that contains the vision centers.

occupational reinforcer patterns an evaluation of jobs in terms of the worker-perceived reinforcers that are present or absent.

operational definition a definition of a concept in terms of the way it is measured, such as, intelligence is "what the tests test."

ordinal scale a measurement scale that allows for ranking; ordinal scales do not provide information about the relative strength of ranking.

orthogonal axes in factor analysis, the assumption that the factors are at right angles to one another, which means that they are uncorrelated.

overt integrity test an employment test that seeks to assess attitudes toward theft; these instruments may also contain a section dealing with overt admissions of theft.

paralinguistics the nonverbal aspects of speech such as tone of voice and rate of speaking.

parietal lobe the part of the cerebral cortex that mediates spatial integration and sensory awareness of what is happening on the surface of the body.

Parkinson's disease a degenerative brain disease characterized by three types of motor disturbance: involuntary movement, including tremor; poverty and slowness of movement without paralysis; and changes in posture and muscle tone.

percentile the percentage of persons in the standardization sample who scored below a specific raw score; percentiles vary from 0 to 100.

perceptual organization the second factor on the WISC-III consisting of Picture Arrangement, Picture Completion, Block Design, and Object Assembly.

personal injury in personal injury lawsuits, attorneys may hire psychologists to testify as to the lifelong consequences of traumatic stress or acquired brain damage.

personality an inexplicit construct which is invoked to explain behavioral consistency within persons and behavioral distinctiveness between persons.

personality coefficient a term used to refer to the finding that the predictive validity of personality scales rarely exceeds .30.

personality test a test that measures the traits, qualities, or behaviors that determine a person's individuality; this information helps predict future behavior.

phallometry the assessment of sexual arousal by attaching a flexible band around the penis of an examinee who views standard slides and pictures.

phrenology the discredited idea, attributed to Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), that cranial "bumps" signify a prominence of certain mental faculties and personality traits.

physiognomy the historical and discredited idea that we can judge the inner character of people from their outward appearance, especially the face.

pineal body a pea-sized structure that sits at the center of the brain; it secretes the hormone melatonin in a cyclic biological rhythm, but its functions are not well understood.

placement in testing, the sorting of persons into different programs appropriate to their needs or skills.

polygraph a device that monitors ongoing physiological responses, including changes in breathing, pulse rate, blood pressure, and perspiration; inaccurately referred to as a "lie detector."

positive psychological assessment the appraisal of what is right with people, for example, evaluation of hope, creativity, wisdom, courage, forgiveness, humor, gratitude, and coping.

positive psychology the scientific and practical pursuit of optimal human functioning.

power test a test that allows enough time for test takers to attempt all items; however, the test is difficult enough that no test taker is able to obtain a perfect score.

predictive validity a type of criterion-related validity in which the criterion measures are obtained in the future, usually months or years after the test scores are obtained, such as when college grades are predicted from an entrance exam.

primary mental abilities the seven group factors of intelligence posited by Thurstone.

processing speed the fourth factor on the WISC-III consisting of Coding and Symbol Search.

projective hypothesis the assumption that personal interpretations of ambiguous stimuli must necessarily reflect the unconscious needs, motives, and conflicts of the examinee.

projective test a test in which the examinee encounters vague, ambiguous stimuli and responds with his or her own constructions.

psychometrician a specialist in psychology or education who develops and evaluates psychological tests.

psychophysics the empirical study of the functional relationship between physical stimuli and mental phenomena.

Public Law 93-112 a "Bill of Rights" for persons with disabilities that outlawed discrimination based upon disability.

Public Law 94-142 the Education for All Handicapped Children Act that mandated that schoolchildren with disabilities receive appropriate assessment and educational opportunities.

Public Law 99-457 legislation that requires states to provide a free appropriate public education to children ages 3 through 5 who have disabilities.

pupillometrics the measurement of pupil size to gauge interest in, or pleasure in, the observed stimulus.

Q-technique a technique for studying changes in self-concept and other variables by the sorting of statements into a near-normal distribution for assigned categories.

qualified individualism in testing for selection, the ethical stance that age, sex, race, or other demographic characteristics must not be used, even if knowledge of these factors would improve the validity of selection.

quotas in testing for selection, the ethical stance that the best-qualified candidates within definable subgroups should be selected in proportion to their representation in the population.

random sampling a selection strategy in which every subject has an equal chance of being chosen.

rapport in testing, a comfortable, warm atmosphere that serves to motivate examinees and elicit cooperation.

Rasch Model named after the Danish mathematician Georg Rasch, this mathematical model uses complex equations to predict the probability of respondents at different skill levels correctly answering test questions.

rater bias the tendency for supervisor ratings to be inaccurate because of leniency, severity, and other forms of evaluation errors.

ratio scale a measurement scale that yields equal-sized units or intervals and that possesses a conceptually meaningful zero point; the highest level of measurement.

raw score the most basic level of information provided by a psychological test, for example, the number of questions answered correctly.

reactivity of measurement the phenomenon in which the process of measurement (e.g., clients knowing that they are being observed and rated) changes what we seek to measure.

real definition a definition that seeks to tell us the true nature of the thing being defined.

regression equation an equation that describes the best-fitting straight line for estimating the criterion from the test; the best-fitting line is one that minimizes the sum of the squared deviations from the line.

reliability the attribute of consistency in measurement.

reliability coefficient the ratio of true score variance to the total variance of test scores.

religion as Quest the view that complexity, doubt, and tentativeness are aspects of mature religious expression.

restriction of range a phenomenon in which the range on a variable is restricted, causing correlations with other variables to be artificially low.

response to intervention RTI is a relatively recent approach to learning disabilities in school systems that stresses early identification and lack of response to intervention as important factors in LD identification.

reticular formation a network of ascending and descending nerve cell bodies and fibers that governs general arousal or consciousness.

RIASEC model a theory of person–environment types that proposes six themes: Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional (RIASEC).

rotation to positive manifold in factor analysis, a method of rotating the factor matrix that seeks to eliminate as many of the negative factor loadings as possible.

rotation to simple structure in factor analysis, a method of rotating the factor matrix that seeks to simplify the factor loadings so that each test has significant loadings on as few factors as possible.

routing procedure in tests such as the Stanford-Binet: Fifth Edition, the first items or subtests administered for the purpose of determining the appropriate starting points for subsequent subtests.

routing test an initial subtest used to determine the entry level for all remaining subtests; used with individual intelligence tests such as the SB:FE.

savant an individual who has mental deficiencies and a highly developed talent in a single area such as art, rapid calculation, memory, or music.

schema in Piaget's theory, an organized pattern of behavior or a well-defined mental structure that leads to knowing how to do something.

screening the use of quick and simple tests or procedures to identify persons who might have special characteristics or needs.

self-efficacy in Bandura's theory, the personal judgment of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations.

self-monitoring a therapeutic approach in which the client chooses the goals and actively participates in supervising, charting, and recording progress toward the end point(s) of therapy.

semantic differential a rating technique in which the subject uses a seven-point continuum to rate a concept on a number of bipolar adjectives such as good-bad, strong-weak, active-passive.

sensitivity the ability of a test, expressed as a percentage, to accurately "rule in" or identify individuals who manifest a trait or syndrome of interest.

simultaneous processing a form of information processing characterized by the simultaneous execution of several different mental operations.

situational exercise an assessment procedure in which the prospective employee is asked to perform under circumstances that are highly similar to the anticipated work environment.

skewness the symmetry or asymmetry of a frequency distribution; positive skew indicates that scores are piled up at the low end and negative skew indicates that scores are piled up at the high end.

social desirability response set the tendency of examinees to react to the perceived desirability (or undesirability) of a test item rather than responding accurately to its content.

social intelligence the capacity to understand other people and to relate effectively to them.

source traits the stable and constant sources of behavior that are less visible than surface traits but more important in accounting for behavior.

Spearman-Brown formula a formula for adjusting split-half correlations so that they reflect the full length of a scale.

specific factor according to Spearman, a factor of intelligence specific to an individual test.

specificity the ability of a test, expressed as a percentage, to accurately "rule out" or identify individuals who do not manifest a trait or syndrome of interest.

speed test a timed test that contains items of uniform and generally simple level of difficulty; the time limit is strict enough that few subjects finish a speed test.

split-half reliability a form of reliability in which scores from the two halves of a test (e.g., even items versus odd items) are correlated with one another; the correlation is then adjusted for test length.

standard deviation a statistical index that reflects the degree of dispersion in a group of scores; the square root of the variance.

standard error of measurement an index of measurement error which indicates the extent to which an examinee's score might vary over a number of parallel tests.

standard error of the difference a statistical index that can help a test user determine whether, for an individual examinee, the difference between scores on two tests or subtests is significant.

standard error of estimate SE_{est} is the margin of error to be expected in the predicted criterion score.

standard of care the standard of care that is usual, customary, or reasonable.

standard score a transformed score in which the original score is expressed as the distance from the mean in standard deviation units.

standardization fallacy the fallacious view that a test standardized on one population is ipso facto unfair when used in any other population.

standardization sample a large and representative group of subjects representative of the population for whom the test is intended.

standardized procedure in testing, the attempt through carefully written instructions to ensure that the procedures for administering a test are uniform from one examiner and setting to another.

stanine scale a scale in which all raw scores are converted to a single-digit system of scores ranging from 1 to 9.

state anxiety the transitory feelings of fear or worry that most persons experience on occasion.

sten scale a 10-unit scale with five units above and five units below the mean.

stereotype threat the threat of confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one's group.

stratified random sampling a selection strategy in which subjects are chosen randomly, with the constraint that the sample matches the population on relevant background variables such as race, sex, occupation, and so on.

subgroup norms norms derived from an identified subgroup, as opposed to a diversified national sample.

successive processing a form of information processing in which a proper sequence of mental operations must be followed.

superego in psychoanalytic theory, that part of personality that is roughly synonymous with conscience and comprises the societal standards of right and wrong that are conveyed to us by our parents.

surface traits in Cattell's theory, the more obvious aspects of personality that typically emerge in the first stages of factor analysis when individual test items are correlated with each other.

systematic measurement error a type of measurement error that arises when, unknown to the test developer, a test consistently measures something other than the trait for which it was intended.

table of specifications in test development, a table that lists the exact number of items in relevant content areas; such a table also specifies the precise number of items which must embody different cognitive processes.

technical manual in testing, the manual that summarizes the technical data about a new instrument.

temporal lobe the part of the cerebral cortex involved in processing of auditory sensations, long-term memory storage, and modulation of biological drives such as aggression, fear, and sexuality.

teratogen a substance that crosses the placental barrier and causes physical deformities in the fetus.

test a standardized procedure for sampling behavior and describing it with categories or scores. In addition, most tests have norms or standards by which the results can be used to predict other, more important, behaviors.

test anxiety a constellation of phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral responses that accompany concern about possible failure on a test.

test bias in popular usage, a test is biased if it discriminates unfairly against racial and ethnic minorities, women, and the poor; technically, *test bias* refers to differential validity for definable, relevant subgroups of persons.

test fairness the extent to which the social consequences of test usage are considered fair to relevant subgroups; a matter of social values, test fairness is especially pertinent when tests are used for selection decisions.

test of functional literacy a test that evaluates practical knowledge and skills used in everyday life.

test-retest reliability a form of reliability in which the same test is given twice to the same group of heterogeneous and representative subjects; scores for the two sessions are then correlated.

thalamus a key structure that provides sensory input and information about ongoing movement to the cerebral cortex; the thalamus is the major relay station in the brain.

token economy a behavioral approach in which many different forms of prosocial behavior are rewarded with tokens that can be later exchanged for material rewards or privileges.

trait any relatively enduring way in which one individual differs from another.

trait anxiety the relatively stable tendency of an individual to respond anxiously to a stressful predicament.

true score an examinee's hypothetical real score on a test; the true score can be estimated probabilistically, but is never directly known.

***T* score** a transformed score with mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10.

Type A coronary-prone behavior pattern a behavior pattern consisting of insecurity of status, hyperaggressiveness,

free-floating hostility, and a sense of time urgency (hurry sickness).

unqualified individualism in testing for selection, the ethical stance that, without exception, the best-qualified candidates should be selected for employment, admission, or other privilege.

user's manual in testing, the manual that gives instructions for administration and also provides guidelines for test interpretation.

validity a test is valid to the extent that inferences made from it are appropriate, meaningful, and useful.

validity coefficient the correlation between test and criterion (r_{xy}).

validity shrinkage the common discovery in cross-validation research that a test predicts the relevant criterion less accurately with the new sample of examinees than with the original tryout sample.

value according to Rokeach and others, a shared and enduring belief about ideal modes of behavior or end states of existence.

variance a statistical index that reflects the degree of dispersion in a group of scores.

ventricles fluid-filled caverns within the brain.

verbal comprehension the first factor on the WISC-III consisting of Information, Similarities, Vocabulary, and Comprehension.

virtual reality the use of sophisticated computer images projected to wrap-around goggles to portray a moving, changing, three-dimensional environment.

visual agnosia a difficulty in the recognition of drawings, objects, or faces caused by brain damage.

Wernicke's aphasia also known as receptive aphasia, a form of language disturbance in which speech is fluent but meaningless, presumably because language comprehension is impaired.

white matter those parts of the brain that consist of axons wrapped in a white, fatty substance called the myelin sheath.

work sample an assessment procedure that uses a miniature replica of the job for which examinees have applied.

work values the needs, motives, and values that influence vocational choice, job satisfaction, and career development.

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